Applying a Model of Public Management Reform to  Tax Reform in a Post-Soviet Transition Country:  The Case of the Kyrgyz Republic by Karalaeva, Elima
 
 
 
 
Applying a Model of Public Management Reform to  
Tax Reform in a Post-Soviet Transition Country:  
The Case of the Kyrgyz Republic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted by Elima Karalaeva to the University of Exeter  
as a thesis for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Politics 
in November 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright 
material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper 
acknowledgement. 
 
 
 
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified 
and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a 
degree by this or any other University. 
 
 
 
 
 
Signature: ………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
  ii 
ABSTRACT  
The recent political and fiscal crises in Kyrgyzstan offer a good opportunity to rethink 
the objectives and the direction of tax reform. The tax system of the Kyrgyz Republic 
has changed substantially since 1991 including a shift of the tax structure towards 
indirect taxation, reduction in a number of taxes, and drastic decrease in tax rates. 
The thesis aims to identify and describe the main factors influencing tax reform in 
Kyrgyzstan during the first decades of transition to a market economy using 
important theoretical model of public management reform. So, it will critically review 
the applicability of a Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s model in this context and implications for how 
the model could be adapted to fit the tax reform process in post-Soviet transition 
countries.  
Accomplishment of these goals would require a multiple methods approach based on 
the assumption that collecting diverse types of data sequentially in the embedded 
single-case study will provide more complete understanding of research questions 
than either quantitative or qualitative data alone. For the study of tax reform, the 
quantitative data are subjected to time-series analysis of the embedded units while 
the qualitative interviews remain critical in explaining the main proposition central to 
the entire case study. The study starts with the theoretical assumption that the factors 
identified in the model have significant effect on tax reform process. This basic 
proposition – the impact of socio-economic forces, political changes, administrative 
system, elite‘s decisions, and chance events on the reform process – will be traced 
for each factor in ‗within-country‘ explanatory case study.  
The fundamental part of this thesis is the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model of public 
management reform, which will provide a framework for discussion of the main forces 
influencing the reform process. As a diagram of main factors of the public sector 
reform, this model will be further adapted and modified for tax reform purposes. 
However, the direction of tax reform in the Kyrgyz Republic cannot be understood 
completely without a good knowledge of the main legacies of the Soviet Union, the 
cultural and institutional features of centralized planning system, which have left a 
long-lasting impact on trajectory of the economic and political development in the 
country. Therefore, the model proposed by Pollitt and Bouckaert does not include 
other forces, which have substantial impact on reform. In particular, it needs to take 
more account of significant importance of the development partners in tax reform 
process. 
Keywords: tax reform; Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s model, post-Soviet transition country.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The research addresses the questions of what are the main directions, and what are 
the main factors affecting these directions, of tax reform in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, the main 
objectives of research are to review the tax reform process in the Kyrgyz Republic 
during the first decades of transition to a market economy and to identify the directions, 
and the factors, of reform – mainly, socio-economic forces, political pressures, and 
features of administrative system. This issue is of considerable importance because tax 
could bring public finance back to fiscal sustainability, and an effective and equitable 
tax system could lead to political support and economic growth. The thesis aims to 
identify and describe the main factors influencing tax reform in the Kyrgyz Republic 
since 1991 using important theoretical model of public management reform. So, it will 
critically review the applicability of the Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s model in this context and 
implications for how the model could be adapted to tax reform in post-Soviet transition 
countries.  
In practice, the main goals of tax reform are to improve revenue collection and reduce 
budget deficit in the short-term, maximize voluntary compliance, equally distribute the 
tax burden among the general population, create favourable conditions for the 
economic development, and adapt the new tax system to a market economy. However, 
the increased revenues could contribute to the wider tax avoidance, showing that there 
is still much room for improvement. In general, this could be best achieved by 
broadening of tax base, by cutting in tax expenditures, by shifting the tax structure 
towards taxes on property and consumption, rather than by directly raising tax rates 
(European Commission, 2010b). It is necessary to note that improving the efficiency of 
tax collection and administration is a significant option to increase tax revenues from 
existing sources without changing the tax rates (de Jantscher et al., 1992). However, 
Kyrgyzstan did not fully realize such an opportunity because of corruption, weak 
enforcement power, absence of tax culture, lack of tax professionals and out-dated 
technologies. The global economic crises and chance events have also had a 
significant impact on the tax policy of the Kyrgyz Republic.  
In order to address central questions of the direction of tax reform and to examine the 
main factors and forces influencing reform, the thesis adopts a conceptual framework 
of a model of public management reform. The modelling approach is based on a view 
that it is necessary to take a broad perspective to look at the range of influential factors 
that affect the direction of tax reform, rather than concentrating narrowly on one factor 
in isolation. In particular, rather than focus only on economic factors, political and 
administrative factors also should be included. The thesis identifies possible models 
appropriate for this analytical focus for a country that is in transition from a former 
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Soviet republic over the last two decades. The fundamental part of this thesis is 
applying the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s Model of Public Management Reform (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011), which will be a framework for discussion of the main factors of a 
reform process – mainly, socio-economic forces, political factors and elements of 
administrative system.  
Definition of Tax Reform 
For the purpose of this study the tax reform is defined as a process of a deliberate 
change in the tax system. As a process, tax reform has distinct phases, namely 
designing, planning, monitoring and implementation – if any one of them is missing, the 
process cannot be described as a tax reform. Tax reform can also be characterized as 
intended change of the tax system, which can be a change in tax structure through 
changes in the parameters of tax policy – for example, a change in the tax mix or 
introduction of new tax law – or modernization in tax administration. 
An important element of this definition is that reform is a deliberate change. In other 
words, reform is not accidental, nor does it consist of changes in the tax structure or 
administration that are unintended. Of course, the reform should imply some element of 
planning – the pattern of reform reflects a design, however loose or vague, that has 
been developed by policy-makers. In that occasion, Leemans (1976: 6) comments that 
the reform is ‗a consciously induced and directed change in the machinery of 
government.‘ Similarly, Dror (1976: 129) highlights that reform is ‗a directive and 
conscious activity, rather than a post-factum classification of administrative change 
phenomena.‘ Thus, reform must be distinguished from mere change which may be a 
spontaneous response by public officials to new circumstances. In this sense, reform 
cannot be initiated ‗bottom-up‘ – it will inevitably involve elements of ‗top-down‘ 
imposition by main players in the reform process. Caiden (1982: 85) claims that ‗the 
whole essence of reform is getting someone to do something they would not otherwise 
do by themselves of their own accord.‘ This means that reform is bound to encounter 
resistance. After all, if the organizations that are to be altered were already adopting 
the desired structures or processes, then reform would be unnecessary. 
The definition of reform also includes innovations in public finance management – that 
is, the ways of providing tax services that are new to a tax agency or to the public 
sector as a whole. However, it does not mean that reforms should be innovative in this 
sense. In fact, they might attempt to implement an organizational structure or process 
that already existed before but was subsequently replaced or simply abandoned. 
Indeed, sometimes it is appeared that reforms just replicate the predecessors. 
Moreover, as mentioned by Boyne et al. (2003: 3), the ‗reforms often seek to return to a 
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past position that is subsequently believed to have been false rejected.‘ Such forward-
backward swings are more likely to occur when the reforms have resulted in the loss of 
long-serving members of tax departments, thereby weakening the ‗institutional 
memory‘ of tax offices. They may also happened when one administration replaces the 
other in the government, and reinforces a tax practice that was dropped previously. To 
put it more simply, political instability as well as organizational amnesia could have a 
profound effect on reform process. The content of a reform package must also be 
distinguished, both conceptually and empirically, from its desired and feasible 
outcomes. Caiden (1991: 1) alleges that the administrative reform can be viewed as 
‗the induced systematic improvement of public sector organisational performance.‘ But, 
this confuses the act of reform with its possible consequences. In fact, the ‗induced‘ 
change of tax system could have rather negative effect, but still be a reform. Although, 
the new management ideas and the new ways of working may improve the 
organizational performance, they may also be introduced to serve the self-interests of 
politico-administrative elite. As Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000: 18) mention, ‗simply 
announcing, discussing, and beginning to implement reforms may bring benefits to 
some politicians and public servants, even if later, more ―substantive‖ effects are 
elusive or counter-productive.‘ Indeed, the policy designed with ‗good‘ intentions may 
have ‗bad‘ results, and, controversially, bad intentions may lead to good results that 
were never assumed.  
To generalize the aims and results of tax reforms and systematically compare different 
reform programs across developing countries, Gillis (1989) develops taxonomy of tax 
reform based on six principal attributes – that is, breadth and scope of reform, revenue 
goals, equity goals, resource allocation goals, and timing of reform. 1  It also 
demonstrates that term ‗tax reform‘ has a variety of different meanings. 
Structure of Thesis 
One of the key lessons learned over the last decades is that simply applying the 
theories and practices of tax reforms used in developed economy in a context of 
developing and transition countries is not very effective. Instead, the process of tax 
policy and tax administration reform often requires a separate approach rooted in 
institutional capacity building and organizational development, and a commitment to 
understand the highly politicized nature of taxation. Thus, it is not possible to isolate a 
tax system from its broader political and economic environment. That is why tax reform 
                                                 
1
 Taxonomy proposed by Gillis generates over 200 combinations of tax reforms. Then, it will be a task for 
policy-makers to narrow down these options to few alternatives based on feasibility study of legal, 
political and economic factors and to deliver a unique reform proposal. So, this taxonomy was designed 
primarily to fulfil the needs of the policy-makers and lacks of perspectives from other stakeholders. Also, 
there is a possibility that the initial type of reform assigned at the beginning will be re-categorized later as 
other internal and external factors will affect the reform process. 
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in the Kyrgyz Republic will be described and analysed in the wider context of the 
economic, political and administrative systems, as well as socio-economic reforms 
undertaken in the country for the last two decades. 
Chapter 1 will overview the documentary landscape of public financial management 
(PFM) reforms by identifying the significant milestones and trends in tax reforms as 
well as factors affecting the quality of tax systems and their reforms in developing and 
transition countries.2 A recent literature highlights the importance of sound tax reform 
and prudent tax policy to maximize financial efficiency, to improve transparency and 
accountability in public finance and to ensure economic recovery and long-term growth.  
A synthesis of the main theoretical models and approaches to PFM reforms will be 
presented in Chapter 2. A key purpose of this review is to highlight the main theories 
and approaches to tax reform within broader PFM reforms, aggregate what is known 
regarding their interrelated sub-systems, and identify any knowledge gaps in the 
existing literature. The chapter will also introduce the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model of 
public management reform which will be referred to throughout the rest of the thesis. 
Chapter 3 will provide an overview of the important methodological issues in 
conducting an explanatory case study and explore both the strengths and weaknesses 
of different research strategies. It will also focus on the distinctive characteristics of 
case study design and its place within, and alongside, other research methods. The 
study is based on the assumption that collecting diverse types of data in the Embedded 
Case Study design will provide a more complete understanding of research questions 
than either quantitative or qualitative data alone. The study will begin with a broad 
statistical time-series analysis in order to provide general overview of tax reform 
process in the country and then, in a second phase, will focus on qualitative interviews 
to collect detailed views from participants about the main factors, and forces, of tax 
reform. 
The second part of this thesis will empirically review the specifics of the economic 
forces, political changes, administrative system, elite‘s decisions, and chance events 
organized by the Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s model. The theoretical proposition of the study is 
that the factors identified in the model have a significant influence on tax reform in 
Kyrgyzstan. This basic assumption will be traced for each factor in ‗within-country‘ 
explanatory case study. The purpose of Chapter 4 is to connect data with the 
theoretical propositions within the broader case study design, to show how the 
formation and implementation of the tax reform agenda occurred after the transition to 
                                                 
2
 In this thesis transition countries, or countries with transition economies, are countries moving from 
centrally planned to market-style economies. Although the term ‗transition economies‘ usually covers the 
countries of the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, China, Mongolia, and Vietnam, in a 
wider sense it could also refer to countries which attempt to change their basic economic system towards 
market economy. 
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a market economy, and how the key players acted on behalf of their interest groups.  
Chapter 5 will give a brief overview of the modern tax system of the Kyrgyz Republic, in 
particular tax mix and tax administration, in contrast with the tax system of the Soviet 
Union. It is important to mention, at this point, that customs administration will not be 
part of this study – it is a broad and stand-along topic by itself. Then, the chapter will 
offer a descriptive summary of the history and arrangements of the economic reforms 
in the country during the past twenty years, in particular privatization, internal 
liberalization and structural reforms. In line with the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model, the 
background socio-economical influences include a broad set of diverse factors – such 
as, the Global Economic Forces, Socio-Demographic Change, and Socio-Economic 
Policies. The role of the political system in determining a tax reform agenda will be 
discussed in the third part of this chapter – in particular, how the New Management 
Ideas together with Pressure from Citizens influence the Party Political Ideas. As shall 
be seen in the next part, the Elite Decision-Making is of particular importance for 
Central Asia, where historically the clan politics and regional networking thrive. 
According to Pollitt and Bouckaert, Content of Reform Package, Implementation 
Process and Results Achieved represent the more dynamic elements of the 
administrative system. These activities – announcing reform program, implementing 
technological changes, and achieving results – are the main focus of the fifth part, and 
their treatment will be correspondently related to donor-driven mini-case studies of tax 
administration reform and modernization in the Kyrgyz Republic. Last, this chapter will 
describe the main development partners and their programs at work in Kyrgyzstan. It 
will also identify key issues that require close attention if international organizations 
and donors are aim to improve the quality of their support for the tax reform – mainly, 
aid coordination and harmonization of the activities of such organizations in the 
republic. 
Finally, the thesis concludes in Chapter 6 that the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model is 
useful for incorporating the range of factors affecting tax reform but it needs to be 
adapted for use in the Kyrgyz Republic and other similar contexts of transitional, post-
Soviet states. In particular, it needs to take more account of significant influence, and 
involvement, of the development partners in tax reform process. Conclusion will also 
examine the lessons from over thirty years of experience in public sector reform and 
offer some recommendations for further research. 
  6 
1. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Taxation in developing countries is now a sufficiently developed subject 
to be recognized as a specialty in public finance … The considerable 
time and effort devoted to reforming tax systems in developing countries 
may as yet have borne relatively little fruit in terms of either practical 
results or new economic knowledge, but much has been learned in the 
course of these efforts about the process of tax reform. 
Richard M. Bird (1992) 
It seems that the tax reform as part of broader public financial management (PFM) 
reform went through the same stages and influenced by the same factors. Among 
these factors are high economic growth, social and political stability, coordination 
across government and donor support, adaptation of reform packages to the country 
context, political will and sustained government commitment to reform, and 
administrative heritage. There are a number of difficulties in seeking for the linkages 
between public financial management and tax reforms. First, although there have been 
significant attempts to assess the impact of the PFM reforms in developing and 
transition countries only a limited amount of evaluation studies on tax reforms has been 
undertaken. Second, the scope and nature of the data available varies considerably 
among countries, which mainly reflects the different pace and extent of reforms in 
these countries. Third, it is inevitably difficult to determine what factors can be 
attributed to public sector reforms, especially in the sense of causality. 
1.1. Linkages between Public (Financial) Management and Tax Reforms 
In the recent years, public financial management reforms became a central element of 
public sector reforms in developing and transitional countries as well as an important 
area of donor support. By definition, Public Financial Management (PFM) relates to the 
way how the governments manage public resources and the impact of these resources 
on economic and societal development. As such, the PFM system is influenced by a 
broad set of various processes, systems and institutions making PFM contextual – for 
example, the political pressures that determine the budget preparation, or the human 
resource management embedded in fiscal administration. In practice, well-functional 
PFM systems could ensure prudent fiscal decisions, credible budgets, reliable and 
efficient resource flows and transactions, and institutionalized accountability in the 
management of public resources, which are critical to achievement of macroeconomic 
stability, and operational efficiency. However, the public policy goals and functionality of 
the PFM systems are difficult to achieve. As a result, the PFM systems in many 
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countries are not as functional as could be, so PFM reforms have been introduced with 
the help from international organizations and donors to improve their functionality 
(Diamond, J., 2013). Among the widespread reforms are medium-term expenditure 
frameworks, fiscal rules, formalized budget preparation processes, budget 
classification systems, program or performance-based budgeting, legislative 
strengthening, independent revenue collection agencies, treasury single accounts, 
integrated financial management information systems, public procurement, 
independent and transparent HR management, internal audit and monitoring, 
accounting and reporting reforms, external audit and external accountability reforms, 
budget and spending transparency and citizen participation. However, taxation is rarely 
a clearly stated objective for PFM reforms – the primary objective is the ‗purposeful 
changes to budget institutions aimed at improving their quality and outcomes‘ (Andrews 
et al., 2014: 8).   
As over the past two decades the development partners have provided a significant 
level of external support to PFM reform, the coordination across agencies became an 
issue of great importance (Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008). It is necessary to ensure that 
a room is left for local choice of reform types, learning and adaptation process. The 
purpose is to help fit the ‗best practices‘ to a country context, so that PFM institutions 
will be more responsive to locally-defined reform packages and able to match 
institutional capacity and political realities. While donors actively participate in PFM 
reforms, the growing interest in PFM reforms results in more efforts to quantify the 
quality of PFM systems. And the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability 
(PEFA)3 framework is probably the best-known assessment tool used for evaluation of 
reform outcomes in developing countries, which contains only four tax-related 
indicators to assess the performance of tax systems (PEFA, 2011, Eckardt and 
Schickinger, 2010). With regard to the first indicator PI-3, the PEFA analysis 
demonstrates that most countries do have substantial problems in revenue forecasting, 
and hence large underestimation of budget revenues as this indicator focuses only on 
negative variations of aggregate revenue from the original approved budget. In terms 
of the transparency of taxpayer obligations and liabilities, measured by indicator PI-13, 
the majority of governments try to provide sufficient information about the tax system. 
However, there is no fair, transparent and effective system of tax appeals, and 
                                                 
3
 PEFA was launched in 2004 as a multi-agency partnership program sponsored by the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Commission, The UK‘s Department for International 
Development, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, and the SPA Strategic Partnership for Africa. The PEFA 
PFM Performance Measurement Framework is an integrated monitoring framework that allows 
measurement of country PFM performance over time. It has been developed as a contribution to the 
collective efforts of government, donors and other stakeholders to assess and develop essential PFM 
systems by providing a shared information pool for measurement and monitoring of PFM performance 
and a common platform for dialogue. www.pefa.org  
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taxpayers should be more aware of how to comply with their responsibilities. Effective 
measures for taxpayer registration and tax assessment as captured by PI-14 are a 
critical issue. Most countries do not have the technical background to provide tax-
related information in reliable and systematical manner, data processing is hampered 
by different systems and incomplete databases used by various government agencies, 
not to mention the lack of the automatic exchange of information between them. This 
means that tax administration is seriously limited in its capacity to integrate the 
management information system with others, which in turn constrains its ability for tax 
audit and fighting tax avoidance and evasion. The aggregated indicator PI-15 tells 
more about treasury‘s cash flow management than about the capacity of tax 
administration to collect tax payments - in particular, the effectiveness in collection of 
gross tax arrears. It seems that the indicator does not distinguish between former and 
actual arrears and thus cannot appraise reform efforts against historical background, 
which often lack the legal framework and could be a major problem in the present. 
Overall, within the resource management stage of the PFM system (Figure 1.1.1), 
PEFA assessments review the credibility of the budget (PI-3) and predictability and 
control in budget execution (PI-14, PI-13, and PI-15). 
While many performance reports focus on evaluating PFM reform, research to assess 
the progress of tax reforms in transition countries remains scarce. Against this 
backdrop, the linkages between PFM and tax reforms are being acknowledged by the 
donor community, which increasingly uses taxation as an element of PFM system for 
donor-driven revenue administration reforms (Fjeldstad, 2013). It is expected that PFM 
reform will provide a transparent and predictable process of tax collection as well as 
clear criteria for taxation. Reflecting this trend, Crandall (2011) suggests to develop a 
possible diagnostic tool for tax administration to be similar to PEFA measurement 
framework. PFM reforms also have the potential to deliver on broader governance 
goals when a number of factors are met – particularly, strong political leadership and 
commitment to reform implementation, adaptation of reform models to the institutional 
capacity and the country context, strong management and coordination arrangements 
among donors to monitor and guide reforms, and government ownership of the reform 
process. This also confirms the results reported in Andrews (2010) that ‗countries make 
budgets better than they execute them, pass laws better than they implement them, 
and progress further when responsibility for reforms lies within core groups in the 
Ministry of Finance‘ (de Renzio et al., 2010: 46). With regard to donor support to PFM 
reforms, better results have been achieved in those countries where the context and 
mechanisms were right for success, and where external funding was focused on the 
country-specific reform packages (Lawson, 2012: 13). The international agencies also 
continue to actively support the development of civil society organizations. However, 
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advocacy work by CSOs and pressure from the parliament are more likely to be 
effective in the shorter term due to the limited expertise of these players in PFM reform 
and a weak culture of public accountability. 
Figure 1.1.1. Typical PFM System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Andrews, M., Cangiano, M., Cole, N., de Renzio, P., Krause, P. & Seligmann, 
R. (2014) This is PFM. CID Working Paper No. 285. Center for International 
Development, Harvard University, p. 2. 
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and quality of PFM systems across countries. However, existing analyses are limited 
by the lack of adequate data and the cross-country nature of most datasets – little 
information is available to track country-specific changes in PFM systems over time. It 
is necessary to rely on similarities and differences among countries to indicate which 
factors are likely to affect changes in the quality and performance of PFM systems for 
each country. Even then, the findings are ambiguous. The available data allow only 
broad comparisons on the basis of contextual factors. So, ‗they do not take into 
account the idiosyncratic features that may affect the design and implementation of 
PFM reforms‘ (Hedger and de Renzio, 2010: 5). 
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Country Context 
The results of multivariate regression analysis conducted by de Renzio (2009) show 
that the main factors which significantly correlated to variations in the overall PEFA 
score are the level of income, country size, and degree of aid dependency. In the study, 
the PEFA average score was used as the dependent variable, and different 
combinations of independent variables include region, population size, income levels, 
degree of dependency on foreign aid or natural resources, and strength of democratic 
institutions to explore particular cross-country patterns. It is not surprising that the level 
of income is significantly associated with quality of PFM systems, but it is not clear 
whether it is the driver of change. The positive correlation with aid dependency may in 
fact reflect a reverse causality when countries with better PFM systems attract more 
foreign aid, and thus more aid dependent. Moreover, even if the direction of influence is 
known, the small size of the coefficients means that massive aid flows would be 
needed for marginal improvements in PFM performance. In contrast, resource 
dependency, the type of political system, democracy level, degree of press freedom 
and administrative heritage are found to be statistically insignificant along with the 
regional differences. Despite the limitations of the existing data, as more assessments 
are carried out using adequate statistical techniques, the availability of new data will 
allow more robust analysis of explanatory variables to generate further 
recommendations for improvements in PFM system. In turn, quantitative analysis could 
be complemented by country-specific case studies that can offer a large number of 
context-specific variables that might affect the quality of PFM systems and its evolution 
over time. 
de Renzio et al. (2010) also uses data from PEFA assessments to analyze quantitative 
evidence on the quality of PFM systems, and to identify factors that may help to 
determine cross-country differences in the PFM performance over time. The dataset for 
the evaluation study includes three sets of variables – in particular, data on PFM 
systems as dependent variable, data on donor support to PFM reforms as the main 
independent variable, and other independent variables. They represent relevant social, 
economic, institutional and political factors which can be hypothesized as having an 
influence on the quality of PFM systems, such as economic growth rate, social and 
political stability, a ‗fiscal state‘ reliant on domestic tax revenues, trade openness, 
technological diffusion, aid dependency, sustained government policy commitments, 
democracy and administrative heritage. These factors are, working in combination, 
likely to facilitate public finance reform in a country and consequently to boost PFM 
performance. 
The main finding from the cross-country econometric analysis is that the countries with 
  11 
higher levels of per capita income, larger populations, and better economic growth 
could be characterized by better quality in PFM systems. In contrast, fragile countries 
tend to have poorer quality systems. These economic and institutional factors explain 
most of the cross-country variation in PFM performance. The study also finds that, on 
average, countries that received more PFM-related technical assistance tend to have 
better PFM systems, but in those cases the direction of causation could not be 
determined. The limitations and challenges of this study include poor quality of data 
and limited information on donor-supported PFM reforms. These limitations mean that 
the results of the analysis should be interpreted with caution (de Renzio et al., 2011). 
As a next phase of this evaluation, the study will be complemented with qualitative 
research at country level through a number of country case studies. However, these do 
not alone explain the emergence of the space for performance-enhancing reforms – 
maybe have more to do with the features of the reform process and its management 
than the country context. 
Reform Process  
Qualitative analysis by Andrews (2008) provides further explanations of the factors 
appear to influence the quality of PFM systems and their reforms. He finds notable 
similarity in the PFM reports that the intrinsic features of the reform process itself may 
affect PFM performance more than exogenous country variables. For example, among 
reasons for limited progress with PFM reforms could be a lack of secondary regulations, 
coordination and harmonization failures among key players, institutional constraints on 
government capacity, and absence of political will. In the same way, other PFM studies 
also suggest that government authority, leadership by politico-administrative elites, 
transparency and incentives are critical to successful reforms (Hedger and Kizilbash 
Agha, 2007). Not to mention the focus of donor effort and access to information 
networks. In reality, the development partners tend to pay less attention to existing 
incentives for reform within government that could conflict with formal laws and 
practices. In this regard, change management became an integral part of the reform 
process (Diamond, 2006). Within wider public finance reforms it was also observed a 
strong focus on institutional change in the revenue administration. Today, 
organizational culture, management style, staff training and administrative capacity are 
given equal priority in reforms packages. It may mean that similar country-specific vari-
ables would result in more effective public expenditure reforms. These lead to the 
matter of external support to PFM reforms – how development partners should best 
engage with the contextual dimensions of the reform process. 
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Donor Support 
Donor effort in supporting PFM reforms has grown substantially in recent years and 
assistance program is being built on a new approach to foreign aid. This view is based 
on the assumption that increased effort and more sophisticated approaches have the 
power both to provide more incentives for reform and to influence positively the quality 
of the system (Booth, 2013). Consequently, there was a shift from project to program-
based aid, better use of country systems, and integration of financial and technical 
assistance. In relation to long-run impact of donor-driven reforms, conclusive findings 
are largely drawn from the World Bank‘s studies. Still, despite the promising results on 
strengthening budget processes and aid effectiveness, further empirical analysis is 
needed to support the new approaches. The World Bank evaluation confirms that ‗the 
expectations and objectives in heavy budget-support projects tend to be more 
ambitious and global, reflecting the donors‘ list of things that need fixing rather than the 
government‘s list of things it is ready to do‘ (World Bank, 2008: 40). The insistence on a 
full set of public sector reforms means that ‗staff often lack the time and resources to 
design a fully tailored product. So the result is likely to be one size fits all, off the shelf‘ 
(World Bank, 2008: 38).  
It is evidential that there is the correlation between progress in PFM reforms and 
reduction in corruption – the level, and nature, of corruption risks varies across different 
stages of the PFM cycle (World Bank, 2012). Donors, however, prefer to tackle 
administrative rather than political corruption (Fjeldstad, 2005). To improve the 
performance of anti-corruption elements of the PFM system, the governments have 
been trying a variety of tools that may lead to decreasing opportunities for corruption 
and fraud. It seems that the budget execution and accounting system are the elements 
that are likely to have the greatest impact on corruption and fraud reduction – hence 
the priorities in reform programs (Morgner, 2013). 
To sum up, contextual factors do matter in shaping the feasibility and likelihood of 
successful PFM reforms – still, features of country context may be ambiguous. To this 
extent, the typology of PFM reforms also affects their outcomes, but it should be 
remembered that the political, institutional and organizational factors underlying the 
reform process are complex by nature. It seems that an implicit model of external ‗best 
practices‘ prevail in donor assistance – the degree of standardization in recommended 
reform packages may be excessive. This could help with the design and sequencing of 
PFM reforms across countries but may actually undermine its effectiveness. 
In response to these challenges, a series of adjustments to current models and 
approaches to PFM reform are proposed. First of all, political and technocratic support 
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for reforms is needed. This includes promoting a shared diagnosis of PFM performance 
to create a ‗reform space‘ and to encourage a dialogue with country stakeholders on 
reform measures – the government should take full advantage of such standardized 
assessment tools as PEFA. However, measures on external legitimacy may be focus 
too narrowly on financial accountability to outside donors. Such measures may 
diminish the central role of strong budgeting and financial management to deliver 
socio-economic policies for long-term economic growth. 
It is necessary to distinguish between different types of reform, and adjust expectations 
about possible reform outcomes accordingly. This means paying close attention to 
institutional, organizational and cultural factors alongside change management of the 
technical processes and systems. In other words, country context is important, and the 
reformers should avoid the mechanistic application of pre-defined reform objectives 
and packages. Reform approaches and expectations should be adapted to broad 
country characteristics – for example, economic growth, production rate, external debt, 
revenue sources, tax base. Indeed, greater contingency to specific country needs and 
reform challenges is more likely to offer an adequate response to PFM weaknesses. 
For instance, the differences in policy context and institutional capacity among 
countries may affect which PFM objective will be given a priority (Campbell, 2001) – 
the core objectives typically include fiscal discipline, strategic resource allocation and 
operational efficiency.  
Much deeper engagement with a broader set of key actors should be extended beyond 
the central government level – the constructive dialogue with multiple stakeholders, 
including sector ministries, government agencies, local administration, professional 
associations and civil society organizations, could stimulate stronger support for PFM 
reforms. This will replace prescriptive and externally-driven efforts by consultative 
approach. So, for reforms to succeed, new ideas must be accepted, authorized, and 
enabled by different categories of players. However, it is unlikely that international best 
practice models will pass the institutionalization stage in change management process 
and multiple interest groups. Therefore, wider internal acceptance is needed for reform 
to proceed and results to sustain – and development of professional associations could 
be a help. 
1.2. Process and Direction for Tax Reform  
In the literature on tax reform it was a consensus that there are two basic choices in 
approaches to reform. The first choice was the ‗big-bang‘ approach to generic 
economic reforms introduced by Lipton et al. (1990). The second choice was a 
gradualist approach to apply elements of a modern tax system evolutionary. However, 
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McKinnon (1991), and Hussain and Stern (1993) recognize the lack of administrative 
and institutional capacity in the central planned economes and claim the adoption of a 
new approach to tax reform. 
International experts expressed warning about a tendency in countries in transition to 
adopt tax systems similar to developed countries of Western Europe or North America. 
The potential risks associated with such choice could be ranged from import of 
troublesome features already existed in advanced economies to assimilation of fiscal 
policies designed particularly for advance economies with comprehensive tax 
administration, established accounting practices, and enforceable tax laws (Tanzi, 
1993). 
Due to many unfavourable conditions such as the weakness of tax administration, 
undeveloped custom services, incomparable finance accounting standards, and shift of 
state ownership toward private property which is hard to monitor, the experts 
recommended an evolutionary approach to CITs. However, the slow gradualist 
approach could make comprehensive tax reform very difficult as interest groups could 
merge their power to slow down or block fundamental reforms. Additionally, this 
approach has other risks in form of political, economic and social instability, which 
negatively affected domestic entrepreneurship and foreign investments. In summary, 
public policy advisers concentrated on the following topics: 
 International experts expressed concerns about the revenue problems expected at 
the beginning of the transition (Tanzi and Shome, 1993). In particular, selecting 
taxes with wide base would help reduce the volatility of tax revenues (Cnossen, 
1991). 
 In transition each country developed its own model of tax system to meet the 
specific needs and individual features reflecting country‘s circumstances and 
peculiarities (Bird, 1992). 
 Choice of tax instruments reflected the weaknesses of tax administration by 
selecting taxes that could easily be enforced and by incorporating critical aspects of 
tax administration into the tax laws (Ickes and Slemrod, 1991). 
The advice of international experts included the early introduction of a VAT and 
excises, the prevention of high import taxes, the elimination of export taxes, and the 
use of schedule taxes and withholding at source for personal income taxation. 
However, experts did not reach agreement about the structure of corporate income 
taxes. On top of that, emerging countries decided to focus the reform effort solely on 
tax policy and ignored policy advice to modernize tax administration and to introduce 
modern accounting practices. Yet, the tax administration reform has received high 
  15 
priority and taken central role in reform strategy only recently. 
The early movements toward comprehensive tax reform and modern tax systems in 
CEE (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovenia) and Baltic States (Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania) could be explained by their desire to join the European Union 
(EU). In contrast, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) experienced diverse 
practices in the implementation of serious tax reform in last decades. For example, 
Kazakhstan was the first among CIS countries to introduce a new tax code in 1995 
(McLure et al., 1999) followed by Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan (Ebrill and 
Havrylyshyn, 1999). On the other hand, Russia still lacks an adequate tax system 
(Martinez-Vazquez and Wallace, 1999). Overall, progress in tax reform varied from 
country to country and depended on undergoing privatization and other types of 
economic reforms. Also, political priority, support of the top authorities and a majority in 
the parliament played a significant role in reinforcing of tax reform. The path-
dependence concepts will help to explain why some elements of tax system in the 
post-Soviet transition countries remained unchanged during considerable amount of 
time, and what factors have influenced the countries decision to follow particular way of 
changes (Pollitt, 2008). 
1.2.1. Tax Structure 
Historically, tax structure was at the centre of most debates on tax reform. Since the 
1980s, the focus has been on maximizing revenue collection and achieving neutrality – 
to minimize economic distortions caused by taxation. In practice, there are several 
common measures that have been adopted by virtually all developing countries. 
 A shift from trade taxes towards taxes on goods and services  
 Reducing tax rates for corporate and personal income taxes 
 Broadening the tax base and simplification of tax codes  
Nowadays, the growing concern are taxation of the informal sector and decentralization 
of revenue administration. But still these reforms remain in their infancy (Thirsk, 1991, 
Gillis, 1989, Fjeldstad and Moore, 2008). 
Income Taxation 
As a share of tax revenue, direct taxes are dramatically lower in developing countries in 
comparison with OECD members. And relatively little progress has been made so far 
despite tax reform efforts (Bird and Zolt, 2005). While income taxes now is the major 
source of revenue in OECD countries, it is important to recall that their introduction was 
both slow and difficult process in most of those states (Aidt and Jensen, 2009). This 
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reflects the fact that income taxation is hard to improve due to the administrative 
challenges as well as the political barriers to taxing local elites.  
During the 1980s and 1990s, direct taxes received little attention in tax reform agenda 
as there were doubts about whether developing countries had enough capacity and 
political commitment to collect income and wealth taxes effectively. To estimate tax 
liabilities correctly, the tax administration has to effectively monitor the economic 
activities and assets of taxpayers. In spite of these administrative challenges, it is also 
important not to allow ‗capacity constraints‘ to be used as an excuse for inactivity. In 
most cases, such measures as information sharing across government agencies, and 
using data analysis and management system to detect tax evasion would be 
technically feasible for larger governance benefits. The other barrier to such initiatives 
is an absence of political will, as income taxes have traditionally affected a relatively 
narrow groups of elite, who have wielded sufficient political power to resist any 
changes – even improved tax collections (Bird and Zolt, 2005). 
Despite these caveats, the mission is still possible. Significant improvements could 
dramatically improve both revenue generation and legitimacy of the tax system, along 
with the responsiveness and accountability of government. From a governance 
perspective, strengthening direct tax enforcement is essential for enhancing horizontal 
equity and visibility of taxation. Among the potential gains from doing so could be an 
increase in public awareness, and greater trust between the government and taxpayers 
as well as amongst taxpayers. Consequently, all of these will make engagement of civil 
society more likely. As direct taxes are more reliant on voluntary compliance than 
indirect taxes, this provides stronger incentives for government to engage broadly in 
tax bargaining.  
Informal Sector Taxation  
Taxation of the informal sector has recently become an important objective of the tax 
reform agenda. This objective holds the potential for national governments to increase 
revenue and to support responsiveness and accountability. More generally, there is 
strong evidence that improvements in taxation of the shadow economy could increases 
the willingness of formal businesses to comply with tax laws. By contributing to the 
normalization of business environment, improving taxation of the informal sector may 
support the growth of broader and more inclusive business associations that can 
constructively engage with the government. This not only increases the possibility for a 
stronger tax bargaining, but also could encourage the political engagement of small 
businesses. However, most government efforts have been focused on finding technical 
solutions to improve compliance. Yet, these solutions alone are unlikely to succeed in 
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the absence of positive incentives for informal sector to come out of the shadow. These 
positive incentives could range from tangible benefits – such as improved public 
services, tax amnesty and legalization of undeclared income and assets, reduced 
harassment by enforcement agencies, access to tax consultancy and taxpayer support 
services – to a broader political commitment by government. 
Property Taxation 
The absence of effective property taxation is perhaps the most common weakness of 
tax systems in developing countries, frequently associated with significant revenue 
losses and reduced income redistribution. In principle, property taxes are among the 
most recommended tools to boost local revenue, as they can be easily collected by 
local governments (Bird, 1974, Rajaraman, 2004).While this possibility remains under-
researched, land taxation could encourage even more efficient use of land – especially 
in rural areas. Often overlooked is the fact that property taxation can encourage 
taxpayers to engage in a broader political dialogue with government, and thus help to 
build trust between taxpayers and the state. Moreover, because of their close proximity 
to particular location, unlike other large taxes, property taxes can be explicitly 
earmarked to specific public expenditures in designated local communities. Property 
taxes are highly visible, which makes them so attractive from a governance 
perspective. But, this visibility has also made property taxation politically contentious – 
that can partly explain the relative weakness of such taxes across the developing 
nations. It is essential to understand that despite major administrative challenges, the 
property tax reform is possible when the government fulfils its political commitments.  
Local Taxation 
Fiscal federalism and decentralization have become a popular topic in recent years. By 
delegating decision-making power to local authorities, decentralization reform could 
strengthen the connections between taxation, responsiveness and accountability. The 
main argument is that decentralized revenue system can improve government 
accountability because ‗people take more interest in what they have to pay for and are 
hence more likely to be interested in ensuring that they get value for their 
contributions‘(Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998). By empowering citizens‘ participation in the 
tax assessment process, the government can contribute to increasing public 
engagement and awareness. Second, new forums through which citizens could raise 
questions and concerns about tax collection and public expenditure can help in 
institutionalizing consultation, and thus increasing accountability. 
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Still, it is important to remember that fiscal decentralization is not a panacea for better 
governance. Yet, the literature on the development impact of decentralization reform is 
rather controversial. While some studies argue that greater reliance on local taxation 
could improve government performance (Hoffman and Gibson, 2005), others point out 
that decentralization may actually lead to coercion, exploitation and abuse of power 
(Fjeldstad, 2001). Besides, local taxation is heavily reliant on broad-based, and more 
visible, direct taxes, particularly property taxes, land tax and various local fees and 
levies. And this could be a good reason why local taxation may be suitable for 
embracing tax bargaining between citizens and government, even though the absolute 
amount of local revenue collected is modest.  
1.2.2. Tax Administration 
Over time, tax administration took a central position in the global tax reform agenda, 
reflecting the old dictum that ‗Tax Administration is Tax Policy‘ (de Jantscher, 1990). 
Besides general improvements in institutional capacity, the following elements have 
also characterized the reform agenda:  
 Reorganization has focused on moving away from tax agencies organized by type 
of taxes to organization by core functions and, more recently, by taxpayer 
segments. The focal point of change has been the creation of Large Taxpayer Units 
(LTUs), which are functionally organized to deal with a single segment. However, 
reorganization effort in other areas of tax administration has been much slower. 
 Information Technology upgrading has been a part of virtually all reform programs, 
with a hope to improve data management and analysis, reduce administration and 
compliance costs, and mitigate the scope for corruption and collusion. While there 
is great potential, and there have been notable successes, many highly ambitious 
projects have ultimately disappointed due to large delays, poor integration with 
existing processes, and weak monitoring and implementation (Bird and Zolt, 2007, 
Peterson, 2006). 
 Taxpayer Services have gained greater prominence, with a focus on improving 
taxpayer education and awareness, lowering compliance costs and adopting a 
‗customer‘ orientation (LeBaube and Vehorn, 1992a, Jenkins and Forlemu, 1993). 
While some change in attitudes is apparent, the lack of detailed assessments 
suggests the limits of actual progress. 
 Autonomy from the civil service has been a major feature of reform, particular 
strongly demanded by donors. This agenda has been pursued in hopes of 
improving performance by reducing political interference, increasing flexibility and 
  19 
improving wages and conditions of work. This has been culminated by the creation 
of Semi-Autonomous Revenue Agencies (SARAs) in many countries in Africa and 
Latin America (Fjeldstad and Moore, 2009). While SARAs have proven to achieve 
dramatic improvements in performance over short-term, those gains were often 
difficult to sustain once the initial urgency for reform has subsided (Devas et al., 
2001, Fjeldstad, 2005). 
Although the existing body of contemporary research provides meaningful evidence 
that improvements in tax administration may lead to broader improvements in state 
capacity, lessons from tax reform experiments suggest that the potential for broader 
administrative gains is shaped by context. Central to many studies is a message that 
changes that are particularly demanded from an administrative standpoint are more 
likely to create positive externalities. But, this says little about what conditions may 
contribute to such positive outcomes (Prichard and Leonard, 2010). 
Building Linkages within Government 
Improvements in tax administration may build state capacity through strong linkages 
with other areas of government. However, such demonstration effect is only 
guaranteed if administrative innovations are either transmitted explicitly to other 
government agencies or generating pressure for reform in those related agencies 
essential to tax collection. The introduction of unique taxpayer identification numbers 
(TINs) illustrates its full potential. While initially introduced for tax registration only, 
various government departments quickly began to use the same TINs in order to 
improve information sharing, leading to broader improvements in data analysis and 
performance management. In this way, the TIN can be used by those agencies that 
interact directly with the tax administration including local governments, business 
registration, land and property registries, vehicle licensing agency, statistics 
department, ministry of economy and finance, treasury, customs and local tax offices.  
Apart from encouraging positive spill-overs, building linkages across government is 
also a good administrative strategy. Connecting with private sector institutions, such as 
commercial banks, investment firms and insurance companies, is an important practice 
in developed nations. On the contrary, low-income countries over the past two decades 
have moved in the opposite direction, focusing more on building institutional autonomy 
rather than strengthening tiers within and between agencies. As a result, SARAs 
became very popular, mainly because of the potential for autonomy to dramatically 
accelerate reform. Unfortunately, while SARAs achieved notable success in the short 
term, sustaining reform progress has been more problematic. One factor appears to be 
true that instead of encouraging linkages with the rest of government, SARAs have 
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sometimes disrupted such linkages and caused resentment within other government 
divisions (Prichard and Leonard, 2010, Devas et al., 2001, Fjeldstad, 2005, Prichard, 
2009, Durand and Thorp, 1998). Still poorly documented, there have been cases of 
disruption in information sharing even within SARAs and most certainly between tax 
and customs officials. 
Improving Data Collection, Sharing and Transparency 
There have been little discussions about the ability of tax system to provide essential 
data for broader economic management. Obviously, it has the potential to produce 
system-wide benefits, while the costs of failing to collect tax data and share it with other 
agencies could be massive. This is also a suggestion that improved data gathering 
could potentially benefit industrial policies as well as investment climate. As developing 
countries tend to provide different forms of government support to prioritized economic 
sectors, often in the form of investment incentives, the absence of verified data on 
economic activities and the cost of such incentives makes even basic cost-benefit 
analysis impossible. Yet, government needs more systematic information about the 
effectiveness of these policies. Economic regulation and planning would likely improve 
if tax agencies are authorized to collect and process data on taxes paid by firms in 
particular sectors in oppose to taxes lost due to incentives. 
In practice, tax data can be valuable not only for tax administration, but also in other 
public domains. For example, it can help with law enforcement and taxation of the 
informal sector. To put it more simply, tax returns can intermediately flag suspicious 
incomes or assets that cannot be explained by declared annual income. Sometimes, 
better taxpayer data on property taxation can help to clarify land ownership – especially 
in countries where the overlap of traditional and state land tenure regimes can 
generate insecurity and conflict – and tax payments can act as a guarantee of property 
rights or at least a partial claim for ownership. For all that, such sophisticated benefits 
cannot fully emerge in the short-term, hence better data management is in need for 
future gains.  
Benchmarking Administrative Innovations  
There is strong possibility that specific improvements in tax administration can be 
applied more broadly to other areas of public administration, where the elements of tax 
reform are most relevant. For instance, reforms that pioneer innovations in internal 
auditing, strategic planning, human resources and performance management may 
become a model to other agencies. Similarly, electronic filing of tax returns and 
knowledge-based management may eventually lead to the introduction of a modern e-
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government system. Potentially, tax administrative reform could be a ‗pilot‘ for broader 
public sector reforms. However, reforms that cannot be duplicated elsewhere in the civil 
service are not likely to be followed throughout the public sector. This is one of the 
main reasons why the reform package called for capital-intensive IT updating or large-
scale salary increases – in order to recruit highly qualified staff in tax offices and thus 
discourage corruption – simply cannot be afforded by other government agencies. Of 
course, incremental ICT reforms or paying decent salaries may be an important tax 
reform strategy, but measures that cannot be easily replicated in the short term 
presumably will not enhance state capacity. 
Improving Local Tax Administration 
One of the most striking features of the command economy is the overwhelming 
centralization of government, and weak government presence in local areas, especially 
remote regions. So, expansion of tax administration to relatively remote areas and 
cooperation between central and local tax offices could allow tax reform to become the 
backbone for strengthening state capacity. While developing countries have shown an 
increased interest in fiscal decentralization, tax capacity of local administrations 
remains very weak. Despite broader efforts of the decentralization reforms, 
intergovernmental transfers continue to dominate local budgets (Fessha and Kirkby, 
2008). Moreover, lack of coordination within tax administration could provoke a high 
degree of arbitrariness, coercion and corruption in local tax systems, not to mention 
little attention to economic efficiency (Fjeldstad and Therkildsen, 2008). While 
availability of local data is very problematic, official statistics suggest that local 
revenues comprise less than 5% of total government revenue in low-income countries. 
This in turn undermines capacity of the local self-governments to provide basic public 
goods to their constituencies, as well as reduce local autonomy and accountability. 
Thus, absence of effective administrative system and need to raise local revenues may 
require a new bureaucratic structure. However, up to date evidences of local taxation 
acting as a driver for improved state capacity have been poorly documented – thus, 
making a case for further research in this area. 
By and large, tax reforms efforts have been significant in recent decades. To the extent 
to which they have been extremely similar due to pressure from international 
institutions, and the growth of a global epistemic community of tax professionals 
(Fjeldstad and Moore, 2008). On the other hand, the experience of tax reforms differs 
widely across countries. In this regard, Gillis (1989) and Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 
(1997: 27-31) summarize the following lessons from decades of tax reform experiments 
in developing and transition countries. According to continuity principle, the tax policy 
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of developed countries significantly limits the choice of tax reforms in developing world. 
It is obvious that the less-developed countries attempt to incorporate the policy 
priorities of major donors into their reform agenda responding to recent changes in 
world lending practice and other unexpected events in the financial market. There is 
also no common opinion about the role of donors in reform process. Definitely, they 
could be very intrusive in promoting their reform packages or new management ideas 
by linking the loan disbursement with aid conditionality. At the same time, the technical 
assistance and professional trainings contributed a lot to a success of tax reform, and 
the demand for donor help is still very high.  
Usually, the economic policy reforms are scheduled to be implemented in particular 
sequence. However, it is not clear whether tax reform is connected with other reforms 
and what is the place of tax reform in the series of economic adjustments. Still, in order 
to be successful, tax reform should be implemented in conjunction with other economic 
reforms. The delay of tax reform does not necessarily mean the lost of reform. The 
reform program initially failed could be used as a background for future reforms or be 
re-implemented later in more favourable environment after appropriate adjustments 
have been made. 
The legacies of centrally planning have played an important role in the development of 
tax systems in emerging countries. It is critical to understand how initial conditions and 
practices inherited from the previous regime continue to provide a solid background for 
reform initiatives and shape the path and strategies of tax reform. Thus, the principles 
and practices of the central planned economies put into disarray the tax systems in the 
countries in transition: 
 Interventionist tradition to use taxes not only to raise revenues but for many other 
purposes has survived during the transition, contributing to the complexity of the tax 
laws and misuse of tax incentives (Gray, 1990). 
 Customised or negotiated taxes were a challenge for systematic link between 
statutory tax bases and actual tax liabilities, but part of the soft-budget constraint 
which protected companies from bankruptcy risk (Kopits and Offerdal, 1994; 
Owens, 1991; (Kornai, 1992). 
 Lack of a tradition of voluntary compliance and transparency is the main reason of 
tax evasion in transition economies. The enterprises did not have experience with 
taxation nether an access to information about taxes paid by other taxpayers. 
Individuals had never filed actual tax returns by themselves and had no perceptions 
of tax burden at the beginning of the transition (Kodrzycki, 1993, Tanzi, 1994). 
 Absence of conventional excess burdens characterized the planned economies 
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with the prevalence of implicit taxation. Restrictions on individual choice and 
mobility made taxpayers less sensitive to the potential excess burden losses of 
distortions and limited decision-making in response to the tax design flaws 
(McLure, 1991a). 
 Taxes and income redistribution was not handled prominently – in practice, real 
income was not equally distributed, as only bureaucracy (nomenklatura) and 
members of the Communist party had direct access to goods and services in the 
condition of chronic shortage. Even more, redistribution function of the tax system 
is still not fully defined in the transition countries. 
 Undeveloped tax administration left transitional countries unprepared for tax 
enforcement and drastic increase in number of taxpayers.  
 Public distrust in government institutions was the result of the state failure to raise 
living standards, eliminate the ‗black‘ market and privileges of ruling elites in 
command economy. During the transition, corruption of government servants and 
growth of unofficial economies created solid ground for tax evasion (Ickes and 
Slemrod, 1991). 
The tax reforms been designed and implemented in hurry, and driven by fiscal crisis 
usually fail. The time schedule of a reform program should allow a sufficient amount of 
time to evaluate alternative proposals, select the winner and construct action plan, 
make corrections to tax laws and institutional capacity of tax administration. After an 
adequate preparation, the implementation is the most crucial part of a reform process. 
However, the years of preparation or speed of reform cannot guarantee the success. 
Over decades, the primary focus of tax reforms in developing and transition countries 
was tax policy. Only recently, these countries recognized the urgency of tax 
administration reform and assigned the highest priority to modernization of tax 
administration and to establishment of a dialogue between the government and the 
taxpayers. The reasons for such shift were the lagged effect of administrative reform, 
which cause the discrepancy between the objectives of tax reform and the institutional 
capacity of tax administration. The tax administration reform should be a centrepiece of 
reform program. Nowadays, the administrative reforms receive wider political support 
as an effective way to restore equity, increase tax compliance and reduce tax evasion. 
Both the simplification of tax structure and reduction in tax rates better work together, 
reinforcing each other. Globally, under the pressure of international trade and tax 
competition, the tax systems were moved toward simplified structure and uniformity of 
low (marginal) rates. Following this shift, the complicated system of tax preferences 
used to protect the interest of special groups were revised with a purpose of cutting the 
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administrative and compliance costs and discouraging taxpayers avoidance and 
evasion. 
Heavy reliance on tax ‗gadgets‘ built-in tax system did not help to solve problems in tax 
administration and compliance – in practice, Bird (1976) recognizes at least five 
commonly used gimmicks such as tax amnesties, tax-based lotteries, premature 
computerization, VAT ‗self-checking‘ mechanism and presumptive interlocking taxes. 
Despite numerous evidences of inefficiency, these gadgets continue to regularly 
reappear in reform programs.  
During a preparation stage, the reform proposals should be carefully evaluated against 
a set of economic criteria including simplicity, neutrality, equity, efficiency, revenue 
generation and distribution. However, in relation to tax reform, the theory of optimal 
taxation was used infrequently and indirectly in justification of reform programs. Among 
the possible reasons of its unpopularity are pure hypothetical economic models, 
unavailability of clear criteria and procedures applicable in the real world and 
unrealistic theoretical assumptions about tax compliance and tax elasticity. As a result, 
the ‗optimality‘ as an objective of tax reform was substituted by less complicated 
‗neutrality‘ – but ‗neutral‘ tax system does not necessary mean ‗efficient‘ or ‗optimal‘ 
structure. 
Due to a lack of own experience and transferability of lessons, the developing countries 
largely welcomed lessons from developed countries. Such direct transfer should be 
used with great care, because a response of tax system in developing countries could 
be unpredictable and even distortional. In fact, during the two decades after WWII the 
tax reforms in low-income countries were focused on income taxation. Later, the 
direction has changed as developing countries have already accumulated enough 
experience which could be shared with each other. This trend has explained the 
remarkable success of value-added tax (VAT) reforms in 1960-1980s. Indirect taxation 
took a dominant position in reform proposals. 
The emerging countries should find a trade-off between to adapt an existing tax system 
to realities of transition economy and to import the ‗ideal‘ model already used by other 
developed counties. While the first option forces the government to continuously re-
adjust the tax system to unpredictable changes in environment, the followers of the 
‗policy transfer‘ approach have to solve numerous incompatibility issues in legal, 
institutional and informational framework. Ironically, the countries in transition continue 
to repeat the same mistakes which further contribute to instability and uncertainty in 
reform process. Last, Gillis (1989: 517) concludes that although ‗successful tax reform 
has not been all that uncommon in the middle-income developing countries,‘ the 
healthy scepticism is required in deciding ‗whether lessons gained from the experience 
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of these countries will prove helpful in reform of tax systems … classified as low-
income in the World Bank system of classification.‘ 
1.3. Political Economy of Tax Reform 
The political economy of reform is still an underexplored topic in many respects. The 
basic pattern is that while formal tax structure and tax administration have been 
transformed in many countries, the levels of tax collection have been surprisingly stable 
over that time. Alongside with dramatic expansion of consumption taxes on goods and 
services – in particular, Value Added Tax (VAT) – the redistributive potential of taxation 
in general remain much more infrequent and hard to achieve (Ascher, 1989, Mahon, 
2005). The difficulty of altering tax level could be in part explained by issues common 
to most public sector reform programs, such as the need for political will, local 
ownership, contextually appropriate design and effective sequencing of reform process 
(Boesen, 2004, Schneider and Heredia, 2003). Besides, certain types of changes in tax 
system could confront strong vested interests – economic and political elites – that can 
loose from proposed changes and often are really able to block reform (Bird, 1989, 
Bird, 1992). Also, it is difficult to mobilize public support for tax reform. In fact, tax 
reform tends to be perceived as a threat even by those who potentially could benefit 
from it, largely because of limited trust in government (Ascher, 1989, Bates, 1989). 
1.3.1. Taxation, Governance and State-Building 
While the tax reform agenda has traditionally focused on maximizing tax efficiency and 
compliance, recent research on taxation and development has revealed the central role 
of taxation to state-building, that is ‗an endogenous process to develop capacity, 
institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relationships‘ (OECD, 
2008b). It is increasingly understood that government can gain substantial ‗dividends‘ 
from mobilizing domestic financial resources through an effective tax system. 
(Brautigam et al., 2008). At the same time, there is a chance that the need to raise 
taxation can strengthen state-citizens ties with positive externalities for state capacity to 
the extent to which government becomes more responsive and accountable to its 
citizens (Prichard, 2009, Ross, 2004). However, the nature of these relationships 
remains underexplored. Further research should be conducted to provide concrete and 
policy-relevant evidences about how to strengthen a link between taxation and broader 
improvements in governance in developing countries. According to (Moore, 2008) and 
Prichard (2010), the tax system may contribute to good governance through the 
following channels: 
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 Promoting Economic Growth. Because of its dependence on taxes, the government 
has a very strong incentive to promote economic growth and, hence, prosperity of 
taxpayers. 
 Developing State Apparatus. Capacity-building processes require the state to 
develop a bureaucratic apparatus for tax collection, given its dependence on taxes. 
It is also expected that this will lead to broader improvements in public 
administration (Brautigam, 2008, Prichard and Leonard, 2010). 
 Developing Accountability and Responsiveness. Taxpayers have legitimate right to 
expect something in return for taxes paid. To hold their government to account in 
case of its underperformance, taxpayer-citizens can make collective claims on 
government either through short-term requests or long-term political engagement. 
Government has to respond to this demand in order to enhance tax compliance 
and sustain budget revenues (OECD, 2008a, Moore, 2007, Prichard, 2009). This 
idea of tax bargaining by engaging citizens in politics and negotiation over taxes is 
central to the concept of a Social Fiscal Contract.  
Although these tax-governance linkages are complex and context-specific, it is clear 
that there are strong synergies between tax reforms and governance. If a reform is 
undertaken in a way that promotes greater responsiveness and accountability, 
alongside improvements in the state capacity, then it can become a catalyst for 
broader improvements in government performance. From this perspective, taxation is 
not just an administrative task for the government and citizens. It is also about politics 
and power, and the way in which state authority is executed in a country through its 
formal and informal institutions. 
Improving Equity  
At present, the greatest challenge to equity facing in developing countries is improving 
tax enforcement among national elites, including extractive industries and large 
informal businesses. The poor enforcement of personal income taxation at this point is 
a defining feature of their tax systems, with a devastated effect on revenue and 
legitimacy as well. This relates in particular to high levels of politicization and corruption 
in tax administration (Bird, 1992, Bird and Zolt, 2005). The other reason why it is so 
difficult to tax elites is because they are a powerful political force against any changes 
in tax enforcement (Ascher, 1989). In the same way, it is difficult to improve taxation of 
the informal sector, as well as local taxation, because the political costs can easily 
exceed any budget gains. This can lead to a ‗Devil‘s Deal‘ in which tax exemptions for 
low-income taxpayers can be used to buy political support (Tendler, 2002). Overall, it is 
a difficult task to mobilize political support for tax reform, even if many citizens would 
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benefit from improved enforcement. Accumulated evidences suggest that a focus on 
more equitable enforcement can be an effective way of mobilizing public support for 
reform. 
While improving equity in tax enforcement stands out as an ultimate challenge, there is 
possibility for low-income countries to raise revenues from taxing the informal sector. 
Although, these gains may have more symbolic value in terms of revenue generation,. 
Torgler and Schneider (2007) show that if the size of the informal sector is relatively 
large, the willingness of citizens to pay taxes will be substantially reduced. The promise 
to improve tax enforcement in the informal sector could encourage better compliance 
among formal sector (Prichard, 2009). The limited country-level research on this topic 
also supports this conclusion (Goldsmith, 2002). 
For all that, improving the equity in tax enforcement could be a firm step towards 
constructive dialogue between the government and taxpayers – all taxpayers should be 
affected equally by tax laws. Apparently this approach can also lead to substantial 
increases in compliance, progressivity and political support for tax reform.  
Tax compliance could be improved if taxpayers feel that existing taxes are enforced 
equitably. This emphasizes the need for government to create a fair tax system, or at 
least to show a credible commitment to building one (Fjeldstad, 2004). Whenever elites 
receive special tax treatments, either formally or informally, this tremendously lows the 
trust in the whole system. Taxpayers will simply prefer to evading and resisting taxation 
rather than entering into a tax bargain with the government. Truly, fiscal contract is 
based on citizens trusting the government to improve governance. Taxpayer unity is 
also very important for successful tax bargaining. Taxpayers will only engage as a 
united force if all of them are treated by laws in a similar way. If certain groups of 
taxpayers do not pay taxes, this will lead to fragmented taxpayer interests, and 
reduced wiliness for public engagement. Such fragmentation is a main reason why 
business associations are so weak in most developing countries. Widespread tax 
evasion by elites also poses political risks, as elites are frequently viewed as a role-
model for broader collective actions. 
While weak tax enforcement can be in general attributed to domestic political and 
administrative constraints, tax avoidance by elites and by multinational corporations 
(MNC) is largely because of the existence of Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs). The 
off-shore zones – commonly known as ‗tax havens‘ – often offer special tax regimes 
with low tax rates, reduced regulatory standards and extreme level of secrecy and 
security to both individual and corporate taxpayers. By doing so, they facilitate very 
aggressive, and frequently illegal, forms of tax evasion. While it is difficult to precisely 
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estimate the impact of these practices on tax collection, due to the top secrecy 
involved, recent studies conducted by the Tax Justice Network and Christian Aid 
suggest that the amount of revenue losses from only one source – transfer pricing – 
may be around 5-10% of total tax revenue in low-income countries (Prichard, 2009, 
Cobham, 2005). Regardless of these estimates, it is clear that such practices 
undermine the government ability to effectively tax wealthy taxpayers, with serious 
consequences for the equity of tax systems. Definitely, this is an area of public policy in 
which international organization and development partners have an important role to 
play. In this regard, the OECD has quite impressive records, beginning with the 
publication of the report on Harmful Tax Competition (OECD, 1998b). 
International attention to the aftermath of the global financial crisis has led to 
meaningful progress by the G20 – a group of finance ministers and central bank 
governors from 20 economies, calling for greater transparency within tax havens and 
improved information exchange between tax havens and national tax authorities. 
However, it is unlikely that these measures will be sufficient enough to significantly 
curtail abuses in the developing countries. Limited technical capacity prevents tax 
agencies from taking advantages of global information exchange. Significant work 
should be done in creating easier access to information exchange network, developing 
new financial accounting standards on a country-by-country basis, reducing secrecy in 
offshore jurisdictions by clearly reporting the beneficial owners, and supporting 
capacity-building and multilateral cooperation to improve enforcement in the low-
income countries. 
Strengthening Accountability 
While little research was done on linking taxation to improved public spending and 
government performance, a growing body of evidence suggests that supporting robust 
and inclusive revenue-raising processes may be an effective strategy for promoting 
broader improvements in governance. Arguably, this could also stand for strengthening 
tax system in a way that encourage accountability-enhancing tax reform agenda. 
Nevertheless, such strategy would vary between different levels of government. At the 
local level, the intention would be to strengthen the effectiveness of local administration 
by rapidly building trust in government, public engagement and legitimacy. This may be 
particularly important for post-conflict countries where trust, engagement and 
legitimacy have been severely eroded. In practice, the local government can make an 
announcement that it is committed to provide a set of public goods as long as it can 
raise a required level of public funding. Then, it can turn to the local community to 
endorse a plan for collecting that revenue. Whereas permitted the government has to 
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work closely with community members and implements that plan as transparently as 
possible by directly involving citizens in tax assessment process. Alternatively, tax 
collection could be outsourced to well-defined community groups. If the local 
government succeeds in raising the revenue and delivering its promises, this could be 
a platform for further collaborative efforts in subsequent years. 
At the national level, such explicit tax-expenditure tiers will be more difficult to achieve, 
though using the earmarked tax revenues maybe a feasible solution. Tax reform could 
be a central element on strengthening the role of parliament, political parties, judiciary 
bodes, government agencies, and other civil society organizations in the revenue-
raising process. This possibility follows recent work by the OECD that proposes that 
building accountability across public institutions around a single issue may be more 
effective than trying to strengthen individual institutions in isolation (Hudson, 2009). If 
this strategy would be adopted, revenue-raising could be an entry point for successful 
governance-enhancing tax reform because it involves a broad range of accountable 
institutions and because it is so fundamental to the state-building process. And 
technically, such an accountability-focused tax agenda might include a variety of 
institutions. For example, the role of parliament will be in setting tax policy agenda for 
tax administration. Yet, the international institutions might oversight this process, when 
parliament has lacked the capacity to be more actively involved. The remarkable 
similarity of tax policies and tax administrations across the developing world, and the 
haunting legacies of central-planned economy in particular, seems to support this idea. 
The ability of the public audit services and anti-corruption agencies to confront internal 
corruption in the tax agencies, as well as the suspicious tax incentives to elite should 
be also considered. Not to mention the role of the courts and enforcement bodies in 
prosecuting tax fraud and violation of tax laws. At the same time the latter institutions 
have been viewed as major impediments to effective tax collection (Durand and Thorp, 
1998, Therkildsen, 2004). So, the extent to which agencies make revenue-related 
information publicly available – and the possibility for legislators to improve the access 
to that information – do matter. 
Increasing Transparency 
While recent work has underlined the need to be more realistic about the potential of 
greater transparency to strengthen public understanding on the link between tax 
collection and public spending, the message that transparency can also make a 
valuable contribution to improving citizen monitoring, and thus quality of public goods 
remains valid. This finding emphasizes the possibility for transparency and taxpayer 
education to facilitate positive changes in public attitude towards taxation and to 
  30 
encourage broader citizen engagement in political debates over budget revenues and 
expenditures. 
Meanwhile, the key challenge for improving tax transparency is rebuilding public trust in 
the system. The recommended strategies could include working directly with civil 
society groups to collect taxes, publicly and regularly declaring the amount of revenue 
collected versus estimated, and explaining the specific implications of changes in tax 
collection for public spending. So as to build public support for tax reform, it is also 
important to making tax data widely available to citizens – for example, through 
newspapers and radio. As such, the potential benefits of better transparency in 
publicizing tax information can be substantial, particularly when linked to efforts of 
broader community engagement. 
For all that, it is almost impossible for general public to access more comprehensive 
statistics about tax collection and compliance – despite official reports with highly 
aggregated macro-economic indicators. At a minimum, government has to provide 
basic information on total tax revenues, disaggregated by tax types, taxpayers and 
geographic areas. Ideally, it should attempt to demonstrate the explicit link between the 
collection of taxes and delivery of particular public service. In practice, many tax 
administrations in low-income countries continue to keep their data for internal use only 
– which is often classified as strictly confidential information and makes the quantitative 
research on taxation a challenge – and refuse to share any information that they 
already got. The situation is even worse for local taxes as the datasets, usually in 
paper-based format, are composed and retained at the local level only. Even less 
common are efforts by the central government to link tax performance to observable 
changes in public spending, and hence impact on living standards. 
Arguably among the most effective means to improve tax transparency, and rebuild 
public confidence in the tax system, is by directly involving the civil society 
organizations in collecting process. The government can also introduce a system of 
associational taxation for taxing the informal sector as well. As part of the out-sourcing 
mechanism, the tax collection power could be given to business associations in return 
of stable revenue flows at the end of a predetermined period. Of course, this system is 
not without flaws, but it could be helpful in polling the shadow sector into the domain of 
formal taxation, whilst improving tax compliance, with a relatively low resistance from 
business community. In addition, the corporate taxpayers will benefit from reduced 
harassment by police and other enforcement agencies, improved information support 
and consultancy services, and increased political legitimacy (Joshi and Ayee, 2008). It 
seems that such partnership with the civil society for tax collection purposes has 
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significant potential to succeed, as long as an appropriate balance will be found 
between autonomy for societal groups and enforcement efforts by government. 
In terms of structure, national taxes usually comprise the biggest part of total revenue, 
and thus should be an important part of reform efforts. In accordance with the 
government accounting principles, transparency could be dramatically improved by 
regularly publishing the comprehensive annual financial statements including 
management analysis and discussion notes about public spending, disclosing 
government performance reports with measurement targets and outturns, making the 
use of revenue earmarking, and disseminating ‗Name and Shame‘ information about 
tax evaders. Not to mention the importance of fostering a nationwide dialogue about 
tax-expenditure linkages – in addition to giving an opportunity to taxpayers to express 
their opinion and concerns about proposed or/and recent changes in tax system. In 
that case, joint government-civil society public bodies could be a good solution. 
Reforming local taxation could also play a crucial role in promoting tax bargaining, 
even though the share of local taxes is much smaller. Despite that fact, majority of 
citizens have primary experience with taxation at the local level, through paying 
property taxes, land tax, user fees and charges. Still, public trust in local tax systems 
appears to be particularly low. Thus, if the government wants to change the nature of 
the relationship between the tax administration and taxpayers, the local level must be 
an important part of the agenda. 
Increasing Visibility and Awareness 
While taxpayer awareness is essential to government transparency, taxpayers often do 
not fully understand what taxes, they are paying, are, and hence what is the connection 
between taxes and public spending. Yet, there is strong evidence that the public is 
genially eager for more information, and that clearer understanding of actual tax 
payments could motivate public engagement. Thus, increasing the visibility of taxation 
could be a potentially beneficial area for tax reform. Sometimes, government reduces 
the visibility of taxes on purpose to avoid open public opposition. Although this may be 
an effective strategy in short-term, it cannot form the basis for a long-term fiscal 
contract. And may even exacerbate mistrust and conflict in the future. 
As known from the theory of public finance, direct taxes – such as income taxes and 
property tax paid directly by taxpayers to the state budget – are more visible than 
indirect taxes – mainly sales taxes, excises and customs duties – which are often 
hidden from consumers. Indeed, VAT is collected, but not paid, by the retailers as a 
difference from tax payments made earlier in the value-chain. Thus, a shift towards 
direct taxes can substantially increase their visibility to taxpayers, however, the full 
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replacement by indirect taxes is not possible. So, it is important to consider another 
strategies in order to increase visibility of taxation, as well as public awareness. The 
most explicit way to do so is to focus on tax collection and enforcement. In fact, adding 
more detailed information on sales taxes in customer receipts may improve their 
visibility. Unfortunately, such practice is unlikely to be useful in low-income countries 
where receipts are rarely used. Therefore, more innovative strategies are needed. One 
possibility is tax lottery or prize rewards for taxpayers with the highest number of 
receipts. This can also help with fighting against informal sector as more taxpayers will 
be wiliness to request a receipt over the counter at the point of sale – this transaction 
could be double-checked by tax administrators with financial records in sale ledger and 
entries stored in the VAT-memory of the cash machines. Meantime, information 
campaigns hosted by civil society, in partnership with business associations and 
government, can give the media outlet a more active role to play in publicizing the 
share of tax in common purchases, and raising public awareness in generally.  
Engaging Civil Society 
In discussing the relationship between the government and business associations, 
Handley (2008) has argued that there is a need for ‗constructive contestation‘ – the 
business sector must be strong enough to contest government decisions, but must also 
do so constructively, seeking broad-based improvements in economic policy rather 
than narrow, corporatist-type bargains. In the same way, reaching an effective tax 
bargain presents a similar challenge. Taxpayers must be organized to make demands 
on government, but both sides must also be willing to reach an inclusive and 
nationwide tax bargain rather than claiming narrow privileges or engaging in endless 
debates. Government, civil society and development partners can help to promote 
such ‗constructive contestation‘ by pursuing a number of measures that are beyond the 
direct realm of tax reform. 
In principle, business associations should be among the most important voices 
advocating for an effective tax system. Unfortunately, this has often not been a case – 
business associations in developing countries tend to be relatively weak and highly 
fragmented (Goldsmith, 2002). Because of their weakness, they are unable to have a 
significant influence on tax policy, or in pushing the government to reverse its decisions 
in exchange for tax compliance. Because they are fragmented, a subset of powerful 
businesses has tended to pursue their own narrow benefits – such as tax exemptions 
or special privileges – at the expense of broader improvements in governance. The 
tendency of business elite to maintain personal ties to government has undermined the 
ability of business community to develop an independent and effective political voice 
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(Handley, 2008). In some cases governments have gone even far by intentionally 
weakening business associations in order to reduce potential political threats, but this 
short-term perspective overlooks the extent to which a unified business sector can be 
an indispensable ally in pursuing reform. However, there is little research is done about 
how to foster the growth of unified and effective business associations. The basic 
challenge is to generate incentives for businesses of all sizes to put their collective 
needs in front of fragmented corporate interests. At the same time, the government 
itself plays a huge role in setting these incentives – success is more likely when the 
government adopts cross-cutting economic policies, communicates with business 
associations and provides distinct advantages to members of these associations. The 
other opportunity is to support the formation of inclusive associations of small and 
medium businesses. Historically, major business associations have been controlled by 
large companies with a rent-seeking agenda, even to the exclusion of mid-sized firms. 
While small business associations exist in many countries, they are in general 
extremely weak and under-resourced. While it is inevitable that larger firms will be 
particularly influential, participation of SMEs in business associations is likely to expand 
the scope of any political bargain, and maybe this provides extra incentives for 
government and large corporations to support broad, rather than particularistic aims. 
Likewise business associations, associations of individual taxpayers can also engage 
in ‗constructive contestation‘ with the government over issues of tax policy and 
administration. They can create pressure for greater equity and efficiency in tax reform, 
and also be a valuable partner to government by organizing debates on taxation and 
expanding public engagement. Throughout, the goal is to use taxation as an organizing 
idea to engage citizens in broader-based advocacy. Unfortunately, taxpayers‘ 
associations are rare, politically weak and almost completely under-researched in 
developing countries. 
Besides contestation, the concept of ‗constructive contestation‘ also implies 
partnership. Indeed, government together with civil society organizations can build a 
more equitable, effective and transparent tax system. Aside from possibility to bargain 
with broader social groups and facilitate better compliance, government can also work 
with these groups to improve tax education, awareness, and trust. At a micro level, civil 
society bodies can be an important agent for increasing taxpayer education and 
awareness because of their special link to taxpayers – probably taxpayers trust them 
more than the tax authorities. These non-governmental organizations can explain 
controversial tax issues clearly, while reinforcing the importance of paying taxes. As a 
fact, effective partnership may actually help civil society organizations to encourage 
compliance by their members. Those who pay taxes have a strong incentive to 
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encourage others to comply, and organized effort can facilitate this process better. The 
government may also support the emergence of a new profession – tax consultancy, 
which can help taxpayers with tax accounting and reporting, and act as a general 
resource of tax-related information. While tax consultants are sometimes viewed as 
facilitators of tax evasion, this must be balanced by the trust-enhancing benefits of 
professional tax service (LeBaube and Vehorn, 1992b). This provides a compelling 
evidence that taxation can be a catalyst for improving governance and mobilizing 
communities to seek more government responsiveness and accountability (OECD, 
2010a). 
1.3.2. Taxation, Development and Economic Growth 
Past experience demonstrated that success in fiscal consolidation processes could be 
achieved by cutting non-productive expenditures and creating favourable conditions in 
order to attract new investments and to increase country productive capacity. However, 
it is impossible to sustain fiscal consolidation by only reducing expenditures, the 
revenue boost is inevitable part of the consolidation process. Recently, the European 
Commission (2010c) conducts a comprehensive literature review of the main 
determinants towards successful fiscal consolidation. There is a consensus that the 
probability of tax-based consolidation to succeed is not as high as through 
consolidation of expenditures. Based on these discussions, the key question is what 
changes in a tax system could contribute to additional tax revenues without distorting 
economic growth, investments and productivity. Hypothetically, this could be achieved 
by accommodating right incentives in design of a particular tax or by shifting the overall 
tax structure in a desired way. Therefore, the consolidation plan should include a 
growth-friendly tax reform as an essential component of economic recovery strategy.  
Typically, there are two approaches to assess the impact of changes in tax system on 
economic growth – ‗tax level‘ approach and ‗tax structure‘ approach. As tax level (tax-
to-GDP ratio) and economic growth (GDP per capita) are endogenous variables, it is 
extremely hard to justify the causal relationship between the total level of taxation and 
growth. While the relationship between the tax level and growth is uncertain, the 
individual taxes affect economic growth especially in ‗high tax-to-GDP ratios‘ countries 
through three determinants – productivity, capital stock and labour supply. Johannson 
et al. (2008), Arnold (2008) and Myles (2009b, 2009a) and Arnold et al. (2011) found 
that income taxes are associated with lower economic growth and that property and 
consumption taxes are less distortable to growth. Among income taxes the corporate 
income tax (CIT) is the most harmful for capital investments and factor productivity. 
Personal income taxes (PIT) usually have a progressive structure of tax rates, which 
discourages saving and adversely affects labour supply by reducing net income and 
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purchasing power. Consumption taxes are considered as less distortive element of tax 
structure with the broadest and inelastic tax base. Property taxes, particular recurrent 
taxes on immovable property, occupy the bottom position among the least detrimental 
taxes and provide incentives for capital allocation in housing business.  Finally, 
environmental taxes are recognized as a new ‗green‘ source to generate additional tax 
revenue. The authors suggest that the tax reform program should heavily rely on the 
adjustments in three types of taxes – Property Tax, Consumption Tax and 
Environmental Tax. Alternatively, the OECD‘s Economics Department and Centre for 
Tax Policy and Administration (2010b) reviews the impact of changes in tax structure 
on GDP per capita through labour utilisation and labour productivity with discussion of 
efficient design of the main tax categories, notably consumption, property and income 
taxes. The empirical study of Heady et al. (2009) also supports this approach. Their 
simulation model demonstrates that a structural shift from income taxes to consumption 
and property taxes by 1% of GDP would increase GDP per capita by 0.25-1 
percentage point in long-term. The dynamic economic Quest III4 model developed by 
the European Commission (2010b: 69) confirms the same empirical findings and 
declares that ‗a consolidation through an increase in property taxes and VAT is the 
most favourable of all tax-based consolidations as regards to long run GDP growth.‘  
Roeger and in 't Veld (2010) highlight that this revenue-neutral shift in the tax structure 
could offset the output losses caused by fiscal consolidation in the short term leading to 
positive growth in the long term. Logically, the next element of the growth-friendly tax 
system reform is the individual tax design (marginal tax rates, progressivity, and tax 
expenditures). 
1.3.3. Taxation, Donors and Foreign Aid  
It seems that high levels of dependency on both external aid and natural resource 
revenues could pose a substantial challenge for the improvements in governance in 
the developing countries. This has been already debated for a while that aid is not the 
same sort of revenue as single natural resource renting and presumably has a less 
damaging effect on governance – if it is provided in ‗purposive‘ ways, and accompanied 
by mechanisms of scrutiny, expertise and management techniques that can add value, 
and create some pressure for accountability (Collier, 2006). On the other hand, the ‗aid 
can have similar disincentive effects on governments, freeing them from the imperative 
of reforms to broaden the tax base, and thus from an important kind of pressure for the 
provision of economic and social services‘ (Prichard et al., 2012). Nonetheless, 
                                                 
4
 QUEST III is the New-Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model used by 
international institutions and central banks for global macroeconomic modelling and policy analysis. 
Alternatively, the IMF has developed its own Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models 
and small Quarterly Projection Models (QPMs) to analyze economic behaviour and to forecast future 
developments. 
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development partners and donors should be aware of a potential risk of high aid 
dependency. Especially, if the levels of aid inflows to some countries would rise 
significantly over a sustained period of time without a complementary effort in domestic 
revenue mobilization, this could have a harmful effect on institutional development, too 
(Moss et al., 2006).  
Nowadays, there is growing concern that the availability of foreign aid may reduce 
incentives for aid-dependent countries to mobilize domestic revenue. Besides, this may 
also negatively affect the quality of governance by reducing pressure for state-capacity 
development and necessity to bargain with citizens over taxes (Moore, 1998). In reality, 
most governments are genuine in their desire to raise revenue, but easy access to 
large aid streams may compress the urgency with which revenue collection is pursued. 
There is also an additional risk that aid-recipient countries will particularly shy away 
from politically demanding tax policy reforms, even though these are precisely the 
areas – tax revenue (income, property and local taxes) and tax administration – that 
are likely to be most important to ‗taxation-governance‘ linkages. Despite widespread 
discussion of this risk, there is no compelling evidence that development aid 
consistently leads to reduced levels of tax collection in low-income countries. For all 
that, it is not clear whether the high level of aid dependency can actually affect 
domestic revenue mobilization, and how. While some studies report a rather 
depressing effect (Remmer, 2004), review of the statistical research on this topic 
suggests that the case is not proven (Moss et al., 2006). In particular, many of early 
studies concluded that foreign aid has had a systematically negative impact on taxation 
(Gupta et al., 2004b, Remmer, 2004, Bräutigam and Knack, 2004, Knack, 2008). 
However, more recent econometric studies have found a negligible, or even positive, 
evidential link between an increase in aid flows and a reduction in revenue mobilization 
(Gupta, 2007, Clist and Morrissey, 2011, Brun et al., 2006). At the same time, it should 
be noted that this statistical evidence is unlikely to be conclusive as it is very hard to 
find reliable fiscal data for aid-dependent economies. The ambiguity of these findings 
almost certainly reflects the fact that foreign aid affects domestic revenue in multiple 
ways, through the following channels: 
 Pure Revenue Incentives. It is almost certainly that foreign aid by itself is rather a 
disincentive to revenue collection, similar to dependency from natural resource 
revenue. 
 Technical Assistance. Development partners frequently provide direct technical 
support to tax reform projects, as well as consultancy with international 
communities of tax experts that have been an essence to successful tax reform in 
recent decades. 
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 Conditionality. Donors usually make domestic revenue collection as a condition for 
aid disbursement, both through broad conditionality for aid programs at the national 
level and strict requirements for matching funds for specific projects at the local 
level. Even though conditionality can vary in its effectiveness even within a country 
and over time. 
 Increased Demand for Public Spending. While often overlooked, it has long been 
recognized that aid may contribute to escalating public spending, and, hence, 
greater need for tax revenue. Aid-sponsored projects may imply long-term 
maintenance and operational costs for governments (Collier, 2006, Fjeldstad and 
Moore, 2008, Sanchez, 2006). 
The fundamental question is whether these positive incentives for revenue generation 
are sufficient enough to offset the fiscal disincentives created by foreign aid. Available 
evidences suggest that the answer is more likely to be context-specific. It is clear that 
in some cases direct donor support for tax reform has led to substantial increases in 
revenue generation. At the same time, the question about the effectiveness of aid 
conditionality is more ambiguous and contested, and there is little research was done 
on the topic. However, it appears that aid conditionality often is an important factor in 
promoting revenue enhancement. In broader terms, aid is more likely to be effective 
when the political environment is already conducive to reform, and when donors have a 
high degree of political leverage with the government. The message that emerges is 
that the relationship between aid assistance and taxation is much more complicated 
than the simple regression models that have been proposed. In different settings, and 
at different time, aid has had conflicting impacts on domestic tax collection, as well as a 
profound influence on the way how revenue is collected. These impacts are likely to 
have very important implications for linking taxation and state-building, but further 
research and analysis is urgently needed. 
Over a decade, there has been a wide range of studies attempting to explore the 
impact of foreign aid on tax reform efforts in aid-dependent nations. The early studies 
consistently reported that aid has a rather discouraging effect on tax collection across 
developing countries. The most prominent was work by IMF‘s Gupta et al. (2004b) 
which not only confirms that aid can actually suppress tax effort, but also highlights the 
fact that the composition of aid assistance does matter. That is to say, loans, which 
should be repaid later, could encourage tax collection, whereas grants in opposite have 
a more depressing effect. As a follow-up to this study, Benedek et al. (2012) partially 
replicated the initial approach. They divided the sample according to institutional 
strength and used a updated, and more complete, dataset for the period of 1980 to 
2009. The new study tested the robustness of expanded sample to selection bias, 
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concluding that the findings are robust enough across samples, although the negative 
link between aid and tax collection is stronger in developing countries with weak 
institutions. However, the study still has its distinct limitations. For instance, the dataset 
covers only 70.23% of entire sample (2,465 out of 3,510) and 58.42% of a possible 
observations (999 out of 1,710) among countries with weak institutional environment. It 
should be mention for further reference that this type of problems is very common to all 
existing studies on taxation and development. It raises broader concerns about both 
data quality and accuracy, as well as the robustness of the findings and model 
specification.  
More recently, a series of econometric studies started to challenge the basic findings 
about the negative correlation between donor‘s aid and taxation. Amongst them, Gupta 
(2007) and Teera and Hudson (2004) agree with a negligible impact of external 
assistance on total government revenue, Clist and Morrissey (2011) find no robust 
negative relationship so far, and even a positive effect on taxation since 1985. Brun et 
al. (2006) argue that a long-run relationship between aid and tax effort is contingent on 
the quality of institutions as countries with weak institutions may be more susceptible to 
a negative impact of aid flows on tax collection (Azam et al., 1999) and aid may affect 
tax performance indirectly through its effect on institutions and accountability. 
Correspondingly, they introduce various measures of institutional and democratic 
quality into a standard regression model and confirm that the aid-tax linkage is stronger 
affected by the quality of institutions, rather that the level of corruption or democracy. 
Particularly, they find that the impact of aid is positive for countries with high quality of 
bureaucracy and negative in weak institutional environments. These divergent results 
reflect various differences in data and model specifications, and pose a major doubt 
toward a collective claim about a consistently discouraging effect of foreign aid on 
taxation. 
The firmest response came from Clist and Morrissey (2011), who also replicated the 
Gupta et al (2004a) study to assess the effect of aid on tax effort by using data for 82 
developing countries over the period of 1970-2005. However, they do not find any 
robust evidence of a negative effect of development aid on tax collection assuming that 
this relationship was initially misspecified, and thus conclusion drawn from existing 
results should be carefully assessed. The main argument is that a negative correlation 
associated with higher level of aid and lower tax to GDP ratios is what to be expected 
in the developing countries which historically have a very low tax ratio and, in part 
because of this, tend to receive higher external financing – nowadays, more in the form 
of grants due to fiscal consolidation efforts. So, as achieved improvements in revenue 
performance have been difficult to sustain, this suggests that tax outcomes are shaped 
by deeply-rooted historical factors as well (Mkandawire, 2010, Keen and Simone, 
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2004, Teera and Hudson, 2004). In addition, they also argue that such complex causal 
relationship between higher aid and reduced efficiency in the collection of tax revenue 
has a behavioural pattern, which could only be revealed over time. As such, it is 
necessary to introduce lagged effect into an equation. Intuitively, Clist and Morrissey 
(2011) claim that longer lags on aid could eliminate its negative effect, and that 
sustained changes in tax collection are more likely to occur over the medium-term (five 
years in a panel context). This makes the search for immediate responses in tax 
collection to changes in aid allocation potentially misleading, and thus raises important 
questions about model specifications, particularly in regard to cross-country studies.  
Among regression factors, it is likely that aid-related policies, including conditionality 
and technical assistance, have a significant effect on tax collection. Yet, proxy used for 
the tax base, such as agriculture, industry, imports and exports shares in GDP, cannot 
adequately capture these policy effects. To put it more simply, it seems that aid could 
affect tax performance through multiple variables – these variables not only move in 
different directions, but also interrelated with each other. Multicollinearity makes it very 
difficult to distinguish their effects on dependant variable and isolate from the others 
with confidence.5 
Clist and Morrissey (2011) also review how aid policies and tax collection can influence 
each other, as in the past two decades aid-dependent countries continuously reported 
an increase in their tax ratios. But, this may not reflect any causation at all. In fact, aid-
sponsored projects can generate broader outcomes, such as economic growth or 
institutional capacity, which may equally support tax performance. Even more, some 
aid policies could be actually associated with reduction in tax revenue. For example, 
economic reforms such as trade liberalisation and deregulation, which have been a 
typical component of aid conditionality and hence more aid funding, can dramatically 
erode tax revenue from tariffs, which happen to be an important revenue source for 
low-income countries (Aizenman and Jinjarak, 2009). Over the last two decades, a 
global shift away from trade taxes towards sale taxes has exacerbated a problem of 
domestic revenue-raising for developing countries. According to IMF research, while 
developed countries have managed to offset this decline in revenues by other sources, 
notably VAT, the low-income countries were able to replace at best only 30% of losses 
in trade taxes (Baunsgaard and Keen, 2010). In addition, their governments also lack 
of appropriate resources and capacity to build comprehensive tax administration 
system. Despite recent attempts to broaden the tax base, tax authorities in developing 
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 In statistics, multicollinearity occurs when two or more of the independent variables in a multiple 
regression model are highly correlated. Consequently, multicollinearity misleadingly increases the 
standard errors that can make some variables statistically insignificant while they should be otherwise 
significant. Easy way to detecting multicollinearity is to compute correlation coefficient between all pairs 
of the explanatory variables or to calculate the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each of them.  
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countries tend to concentrate their efforts on monitoring the Large Taxpayers Unit – 
which is very small in number, but generates the most revenue – to the exclusion of 
other taxpayer groups, such as professionals and small businesses in the informal 
sector. This makes sense from the point of cutting administrative costs, but could have 
perverse effect on governance. On top of this, globalization may also exacerbate fiscal 
problems, as international mobility of capital makes it very difficult to tax. In the same 
way, these countries struggle to recoup revenue losses from ‗hard to collect‘ taxes, 
such as income taxes or taxes on consumption. This helps to explain why some 
studies find a negative impact of aid on tax ratios, but this could be not due to a direct 
effect of aid policy. In this case, economic policy reforms in developing countries 
through aid conditionality may lead to reduction in tax to GDP ratio in the short-term 
(Prichard et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, important evidence emerges from country-specific econometric studies 
that estimate the effects of aid on main fiscal aggregates, such as budget revenue, 
public spending and borrowing. While these time-series studies look in detail at the 
relationships between aid and taxation within particular country, this approach 
highlights the fact that it is not possible to draw reliable conclusion about the effect of 
aid on tax revenue solely based on observation of the changes in aid inflows and the 
tax ratio alone. In order to understand fiscal effects of aid in full, the other components 
of the budget process should be included as well, notably non-tax revenue, domestic 
borrowing, and government expenditures. Lloyd et al. (2009) apply such fiscal 
response analysis to a sample of 19 developing countries. The main finding is that aid 
does play significant role in shaping budgetary behaviour. Meanwhile, for the majority 
of developing countries aid is a weakly exogenous element of the fiscal relationship – 
thus, donors do not usually include fiscal imbalances in their decisions about aid 
allocation, but aid has effect on other budget components. Besides, they find the 
positive correlation between aid and spending (both current and capital). However, the 
relationship between aid and tax revenue is not as simple – the correlation coefficients 
in aid-recipient countries vary wildly from negative to positive and even insignificant. It 
appears that negative one was due to donor decision to reduce aid flow in response to 
subsequent increase in domestic tax revenue. Thus, negative correlation between aid 
and taxation does not necessary mean that it is the aid that causing reduced tax effort. 
Another common finding from multiple-regression studies is that the tax to GDP is 
relatively an exogenous variable. In other words, it is not affected by other components 
in the fiscal system, leaving most of the adjustments to balance revenue and spending 
to them. Brun et al. (2006) also emphasise the need to account for possible problem of 
endogeneity. While high flows of aid may affect tax revenue, it is equally possible that 
high levels of tax collection in aid-dependent countries may influence aid flows, 
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particularly in post-conflict countries where low level of tax revenue driving higher 
demand for aid funding. Indeed, it seems precisely evident that aid inflow will be 
inflated because of national governments incapacity to raise domestic revenue. The 
econometric solution to tackle this issue with endogeneity is either to compute a new 
instrumental variable for aid or to use new estimation techniques eliminating the impact 
of multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. For example, Brun et al. (2006) construct an 
‗aid potential‘ index, based on the method proposed by Tavares (2003), and, by doing 
so, they receive a statistically significant result on positive correlation between aid and 
tax effort within the entire sample. Similarly, Benedek et al. (2012) use the General 
Method of Moments (GMM) technique to deal with possible endogeneity in their study. 
As a recent IMF working paper concludes, revenue-raising capacity is essential to 
guarding against aid volatility and preparing an orderly exit from long-term reliance on 
aid (Gupta, 2007). Furthermore, assistance projects financed by donors are likely to 
generate recurrent expenses later, which still need to be covered by public revenues. 
How far aid dependency is a concern also depends on how development assistance is 
provided, and whether or not rates of economic growth and increases in domestic 
revenue mobilization outpace increases in aid. So, it is expected that different types of 
aid may have different effects on revenue-raising process and hence accountability. 
One of the suggestions is that loans are associated with higher revenue mobilization, 
as opposite to grants. However, much more research is needed if useful policy 
recommendations are to be drawn (Gupta et al., 2004b). 
Finally, despite the IMF‘s position that aid has a discouraging effect on taxation, the 
recent evidence suggests that this proposition is not robust. Moreover, there are strong 
arguments that the fiscal impact of aid is more context-specific and dependent on the 
quality of institutions. Nevertheless, it should be noted that all of the empirical results 
reviewed above are subject to quite pronounced conceptual and econometric 
challenges, which means that these results, while useful, should be treated with 
caution. 
Conclusions 
The aim of tax reforms is to increase revenue, as well as to encourage voluntary 
compliance and reduce tax evasion. In developing and transition countries, tax 
administration reforms only recently begin to receive significant level of attention and 
financial support from the global community. In order to be successful the tax reform 
should be embedded in broader public management reforms to avoid unsustainable 
‗islands of excellence‘ and be attributed to wider public sector reforms, including anti-
corruption and civil service reforms. They also need political support, broader 
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participation of the civil society and appropriate use of change management (Robson 
and Engelschalk, 2006, Hestad, 2005). According to the World Bank (2008: 58), 
patience is also in demand, as ‗most of the Bank‘s tax administration investment 
projects lasted five to seven years, and more than 80 percent had to be extended to 
achieve the desired results.‘  
Understanding the politics of tax reform is essential to effectively pursue the goals 
associated with raising revenue, promoting economic growth, and strengthening 
governance. Indeed, the governments in developing and transition countries urgently 
need to increase domestic revenues to fund social-oriented expenditures. However, 
revenue is not the only concern, it is also important to take into consideration what 
impact the level and composition of taxes can have on efficiency, equity and long-term 
economic growth . Also, high occurrence of tax incentives, especially time-limited tax 
exemptions and privileges, may create opportunities for bribery and corruption, and 
increase the appearance of loopholes in tax laws. Research should be done to 
examine what reforms and reform strategies have been most successful, and why. 
As this literature review demonstrates, to achieve a better understanding of the main 
directions, and the main factors affecting these directions, of tax reform in post-Soviet 
countries the model should include not only traditional socio-economic forces, but also 
the features of the political pressure, elements of the administrative system and the 
influence of development partners on the reform process. It is already clear that the key 
themes for tax reform in transition countries are country context, political will, high-level 
commitment and government ownership of reform, donor support and aid dependence, 
adequate institutional capacity, and wider public engagement – in particular, by civil 
society, media and private sector. Also, it should not be forgotten that tax reform took 
place within broader public sector reforms (Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008).  
Historical Factors. The legacies of centrally planned economy have played an 
important role in the development of tax systems in post-Soviet transition countries. It is 
critical to understand how initial conditions and practices inherited from the previous 
regime continue to provide a solid background for reform initiatives. Thus, the 
principles and practices of the central planning put into disarray the tax systems in the 
countries in transition. 
Socio-Economical Factors. Empirical research on tax reform and economic growth 
should extend efforts to mobilize new evidences on the impacts of different tax policies 
and incentives on small and medium businesses, to look at a link between tax 
administration and corruption, and to explore the policy incentives for government in 
promoting fiscal consolidation and macroeconomic stability. It is important to avoid the 
temptation to seek general conclusions about the ways taxation might affect growth 
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without paying close attention to its interaction with other instruments of the socio-
economic policy in specific contexts – the political and fiscal conditions under which 
elite‘s decisions are made. As already known, investment is more likely to respond 
positively to more predictable and unambiguous tax policies, rather than to specific 
changes in tax regimes. It also seems that more efficient, fairer, and less corrupt tax 
system can improve wider relations between governance and state-building.  
Political and Administrative Factors. It is widely understood that effective tax systems 
can be a catalyst for strengthening state capacity and government-citizens ties. 
However, the specifics of these relationships remain underexplored. Further research 
should be conducted to provide concrete and policy-relevant evidence about the nature 
of these connections, when and how they can be improved.  At the same time, there is 
a strong argument in the literature that taxation and state-building are linked – the 
government can gain substantial ‗dividends‘ from mobilizing domestic financial 
resources through tax system (Brautigam et al., 2008).  
The tax-governance relationship can also underpin formal mechanisms of political 
accountability (IDS, 2005). It is clear that the form of government, as well as the 
citizen‘s perception of government in terms of legitimacy and efficiency have a 
significant effect on the level of tax compliance. In a study on culture and taxation, Witt 
(2006) also concludes that cultural factors do shape tax policy, and that transparency 
and accountability are important elements of building taxpayer culture. However, 
Robson and Engelschalk (2006) note that the way how performance and particular 
behaviour of tax administrators influence governance, state-building, and development 
is not yet well understood. Another reform initiatives include the introduction of the 
integrated automated information system within revenue service and the innovative use 
of the media to improve taxpayer information support and tax appeals mechanism. 
External Factors. There is no common opinion about the role of development partners 
in the reform process. Definitely, they could be very intrusive in promoting their reform 
packages and new management ideas, including the international ‗best practice‘ 
models. At the same time, the technical assistance and professional trainings 
contributed a lot to a success of tax reforms in developing countries, and the demand 
for donor support is still very high. 
Aid dependency level has a significant influence on the progress of tax reforms - again, 
the direction of influence cannot be determined. On one hand, higher levels of aid 
dependency may mean that donors invest more in reform programs, which in turn have 
a positive effect on tax system performance. On the other hand, the relationship may 
be generated by the fact that countries with better tax systems attract more aid, and 
therefore appear as more aid dependent. Moreover, even if causality could be 
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established, the small correlation means that massive injections of aid would be 
needed for relatively small improvements in tax systems. 
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2. THEORETICAL MODELS AND APPROACHES  
As in other areas where value-judgments and emotions are involved 
(eg, aesthetics, ethics, politics, psychology) irrationality permeates 
public finance literature and discussions of tax policy issues, and 
frequently this is because terms and expressions are used in an 
inconsistent or ambiguous way. 
Ken Messere (1993) 
In the last two decades, a significant amount of literature has been written about tax 
reform experiments in developing countries and countries in transition. However, there 
is no universal model or approach to tax reform – also, definitions differ widely. 
Although, the review of literature will show that generic tax reform is considered to be a 
fundamental part of broader PFM reform, in practice they have been treated separately. 
According to Lledo et al. (2004), tax reforms have been consistently influenced by four 
theoretical approaches, including the Public Economics Approach, which traditionally 
deals with main principles of microeconomics such as efficiency and equity, the 
Macroeconomic Approach, which emphasizes the link between taxation and the main 
economic aggregates, the Administrative Approach, which focuses on effectiveness 
and efficiency of tax system in terms of cost minimization and revenue gains, and the 
Political Approach, which explores the inherent political nature of taxation expressed in 
various preferences and incentives (Table 2.1.1).  
The structure of this chapter mirrors these main approaches, starting with the optimal 
taxation, the ‗reigning‘ approach in microeconomics, before going to discuss 
administrative and political ‗models‘ and approaches to tax reform. Each section 
provides a brief overview of the concept and its impact. Among the approaches 
covered are the NPM Model, PEM approach, getting the basics right, platform 
approach, strengthened approach, drivers of change approach, and expected utility 
stakeholder model. While all these approaches have been included under expenditure 
management, the last three could be applicable to other situations as well. More 
popular approaches to the reform of revenue administration are the introduction of 
semi-autonomous revenue authorities and the organization of tax administration by 
functions, rather than by tax types. The Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model of the public 
management reform will be described at the end of the chapter.  
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2.1. Optimal Taxation Approach 
For the past few decades, the theory of optimal taxation has been the ‗reigning‘ 
approach to taxation (Slemrod, 1990: 157). Within the context of public economics, 
Optimal Taxation is generally viewed as ‗an explicitly normative approach to tax 
analysis that is based on standard tools of welfare economics, as applied in a world 
when the first-best allocation of resources and distribution of income cannot be 
achieved … based on several methodological assumptions: the government is required 
to raise a specified amount of revenues; it is limited in the types of tax instruments that 
it has available to it, such as only commodity taxes, only income taxes, or both types; 
its decisions must be consistent with individual and firm optimization; and it makes its 
choices in order to maximize a ―social welfare function‖, which indicates the value that 
society places on the welfare of different individuals‘ (Alm, 1996: 117-118). This 
normative framework of optimal tax theory provides the intellectual foundation for 
Optimal Tax Reforms which ‗strive to maximize an explicit social welfare function that 
balances vertical equity gains against tax-induced losses in the efficiency of resource 
allocation … seek a pattern of tax rates on different tax bases that will minimize the 
efficiency cost of taxation while respecting society‘s aversion to extensive income 
inequality‘ (Thirsk, 1997: 8). 
The core issue in optimal tax theory is the appropriate design of a tax system described 
as a balance of different characteristics - ‗taxes must be raised (revenue-yield) in a way 
that treats individuals fairly (equity), that minimizes interference in economic decisions 
(efficiency), and that does not impose undue costs on taxpayers or tax administrators 
(simplicity)‘(Alm, 1996: 117). In regard to desirable attributes of good tax system, Adam 
Smith (1776, Book 5, Ch. 2, Part 2) came up with four criteria for optimality: 
 Equality. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the 
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities - that is, 
in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of 
the state. 
 Certainty. The tax which each individual is bound to pay should be certain, and not 
arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, 
should all  be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person. 
 Convenience of Payment. Every tax should be levied at the time, or in the manner, 
in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. 
 Economy in Collection. Every tax should be so contrived as both to take out and to 
keep out of the pockets of the taxpayers as little as possible over and above what it 
brings into the public treasury of the state. 
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The certainty and convenience of payment principles (maxims 2 and 3) are self-
evidential and fundamental for taxpayers rights, whereas did not generate prominent 
debates in the public economics literature. It is equality and economy in collection 
(maxims 1 and 4) that received the precious attention of economic theorists, so the tax 
fairness, minimal administrative costs and encouragement of business were claimed to 
be the major criteria in evaluation of tax proposal (Heady, 1993: 17). However, the 
administrative costs have been gradually omitted from proposal analysis because the 
‗tax rates-costs‘ relationship is very difficult to model. The costs tend to also correlate 
with other variables such as number of differential tax rates or tax allowances (Heady, 
1993: 24). In that case, the economists usually ignore the costs (administrative and 
compliance) and try to use economic models that will provide the best trade-off 
between equality (fairness) and efficiency (incentives) based on the concepts of utility 
and social welfare - and assumptions of perfect economy in the absence of 
externalities. by and large, the same evaluation criteria could be applied to tax reform 
analysis where the ‗aim is not to find the best tax system, but to find a better one‘ 
(Heady, 1993: 18, Ahmad and Stern, 1991). 
The neglect of administrative costs despite their importance for actual policy-making is 
the serious limitation of optimal tax theory (Heady, 1993: 18). In fact, the survey of 
optimal taxation literature reveals the ‗lack of real world applicability of tax theory on 
administrative grounds‘ (Dhami and al-Nowaihi, 2005: 3). In principle, Sandmo (1976: 
52- 53) admits that the ‗costs of administration have not been incorporated into the 
theory …,‘ but argues ‗The incorporation of costs of administration is an extremely 
complicated task, and it remains to be seen whether a formally more complete theory 
can still yield conclusions which are interesting and meaningful from the point of view of 
implementation.‘ Heady (1993: 24) points out that ‗One way in which many models are 
unrealistic has already been mentioned: their neglect of administrative costs of tax 
collection. To this can be added neglect of the costs to taxpayers of compliance.‘ 
Further, Slemrod (1990: 157, 168) comments that ‗differences in the ease of 
administering various taxes have been and will continue to be a critical determinant of 
appropriate tax policy‘ and believes that ‗integrating the issue of administrative ease 
into optimal tax theory will require a shift of emphasis away from the structure of 
preferences, which has been the principal focus of optimal tax theory, toward the 
technology of tax collection‘ in order to create a unified Theory of Optimal Tax Systems 
that incorporates the capacity constraints of tax administration. In connection with 
imperfect administration, Thirsk (1997: 10) proposes the ‗blending of theoretical 
insights from formal models of tax reform with the results from less formal approaches 
to reform in developing countries that recognize the problems of tax evasion and the 
existence of a large informal economy.‘ 
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Principles of Good Tax System 
Tax principles often play a role of the ‗pathfinder‘ for fundamental tax reforms. There 
have been a large number of debates regarding what constitutes an ‗ideal‘ tax system. 
The normative analysis of tax policy tends to follow a standard principles-based 
approach according to which a good tax system should meet certain criteria. Adam 
Smith (1776) outlined the four canons of taxation - equity, certainty, convenience and 
economy - which are still relevant to modern tax environment. These basic principles 
are important in implementing tax policy, because if the Adam Smith‘s tax design 
principles are upheld the changes in tax system are introduced in a manner which 
satisfies the stated objectives of tax reform. According to Alley and Bentley (2005: 582), 
the interpretation and content of the principles underlying the tax system are 
embedded within the purposes of taxation which help to understand the basis for the 
differences in meaning ascribed to the same principles: 
 Taxation is the primary source of funding public expenditures. Burgess and Stern 
(1993: 762) make similar statement ‗The main purpose of taxation is to raise 
resources to finance government expenditure … There must clearly be some trade-
offs among revenue, administration, political acceptability, equity, and efficiency. 
The problem of tax reform is to find an improvement, with respect to these criteria, 
of an existing system.‘  
 Taxation acts as an instrument to achieve the economic goals of the government. 
 Taxation helps to redistribute income on a socially acceptable basis.  
However, even if the meaning of the commonly used principles is agreed, ‗there is also 
a penumbra of uncertainty, simply because language is so open-textured‘ (Alley and 
Bentley, 2005: 581). Hart  (1961: 121-132) also points out that, ‗uncertainty at the 
borderline is the price to be paid for the use of general classifying terms in any form of 
communication concerning matters of fact.‘  
In terms of the legal background of tax reform, Alley and Bentley (2005: 581) assert 
that ‗the general principles used to provide a basis for reform do not provide a taxpayer 
with a legally or morally enforceable right. Nor do they require the administration or the 
executive to act in a particular way. The ―broad taxation principles‖ are stated generally 
as goals to be pursued. Once the law is developed based on these principles, 
legislation will transform some of their content into enforceable rights and obligations.‘ 
On the whole, the art of tax design is to find an adequate compromise between 
interpretation and application of the principles most effectively in order to achieve the 
intended purposes of taxation. 
In the context of global economy, the international application of design principles that 
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have common core of meanings becomes increasingly important. As a response, Alley 
and Bentley (2005: 586-588) prepare a selective, but incomprehensive, summary of 
generally accepted tax principles which have been used in representative reports over 
years and across countries (Table 2.1.1). According to this list, there is significant 
conflict and overlap within design principles - indeed, criteria for an efficient tax system 
differ widely in content and meaning. It is important to note that ‗the general principles 
are not necessarily consistent. Sometimes they are mutually exclusive in their 
application. It will be the value judgments of those applying the principles that will 
determine which will carry more weight. This does not make the use of the principles 
any less worthwhile, for in deciding that one principle should take priority over another, 
both principles have to be considered and there is transparency in the process‘ (Alley 
and Bentley, 2005: 582). For example, the OECD (1998a) delivers a broad framework 
of key principles, while the AICPA (2001) produces more specific list of tax principles 
soundly called the Guiding Principles of Good Tax Policy. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
The Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the OECD (1998a: 4) sets out the key tax principles 
that should be applied to electronic commerce - today, e-commerce creates substantial 
challenges to the existing tax design. These principles are also important because they 
represent the agreed position of the OECD members and the global community on tax 
matters which in general fits the framework.  
 Neutrality. Taxation should seek to be neutral and equitable between forms of 
electronic commerce and between conventional and electronic forms of commerce. 
Business decisions should be motivated by economic rather than tax 
considerations. Taxpayers in similar situations carrying out similar transactions 
should be subject to similar levels of taxation. 
 Efficiency. Compliance costs for taxpayers and administrative costs for the tax 
authorities should be minimised as far as possible. 
 Certainty and Simplicity. The tax rules should be clear and simple to understand so 
that taxpayers can anticipate the tax consequences in advance of a transaction, 
including knowing when, where and how the tax is to be accounted. 
 Effectiveness and Fairness. Taxation should produce the right amount of tax at the 
right time. The potential for tax evasion and avoidance should be minimised while 
keeping counter-acting measures proportionate to the risks involved. 
 Flexibility. The systems for the taxation should be flexible and dynamic to ensure 
that they keep pace with technological and commercial developments. 
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In reality, they have a profound impact on positions taken by the World Bank, IMF and 
WTO in terms of projects proposing tax reform or making recommendations for the 
design of tax system, and expand the influence of taxation principles to the extent that 
‗whereas the OECD and WTO are concerned with coordinating and shaping the future 
economic direction of the world‘s major economies, the IMF and World Bank are 
concerned with ensuring that other countries follow suit‘ (Bentley, 2003: 1127, 1133). 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants  
As a part of the Tax Policy Concept Statements series, the Tax Division of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA, 2001: 9-14) has published a taxation 
framework of ten guiding principles – based on Adam Smith‘s maxims of tax policy – to 
analyse and compare tax proposals.  
 Equity and Fairness. Similarly situated taxpayers should be taxed similarly. The 
AICPA (2007: 3-9) identifies several ‗dimensions‘ that should be considered in 
assessing tax proposal, such as exchange, process, compliance, horizontal and 
vertical equity and fairness. 
 Certainty. The tax rules should clearly specify when the tax is to be paid, how it is 
to be paid, and how the amount to be paid is to be determined. The rules of tax 
system must enable taxpayers to determine what is subject to tax (tax base) and at 
what tax rate(s). 
 Convenience of Payment. A tax should be due at a time or in a manner that is most 
likely to be convenient for the taxpayer. Convenience of payment is important in 
helping to ensure compliance with the tax system. The more difficult a tax is to pay 
the more likely that it will not be paid. 
 Economy in Collection. The costs to collect a tax should be kept to a minimum for 
both the government and taxpayers. These costs include the administrative cost to 
the government that is influenced by the number of revenue officers necessary to 
administer the tax and compliance costs incurred by taxpayers. This principle is 
also closely related to the principle of simplicity. The more complex a tax, the 
greater the costs for the government to administer it and the greater the compliance 
costs for taxpayers to determine their tax liability and report it. 
 Simplicity. The tax law should be simple so that taxpayers understand the rules and 
can comply with them correctly and in a cost-efficient manner. Simplicity is 
important both to improve the compliance process and to enable taxpayers to 
better understand the tax consequences of transactions. Moreover, the AICPA 
(2002: 8-12) recommends the specific principles that must be taken in order to 
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make tax legislation and regulations simpler, such as make simplification a priority 
and seek simplest approaches, minimize compliance burdens, reduce frequency of 
tax law change, use consistent concepts and definitions, consider administrative 
burdens and avoid limited applicability.  
 Neutrality. The effect of the tax law on a taxpayer‘s decisions as to how to carry out 
a particular transaction or whether to engage in a transaction should be kept to a 
minimum. The primary purpose of taxation is to raise revenue for governmental 
activities, rather than to influence business and personal decisions. 
 Economic Growth and Efficiency. The tax system should not impede or reduce the 
productive capacity of the economy and should neither discourage nor hinder 
national economic goals, such as economic growth, capital formation, and 
international competitiveness. The principle of economic growth and efficiency is 
achieved by a tax system that is aligned with the economic principles and goals of 
the jurisdiction imposing the tax, and related to the principle of neutrality in that tax 
rules that distort taxpayer behaviour may hinder economic efficiency. 
 Transparency and Visibility. Taxpayers should know that a tax exists and how and 
when it is imposed upon them and others. Visibility enables individuals and 
businesses to know the true cost of transactions and see what their total tax liability 
is and to which level of government it is being paid. When a tax is not visible, it can 
be easily retained or raised with little, if any, awareness among taxpayers about 
how the tax affects them. For the law to become more transparent, the AICPA 
(2003: 13-22) offers a roadmap - make the promulgation of a good tax system a 
priority, implement transparent approaches, eliminate and avoid phase-outs, 
 eliminate and avoid interactive provisions, adopt uniform definitions of terms for all 
statutory purposes, and avoid multiple effective dates and sunset dates. 
 Minimum Tax Gap. A tax should be structured to minimize noncompliance. The tax 
gap is the difference between taxes that are owed and taxes that are voluntarily 
paid. A number of tax provisions may encourage noncompliance because the 
provision is too complex to understand or to comply with. Generally, compliance 
measures need to strike a balance between the desired level of compliance against 
the costs of enforcement and the level of intrusiveness of the tax system. 
 Appropriate Government Revenues. Tax systems should have some level of 
predictability and reliability to enable the government to determine how much tax 
revenue is likely be collected and when. Typically, a mix of taxes provides a more 
stable tax base because different types of taxes are affected differently by changes 
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in the economy. Governments need some assurance that tax revenues will be 
stable so that required spending can occur. 
The purpose of the tax policy statements is to provide a tool for lawmakers and policy 
analysts to evaluate competing proposals for tax reform against a set of common 
principles to ensure a simple, fair and economically efficient tax system based on good 
tax policy (AICPA, 2005, 2009). A key challenge of incorporating these principles into 
tax system is that it is difficult to achieve all  of the indicators at the same time. Hence, 
to balance the competing objectives legislators and policymakers have carefully 
formulate and implement optimal tax policies. For instance, the equity and fairness 
have been recognized for long as the main characteristics of an ‗ideal‘ tax system. But, 
tax provisions which are targeted to enhance equity and fairness may have dual effect 
on the simplicity, transparency or certainty of the tax system. Conversely, tax proposals 
intended to promote economic growth and efficiency may result in horizontal inequity 
(AICPA, 2007: 10). In addition, James and Nobes (2010: 132 ) emphasize the ‗fact that 
many taxes do not meet these criteria might be predicted from public choice analysis 
which examines the way individuals attempt to achieve their aims through the public 
sector.‘ While definitions and layout of the reports issued by the governmental agencies 
may vary and some tax organizations and committees either ignore the principles 
utilized by others or find them to be less relevant to particular analysis, there are 
similarities among the tax frameworks used to analyse alternative tax proposals and to 
determine how well they satisfy the common principles of good tax system. 
Comparison of Tax Principles 
On the whole, it appears from the comparative analysis of the narrow (OECD) and 
extended (AICPA) lists of tax criteria, that ‗several of the principles in the extended lists 
simply reflect a greater level of detail within the principles on the shorter lists‘ (Alley and 
Bentley, 2005: 621). In other words, the related principles with the same goals should 
be allocated within existing criteria rather than as additional categories (Table 2.1.2).  
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Table 2.1.2. Comparison of Tax Criteria 
Adam Smith 
(1776) 
OECD 
(1998) 
AICPA 
(2001) 
Alley and Bentley 
(2005) 
Equity Effectiveness 
Fairness 
Equity 
Fairness 
Equity 
Fairness 
Certainty Certainty  
Simplicity 
Certainty Certainty  
Simplicity 
Convenience  Convenience of payment  
Economy Efficiency Economy in collection Efficiency 
 Neutrality Neutrality Neutrality 
 Flexibility   
  Simplicity  
  Economic growth and 
efficiency 
 
  Transparency and 
visibility 
 
  Minimum tax gap Effectiveness 
  Appropriate government 
revenues 
 
Source:  Alley, C. & Bentley, D. (2005) A Remodelling of Adam Smith's Tax Design 
Principles. Australian Tax Forum, 20, 579-624, pp. 619-621. 
 It is obvious that Adam Smith‘s principles should be modernized as tax design rules 
become more international in perspective and countries are looking for contemporary 
design of their own tax systems. For all that, it is essential to have a common 
framework such as Smith‘s principles that will be widely adopted and used as a basis 
for consistent analysis of the on-going changes in tax system. Consequently, Alley and 
Bentley (2005: 622-623) recommend a set of five principles to be adopted with the 
accompanying terminology to ensure a common approach to tax design, to assess 
different components of the tax system and to make effective recommendations for tax 
reform in future. In reality, such framework of tax design principles will always be a 
subject for continual disagreements, debates and negotiations between different 
stakeholders and influential groups.  
 Equity and Fairness. Taxation system design should take account of horizontal and 
vertical equity. It is important that the public perceives the tax system as fair.  
 Certainty and Simplicity. Tax rules should not be arbitrary. Tax rules should be as 
clear and simple to understand as the complexity of the subject of taxation allows, 
so that taxpayers can anticipate in advance the tax consequences of a transaction 
including knowing when, where and how the tax is to be accounted. There should 
be transparency and visibility in the design and implementation of the tax rules. 
 Efficiency. Compliance and administration costs should be minimised and payment 
of tax should be as easy as possible. 
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 Neutrality. The tax system should not impede or reduce the productive capacity of 
the economy. Business decisions should be motivated by economic rather than tax 
considerations. Taxpayers in similar situations carrying out similar transactions 
should be subject to similar levels of taxation. Capital import neutrality and capital 
export neutrality should be considered. 
 Effectiveness. The system should collect the right amount of tax at the right time 
without imposing double taxation or unintentional non-taxation at both the domestic 
and international levels. The system should be flexible and dynamic to ensure a 
match with technological and commercial developments. The potential for active or 
passive non-compliance should be minimised while keeping counter-acting 
measures proportionate to the risks involved. 
Theory of Optimal Taxation and Tax Reform 
For many years, the theory of optimal taxation has been widely criticized for being 
abstract with extensive use of mathematics, ignoring the administrative and compliance 
costs (Heady, 1993, Mirrlees et al., 2011) and offering few robust theoretical results 
(Sørensen, 2010: 212). For these and other reasons many policymakers consider 
optimal taxation as irrelevant to practical tax policy.  
According to Tanzi (1992), the ‗optimal tax theory inappropriately neglects the 
informational, administrative, and political requirements needed to implement it. 
Because of this oversight, tax reformers have taken few of their cues from the 
normative analysis of optimal taxation‘ (Thirsk, 1997: 10). The impact of optimal tax 
theory on guiding the direction of tax reforms in developing and transition countries has 
been rather small and indirect ‗because the literature on optimal taxation has not yet 
produced rules and criteria readily understandable by framers of tax policy, because 
the theory assumes frictionless tax administration and compliance and because it 
assumes knowledge about elasticities that is not yet available‘ (Gillis, 1989: 515 ). 
However, it has been a significant effect of the optimal tax theory on the way how the 
economists view tax reform. In particular, the theory has inspired them to justify a shift 
toward ‗neutral‘ tax system which is happened to be not necessarily an ‗optimal‘ or 
‗efficient‘ structure. Yet, neutrality is among the explicit objectives of tax reform cited by 
the majority of governmental agencies and international organizations in recent reform 
proposals along with efficiency, simplicity, transparency, stability and economic growth. 
Unsurprisingly, Mirrlees et al. (2011: 471-473) define a good tax system as 
‗progressive, neutral tax system … structured to meet overall spending needs … treats 
similar economic activities in similar ways for tax purposes will tend to be simpler, avoid 
unjustifiable discrimination between people and economic activities, and help to 
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minimize economic distortions … achieve progressivity as efficiently as possible.‘ Thus, 
there is no doubt that neutrality is a useful instrumental guideline (second-best 
framework, rule of thumb) which can make the tax system design better. In this regard, 
Kaplow (2011: 2) recommends to follow a ‗distribution-neutral (and revenue-neutral) 
approach toward tax reform.‘ To summarize, Gillis (1989: 501-502, 515) concludes that 
the optimal tax theory has not much influenced the shape of actual tax policy as 
‗optimality‘ in real-world tax systems is at present unattainable at any cost, tax reform 
directed toward more efficient resource allocation is generally measured against 
conditions required for greater neutrality in taxation … taken to imply greater uniformity 
in tax rates and generality in not only the tax rules prescribed in tax structures but in 
mechanisms of tax administration. Greater generality, then, requires both the 
broadening of tax bases to the extent possible, as well as more even-handedness in 
tax administration‘ and predicts that ‗neutral taxation will be preferred as a benchmark 
until such time as analysts are able to identify optimal departures from neutrality in real 
world policy settings, and until such time as administrative capacities are equal to the 
task of operating necessarily complicated optimal tax structures.‘ 
In contract, Sørensen (2010: 213) argues that ‗recent advances in optimal tax theory 
have made that theory easier to apply and may help to explain some current trends in 
international tax policy‘ in terms of uniform commodity taxes as well as ‗neutral‘ taxation 
of capital income across all types of investments. Sandmo (1976: 53) urges that ‗no 
policy model can be complete in the sense of taking account of all relevant concerns 
facing a policymaker.‘ To make it more practical, Mankiw et al. (2009: 2) discuss the 
theoretical underpinnings of the eight lessons suggested by theory of optimal taxation 
and compare them with actual OECD tax policy developed in recent decades. While 
the gaps between the theory and practice of taxation still remain, the tax policy has 
typically followed the directions recommended by the optimal tax theory even though 
the theory‘s prescriptions are not always clear. In fact, top marginal rates on labour 
income have declined, marginal income tax schedules have moved toward flatter 
(lump-sum) tax rates, and commodity taxes have become more uniform by exempting 
intermediate inputs and applying directly to final consumption goods. However, the 
effect of regressive capital taxes, ‗tagging‘ of taxpayer personal characteristics, asset-
testing of public disability insurance, and history-dependent on tax policy has been 
modest in dynamic settings. Therefore, the question ‗whether policymakers need to 
learn more from theorists, or the other way around‘ is still open to debate.  
Although developing countries attempt to improve the performance of their tax systems 
by replacing the idealized ‗optimal taxation‘ approach by more pragmatic models and 
by obtaining a better understanding of political and administrative obstacles towards 
successful tax reform, the ‗best approach to reforming taxes … is one that takes into 
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account taxation theory, empirical evidence, and political and administrative realities 
and blends them with a good dose of local knowledge and a sound appraisal of the 
current macroeconomic and international situation to produce a feasible set of 
proposals sufficiently attractive to be implemented and sufficiently robust to withstand 
changing times, within reason, and still produce beneficial results‘ (Bird and Oldman, 
1990: 3).  
2.2. Expenditure Management Models and Approaches  
During the seventies and eighties, developing countries with an active support of the 
external partners started to introduce the new management ideas into their public 
sector settings. This led to the development and implementation of the business-alike 
New Public Management (NPM) Model. By the mid-nineties, the global community 
reached a point of understanding that the direct transfer of these ideas to developing 
countries could be beset with political, as well as historical, social, cultural and 
institutional factors. It has been realized that developing countries have to ‗get the 
basics right‘ before embarking on more complex reform initiatives (Schick, 1998b). 
During the same period, the World Bank began to review its approach to providing 
assistance to public finance reforms and developed the Public Expenditure 
Management (PEM) Approach. By the beginning of 2000, both donors and country-
recipients began to question why public sector management reforms aimed to improve 
expenditure management had only achieved limited results – again this highlighted the 
importance of political context, country ownership, and realistic timetable of change 
and donor harmonization. 
2.2.1. New Public (Financial) Management  
Initially introduced as a response to  criticism of the quality of public service provision, a 
New Public Management (NPM) Model was not just a different way of managing public 
services, but also the ethos of the growing demand for different financial management 
tools and techniques, and hence greater public sector efficiency. In practice, the 
common features of NPM-type reforms include emphasis on managerial culture and 
accountability, orientation on customers and results-focused, decentralized government 
authority and control, and the separation of policy-making from service delivery 
(Guthrie et al., 2005). Overall, there were implicit expectations of better operational 
efficiency and bureaucratic responsiveness to political changes. However, in its 
implementation, developing countries did not follow a common path, they rather faced 
multiple choices.  
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The financial management measures associated with the introduction of the New 
Public Financial Management (NPFM) Model became an integral part of the 
performance management framework to increase financial awareness in public sector 
decision- making. Accordingly, Guthrie et al. (2005) highlight at least five key 
components of NPFM, such as switch to accrual-based government accounting and 
reporting system, fiscal decentralisation and budget devolvement, market-oriented 
management accounting system, risk-based auditing, and performance management 
tools and techniques. In terms of the progress of the NPFM reform, Olson et al. (1998) 
recognise an overall positive affect of NPFM on public sector accounting and 
management system. Still, several authors raise concerns about increasing complexity 
of the financial management systems, which in fact discourages rather than enhances 
political accountability and government control. The other question is whether it is 
possible to adequately evaluate and track the impact of NPFM reforms – it seems 
somewhat ironic, given the overemphasis of NPM on performance evaluation. In that 
matter, Newberry and Pallot (2005) conclude that while there has been some progress, 
initial expectations have not been met. At this stage, it is clear from available literature 
that the direction and speed of NPFM reforms have been strongly influenced by the 
social, political and organisational factors, as well. By the mid-1990s, a ‗due process 
approach‘ of transferring NPM ideas to developing countries framework was widely 
criticised by donors‘ community. Consecutively, there was a paradigm shift from 
conventional budgeting to recognizing the importance of country context, capacity 
development of budgetary institutions, governance and state-building, (Figure 2.2.1), 
and a necessity to ‗get the basics right‘ before implementation of more complex 
initiatives (World Bank, 1998, Schick, 1998a).  
2.2.2. Public Expenditure Management Approach 
In the eighties, the World Bank shifted the focus of its work from an emphasis on 
investment projects efficiency to a wider recognition of the important the role that the 
budgetary institutions and donors play in the budget process and governance building. 
Developed in the late nineties, the Public Expenditure Management (PEM) Approach 
was described as the contemporary approach to budgeting, although it could be 
applicable to other situations as well. According to Schick (1998a), the PEM Approach 
stresses the need to understand the rules of the game under which the behaviour and 
practices of main actors influence the budget preparation and execution, and the link 
between public expenditures and measurable results in terms of budget outputs and 
outcomes. Advocates of this approach also highlight the fact that improvements in 
public expenditure management require changes in institutional structure and 
procedures under which they claim, allocate and use resources and the information 
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available to them In particular, the PEM Approach focuses on government incentives 
and the informal practices, as well as behaviour of various players (Schick 1998a). 
However, no evaluations of the impact of the PEM Approach on reform effort have 
been conducted yet. 
Figure 2.2.1. PEM Paradigm Shift in Budgeting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:   Overseas Development Institute (2004) Why Budgets Matter: The New 
Agenda of Public Expenditure. Briefing Paper. London, p. 1. 
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Figure 2.2.2. Getting the Basics Right  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from Schick, A. (1998) A Contemporary Approach to Public 
Expenditure Management. Washington, DC, World Bank. 
Source:   Pretorius, C. & Pretorius, N. (2008) Review of Public Financial Management 
Reform Literature. Evaluation Working Paper. London, Department for 
International Development, p. 9. 
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successfully applied the ‗basics first‘ philosophy, but he also provides examples of 
countries where the donors did not adopt this approach - instead they support complex 
initiatives in countries, which were not ready for such sophisticated tools. As Stevens 
(2004) notes, the problem seems to be that government officials and donors do not 
have a shared understanding of what the term ‗basics‘ means. as a result, this has led 
to the implementation of advanced solutions, which have often proved to be ineffective 
and inappropriate.  
2.2.4. The Platform Approach  
Similar to 'Getting the Basics Right‘ philosophy, the Platform Approach is designed to 
address the weaknesses of PFM system, although it is a more holistic approach to the 
reform process (Brooke and Consulting, 2003). It aims to implement a package of 
measures or activities designed to achieve increasing levels (‗platforms‘) of 
competence over a manageable timeframe (DFID, 2005). The focus of each platform is 
the achievement of an intended outcome rather than particular output or activity. For 
the government, the initial activity is to define its overall long-term vision for public 
management and financial accountability, and then define the way how to achieve this 
vision. At this step, the country context is very critical. The main idea of the Platform 
Approach is that it can help to facilitate government leadership, political support for 
changes in PFM system, donor harmonization, civil engagement and greater levels of 
public trust – all these problem areas were identified as the main reasons for lack of 
progress on PFM reforms (DFID, 2005). Once the country-specific platforms are set-
up, the action plan will be developed for each particular platform, including pre-
activities required for subsequent platforms (Figure 2.2.3). In a number of countries, 
including post-Soviet states, such as Kyrgyzstan and Russia, the Platform Approach 
has been already implemented for PFM system. Although the reforms are at their early 
stages, the preliminary results suggested that for the process to be successful, it is 
necessary that the donors leave a room for the government to lead, to develop a 
realistic timescales, and to be open for further opportunities, but be prepared to drop 
inappropriate projects (DFID, 2005).  
The other critical success factors emphasize the importance of extensive, and 
sometimes time-consuming, consultations within government, while ensuring the unity 
of donor positions throughout consultation process and the possibility to restrain their 
demands, when necessary (Taliercio Jr and Prem, 2004).  
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Figure 2.2.3. Platform Approach Framework 
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2.2.5. The Strengthened Approach to PFM Reform 
Responding to the need to improve PFM systems as a critical element for economic 
growth and development, several institutions came together in 2001 to form the Public 
Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) program
 
– a multi-donor initiative aims 
to improve the coordination of international organisations in the monitoring and 
assessment of PFM system. In 2003, the PEFA program commissioned a study to help 
develop a more coordinated and effective way of assessing and reforming PFM in 
developing countries, particularly those receiving significant external assistance (Allen 
et al., 2004).  As a result, at least three obstacles of PFM reform were identified. Firstly, 
the report highlighted the vast array of diagnostics being carried out to both monitor 
PFM reform and to make baseline assessments of PFM systems, sometimes to the 
extent of over-diagnostics and duplication, the different purposes, the gaps and, 
perhaps most importantly, the inability to objectively measure any progress. In fact, it 
seems that only the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) assessments had any 
performance-based measurements. A second obstacle was the lack of country 
ownership, reflected by a multitude of externally-driven technical assistance projects. 
Therefore, the third barrier was the plethora of PFM reform projects – often 
uncoordinated, sometimes competing with each other, and frequently over-taxing 
government officials charged with their implementation.  
The various lessons droved from this study laid the foundation for the Strengthened 
Approach to PFM reform in the form of three pillars of good practice (Figures 2.2.4). 
Not surprisingly that this approach was embedded into the Paris Declaration 2005 for 
Aid Effectiveness and OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Guidelines on 
Capacity Building (Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008).  
 Country-specific agenda, with a country-led PFM reform strategy and action plan 
 Coordinated multi-year program of donor support, that is aligned with the 
government‘s PFM strategy 
 Shared information pool, with a framework for measuring results that provides 
consistent information on country PFM performance, including progress over time.  
More recently, Betley (2008) completed a report on the impact of the Strengthened 
Approach on reform agenda based on the review of 12 countries. She found that PEFA 
assessments have made a profound effect on both governments and donors and 
provided external stakeholders with a comprehensive and evidence-based view of 
PFM strengths and weaknesses, as well as achievements and challenges. Even more, 
there have been cases where the PEFA assessments have led to direct changes in 
PFM reform programs.   
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Figure 2.2.4.  PFM Strengthened Approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compiled from Allen, R ., Schiavo-Campo, S. & Garrity, T. (2004) Assessing 
and Reforming Public Financial Management: A New Approach. in Bank, W. 
(Ed.) Washington. 
Source:  Pretorius, C. & Pretorius, N. (2008) Review of Public Financial Management 
Reform Literature. Evaluation Working Paper. London, Department for 
International Development, p. 12. 
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democracy and poverty reduction, as well as formal versus informal institutions, agents 
and the importance of this process. However, no evidence on the use of these studies 
for PFM reform were found in the recent literature. Whereas, recognising the political 
nature of budget process, the WB and DFID have been using the expected utility 
stakeholder model and the drivers of change approach, respectively, in relation to PFM 
reform.  
The Drivers of Change Approach  
For the purpose of political analysis, DFID developed the Drivers of Change (DoC) 
Approach to examine the political economy of budgeting which has been evolved from 
previous studies commissioned in 2004. Their main findings were that the budget 
process is a political rather than technical exercise, and that there is a gap between 
how formal institutions and informal practices work (DFID, 2007). Schick (1998b) also 
notes that in low-income countries informal practices often could ‗make the system 
work‘ but can also disturb economic development and breed corruption. This could also 
lead to larger deviations between budget estimates and actual spending and strong 
systematic biases in budget performance. Among the reasons for that could be 
ineffective accountability of budgetary institutions, inadequate access to information 
and low public awareness, and unreasonable aid conditionality due to widespread 
culture of secrecy and strict confidentiality among government officials, lack of strong 
civil society institutions including independent media and NGOs, and a sort of budget 
‗ritual‘ and rating ‗scores‘ game just to keep the donors happy. At the end, the studies 
conclude that PFM reform will only succeed if there is strong government leadership 
and political will to drive the reforms, sufficient capacity for long-term sustainability, 
effective parliamentary scrutiny, and broader engagement by civil society into the 
budget process in order to hold the government accountable and system transparent. 
(Hedger and Kizilbash Agha, 2007).  
At present, DFID has already carried out a number of DoC studies in various countries 
focusing on such drivers of change as fiscal crisis, public pressure, political change, 
donor pressure, post-conflict situation, new technology and regional requirements. For 
example, the PFM reform process in the Kyrgyz Republic was triggered in particular by 
political changes and donor pressure (DFID, 2007). However, it is not possible to verify 
whether these high-level analyses have been translated into operational programs and 
strategic plans. Marquette and Scott (2005) acknowledge the fact that while DoC 
seems to be useful for country analysis, the question still remains about its practical 
applicability to reform planning. A review of some of DFID‘s latest country evaluations 
indicates that in some cases the DoC approach has been used to identify potential 
entry points for reform, but the extent to which how it can be used and what its 
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influence on both the design and implementation of PFM reforms is unclear.  
Expected Utility Stakeholder Model  
The other model for political analysis – Expected Utility Stakeholder Model (EUSM) –
has been introduced by the World Bank to ‗sought to elevate the sophistication, 
accuracy, and operational relevance of its political analysis by piloting a game-theoretic 
approach to analyse public sector governance reform issues in two of its client 
countries‖ (Nunberg and Green, 2004: 1). Most interesting that this economic model 
has also been used to determine potential responses to tax administration reform. For 
all that, Marquette and Scott (2005) do raise concerns whether such an economics-
based methodology can have effective or reliable application in practice.  
2.3. Revenue Administration Models and Approaches 
Evolutionary, there is a different set of models used for expenditure management and 
revenue administration. The first-generation NPM, PEM and basics first approach were 
applied to expenditure management, while the political economy, strengthened and 
platform approaches, despite their diverse nature, were carried out predominantly for 
expenditure reform. In contrast, the tax revenue administration ‗models‘ are more 
focused on institutional and organizational changes.  
2.3.1. Semi-Autonomous Revenue Agency  
The major approach to revenue administration reform that gathered pace in the early 
nineties was the creation of Semi-Autonomous Revenue Agencies (SARAs). Kidd and 
Crandall (2006) view it as not a standard governance ‗model‘, but some kind of 
independence from central government policies. However, the degree of autonomy 
differs from country to country. The initial reasons for their creation were low levels of 
tax collection, high perception of corruption in revenue bodies and enormous pressure 
from international partners. There are various arguments for and against SARAs and 
findings on their effectiveness are very controversial. Besides positive feathers such as 
operational autonomy and freedom from political interference, this approach could lead 
to creation of power ‗enclaves‘ which potentially re-enforce the tension between 
SARAs and central authorities – Minister of Finance, Treasury – with a demoralizing 
effect to other government departments (Taliercio Jr and Prem, 2004, Mann, 2004). 
Based on a review of several DFID projects, Delay et al. (1999) argue that SARAs 
have huge potential, but are not a panacea – they cannot prevent political interference, 
neither protect against human incompetence and malpractice. Gray and Chapman 
(2001) also point out that this ‗model‘ cannot enhance the levels of department 
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enforcement. Following a desk-based study of existing SARAs, Kidd and Crandall 
(2006) report that SARAs have been rather an intuitive move, based on pressure from 
International Financial Institutions (IFI) and neighbour-country practices, than any 
evidence of success can recommend. 
2.3.2. Functional Organization of Tax Administration  
The aims of tax reform are to increase the level of tax revenue collection and voluntary 
compliance, while reducing tax evasion and possibility for corruption. As a first step 
towards these objectives, the organizational structure of tax administration was re-
aligned on functional basis, that is registration, collection, audit, enforcement, and 
education, rather than by tax type, notably Value Added Tax, Income Tax, Excise, and 
Property Tax. Simultaneously, the Large Taxpayer Units (LTUs) were established within 
revenue bodies to concentrate their effort on dealing with big businesses and their tax 
compliance. The advantages of such an approach include enhanced accountability, 
risk-based allocation of limited resources and better matching of enforcement, service, 
and educational programs to specific taxpayer needs (Crandall and Bodin, 2005). 
Consequently, development partners and donors have promoted many of these 
changes in developing and transitional countries as a way to boost efficiency and to 
minimize corruption. 
2.4. Model of Public Management Reform  
The discourse on public management reform has largely taken place in the absence of 
a sound theoretical background, making construction of a universal model both 
extremely useful and possible. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) develop a schematic Model 
of Public Management Reform which establishes a causal relationship between 
political, socio-demographic, economical, intellectual, and administrative contexts and 
the modernisation process, and provides a framework for discussion of the main 
factors of public sector reform. As a diagram of key forces driving and restraining the 
reform process, the model will be further adapted for tax system reform. Such a broad 
conceptual map will be very helpful in developing specific typologies and theories 
which will be used later to explain particular patterns, trends and trajectory of tax 
reform in the Kyrgyz Republic over the last two decades (Figure 2.4.1). Therefore, its 
function is not merely descriptive, but rather explanatory.  
The intention of the model is to be utilized as a heuristic device to learn more about 
how various factors are influencing the reform process. To indicate that it is indeed 
designed to be universally applicable, the separate elements of the model could be 
modified as new theoretical approaches and concepts will be introduced. The model 
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architecture embodies the centrality of elite decision-making and interaction between 
three groups of influential forces – economic and socio-demographic forces, political 
system, and administrative system. Also, the model allows to evaluate the evidence of 
public management reforms in comparative terms and explore the performance of 
government from a international perspective, while leaving a room for more specific 
theories to ‗fill-in‘ the map – to explain particular ‗topographical‘ features in particular 
countries and period of time. The centre of the model is Elite Decision-Making since 
most of the changes have been initiated and executed by politicians and senior civil 
servants predominantly ‗top-down‘ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 32). Although, it 
acknowledges the fact that these key players do not operate in a vacuum – they are 
themselves influenced by ideas and pressures from the other spheres within the 
model. On the other hand, elite decisions have a profound effect mainly on the 
administrative system. Particularly interesting part of the model is the difference 
between elite perceptions of what is desirable and what is feasible. At the same time, 
both reform desirability and feasibility are influenced by variety of intervening factors 
largely captured within the Socio-Economic Forces. In this regard the authors point out 
that no matter how influential the elite decision-makers are, their intentions are 
circumscribed by ‗cognitive limitations, cross-cutting actions, politico-administrative 
roadblocks, and unforeseen developments of a wide variety of kinds‘ (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011: 34). 
‗Neoliberal‘ policies in favour of high capital mobility and ‗free‘ trade have been for a 
long the global economic order of the day. At the same time, the globalization of the 
capital and investment markets and international trade have shaken the ability of the 
national governments to control their economic policies. So, it is not possible any more 
to keep the level of public spending that the global financial markets deem as 
imprudent. The strong international competition also forced the governments to give 
better attention to the competitiveness of their businesses. Indeed, companies are 
unlikely to compete effectively in the context of heavy bureaucratic or taxation burden – 
high taxes are needed to finance high budget expenditures. Driven by the Washington 
Consensus, ‗national and local governments are more restricted than they used to be 
in their ability to address costly and painful social problems such as unemployment‘ 
because they are now competing for global investments on the premise of lower taxes 
and exuberated tax competition (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 35). As a result of 
intensified capital mobility and tax competition, the governments have lost their power 
over taxation of capital assets and capital gain income, as well as to avert 
macroeconomic instabilities, such as inflation and unemployment, through economic 
strategies that were relatively effective several decades ago. 
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Figure 2.4.1. Model of Public Management Reform  
 
 
 
Source: Pollitt, C. & Bouckaert, G. (2011) Public Management Reform: A Comparative 
Analysis-New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo-Weberian State, 
New York, Oxford University Press, p. 33. 
 
 In the same way, the central banks cannot reduce the interest rates below the 
international threshold in order to stimulate economic growth, and increases in tax 
rates indicate that the growing fiscal deficit to preserve popular social policy services 
has become more expensive and stressful for the government. Even more, the global 
economic crisis has demonstrated how easily the problems in the financial sector could 
be spread to other ‗real‘ sectors, and across countries. Of course, the government tried 
to rescue the banking industry by expanding the public expenditures, which further 
unbalanced the budget – hence, the budget cuts in the public programs are inevitable. 
H. Party political 
 ideas 
 
E. POLITICAL SYSTEM A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORCES 
D. Socio-economic 
 policies 
G. Pressure from  
 citizens 
F. New management 
ideas 
C. Socio-demographic 
change 
B. Global economic 
 forces 
K. ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
L. Content of reform package 
J. ELITE DECISION-MAKING 
What is 
(a) Desirable? 
(b) Feasible? 
I. Chance events, 
e.g. scandals, 
disasters 
M. Implementation process 
N. Results achieved 
  69 
Thus, these forces constitute ‗one set of reasons for widespread public sector reforms 
– to restrain public spending, lighten the bureaucratic burden and reshape social 
policies that can no longer be afforded‘ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 36).  
While it seems entirely plausible that global economic forces are an important factor in 
promoting administrative reform, it should be noted that this background pressure 
cannot determine the exact type, scope, scale, timing or degree of public management 
reform. Moreover, the timing and patterns of management reforms have differed 
considerably between countries regardless of economic crises, meaning that the 
effects of globalization are not uniform. Therefore, the global markets may provide the 
economic pressure for reform, but they do not supply the ideas – that is, the model or 
plan of how to improve the public sector.  In the post-Soviet transitional countries, after 
unexpected independence in early 1990s, the degree of familiarity of government 
officials and politicians with the models and approaches to public (financial) 
management reform in general, and tax reform in particular, was relatively low. Often, 
such countries referred to the development partners and their international experts for 
guidance over a more appropriate type of reform models, which they might consider in 
designing and implementing reform packages. Eventually, there is a link between the 
Global Economic Forces and the New Management Ideas which is broadly missing in 
the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s Model. 
Too often the concept of ‗globalization‘ is presented in a vague and abstract way. In 
practice, it is necessary to distinguish the different processes and mechanisms 
involved in the increasing complexity of the global financial markets, free trade 
agreements, and technological changes, growth of multinational corporations and 
internationalization of brands. For all that, the authors do make an interesting point – 
globalization of capital and trade flows that has been an important decisive factor in 
public sector reform should be filtered through a number of other intervening variables. 
This distinguishing point prevents ‗globalization‘ from becoming an overstated 
explanatory variable. 
In terms of the Socio-Demographic Changes, it is not so much about the changes 
themselves, but rather the pressure arising because of them. In the Kyrgyz Republic, 
this includes massive labour migration during the post-independence period.  The 
basic effect of this social change has been to increase the demand upon adopting 
necessary legislation – particularly the social security and health insurance of Kyrgyz 
migrants living abroad. As with the economic pressure of globalization, the impact of 
labour migration on institutional change is indirect. An increase in the number of 
emigrants or unemployed would not lead to a particular type of management reforms. 
But it will produce powerful incentives for politico-administrative elite to look for the way 
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of easing the pressure on the system. This may include developing state programs and 
building an adequate institutional mechanism for migration management, which imply a 
considerable growth in social expenditure – just as the global economic forces, in 
opposite, are pushing on cutbacks in public spending. Therefore, in the quest for 
cutting public expenditures and reducing budget deficit, the Kyrgyz government has 
come under enormous pressure from citizens and the global community to react to high 
levels of inflation and unemployment, natural disasters, a series of tragic social events 
in 2005 and 2010, and the increasing vulnerability of low-income groups – including 
women and children, disables and national minorities – to global financial crises. In 
order to indicate the impact of the Chance Events on the public management reform 
agenda, it may be worthwhile to separate one-off accidents and disasters from those 
that have lasting and pervasive effects. This will, however, depends on country 
specifics and may not be a sufficient-enough reason to alter a model that was originally 
designed for generic purposes. 
Pollitt and Bouckaert go to the heart of the matter when they make the point that it is 
not possible to review management reform without taking into account a country‘s 
political, administrative and institutional arrangements. As countries may well combine 
these elements in very different ways, these differences can drastically influence the 
choice and implementation of reform measures. Thus, the Political System do play a 
highly significant role in determining a reform agenda. New Management Ideas 
together with Pressure from Citizens and civil society have a significant impact on Party 
Political Ideas. The authors also make it is clear that the contrasting features of 
different political systems are to some extent structural as well as cultural (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011: 38). As shall be seen, these are of particular importance for Central 
Asia, where historically the clan politics and regional networking thrive. 
The Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s model not only provides an excellent insight into working 
relationship between politicians and public servants, but it also offers a fresh view of 
the impact management reform has had on the traditional ‗politician-civil servant‘ 
bargain game – in recent years the role of the politicians in shaping public policy has 
changed dramatically due, at least in part, to management reform efforts. The same 
can be said about the relationships between government and citizens, and between 
civil servants and taxpayers, and how accountability and transparency have been 
evolved. In that case, the role of the mass media and their influence on government 
performance can be explored further, particular the 24-hour television news and the 
rise of the social media. 
Despite a multitude of other variables influencing the progress of public sector 
management reform, a thoughtful reform in the Administrative System is often 
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perceived as a key factor for success, but which difficult to change in ‗more-than-
incremental way‘ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 42). For example, the tax service in 
Kyrgyzstan consists mainly of staff trained during the Soviet period. A cultural and 
disciplinary legacy of the Soviet Union cannot be eliminated overnight – it influences 
the way in which tax officials conceptualize and approach a wide variety of issues, 
including taxpayer registration, tax audit and reporting. Structural differences also 
played a significant role. Over the years, the STS became a relatively independent 
administrative agency which developed function-based organizational structure for 
most operational tasks – still, it is an example of traditional, highly-hierarchical, 
conservative bureaucratic organization. This was a more decentralized system with 
completely new government agencies than that which obtained from the Soviet Union. 
Many of the taxation issues for which government authorities previously dealt directly 
with the central ministry in Moscow, were taken care of by new-formed tax agency. For 
the Kyrgyz Republic, this required a drastic change in tax legislation and a 
reconsideration of the highly politicized relations between the government and tax 
office. Soon, it has been done, but to some extent not so quickly or smoothly. There is 
also necessity to ensure that tax officers behave with propriety and consistency – yet, 
they tend to have a momentum of their own. In two decades, new personnel rules and 
procedures were built upon previous command regime, and it will be very difficult to 
revise these interlocking manuals. Moreover, in reality, a civil service did not really give 
up on all its internal rules, and it seems that the tax service continues to apply most of 
the rules as before. Hence, personnel regulations have become formidable constraint 
on reform and hopefully functional reorganization of the STS will help to address these 
issues. 
At the operational level, administrative system is even harder to budge. In early 2000s, 
the decision was made to reform the tax administration system by introducing modern 
ICT. In theory the new technology-driven procedures will be quicker, less staff-intensive 
and taxpayer-friendly. Also, large efficiency gains and increase in tax collection were 
predicted. In practice, even such simple technological change involved extensive 
complications – for instance, staff need basis trainings to use new technology, and new 
operation manual should be developed. And it is likely that personnel will be concerned 
about such changes, to the extent of resistance to any of them. The development of the 
necessary software and purchase of the new equipment were more than 
straightforward with a financial assistance of the development partners. At the same 
time, questions about linking the new ITAS to other government databases and about 
the security of personal data also aroused – these would have legal implications as 
well. To manage the reform process well will take considerable forethought, planning, 
and time. In other words, the announcement of the reform program is the easy part – to 
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carry it through requires patience, commitment and internal funding. In 2010-2013, the 
STS struggled to implement a ADB‘s project on tax administration, but in the end the 
results fell well short of what had been planned. 
Within this functional category, the Content of Reform Packages are the direct result of 
the interaction between the desirable and the feasible in the elite decision-making. 
When announced, the reform packages often include a considerable amount of political 
and managerial rhetoric, balancing the different styles and ideas of the moment in an 
attempt to establish, or reinforce, discourses which support the proposed institutional 
changes under review. Reform announcements are therefore as much political 
statements to be translated to the public as they are action plan for administrative 
changes. In this sense, they are not different from other political manifestos. It is 
important to recognize that announcing reforms and making recommendations for 
reforms may be separate activities – in fact, politicians, external experts and 
consultants will make statements, produce reports and receive their credits, even if little 
has been done. So, it is always necessary to check how far the initial promises have 
been kept and measured results achieved in the medium, and long, term. 
Amongst all, Implementation Process is probably the most complicated to trace and 
understand. Lessons learned during the attempt to put new management ideas into 
practice may result in departure from the original design. So, expectancy of reform 
packages unfolding exactly in line with a plan is fairly pessimistic as ‗top-down reforms 
were implemented through long chains of decisions and many levels of administration, 
and the chances of success were no better than the strength of the weakest link‘ (Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2011: 44). In the case of the Kyrgyz Republic, the disparity between the 
intellectual philosophy of the proposed reform packages and the capacity of tax 
administrators to carry out the actual implementation will be of particular interest. Even 
though these two variables produce the ultimate results, their resemblance to the 
original aspirations of the politico-administrative elite must be tested, as ‗Rhetoric and 
reality can be very hard to disentangle‘ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 45). Indeed, the 
final reality is so thoroughly imprinted with the competing discourses through which it 
was formed. There also may be a dualistic feedback mechanism between the 
Administrative System and Party Political Ideas that is not yet captured by the model. 
However, the direction of tax reform in the Kyrgyz Republic cannot be understood 
without a knowledge of the main legacies of centrally planned economy which 
institutional and cultural features have left a long-lasting impact on trajectory of the 
economic development in the region. On the basis of analysis provided, the Pollitt-
Bouckaert‘s model of contextual influences on the process and dynamics of public 
management reform could be further revised. In particular, it seems that this model has 
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profound roots in (new) historical institutionalism (Pollitt, 2008, Ongaro, 2013). Indeed, 
content of reform packages and implementation process are highly dependent from 
contextual factors, and the same policy tools, or techniques, will be differently utilized 
according to local culture, political regime, institutional capacity, preceding history, and 
chance events. Even more, the players in the reform process are highly reflexive – that 
is, they are constantly review what was done, why this happened, what the opponents 
likely to do next – so, they learn from their experience and adapt their behaviour to new 
situations. That is to say, the real world is too complex and dynamic to be captured by 
a general model. The most that could be afford is guiding concept and frequently used 
mechanism that are moderately ‗portable‘ – still, generalization will be possible, but to a 
limited range of contexts. In this regard, Kay (2006: 42) argues that ‗relying on thick, 
contextual and historical description structured by general concepts or portable 
metaphors is not a failure of formal modelling, but rather the appropriate response to 
what cannot be formalized into a model; nor is it amenable to explanation by general 
testable theory.‘ According to Pollitt (2008), this is one of the reasons why the historical 
factors are not part of the model. Nevertheless, they admit that ‗History matters: what 
happened before often affects what happens later‘ and even define history as ‗a form 
of scholarly description and analysis which uses a narrative form to focus on the 
sequence of developments over time, and which has developed specific and 
meticulous techniques for identifying, classifying and interpreting various sources of 
data about the past‘ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009: 14-15). For example, the chance 
events in 2005 and 2010 had profound effects on a choice of the constitution in 
Kyrgyzstan and new political regime occurs – the Parliamentary Republic, the fist in the 
Central Asia. The other example is the pending legacy of the Soviet Union which still 
affect the political and economic development of post-Soviets. Overall, proper historical 
explanations should rely on what the past can yield as a pointer for the present 
situation, and understanding of the main actor‘s behaviour is crucial. So, there is a 
need to try a range of alternative explanations before selecting the one that seems 
more appropriate for particular context.  
Next, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2009) agree that the institutions also matter – in fact, they 
are changing during the course of events and able to unite and guide toward 
formalized goals. In this regard, it is not a surprise that all post-Soviet countries 
preferred to move from the centrally planned system to a market economy, and 
experience the same type of challenges in early 1990s. In this case, the ‗institutions‘ 
could include a set of rules, practices, systems, and procedures. However, it does not 
mean that these agents are enslaved in the institutional structure. In fact, it is rather 
opposite – the agents could be a catalyst to modify and transform institutions. For 
instance, the reorganization of the STS to achieve function-based structure also 
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reshaped its context, as well helped to learn more about the main asset of the new 
institutional framework. 
Over time, institutional development can show and follow certain patters of change. 
According to Streeck and Thelen (2005), there are four possible patterns – the BEST 
typology (Table 2.4.1). The first pattern represents small incremental changes in 
process which lead to small incremental changes in output – these changes are in 
general predictable and smooth, however, could be in different directions. In contrast, 
the process of gradual changes in the second pattern moves to the same direction, 
adding one layer over the others. Interestingly, such incremental and unidirectional 
process could lead to significant change in status quo (Lindblom, 1959). The third 
pattern could be more commonly found in the real world. While the initial intention of 
policy-makers might be radical, in due course this all quietly returns to the original point 
of departure. In that case, the major question is what forces cause this return. The last 
type of change receives most attention from the global community – the great escape 
from the previous system. The corresponding results show a dramatic, and often 
irreversible, impact. It means complete termination of the previous trajectory and 
beginning of a new ‗punctuation‘ – the term frequently used in the concept of path-
dependency (Pollitt, 2008: 40-51). In reality, this ‗window of opportunity‘ can be opened 
due to pressure from citizens or external shock – for example, financial crisis, 
technological innovations, political events – and when the ‗big-bang‘ happened the 
advantage receive those who are prepared and have new management idea for what 
to do next. Unfortunately, it was not the case of the Kyrgyz Republic when the 
government faced the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union without any back-up plan, 
or exit strategy, and had to refer to the international development partners for the 
reform ideas as well as external funding to sustain the reforms. At the same time, it 
does not mean that there could not be patterns within patterns. It also should not be 
forgotten that both the histories and institutions are affected by the choice made by the 
politicians, government officials, and external experts based on their beliefs and 
interests of the influential players and elite groups – in other words, they are ‗socially 
constructed.‘ However, historical institutionalism sometimes experiences difficulties to 
use institutional patters as explanations. To explain path-dependence, for example, it is 
necessary to look at the particular processes and mechanisms which drive the event 
(Pierson, 2004). In reality, the processes could be hidden or too many of them to 
choose from – and, despite several attempts, there is no general classification of these 
processes (Pollitt, 2008: 43). On the other hand, a broader spectrum of forces should 
be considered – such as, political, economic, administrative, and cultural factors. 
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Table 2.4.1. Patterns of Institutional Change: BEST Typology 
 Result of change 
Within path/Incremental Radical/Transformation 
Process 
of change 
Gradual Classic instrumentalism 
 
Tortoise 
Gradual, but eventually 
fundamental change 
Stalactite 
Abrupt Radical conservatism – 
rapid return to previous 
ways 
Boomerang 
Sudden, radical change 
 
 
Earthquake (Punctuation) 
Developed from Streeck and Thelen (2005: 9) 
Source: Pollitt, C. & Bouckaert, G. 2009. Continuity and Change in Public Policy and 
Management, Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 18. 
The argument made by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) about the ways in which the socio-
economic and politico-administrative context may affect the dynamics of public 
management reform identifies certain basic factors, and elaborates on the lines of 
influence they may have, both on the reform process and on the desirability and 
feasibility of the contents of reform package. In regard to the influence on the reform 
process, political and administrative factors are attributed to ‗whether they facilitate or 
prevent to carry out reforms that are ‗‗radical‘‘ in terms of the degree of change, ‗‗wide‘‘ 
in terms of the number of policy sectors affected, and ‗‗intense‘‘ in terms of the pace 
and rapidity with which they can be implemented‘ (Ongaro, 2013: 348). In regard to the 
influence on reform contents, Pollitt and Bouckaert argue that the receptivity of the 
politico-administrative contexts to certain new management ideas about – how the 
public sector should perform – is a key factor determining whether the country is able 
to adopt the NPM (or other) doctrines. Nevertheless, the Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s Model has 
been implicitly, and explicitly, criticized. The most obvious one is that the model 
overlooks a number of important factors – at least in the context of specific countries – 
including the modalities of involvement of stakeholders in reform process, the effects of 
political clientelism and more broadly the differential scope of illicit governance in 
different countries. Also, that it does not go far enough in explaining each of the main 
factors in details.  
Another line of criticism is that the model is rather descriptive and the causal links 
between influential factors and the process of management reforms are not clearly 
defined (Barzelay and Gallego, 2006). As a response, Pollitt and Bouckaert argue that 
the main purpose of their model is indeed descriptive to provide a bigger picture of 
public management reform in the developed countries from the comparative 
perspective (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011), and that the model is a first approximation – 
researchers are encourage to take the model as a starting point and elaborate more 
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sophisticated analysis for specific countries, under specific circumstances, at specific 
period of time. 
In the recent studies on public management reforms, a great deal of conceptual and 
empirical efforts has been devoted to recognizing the factors which account for and 
‗explain‘ various reform results. Among these studies particular interesting is the 
analytical framework that has been employed by Christensen et al. (2002). 
Notwithstanding some conceptual and terminological differences with the explanatory 
model of Pollitt and Bouckaert, they also consider the socio-economic context, the 
institutional and cultural traditions, and the institutional setting (polity) as important 
variables, which influence on the country‘s trajectory of public sector reform is 
presumably most strong. Yet, additional reference should be made to the growing body 
of conceptual and empirical knowledge which has been accumulated, since the early 
1990s, under the sound topic ‗transformation research‘ regarding the unprecedented 
institutional change in the post-Soviet states – after all, it still was a process of public 
sector restruction and modernization.  
In largely conforming with the Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s model, while partly deviating from it in 
the selection or grouping of relevant variables, it is assumed that these factors will be 
of particular significance and relevance. In the following chapters the attempt will be 
made to ‗test‘ the explanatory power of these factors by drawing on the empirical 
evidence from the tax reform experience in the country, as well as on other related 
sources. In conceptual terms, certain crucial dimensions of the process and the state of 
tax reform – the dependent variable – will be subsequently identified and then, in turn, 
it will be asked whether these factors – hence, independent variables – can provide 
plausible explanations. As a caveat it should be mentioned, that these variables, at this 
point, can hardly be anything but exploratory attempts. 
The decision taken to embark upon fundamental public sector reforms can be triggered 
by a complicated Socio-Economic Context, particularly by the economic and fiscal 
crises which force the policy- and decision-makers, regardless of political party 
affiliation, to seek quick remedy in reform actions, largely with the help of the 
development partners.  However, country‘s sensitivity towards new management ideas 
is likely to be determined by its Institutional and Cultural Traditions as well as legacies 
of the past. The impact of these factors is probably the stronger, the more firmly they 
are empirically and normatively rooted in the country‘s history and tradition – to the 
point of eliciting a path-dependency. As a result, the direction and process of tax reform 
in the Kyrgyz Republic cannot be understood completely without a good knowledge of 
the main legacies of centrally planned economy which institutional and cultural features 
have left a long-lasting impact on trajectory of the economic and political development 
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in the country. Thus, in the analytical framework guiding this research, the institutional 
and cultural ‗legacies‘ of the previous regime will be examined as presumed factors of 
the institutional development of the post-Soviet state.  
Both the comprehensiveness and the speed of reforms depend on the Institutional 
Setting of the country. That is to say, in unitary countries the parliament and the 
government – the ruling political majority – have the power to make a decision about 
what policies and measures will be applied, virtually, for all political and administrative 
levels of the country. Once the decision is made by the top-level authorities, the 
implementing stage can, to a large extent, be centrally reinforced. Hence, the reform 
initiative is bound to start ‗top-down.‘ By contrast, in federal countries the political and 
legislative jurisdiction is largely restricted to central government structure. Under these 
conditions, it is more likely that the public sector reform will evolve ‗bottom-up.‘ To 
support such multi-level system, the local government often takes the lead for reform 
implementation following a long-term pattern of ‗fragmented incrementalism.‘  
The conceptual content of public sector reforms may be influenced by the Discourse 
and Reform Coalition involved in the preparation and implementation of reform 
packages, including the ‗external‘ influences of the development agencies and interplay 
of national and international networks, and their discourses, to support the constant 
exchange, learning and adaptation processes. As the decisions on public sector 
modernization are made by tandem of the relevant political, administrative and socio-
economic actors, their beliefs, intentions, interests, also ‗will and skill,‘ will have 
significant influence on the choice of the reform program. 
Probably more than in other areas of institution building, the choices in the public 
sector reform can be influenced by the Starting Conditions in a country – that is, the 
current state of the public sector from which the reform process is about to take off 
(Wollmann, 2003). The leverage of the initial conditions is really apparent, since, in the 
perception of the main actors, a need for reform is defined according to these 
conditions. Hence, it has been expected that the former Soviet Union countries – due 
to their similar starting conditions and common legacy – are going to move along on 
basically convergent trajectories of public sector reforms. However, due to empirical 
findings evidenced by the country-specific institutional and cultural traditions of the 
political systems, it can plausibly be concluded that the countries continue, at least in 
the foreseeable future, to maintain, if not enhance, divergence of their trajectories. 
Similar to Pollitt and Bouckaert, Sandford (1993: 6-7) also proposes flexible framework 
for comparative analysis of tax reform efforts in developed countries against a common 
set of political, economic and administrative parameters. 
 Constitution, Political Institutions and Practices. Electoral system, 
  78 
intergovernmental relationships, political parties. 
 Macro-economic Background. Economic growth, inflation rate, balance of 
payments, public debt, budget deficit, public expenditure, fiscal consolidation. 
 Tax Reform Background. Previous tax reforms, tax system and tax administration. 
 Process of Policy-Making. Special committees and commissions, opposition and 
lobby groups, reform objectives and official documents. 
 External Influences. Neighbouring countries, international organizations. 
 Politicians, Political Will and Personal Relationships. Leadership of finance ministry, 
relationship between chief executive and finance minister. 
At the end of each case study, Sandford (1993) judges the ‗success‘ of the tax reform 
in terms of the extent to which the reform meets the reformers‘ stated objectives 
without undesirable by-products, and how far the reform has been sustained (Bird, 
2004b). 
Conclusions 
This chapter aims to synthesize the main theoretical approaches and findings from 
evaluations of PFM reform programs, and to identify knowledge gaps. The literature 
reviewed includes academic articles, working papers, technical notes, practitioner 
guides, manuals, handbooks and websites. So, the review will address two sets of 
information – that is an overview of theoretical models and approaches, and a review 
of reform experience in developing and transition countries already covered in the 
previous chapter. However, it seems not possible to always relate reform experience to 
the models presented. As the newer approaches evolve, reform experience has been 
pre-dated for these models, which represents a challenge in understanding of PFM 
reform. 
The theoretical ‗models‘ described above reflect different approaches within 
development theory. Each approach is ideologically separate and based on social and 
political theory – that is why each of them gives more or less attention to such critical 
factors as the role of political actors, country context and ownership, informal systems 
and practices, and technical support. At the same time, each of them targets a similar 
goal – to develop more effective, efficient and accountable PFM system. Still, there is a 
difference in terms of process, and the emphasis placed on different aspects of PFM 
reform.  
While the political economy models review the sequences of PFM reform within 
political context, the platform approach improves understanding of specific country 
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context. The strengthened approach clarifies the relationship and roles of core 
stakeholders in the reform process. Despite field-testing of these approaches, 
evaluation evidences of the political economy models are limited, and progress 
assessments of very new Platform and Strengthened approaches are not yet available. 
In general, the first-wave of PFM reforms in developing countries were dominated by 
technical issues, the second-wave reforms were built on existing country capacity 
emphasising the importance of legislature changes and country context. Monitoring 
and evaluation have been recognised as the weakest link in the implementation of 
PFM reform. Only recently the World Bank develops comprehensive performance-
based indicators and established a PFM database. While donors tend to be over-
concentrated on technical assistance and remained reluctant to the sustainability of the 
reform process, the executive governments will be more concerned about the 
achievement of performance-based targets at the central level (Pretorius and Pretorius, 
2008). 
In reality, the link between theory and practice is relatively weak. The theoretical 
models reviewed here did not make use of all factors that hinder the progress of tax 
reform – namely, historical, political, administrative, cultural and socio-economic 
barriers. It would therefore contribute to the tax reform literature if the forthcoming 
reform evaluation will be based on theoretical model proposed by Pollitt and Bouckaert 
for the public (financial) management reform.  A key purpose of the literature review is 
to assist with identification of knowledge gaps which the Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s model 
might be able to cover. However, the review is constrained by a lack of sufficient 
evidence and analysis. 
The suggested topics for further research based on this literature review represent 
important areas of PFM reform, but some of the questions go beyond a focus of this 
research – to examine the link between taxation and state-building, and the impact of 
changes in tax system on governance and development.  
Definition. There is no universally agreed definition of tax system, neither the PFM. 
Definitions range from the narrow focus on the mix of taxes to a system of complex 
relationships between numerous players, multiple dynamic processes and policies – in 
the same way, the definition of the tax reform is also vague. There is a realization – at 
least in theory, if not always in practice, – that taxation as a sub-system is 
interconnected with other components of PFM system, so that changes in one element 
affect another.  
The NPM and PEM Approach. In general, the multitude of the historical, political and 
social factors has influenced the direction and speed of NPFM-type reforms. Although 
the literature acknowledges some progress, the question whether it has resulted in 
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improved accountability or service delivery is pretty much open. The PEM approach 
focuses on behaviours of budgeting and informal practices associated with this, moving 
away from an earlier focus on rules and process.  
‘Getting the Basics Right’ Approach. Although intellectually rational, the ‗getting the 
basics right‘ philosophy advocated by donors, seems to have been hindered by the 
lack of any common agreement between donors and recipient governments, and even 
between donors, on what is basics meant to be.  
The Drivers of Change, Platform and Strengthened Approaches. These approaches to 
PFM reform have evolved over time, frequently in response to obstacles and limited 
progress of earlier reforms in developing countries. In practice, current reform agendas 
are likely to combine elements of more than one approach. Both the platform and 
strengthened approaches are comparatively new, and few assessment studies have 
been conducted so far. However, initial studies show some positive impact and 
tangible benefits. At present, DFID has conducted a number of case studies in various 
countries, but it appears not possible to verify whether these evaluation studies have 
been translated into operational action plans.  
Organizational Changes in Tax Administration. The most popular ‗model‘ for revenue 
administration has been the introduction of SARAs. However, various claims have 
been made about their impact on tax collection. Moreover, their introduction alone does 
not prevent political interference or fraudulent activities. Another common trend in tax 
administration has been to organize its activities by functions, rather than by tax types, 
– it was assumed that this encourages tax compliance and reduces associated cost, as 
well as the corruption activites.  
Political, Historical, Social and Institutional Factors. These factors have significant 
influenced the direction and speed of NPM reforms in developing countries, although 
little progress has been made. A key reason given for such results was the lack of 
attention to the political and institutional context. DoC and EUSM attempt to 
understand the political context in which reforms take place. In all areas of PFM reform, 
there is a realization that the required changes are not merely technical. Studies also 
highlight the existence of informal practices, but rarely explain their emergence.  
Country Context and Ownership. There is a growing recognition that policies and 
procedures cannot be simply transferred or imposed by international partners, without 
taking into account the needs of a particular country (Schick, 1998c). Schiavo-Campo 
and Tommasi (1999) also warn that direct transplantation of the reform ‗best practices‘ 
is a dangerous practice. Political support and commitment of top management are 
essential if reforms are to be sustained. Consequently, government should take into 
account a specific political, cultural and social environment within which reforms 
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happen. Not to mention the historical legacies which already built the solid foundation 
of the PFM system. And the Strengthened Approach and Platform Approach attempt to 
address some of these issues. OECD (2006) also points out that design and 
sequencing of the reform agenda should be country specific. 
External Stakeholder. Recent studies have showed that civil society and international 
donors occupy an increasingly active position in promoting and supporting PFM 
reforms – the private sector and media are seen as potential players, as well. Indeed, 
greater donor harmonization and coordination can have a positive effect on reform 
progress. There is also a need to understand how the aid incentives and the political 
economy of donors can affect reform efforts, but this does not appear to have been yet 
well-evaluated.  
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The research is aimed to review the tax reform process in the Kyrgyz Republic during 
the first decades of transition to a market economy and to identify the main directions, 
and the main factors affecting these directions, of tax reform – mainly, socio-economic 
forces, political pressures, and features of the administrative system. Accomplishment 
of these goals would require a multiple methods approach as a combination of both 
quantitative and qualitative methods. The chapter will provide a compendium on the 
important methodological issues in conducting ‗within-country‘ explanatory case study 
and explores both the strengths and weaknesses of different paradigmatic strategies. It 
will also focus on the distinctive characteristics of case study design and its place 
within, and alongside, other research methodologies.  
3.1. Philosophy 
Historically, three approaches to research have been evolved over time, notably 
qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods. Unquestionably, these approaches are 
not as discrete as they first appear. For instance, qualitative and quantitative 
approaches should not be viewed as rigid opposite categories. Instead, they represent 
different ends on a continuum (Newman and Benz, 1998). In reality, a study tends to 
be more qualitative or more quantitative. By logic, mixed methods research resides in 
the middle of this continuum because it incorporates elements of both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. Often the distinction between qualitative research and 
quantitative research is attributed to using words rather than numbers, or using closed-
ended hypotheses rather than open-ended interview questions. A more complete way 
to view the difference between them is in terms of philosophical assumptions 
researchers bring to the study, the types of research strategies and specific methods 
employed in the research. Moreover, the history of both approaches does matter. The 
quantitative approach was the dominating form of research in the social sciences from 
the end of 19th century. In late 20th century, interest in qualitative research increased 
and along with it, mixed methods research was born (Creswell, 2014).  
According to Creswell (2014: 3), research approaches are ‗plans and the procedures 
for research that span the steps from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data 
collection, analysis, and interpretation.‘ This plan involves several decisions, and they 
should be made by researcher in order to decide which approach will be used to study 
a topic. The important components informing this decision are the philosophical 
viewpoint that the researcher presumably brings to the study, as well as procedures of 
inquiry, and distinct methods of data collection, analysis, and interpretation that trans-
late the approach into practice. To put it more simply, research approach is the plan, or 
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proposal, to conduct research, which involves the interaction of philosophy, research 
design, and specific methods (Figure 3.1.1). These three key components involved in 
an approach represent a perspective framework that presents information in a 
successive way from broad constructions of research to the narrow procedures of 
methods.  
Figure 3.1.1. A Framework for Research: Philosophy, Design, and Research 
Methods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Creswell, J. W. 2014. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed 
Methods Approaches, Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications, Inc, p. 5. 
In preparing a research project, researchers have to decide whether they will employ a 
qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methods approach. This approach puts together the 
philosophical assumptions that they propose in the study, the research design that is 
related to the philosophical ideas they espouse, and the specific methods of research. 
The decision about the research approach is also influenced by the nature of the 
research problem being studied, the personal experiences of the researchers, and the 
audience(s) to whom the study being addressed.  
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Selecting Philosophical Stance 
Although philosophical ideas remain largely hidden in research (Slife and Williams, 
1995), they still have huge influence on research practice and need to be identified. 
While Creswell (2014) prefers to use the term worldview as ‗a basic set of beliefs that 
guide action‘ (Guba, 1990: 17), that is a general philosophical orientation about the 
world and the nature of research, other authors choose to call them paradigms (Lincoln 
et al., 2011), epistemologies and ontologies (Crotty, 1998), or broadly conceived 
research methodologies (Neuman, 2009). Worldviews are shaped by variety of factors 
including discipline orientations, and researcher‘s past experience. The types of beliefs 
held by individual researchers based on these factors will help to explain why a 
particular approach was embraced in their studies. Although there is on-going debate 
about what viewpoints researchers could explicitly bring to an inquiry, there are at least 
four that are widely discussed in the literature (Table 3.1.1). 
Table 3.1.1. Philosophical Worldviews 
Post-Positivism  Constructivism  
 Determination  
 Reductionism  
 Empirical observation and 
measurement  
 Theory verification 
 Understanding  
 Multiple participant meanings  
 Social and historical construction  
 Theory generation  
Transformative  Pragmatism  
 Political  
 Power and justice oriented  
 Collaborative  
 Change-oriented 
 Consequences of actions  
 Problem-centred  
 Pluralistic  
 Real-world practice oriented 
Source: Creswell, J. W. 2014. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed 
Methods Approaches, Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications, Inc, p. 6. 
As a philosophical underpinning for mixing methods, Morgan (2007), Patton (1990), 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (2010) convey its importance for focusing attention on the 
research problem in social science research and then using pluralistic approaches to 
derive knowledge about the problem. Pragmatic worldview arises out of actions, 
situations, and consequences. While there are many forms of this philosophy, it 
concerns with applications and solutions to problems (Patton, 1990). Instead of 
focusing on methods, researchers emphasize the research problem and use all 
approaches available to understand it (see Rossman & Wilson, 1985). Pragmatists 
believe that an external world is independent of the mind as well as that lodged in the 
mind. But they also agree that it is necessary to stop asking questions about reality and 
the laws of nature (Cherryholmes, 1992). Therefore, pragmatism opens the door to 
multiple methods, different worldviews, and different assumptions, as well as to 
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different forms of data collection and analysis. For all of this, pragmatism as a 
worldview provides a philosophical basis for the study of tax reform in the Kyrgyz 
Republic.  
In practice, pragmatic researchers have a freedom of choice. In other words, they are 
free to choose the methods, techniques, and procedures that best meet the needs and 
purposes of research. That is, true approach is what works at the time. As pragmatism 
is not committed to any system of philosophy and reality, it is mostly applied in mixed 
methods research, liberally drawn from both quantitative and qualitative assumptions 
(Creswell, 2013). For study of tax reform, collecting and analyzing diverse data 
sequentially in the explanatory case study will provide more complete understanding of 
research questions rather than subscribing to only quantitative or qualitative approach. 
In this study, the quantitative data are subjected to statistical analysis while the 
qualitative interviews remain critical in explaining the ‗what‘ factors and ‗how‘ they 
influencing the reform process. A broad statistical analysis will provide general 
overview of the process and directions of tax reform in the country since 1991, while 
the qualitative interviewing will help to collect detailed data from participants about the 
main factors, and the intended outcomes, of tax reform. Thus, in multiple methods 
research, both quantitative and qualitative data are used because they work to provide 
the best understanding of a research problem. 
Pragmatists do not see the world as an absolute unity, and admit that research always 
occurs in social, historical, political, and other contexts. In this way, the study of tax 
reform starts with the theoretical proposition that the factors identified in the Pollitt and 
Bouckaert‘s model – the socio-economic forces, political changes, administrative 
system, elite‘s decisions, and chance events – have a significant influence on tax 
reform. Consequently, the pragmatic assumptions of this study are predetermined by 
the primary research approach, and the supplemental methods are subservient within 
that. So, if the primary design is the embedded case study, then the research starts 
from postpositivist assumptions and turns to constructivism during qualitative 
interviews. 
The postpositivism represents the traditional form of research in which causes 
determine effects (Phillips and Burbules, 2000). Thus, the problems studied by 
postpositivists reflect the need to identify and assess the causes that influence 
outcomes, such as results achieved in the tax reform in Kyrgyzstan. It is also deductive 
in that the intent is to reduce the ideas into a small, discrete set of the variables to test 
the main theoretical assumption – that the factors identified in the Pollitt and 
Bouckaert‘s model have a significant effect on the process, and direction, of tax reform 
in the Kyrgyz Republic. To better understand a real-world phenomenon, this theoretical 
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proposition is needed to be tested and refined. The knowledge developed through a 
postpositivist lens is based on careful observation of quantitative measures and the 
time-series analysis.  
In contrast, social constructivists believe that individuals develop subjective meanings 
of their experiences – understanding of the world in which they live and work (Lincoln 
et al., 2011, Mertens, 2010, Crotty, 1998). These meanings are varied and multiple, 
allowing to look for the complexity of views rather than narrowing meanings into a few 
categories. Not to forget that often these subjective meanings are negotiated socially 
and historically. They are not simply imprinted on individuals but are formed through 
interaction with others and through historical and cultural norms that operate in the 
country (Crotty, 1998). For example, the case study focuses on the specific contexts in 
which the key actors made decisions – this will help to understand the historical, 
economic, political, administrative, and cultural contexts of the tax system.  
The goal of the semi-structured interviews is to rely as much as possible on the 
participants‘ views and opinions of the tax reform in Kyrgyzstan. The interview 
questions are broad and general to help the participants to identify the factors 
influencing the reform and to share their views. The questions are open-ended, that 
allows me to listen carefully to what participants do or expect in their settings. It should 
be admitted that interviewees engage with the reform and make sense of it based on 
their historical and social perspectives. So, it is vital to understand the setting of the 
participants through visiting the context and gathering information personally. Ii should 
be recognized that the researcher‘s own experience and background could also shape 
interpretation of the participants. The main intent is to make sense of the meanings 
others have about the tax reform and inductively generate patterns of meaning from 
the data collected in the field (Creswell, 2013). 
3.2. Research Design 
Research designs are types of inquiry within research approaches that provide specific 
direction for procedures called research methodologies, strategies of inquiry (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2011), or approaches to inquiry (Creswell, 2013). In other words, the 
researchers not only have to select one of three approaches, but they also have to 
decide on a type of study to conduct within these choices. Fortunately, the designs 
available to the researchers have grown over the years considerably as information 
communication technology (ICT) has advanced the data analysis techniques and 
expanded the ability of researchers to analyse complex econometric models and as 
new procedures for conducting research in social science have arrived.  
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Table 3.2.1. Alternative Research Designs: Quantitative, Qualitative and Mixed 
Methods Designs 
Quantitative Design Qualitative Design Mixed Methods Design 
 Experimental designs  
 Non-experimental 
designs, such as 
surveys  
 
 Narrative research  
 Phenomenology  
 Grounded theory  
 Ethnographies  
 Case study 
 Convergent  
 Explanatory sequential  
 Exploratory sequential  
 Transformative, 
Embedded, or 
Multiphase 
Source: Creswell J. W. (2014) Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed 
Methods Approaches, p. 12. 
Since the late 19th century, strategies of inquiry associated with quantitative research 
were those that invoked the post-positivist philosophy and that originated mainly in 
psychology. These include true experiments and the less rigorous experiments called 
quasi-experiments (Cook and Campbell, 1979). An additional experimental design is 
applied behavioural analysis or single-subject experiments in which an experimental 
treatment is administered over time to a single individual or a small number of indi-
viduals (Neuman and McCormick, 1995, Cooper et al., 2007). One type of non-
experimental quantitative research is causal-comparative research in which the 
investigator compares two or more groups in terms of a cause, that is independent 
variable that has already happened. Another non-experimental form of research is the 
correlational design in which investigators use the correlational statistic to describe and 
measure the association, or even relationship, between two or more variables or sets 
of scores (Creswell, 2013). These designs have been elaborated into more complex 
relationships among variables found in techniques of structural equation modelling, 
hierarchical linear modelling, and logistic regression. More recently, quantitative 
strategies have involved complex experiments with many variables and treatments – 
for example, factorial designs and repeated measure designs. They have also included 
elaborate structural equation models that incorporate causal paths and the identifica-
tion of the collective strength of multiple variables. 
In qualitative research, the numbers and types of approaches have also become more 
clearly visible throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century. The historic origin for 
qualitative research comes from anthropology, sociology, the humanities, and 
evaluation. Nowadays, varieties of books have been written on qualitative research 
summarizing the different types and procedures available on specific qualitative inquiry 
approaches (Table 3.2.1). For example, Stake (1995) and Yin (2014) suggested 
processes involved in case study research. As a type of research design, case studies 
could be found in many fields, in which the researcher develops an in-depth analysis of 
a ‗case,‘ often that is a program, event, activity, process, or individuals. It should be 
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remembered that cases are bounded by time and activity, and researchers have to 
collect detailed information following a variety of data collection procedures over a 
prolonged period of time (Stake, 1995, Yin, 2014).  
Mixed methods involves integration of qualitative and quantitative research, and data, 
in a single study. While qualitative data tends to be text-rich without predetermined 
responses, quantitative data usually includes closed-ended questions. The mixed 
methods research is relatively new field with major work done on developing it 
stemming in 1980s. Its origins, however, could be traced back to 1960s.  
Early thoughts about the value of mixed methods – called multiple methods – based on 
the assumption that all methods have their bias and weaknesses, and that combining 
both quantitative and qualitative data, and triangulating data sources, could neutralize 
the bias and weaknesses of each method (Jick, 1979). By the early 1990s, mixed 
methods moved toward the systematic convergence of quantitative and qualitative 
databases - and the idea of convergence across different types of research designs 
emerged. These types of designs were extensively discussed in a major handbook 
addressing the field in 2003 (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010). Next, basic models and 
procedures were developed, and notation was added, to help the researcher to use 
these designs on regular basis, but challenges to working with such diverse designs 
arise (Clark and Creswell, 2011). Currently, practical issues are widely discussed in 
terms of the benchmarking the ‗good‘ examples of mixed methods studies and 
evaluative criteria, the use of a research team to conduct collaboratively this type of 
inquiry, and the import of mixed methods to other countries and disciplines, as well. 
3.2.1. Defining Case Study  
Using case study as a research method could be a challenging endeavour. Case study 
research has a long history within the natural sciences, dating back to the early 1920‘s. 
Over time, case studies garnered interest in multiple disciplines as scholars started to 
study phenomena in context. However, despite widespread use, case study research 
has received relatively little attention among the literature on research design and 
strategies.  
For the long time, scholars incorrectly treated the case study as a type of quasi-
experimental design. This misperception has finally been corrected by Donald 
Campbell (Cook and Campbell, 1979: 96) as ‗Certainly the case study as normally 
practiced should not be demeaned by identification with the one-group post-test-only 
design.‘ In other words, while the ‗one-shot post-test‘ pre-experimental design does 
exist, the case study has now been recognized as a separate research method with its 
own research designs – still, the case studies could be part of the larger mixed method 
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study. Other stereotype to be avoided is to consider case study to be one of the 
approaches of qualitative research – along with narrative research, phenomenology, 
grounded theory, and ethnography. This view, however, may be questioned as case 
studies could rely on both the qualitative and quantitative evidence. 
Nowadays, the case study is a distinctive form of empirical inquiry. Not surprisingly, the 
case study, as a research method, has been commonly used not only in the social 
sciences, but also in the professional fields – such as, law, medicine, education, 
business, public policy, and evaluation. Hence, there is no common idea about what a 
‗case study‘ should be. And its status and purpose remain contested. In this regard, it 
may be pointed out that case studies are one of the weakest research strategies. From 
this perspective, as ‗soft‘ qualitative investigations, they are vulnerable to all sorts of 
biases – the co-called ‗small N‘ research (King et al, 1994). On the other hand, case 
studies are seen as a highly valuable and flexible approach that can be used for a 
variety of purposes – for example, testing theories, identifying causality or ‗congruence 
analysis‘ (Blatter, 2007, Blatter and Blume, 2007).  
Formally, the most frequent definitions of case studies have just cited the types of 
topics on which case studies have been focused – for example, individuals, 
organizations, projects, processes, decisions, relationships, or events. However, 
repeating a case topic is surely not enough to define the case study as a research 
method. On the other hand, many of the earlier social science studies considered the 
case study only as the exploratory stage for other research method, or even confused 
with ethnography, or with participant-observation. While the culture-sharing groups in 
ethnography may be accepted as a case, the intention of the case study is not to 
determine how they work, but rather to develop a better understanding of a case. 
Therefore, case study research observes a contemporary phenomenon within a real-
life setting (Yin, 2014). Although (Stake, 2005: 443) claims that case study as a form of 
research is not a method – ‗case study is defined by interest in individual cases, not by 
the methods used‘ – other scholar view it as a strategy of inquiry, or comprehensive 
research strategy (Yin, 2014). For this matter, Creswell (Creswell, 2013: 97) prefers to 
present it as methodology – that is, ‗case study research is a qualitative approach in 
which the investigator explores a real-life, contemporary bounded system (a case) or 
multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection 
involving multiple sources of information (e.g., observations, interviews, audio-visual 
material, and documents and reports), and reports a case description and case 
themes.‘ That is to say, the case study research starts from the desire to derive in-
depth understanding of a phenomenon, set in real-world contexts (Bromley, 1986: 1), 
which hopefully results in new learning about its contextual conditions, as well as 
produces a wide range of topics to be covered. Thus, it is assumed that examining the 
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context and other conditions related to the case study is vital to understanding what a 
‗case‘ is about. Accordingly, the relevant case study data are more likely to be collected 
from multiple, and not single, sources of evidence. The in-depth study of a 
phenomenon within its real-world context also means that the case study method will 
benefit from collecting data in natural settings, compared with relying on ‗derived‘ data 
(Bromley, 1986: 23). So, doing original fieldwork, as part of a case study, might help a 
lot in better understanding of real-world situations. This distinctiveness of the case 
study, therefore, could help to define it. To sum up, Yin (2009: 18, 2014: 16-17) 
provides the following twofold abbreviated definition of the case studies - the first part 
clarifies the scope of a case study, while the second part explains the features of a 
case study:  
1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
 investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the ‗case‘) in depth and within its 
real-life context, especially when 
 the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. 
2. The case study inquiry 
 copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more 
variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
 relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion, and as another result 
 benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis. 
This definition helps to distinguish the difference between case studies and other 
research methods, and shows that case study research follows a set of systematic 
procedures and specific techniques – including how to getting started, designing a 
case study, collecting and analysing case study data, and composing a case study 
report.  
By and large, it shows that case study research is based on the procedures typical to 
all types of research, such as protecting against threats to validity, maintaining a chain 
of evidence, and testing rival explanations. Case study research, like any other 
methods, has distinctive advantages and limitations. In general, case study is the 
preferred method when ‗how‘ or ‗why‘ questions are being asked, the researcher has 
little control over events, and the focus of study is a on contemporary phenomenon 
within a real-life context. These conditions separate case study from other types of 
social science research, as well as complement them – thus, all of the research 
methods largely overlap in many points and do not have sharp boundaries. In practice, 
properly doing case study research should address the traditional concerns about case 
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studies – that is, the need for greater rigor, confusion with teaching cases, inability to 
generalize from case study findings, unmanageable level of effort to produce massive 
and lengthy reports, and unclear comparative advantage over other methods (Yin, 
2014:19-22).  
Despite its apparent applicability in studying a real-world phenomenon and addressing 
important research questions, case study research nonetheless did not receive 
widespread recognition as a research method. Partially this comes from assumption 
that case study research could only be used as a prelude for another methods. 
However, such conventional, and even hierarchical, point of view is completely out-of-
date. On the contrary, case study research goes well beyond just being an exploratory 
phase of a larger study. In other words, it embraces the entire range of procedures 
needed to do research, from designing the initial exploration to the interpreting and 
reporting the final results, without calling on any other methods. On the other hand, 
there is a lack of trust in the credibility of these procedures. It seems they may be not 
sufficient to protect against such biases as construct validity, internal validity, external 
validity, and reliability. On top of that, case study research suffers from a perceived 
inability to generalize the findings to other situations. Indeed, these concerns 
potentially reinforce traditional prejudices against the case study method.  In practice, 
such methodological challenges could be met by using more systematic procedures in 
data collection and analysis together with analytic, not statistical, generalization of case 
study findings. 
3.2.2. Designing Case Study 
The case study design covers a full set of procedures needed to do research, mainly 
designing a case study, collecting and analysing the data, and interpreting the results. 
Unfortunately, unlike other methods, research designs for case studies have not yet 
been developed and codified. According to Yin (2009: 27), the following components of 
the research design are of particular importance for case studies. 
Case Study Questions. It is obvious that the choice among different research methods 
is determined by the type of the research question posed – in terms of ‗who,‘ ‗what,‘ 
‗where,‘ ‗how,‘ and ‗why‘ – that a study is trying to address (Shavelson and Towne, 
2002: 99–106). It provides an important clue regarding what research method will be 
used. Accordingly, case studies are appropriate when researcher asks either a 
descriptive question – ‗What are the barriers to tax reform?‘ – or an explanatory 
question – ‗How to overcome these barriers?‘ Indeed, the other methods are unlikely to 
provide such rich description or to give the insightful explanation that might arise from 
doing a case study. Hence, the case study‘s questions are most likely to be ‗how‘ and 
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‗why,‘ asked about contemporary events over which the researcher has little or no 
control (Table 3.2.2). 
Table 3.2.2. Case Study Design: Different Research Methods 
Method Form of Research 
Question 
Requires Control 
of Behavioural 
Events? 
Focuses on 
Contemporary 
Events? 
Experiment how, why? Yes Yes 
Survey who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much? 
No Yes 
Archival Analysis who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much? 
No Yes/No 
History how, why? No No 
Case Study how, why? No Yes 
Source: Yin, R. K. (2014) Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Los Angeles, 
California Sage Publications, Inc, and COSMOS Corporation, p. 9. 
Case Study Propositions. While the ‗how‘ and ‗why‘ questions justify the choice of the 
case study as the appropriate method in the first instance, the propositions point out to 
what should be examined within the scope of study. For example, the initial assumption 
for the explanatory case study is that the main factors identified in the Pollitt‘s Model – 
economic forces, political system and administration – have a significant influence on 
reform process in the country. This proposition, besides reflecting an importance of the 
theoretical model for studying the tax reform, also directs the researcher‘s attention to 
where to start looking for relevant evidence to be collected about each factor. Without 
specific questions and propositions, the researcher will not be able to narrow down the 
relevant data and stay within research topic. Nevertheless, not all studies would need 
propositions – instead of them, an exploratory case study would rather state its 
purpose, as well as the criteria by which the success will be judged. 
Unit of Analysis. Selection of the appropriate unit of analysis will occur after the 
researcher accurately specifies the primary research questions. So, the tentative 
definition of the main unit of analysis – which is the same as the definition of the ‗case‘ 
– is closely related to the way how the initial questions have been defined. However, 
when a definition of the unit of analysis will eventually arrive, this may not be 
considered as its final destination. The choice of the unit of analysis, as with other 
components of the research design, can be revisited later as a result of preliminary 
findings during the data collection.  
Once the general definition of the case has been established, other clarifications to the 
unit of analysis should be made. Also it is desirable to define the specific boundaries 
for the case in terms of a specific geographic location within a specific time limit. For 
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example, the case about tax reform is in fact a case study of a process of a 
deliberate change in the tax system of the Kyrgyz Republic over the last two 
decades. This caution regarding the need for concrete boundaries underlies a key, but 
subtle, aspect in defining the case – the case should be a ‗real-life‘ phenomenon, not 
an abstraction, set in specific context. Understanding economic, political and 
institutional development in the country is part of the context, and the case study also 
contains the embedded units of analysis – an economic policy, civil society pressure for 
new management ideas, elite‘s decision-making about reform package and the 
implementation process, organizational change in tax administration and development 
partners experience in support of the reform. This shows how the definition of the main 
and embedded units of analyses, as well as the definition of the contextual factors 
surrounding these units, depends on the level of inquiry. The main unit of analysis in 
the case study about tax reform in the Kyrgyzstan is likely to be at the highest level 
being addressed by the primary research questions. 
Answering all of these questions will help to determine what data collection strategy will 
be used and, in particular, how to distinguish data about the subject of the case study, 
the ‗phenomenon,‘ from data external to the case, the ‗context‘ for the case study. If 
researchers will want to compare their findings with previous research, the key 
definitions used in the study should be similar to those previously defined by others or 
should be modified in clear, and operationally feasible, way. In this regard, the previous 
literature can become a valuable source for defining the main unit of analysis. 
Linking Data to Propositions. During the design phase, the researcher has to be aware 
of the main analytic techniques linking data to propositions – mainly pattern matching, 
explanation building, time-series analysis, logic models, and cross-case synthesis – 
and how they might suit the case study. In this way, the study design can create a more 
solid background for the later data analysis. In fact, the actual analysis requires that the 
researcher will anticipate the case study data according to the initial propositions. If the 
researcher lacks of experience in conducting an empirical study, it will not be easy to 
identify the appropriate analytic techniques and hence to combine the needed data to 
use these techniques in full capacity. 
Criteria for Interpreting the Findings. If the researcher plans to use statistics for case 
study data analysis, then statistical analysis offers very explicit criteria for 
interpretations. Instead, the researcher can specify the important rival explanations and 
identify alternative strategies to address them while designing a study, so this 
information will be anticipated in data collection strategy.  
Although the last two components have been increasingly better developed in recent 
years, the current literature does not provide detailed guidance on these challenging 
  94 
aspects. Anyway, the complete research design for case studies should specify what 
data should be collected – as defined by research questions, propositions, and units of 
analysis, as well as what should be done after the data collection – as indicated by the 
logic linking the case study data to the propositions and the criteria for interpreting the 
results.  
Selecting Case Study Design 
These general components of the research design presented above also serve as a 
background for selecting specific designs for case studies. But at first, prior to data 
collection, it should be decided whether to use a single case or multiple cases to 
address the research questions, and then whether to keep the case holistic or to 
embed subunits within this holistic design. As shown in the two-by-two matrix (Figure 
3.2.1), single-case and multiple-case studies reflect different design situations and can 
have either unitary or multiple units of analysis. As a result, this matrix leads to four 
types of different designs for case studies to choose from that are holistic single-case 
design (Type 1), embedded single-case design (Type 2), holistic multiple-case design 
(Type 3), and embedded multiple-case designs (Type 4). Every type of design is based 
on the researcher desire to analyse the ‗case‘ within contextual conditions, where the 
line between the case and its context is likely to be blurred.  
In practice, there is a clear distinction in how to design a single-case or multiple-cases 
study. The single-case study could be an appropriate research design under certain 
conditions that will justify the choice. A study could be a critical case for testing an 
existing theory. The theory has to state a clear set of propositions as well as the 
conditions within which the propositions are supposed to work. If the case will meet all 
of these conditions, it can confirm, challenge, or extend the theory. The single-case 
design can be used to determine whether the initial propositions are correct or whether 
rival explanations might be more relevant. The single-case study could also represent 
an extreme, or a unique, case. Or, in contrast, it could capture the circumstances of 
everyday situations in the representative, or typical, case. In this manner, the lessons 
learned from such cases are assumed to be rather informative. In the revelatory case, 
the researcher is able to observe and analyse a phenomenon previously inaccessible 
by others. To understand how certain conditions change over time, the researcher 
could study the same single case at different points of time in the longitudinal case. 
At the same time, if the case study is conducted at the global level, a holistic design will 
be appropriate. The holistic design is preferable if no subunits can be logically identified 
or when the case study is grounded on the theory which is itself of a holistic nature. 
Potential problems occur, however, when such global approach prevents detail 
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examination of the specific phenomenon of interest in operational mode. Thus, a 
common problem with the holistic design is that the entire case study may be vague 
and abstract, lacking sufficient data. Whatever the reason for selecting single-case 
studies, a potential vulnerability of the holistic design is that the case study may shift its 
entire orientation and nature during the course of study – as the study proceeds, 
different alternative explanations may emerge, and the evidence collected begins to 
answer different research questions. 
Figure 3.2.1. Case Study Designs: Basic Types  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Yin, R. K. 2014. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, SAGE 
Publications, Inc, p. 50 and COSMOS Corporation 
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Hence, the original research design is no longer appropriate for new study‘s questions. 
Although some scholars argue that such flexibility is an advantage of the case study 
approach, the others claim that because of that the case studies are so largely 
criticized. One way to avoid such unattended slippage is to introduce a set of subunits. 
Thus, an embedded design can help to retain an important focus on a case study 
inquiry. In fact, the same single-case study may include more than one unit of analysis 
chosen through sampling or cluster techniques (McClintock, 1985). However, there is a 
possibility that the researcher will over-focus on the subunit level only and fail to return 
to the main unit of analysis. 
The rationale for selecting a single-case rather than a multiple-case design for the case 
study of tax reform is that the case represents the critical test of an important 
theoretical model – Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s Model. Such design is used in this case study by 
focusing on factors which supposed to have significantly influence on the reform 
process in the country. The Kyrgyz Republic was selected because it has a prior 
experience with reforming the tax system claimed to suffer from various ‗barriers‘ to 
reform. According to Pollitt, such barriers had been cited as the major reason why the 
majority of the public (financial) management reforms did not succeed in developing 
countries. The study will show that, in this particular country, the reform efforts might 
also fail but that the failure could not be entirely attributed to the factors stated in the 
model. Historical and cultural legacy from previous system, technological innovations 
and influence external to country seem to also account for the failure.  
As a major step in designing and conducting a single case is defining the case – the 
main unit of analysis, an operational definition is needed. As the case study is about a 
deliberate change in the tax system of the Kyrgyz Republic, the several subunits of 
analysis will be added in order to provide an opportunity for extensive analysis and to 
enhance the insights into the case (Figure 3.2.2). In other words, this single case will 
be incorporated subunits of analysis, so that a more complex Embedded Case Study 
Design will be developed. Accordingly, the primary unit is the tax reform process as a 
whole, the smallest units are the main players, and several intermediary units also are 
important. At each level of analysis, different data collection techniques will be used, 
ranging from statistical time-series analysis to semi-structured interviews. Hopefully, 
this study, though limited to a single case, will help to refocus future analysis and 
evaluation of tax reforms from pure public economics standing to more wider 
understanding of such complex ‗real-word‘ phenomenon.  
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Figure 3.2.2. Case Study Designs: Embedded Single-Case  
 
Adopted from Yin, R. K. 2014. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, SAGE 
Publications, Inc, p. 50 and COSMOS Corporation. 
The multiple-methods approach combines the collection and analysis of both 
quantitative and qualitative data within the case study design (Greene, 2007, Greene 
and Caracelli, 1997). The second dataset may be collected and analysed before, 
during, after the implementation procedures associated with the primary design. 
Hence, this dataset plays a rather supportive role. Conceptually, there are two types of 
the embedded design depending on whether one method is embedded as a 
supplement to a larger design or both quantitative and qualitative methods are joined 
within a larger design. At the same time, many variations also exist within these two 
broad categories. The prototypical variant of the embedded design is when the 
researcher uses a secondary dataset within a primary design to address different 
questions. Recently, scholars have also discussed a possibility for hybrid designs 
where researchers have an opportunity to integrate and embed both quantitative and 
qualitative data within traditional designs.  
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And this results in such variant as a case study with multiple methods in which the case 
becomes a ‗placeholder‘ for collecting both quantitative and qualitative data 
(Tashakkori and Creswell, 2007). For the purpose of this study, the quantitative and 
qualitative methods are embedded within a traditional case study design. And both 
quantitative and qualitative data are collected and analysed to examine a case – the 
tax reform in the Kyrgyz Republic. A quantitative analysis is integrated with qualitative 
interviewing to enhance the applicability of the case study design in order to identify 
main factors of tax reform. This means that after the researcher identified emergent 
issues related to the implementation of the primary design, the insight into these issues 
can be obtained with supplemental datasets. Consequently, the philosophical 
assumptions of this embedded design are predetermined by the primary research 
approach, and the supplemental methods are subservient within that guiding 
methodology. So, if the primary design is the predominantly qualitative-oriented case 
study, then the researcher is most likely to start working from a constructivist 
assumptions as the overarching paradigm. 
For all that, the multiple-methods approach seems appropriate as the study has a set 
of research questions that require different types of data in order to support the case 
study design. The premises of this design are that a single dataset is not sufficient to 
address all research questions, and that each type of questions requires different forms 
of data. In practice, a good way to start thinking about the implementing procedures is 
to focus on the timing of the secondary data collection and analysis, as well as on the 
reasons for adding in this data. Indeed, the researcher makes this procedural decision 
according to the purpose of the supplemental data within the larger design (Creswell et 
al., 2009). Sandelowski (1996) first introduced the notion of combining the 
supplemental methods – before, during, or after – with the primary design, which could 
be a helpful framework to gaining more understanding about the case study – and it 
does not matter which approach is placed in the centre. Therefore, the procedures 
would reflect the issues related to either a ‗one-phase‘ concurrent or a ‗two-phase‘ 
sequential nature of the project. As a general overview of the procedures for 
implementing embedded case study design, the common steps include designing the 
overall case study and deciding the reason why qualitative and quantitative methods 
should be included, collecting and analysing qualitative data to improve the case study 
design, collecting and analysing quantitative data and performance outcomes for the 
groups, and interpreting how the qualitative and quantitative results enhanced the 
understanding of the final findings (Figure 3.2.3).  
Still, there are many challenges associated with using the multiple-methods approach. 
For instance, it is necessary that the researcher has prior experience in mixing 
research methods, as well as relevant expertise and adequate resources to implement 
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the qualitative and quantitative studies. The researcher must also specify the purpose 
of collecting different types of data as part of a larger case study – the primary and 
secondary purpose statements – and at what phases of a research project to collect 
the qualitative and quantitative data – pre, during, post, or some combination. This 
decision was made based on the intent for including the quantitative data to review the 
progress of tax reform in the country over last two decades and to identify factors that 
have significant influence on the reform process based on time-series analysis. 
Qualitative data would help to explore the position and opinion of the main actors in 
regard to tax reform and to provide recommendation to overcome these barriers. To 
follow-up on results of qualitative study, further statistical analysis will be applied to the 
factors frequently mentioned during the semi-structured interviews. Still, it could be 
difficult to integrate the results in final findings when two different methods are used to 
answer different research questions. Accordingly, I can keep the two sets of results 
separately and even publishes them in separate papers, which is definitely a strength 
of the embedded design. For ‗during‘-study phase, the qualitative data collection may 
introduce potential bias that could affect the outcomes of the study. Suggestions for 
addressing this potential bias are through collecting unobtrusive data. 
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Figure 3.2.3. Research Design: Flowchart of the Implementing Procedures 
CASE STUDY 
Embedded  
Case Study 
Quantitative 
Before 
Quantitative 
After 
Qualitative 
During 
Implement the Quantitative Strand 
Before the Case Study 
 Decide the reason for the quantitative 
strand 
 State quantitative research questions, and 
determine the quantitative approach 
What is the direction of tax reform? 
What is the current state of taxation in the 
country? Any problems? 
 Identify the quantitative sample 
 Collect statistical data 
 Analyze the quantitative data and outcome 
performance using descriptive statistics and 
time-series procedures  
Use the Quantitative Strand to 
Plan the Case Study 
 Refine the qualitative questions for the 
second phase - semi-structured interviews 
 Determine which participants will be 
selected for the qualitative sample 
 Design qualitative data collection protocol 
 Develop interview guide 
Implement the Qualitative Strand 
During the Case Study  
 Decide the reason for the qualitative strand 
 State qualitative research questions that follow from 
the quantitative results and determine the qualitative 
approach 
What are the main factors of  tax reform? 
What are the barriers to reform? How to overcame 
them? How to make tax system more efficient? 
 Obtain ethics permission 
 Purposefully select a qualitative sample that can 
help 
explain the quantitative results and collect open-
ended data with protocol 
 Analyze the qualitative data using pattern-marching 
procedures of theme development and those 
specific to the qualitative approach 
Use the Qualitative Strand to Understand  
the Case Study 
 Describe participants‘ expectations and experiences 
with the tax reform 
 Describe the reform process and achievements 
Implement the Quantitative Strand 
After the Case Study  
 Decide the reason for the 
quantitative strand 
Follow-up to main factors identified 
during the interviews 
 State quantitative research 
questions, and determine the 
quantitative approach. 
What is the progress of reform? 
 Identify the quantitative sample. 
 Collect and analyze quantitative 
data 
Use the Quantitative Strand to 
Explain the Case Study 
 Describe why outcomes occurred 
 Describe what long-term effects 
are expected 
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Testing Case Study Designs 
As a research design is supposed to represent a logical set of statements, there is 
possible to judge its quality based on certain logical tests. Because case study method 
is also a research approach, these tests can be applicable to case studies, as well.  In 
the book ‗Case Study Research: Design and Methods,’ Yin (2009: 40-45) lists the four 
widely used tests, as well as various tactics available to dealing with these tests. He 
also provides a cross-reference to the formal stage of research where the tactic 
probably could be used – some of the tactics could occur during designing a case 
study, the data collection, or data analysis. (Table 3.2.3).  
Table 3.2.3. Case Study Design: Four Design Tests 
Test Case Study Tactic Phase of research 
in which tactic 
occurs 
Construct validity  Use multiple sources of evidence 
 Establish chain of evidence 
 Have key informants review draft 
case study report 
Data collection 
Data collection 
Composition  
Internal validity  Do pattern matching 
 Do explanation building 
 Address rival explanations 
 Use logic models 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
External validity  Use theory in single-case studies 
 Use replication logic in multiple-case 
studies 
Research design 
Research design 
Reliability  Use case study protocol 
 Develop case study database 
Data collection 
Data collection 
Source: Yin, R. K. 2014. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, SAGE 
Publications, Inc, p. 45. 
Construct validity is especially challenging topic in case study research. Opponents of 
case studies often point to the fact that in a case study the researcher fails to identify 
and develop a sufficient set of operational measures for the concepts being studied 
and has to rely on ‗subjective‘ judgments to collect the data. Internal validity is a main 
concern for explanatory, or causal, case studies, when the researcher is attempting to 
explain a causal relationship between different variables, as distinguished from 
spurious relationships. It should be noted that that this logic test is not relevant for 
descriptive or exploratory studies which are not intended to deal with this kind of causal 
situation. Generally speaking, a case study involves an inference every time a real-life 
phenomenon cannot be directly observed. So, the researcher has to infer that a 
particular event occurred from some earlier events, based on interviews and 
documentary evidence collected during the case study. The analytic tactics like the 
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pattern matching, explanation building, addressing rival explanations, and using logic 
models are especially helpful in dealing with internal validity. 
 The external validity problem has been a major problem in doing case studies for a 
long time. A big question is whether case study‘s findings could be generalizable 
beyond the immediate case. Often, the critics complain that single-case studies offer a 
very poor basis for statistical generalization to a larger population. However, such 
approach is not correct in terms of case studies which have to rely on analytic 
generalization, instead. By doing so, the researcher is striving to generalize a particular 
set of results to broader theory. But, the generalization is not automatic process. A 
theory must be tested by direct replicating the findings in another studies in which, as 
theory has specified, the same results should be reported. Once the replications have 
been completed, the final results could be accepted as providing strong support for the 
theory, even though further replications are not meant to be done. 
The reliability test aims to minimize the errors and biases in a study by insuring that, if 
the other researcher will follow absolutely the same procedures as described in the 
original study and conduct the same case study all over again, the same findings and 
conclusions will be delivered. Thus, it is essential that the researcher document every 
procedure to allow the others to repeat the study. In practice, the use of a case study 
protocol and the development of a case study database will help a lot in dealing with 
the documentation problem. 
3.3. Research Methods 
The third component of the research framework is the specific research methods – the 
distinct forms of data collection, analysis, and interpretation – that researchers intend to 
use for their studies (Table 3.3.1). For them, it is useful to explore the full range of 
possibilities of data collection techniques, as well as to organize these methods by 
degree of predetermined nature, use of different types of questions, and focus on 
particular types of data analysis. 
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Table 3.3.1. Alternative Research Methods: Quantitative, Qualitative and Mixed 
Methods   
Quantitative Methods Qualitative Methods Mixed Methods 
 Pre-determined  
 
 Instrument based 
questions  
 Performance data, 
attitude data, 
observational data, and 
census data  
 Statistical analysis  
 
 Statistical interpretation 
 Emerging methods  
 
 Open-ended questions  
 
 Interview data, 
observation data, 
document data, and 
audio-visual data  
 Text and image analysis  
 
 Themes, patterns 
interpretation 
 Both predetermined 
and emerging methods  
 Both open- and closed-
ended questions  
 Multiple forms of data 
drawing on all 
possibilities  
 
 Statistical and text 
analysis  
 Across databases 
interpretation  
Source: Creswell, J. W. 2014. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed 
Methods Approaches, Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications, Inc, p.17. 
The choice of methods depends on whether the researchers intend to collect specific 
type of information in advance of the study or to allow it to emerge from participants 
during the project. Data collection might involve visiting a site and observing the 
behaviour of individuals with a set of predetermined questions on a behavioural 
checklist or conducting an interview in which the interviewee is allowed to talk openly 
about a topic, largely without the use of specific questions. Also, the type of data 
analysed may be census data gathered on scales of instruments, or voice recording 
and reporting the opinion of the respondents. Researchers might make interpretations 
of the statistical results, or match themes or patterns that emerge from the text-rich 
data. In mixing methods, both quantitative and qualitative data are collected, analysed, 
and interpreted.  
3.3.1. Collecting Case Study Evidence 
By abbreviated definition, case study research is not limited to a single source of 
evidence. In fact, it benefits from having varieties of sources – multiple sources of 
evidence – depending on what is available and how is relevant for particular case. For 
instance, Stake (2008) and Yin (2009) provide a brief overview of the six sources of 
evidence commonly used in case studies – such as documents, archival records, 
interviews, direct observation, participant-observation and physical artefacts – and 
discuss their comparative strengths and weaknesses (Table 3.3.2). It is important to 
note that none of them has predominant advantage over others, besides they are quite 
complemented to each other and can be used in any combination.  
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Table 3.3.2. Case Study Evidence: Strengths and Weaknesses 
Source of Evidence Strengths Weaknesses 
Documentation  Stable – can be 
reviewed repeatedly 
 Unobtrusive – not 
created as a result of the 
case study 
 Exact – contains exact 
names, references, and 
details of an event 
 Broad coverage – long 
span of time, many 
events, and many 
settings 
 Retrievability – can be 
difficult to find 
 Biased selectivity, if collection 
is incomplete 
 Reporting bias – reflects 
(unknown) bias of author 
 Access – may be deliberately 
withheld 
Archival records  Same as those for 
documentation 
 Precise and usually 
quantitative 
 Same as those for 
documentation 
 Accessibility due to private 
reasons 
Interviews  Targeted – focuses 
directly on case study 
topics 
 Insightful – provides 
perceived causal 
inferences and 
explanations 
 Bias due to poorly articulated 
questions 
 Response bias 
 Inaccuracies due to poor 
recall 
 Reflexivity – interviewee 
gives what interviewer wants 
to hear 
Direct observations  Reality – covers events 
in real time 
 Contextual – covers 
context of ‗case‘ 
 Time-consuming 
 Selectivity – broad coverage 
difficult without a team of 
observers 
 Reflexivity – event may 
proceed differently because it 
is being observed 
 Cost – hours needed by 
human observers 
Participant-
observation 
 Same as above for direct 
observations 
 Insightful into 
interpersonal behaviour 
and motives 
 Same as above for direct 
observations 
 Bias due to participant-
observer‘s manipulation of 
events 
Physical artefacts  Insightful into cultural 
features 
 Insightful into technical 
operations 
 Selectivity 
 Availability  
 
Source: Yin, R. K. 2014. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, SAGE 
Publications, Inc, p. 106. 
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Certainly, the investigator has to obtain a certain degree of experience and skills to 
deal with all sources of evidence. In addition to reviewing these sources, Yin (2009: 81, 
101) presents the key principles of data collection which could help to ensure the 
quality of data collected, as well as to address the main design challenges. These are 
to follow case study protocol, use multiple sources of evidence, create a case study 
database, and maintain a chain of evidence 
Typically, it could be helpful to develop and follow a set of questions – a Case Study 
Protocol – to be addressed while collecting the data. It is important that the questions in 
the protocol are derived from the line of inquiry, directed at the researcher level, not by 
participants themselves. In this sense, the protocol differs widely from the interview 
guide. The protocol‘s questions in effect will serve as a mental framework – the specific 
questions posed to interviewees will be tuned to specific line of inquiry, including rival 
explanations. Hence, the researcher has to collect more data to examine rival 
explanations, as well. As rivals become a concern, a truly sceptical attitude should be 
developed towards whether events and actions captured in the case study are as they 
appear to be and whether participants are giving adequate responses. In other words, 
an original interpretation can be challenged by one or more rival explanations which 
directly compete, or even cannot coexist, with each other. If an alternative explanation 
turns out to be more plausible than an original interpretation should be rejected 
immediately. In brief, ‗data collection should involve a deliberate and vigorous search 
for ―discrepant evidence,‖ as researchers are trying to establish the potency of the 
plausible rival rather than seeking to discredit it‘ (Patton, 2002: 276, Rosenbaum, 2002: 
8–10). If no such evidence is found, despite a diligent effort, this in return can boost 
confidence about case study‘s findings. Finally, the case study evidence should be 
presented with sufficient clarity to allow audience to proceed independently to data 
interpretation. Usually, such evidence will come from a formal case study database that 
the researcher compiles after completing the data collection. 
Documentation 
As part of fieldwork, the statistical data and official reports will be collected in Bishkek 
from the central government agencies in order to create a comprehensive database 
which could be used to identify the factors hampering the tax reform process in 
Kyrgyzstan during the first decades of transition to a market economy. The main 
sources of official data are the Ministry of Finance (MOF),13 the Central Treasury,14 the 
State Tax Service (STS),15 the State Customs Service (SCS),16 the Social Fund,17 the 
                                                 
13
  Ministry of Finance of the Kyrgyz Republic http://www.minfin.kg/index.php  
14
  Central Treasury of the Kyrgyz Republic http://www.kazna.gov.kg/index.php  
15
  State Tax Service of the Kyrgyz Republic http://www.sti.gov.kg/  
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National Statistical Committee (NSC)18 and the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic 
(NBKR). 19   The document analysis is focused on the official publications, annual 
diagnostic reports, working papers, technical notes, transcripts, consultant reports, 
feasibility studies, policy statements, directories, and formal reviews of tax policy and 
administration reform projects and programs undertaken by international organizations 
and research institutions.  Archival materials are also used in the form of legal acts and 
official reports issued by central government agencies since 1991.  
Archival Records  
In addition to interviews, the other common source of evidence for case studies 
consists of archival data - records stored in such information channels as libraries, 
electronic repositories, and the mass media. From a research perspective, the archival 
records of the Soviet budget system – in particular, revenue and expenditure structure 
of the individual republics – could be of particular interest in studying the historical 
development of the existing tax system in the Kyrgyz Republic. Unfortunately, many of 
these materials did not survive the transition period, making it is a challenge the pre-
test and post-test assessment of tax reform intervention – hence, experimental design 
is not a plausible option. Not to mention that it is hard to compare two absolutely 
different tax systems. Besides, records maintained by tax offices only cover period after 
independence – the tax system in Kyrgyzstan was officially created in early 1990‘s.  
The archival data can also be a subject to systematic biases – for example, under- or 
over-reporting in census data. Likewise, the editorial choices of different mass media 
are suspected to be affected by powerful interest groups which collectively effort could 
have a disturbing effect on what would be presented as a full and factual account of the 
important ‗chance‘ events, such as the Tulip Revolution in 2005 and dramatic events in 
2010.  As the case study will use archival data, the researchers should be aware of 
these possible biases and take firm steps to counteract them, when possible. It is 
recommended to use at least two different media that are believed, if yet not known, to 
have opposing standings (Jacobs, 1996). To achieve a more balanced picture, it would 
be a helpful procedure to referring to additional sources on the same topic. 
The availability of data from different sources provides an important opportunity to 
constantly cross-check the consistency of the findings during data collection phase. By 
doing so, it is possible to triangulate – that is, to establish converging links of evidence 
– which hopefully will make the findings even more robust. In practice, the desired 
                                                                                                                                               
16
  State Customs Service of the Kyrgyz Republic http://www.customs.gov.kg/content/start/Eng  
17
  Social Fund of the Kyrgyz Republic http://www.sf.kg/  
18
  National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic http://www.stat.kg  
19
  National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic http://www.nbkr.kg  
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convergence occurs when at least three independent sources all point out to the same 
conclusion. However, triangulating is not an easy task. When I interviewed the top tax 
authorities and tax experts directly involved in the modernization and reform project, all 
appear to be giving corroborating evidence what a success the tax administration 
reform is. But in fact, they all may be echoing the same institutional ‗mantra,‘ developed 
over time for presenting the results to public, and the collective ‗opinion‘ may not 
necessarily reflect the organization‘s actual achievements. Interviewing alternative 
groups of the main players may help to anticipate this situation, and reviewing the 
literature also proves to be extremely helpful. 
Interviews 
Regardless of its source, case study evidence can rely on both qualitative and 
quantitative data. A common source of qualitative data for case studies comes from 
open-ended interviews. Because they are generally less structured, the interviews can 
assume a lengthy conversational mode and, hence, offer richer and more extensive 
material than quantitative data. For instance, the semi-structured interviews in the case 
study of tax reform consumed one to two hours on more than a single occasion. The 
flexible format permits qualitative interviews, if properly scheduled and conducted, to 
reveal how interviewees construct their reality and think about the changes in tax 
system, not just to give the answers to researcher‘s specific questions. In this sense, 
the participants‘ perception of reform and associated changes provides important 
insights into the case. The insights gain even more value as the interviewees are key 
members in the governmental agencies, international institutions, political parties, and 
civil society organizations being studied, not just the average member of such groups. 
For the study of tax administration reform, for example, the key persons of contact 
were the head of the Central Tax Office and line managers in the respective 
departments, as well as the coordinators of the development programs. Because by 
definition only a few persons will fit such roles, this type of interviews is also called 
‗elite‘ interviews. 
As part of case study research, a series of the qualitative interviews were conducted in 
Bishkek in the form of intensive face-to-face interviews. The purpose of research 
interviewing is the elicitation of narratives from the respondents to explore the 
meanings and interpretations they give to different aspects of reform process (Kvale, 
2007). By using interview method, it is possible to contrast what was announced like 
objectives of tax reform and what was done by executive government. Thus, the in-
depth interviews will help to identify the main factors of tax reform. The interview 
narratives will be triangulated with findings from time-series and document analysis to 
build up a broader view of how reform objectives and achievements had been pursued 
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by politico-administrative elite, middle-level professionals and international experts. The 
emerging conclusions will be shared with initial participants to receive a feedback and 
to gain more understanding of the directions and the main factors of tax reform in the 
Kyrgyz Republic, 
Data Collection and Sampling Strategies 
As politico-administrative elite is less accessible and more conscious of its own 
importance, the accessibility was a major issue – as a result, the interview sample is a 
lot smaller than in a general interviewing (Richards, 1996). Instead of random 
sampling, the theoretical sampling was employed to specify the social characteristics, 
number and type of respondents to be interviewed within the parameters set up by 
research question – to identify and describe factors influencing tax reform in the Kyrgyz 
Republic since 1991 using the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model of public management 
reform. It was assumed that the government officials from the minister of finance will 
provide more insight into socio-economic policies of the country, while the politicians 
and members of the civil society will present the expectations and opinions about on-
going tax reform from the political perspective. It is expected that the tax administrators 
and the professional associations, such as tax consultants and auditors, will focus on 
the features of the administrative system – in particular, the content of reform agenda, 
implementation process and reform outcomes. And the taxpayers, including the finance 
accountants, will give feedback on the use of this system and the changes needed. Of 
course, the experts of the international organizations and donors will explain their role 
in the reform process in terms of technical assistance, expertise and financial support. 
Finally, the academics will help to explore the theoretical models and approaches to tax 
reform (Table 3.3.3). 
Table 3.3.3. Interviews: List of Interviewees 
Reference Category Position, Organization Interview Date 
    Government Agencies   
010 Tax Officer 1 
Revenue Management Department, Central 
Office, STS September 26, 2012 
011 Tax Officer 2 
Risk-Based Audit Department, Central Office, 
STS September 25, 2012 
012 Tax Officer 3 Former Chief Executive, Central Office, STS September 24, 2012 
013 Tax Officer 4 Former Chief Executive, Central Office, STS September 20, 2012 
014 Tax Officer 5 First May Rayon, Bishkek Rayon Office, STS September 27, 2012 
015 Tax Officer 6 First May Rayon, Bishkek Rayon Office, STS September 27, 2012 
016 Tax Officer 7 First May Rayon, Bishkek Rayon Office, STS September 27, 2012 
017 Tax Officer 8 October Rayon, Bishkek Rayon Office, STS September 28, 2012 
018 Tax Officer 9 October Rayon, Bishkek Rayon Office, STS September 28, 2012 
019 Tax Officer 10 LTU, Bishkek Office, State STS October 1, 2012 
020 Tax Officer 11 Budget Policy Department, Minister of Finance October 2, 2012 
021 Tax Officer 12 Revenue Forecasting Department, MoF October 2, 2012 
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    International Organizations and Donors   
022 Tax Expert 1 Project Manager, ADB's Project September 19, 2012 
023 Tax Expert 2 
Coordinator, Regional Cooperation Program, 
ADB September 12, 2012 
024 Tax Expert 3 Consultant, USAID Reforma Project September 18, 2012 
025 Tax Expert 4 Consultant, USAID Reforma Project September 11, 2012 
026 Tax Expert 5 Head, IPPA, UCA September 17, 2012 
027 Tax Expert 6 Research Fellow, IPPA, UCA September 17, 2012 
028 Tax Expert 7 Research Fellow, IPPA, UCA September 17, 2012 
029 Tax Expert 8 Coordinator, PA Program, Soros Foundation  September 5, 2012 
030 Tax Expert 9 Urban Institute  September 6, 2012 
    Civil Society Organizations   
031 Tax Consultant 1 Chair of Board, Chamber of Tax Consultants October 5, 2012 
032 Tax Consultant 2 Bishkek Business Club October 4, 2012 
033 Tax Consultant 3 Member, PAC, State Tax Service October 3, 2012 
034 Tax Consultant 4 Member, PAC, State Tax Service September 10, 2012 
035 Tax Consultant 5 Union of Accountants and Auditors September 3, 2012 
036 Tax Consultant 6 Chamber of Accountants and Auditors  September 4, 2012 
    Taxpayers   
037 Taxpayer 1 CFO, Coca-Cola Bishkek Bottlers  September 10, 2012 
038 Taxpayer 2 Financial Manager, Company September 14, 2012 
039 Taxpayer 3 Auditor, KPMG March 5, 2013 
040 Taxpayer 4 Auditor, Deloitte March 11, 2013 
041 Taxpayer 5 Taxpayer, Individual September 13, 2012 
042 Taxpayer 6 Project Manager, Company August 20, 2012 
043 Taxpayer 7 Taxpayer, Company August 22, 2012 
044 Taxpayer 8 Director, Company August 14, 2012 
045 Taxpayer 9 Engineer, International Airport 'Manas' August 24, 2012 
046 Taxpayer 10 Taxpayer, Individual August 16, 2012 
047 Taxpayer 11 Taxpayer, Company August 23, 2012 
    Educational Institutions   
048 Academic 1 Associate Professor, PA Department, AUCA March 18, 2013 
049 Academic 2 Assistant Professor, BA Department, AUCA March 18, 2013 
050 Academic 3 
Assistant Professor, Economics Department, 
AUCA March 20, 2013 
051 Academic 4 
Associate Professor, Head, Taxation 
Department, Academy under the President of 
the Kyrgyz Republic March 26, 2013 
052 Academic 5 Lecturer, Taxation Department, APKR March 27, 2013 
053 Academic 6 Professor, Taxation Department, APKR March 27, 2013 
Finding strategies included network snowballing, locating of social settings, and 
assistance of the sponsoring organization. Moreover, it was expected that the 
interviewees themselves could help to expand networks or provide access to other 
individuals in the research area – this snowball effect has accumulated significant 
number of potential participants. Semi-structured interviews with relevant government 
officials, donors, civil society members, independent consultants, and taxpayers 
provided a variety in representation of the main actors engaged into tax reform 
process. The main approach to improve internal validity of the study was to increase 
the sample size to a level of 30 interviews, and to meet with present and former civil 
servants, tax managers and other stakeholders, who oversaw the milestones and 
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major changes in tax system of the Kyrgyz Republic over the last two decades (Berry, 
2002).  
To approach participants using the networking technique, an information letter has 
been sent to the prospective interviewees. The purpose of this letter is to provide 
credibility and legitimacy to researcher‘s work by setting out clearly the status of the 
researcher, explaining briefly the nature of research, benefits gained from conducting 
the interview, sources of funding and how the information will be used. Additionally, the 
hard-copy package – including information sheet, consent form, ethics approval 
certificate, and sponsorship letter – was distributed at the beginning of interview. The 
flexible interview guide included a set of 10-15 open-ended questions followed by 
prompts and probes for about 1.5 hour in total. Hence, the interview guide has not 
been inclusive – in fact, frequently revised during fieldwork. So, the relevant 
adjustments have been made in data recording and coding approach based on issues 
raised during fieldwork. Whenever possible, the participants already interviewed were 
asked to refer to another potential respondents to carry on the ‗snowballing‘ effect. At 
the end of interview, a ‗thank-you‘ letter was sent including a brief abstract of a 
research proposal, and asking for a permission to follow-up if other questions arisen 
during the reflection on the interview notes as well as during the data analysis and 
interpretation stage. This procedure provided a safety net allowing to raise any issues 
which have been missed in the first place and probably to generate topics for the 
second interview – for example, the chair of the CTC, certain top tax officials, and the 
project manager of the ABD‘s project were contacted on multiple occasions.  
Research Ethics and Pre-Interview Preparation 
In practice, the interview process includes many formal activities such as interview 
questions framing, respondents sampling, and interview planning which require a 
separate consideration prior to submitting an interview plan to the ethics committee 
(Warren and Karner, 2009). In order to receive ethical approval, the three principles of 
human subjects‘ protection has been covered in the research proposal – mainly, 
informed consent, confidentiality and avoiding harm. In reality, recording inform consent 
provided by participants is depend upon the media by which the interview has been 
conducted. Web-based collection might be recorded by emailing an acceptance form to 
a researcher. Written consent was recorded using a consent form – the signed forms 
are securely stored in a locker along with other project documents. As the consent form 
has been signed in two copies, the interviewees retained the contact details of the 
researcher and the supervisor, and could use them to withdraw their records from the 
study anytime in the future. The interviewees also have right to request a copy of own 
transcript in order to make corrections or exclude from records. The researcher will 
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keep a copy of the signed consent forms and interview transcripts for the same period 
of time as the project data is to be retained.  
It is expected that anonymity will provide a protection and motivation to participants to 
answer problematic questions about barriers to the tax reform – for instance, 
corruption, tribalism, nepotism, bribery in tax administration. Moreover, in the 
government agencies an interviewing strategy includes additional steps. The top civil 
servant has been contacted and interviewed at the first place. At the end of this 
interview the researcher asked a permission to interview the middle-level managers. 
Potentially, this official approval opened access to senior staff in the hierarchical 
structure, set up interviewer status and provided legitimacy to a research project. 
On the whole, the participation in the research project posed no harm to participants. 
Whenever possible, participants were provided with a schedule of interview questions 
prior to interview, so that any questions that may cause distress for participant can be 
eliminated or changed. The contentious, critical or disturbing questions were kept to the 
end of interview session. Overall, the participants were treated with respect by not 
continuing with a line of questions if the interviewee has not indicated the wiliness to 
address issues being raised, or by not asking for reasons if the participant has made a 
decision to discontinue the interview.  
At the start of the interview any questions about research, data collection and storage 
were answered in short while getting acquainted with an interviewee and specifying 
any areas on which the participant did not want to be directly attributed. It is important 
to establish a degree of rapport and increase the possibility that the interviewees will be 
more open and comfortable about the information they are willing to provide (Harvey, 
2011). At the same time, it was clarified whether the interviewees would be interested 
in receiving a summary of thesis to provide their opinion and to make 
recommendations for further improvement.  
Transcribing, Data Coding and Storage 
According to the Data Protection Act 1998, all information received during fieldwork 
interviews should be treated in the strictest of anonymity and confidentiality. As all 
interviewees preferred to participate anonymously, their anonymity is provided by 
creating two lists to manage the anonymized database. The purpose of this procedure 
is to protect the participants from being identified by responses to interview itself or in 
conjunction with any other information available to the researcher. The first list contains 
unique reference numbers next to the name, position and organization of the 
participants. The second list uses these numbers against a set of raw data and 
transcripts which will be further coded and analyzed using special qualitative data 
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analysis software (Silverman, 2013). The reference is used to link each respondent to 
the personal details submitted, and neither list could identify a specific individual, until 
they are together – hence, it is crucial that these two lists to be stored separately.  
It is important to mention that none of the participants agreed to be recoded. The tax 
officials referred to the article of the tax code according to which disclosure of any 
taxpayer-related information is prohibited by the tax laws. The taxpayers also refused 
to be recorded – they afraid to be prosecuted later by criticizing the tax administration 
and raising issues with corruption in tax offices. This is the main reason why there are 
so many indirect quotes and summary tables in the thesis. As they wished to be, all 
interviewees are anonymized. Besides, the best effort was made to take full notes 
during the interviews – transcripts were written shortly after. The interview transcripts 
were coded and grouped by themes which match the themes captured in the literature 
review (Table 3.3.4). 
Table 3.3.4. Interviews: From Codes and Themes to Factors of Tax Reform 
Code Theme Factor 
HR legacy  Legacy of Soviet Union Historical factors 
Institutional legacy  Legacy of Soviet Union  
Cultural legacy  Legacy of Soviet Union  
Historical background Starting conditions  
   
Weak economy Economic situation Socio-economical 
factors 
Barriers to small and medium 
businesses 
Business development  
Budget planning by 
expenditures 
Revenue forecasting  
Structural reforms Economic reforms  
Quality of official statistics National statistics  
Reliability of statistical data National statistics  
Price volatility and global 
markets 
International trade and re-
export 
Global economic forces 
High dependence on foreign aid Aid dependence Global economic forces, 
External factor 
High poverty rate Low living standards Socio-demographic 
change 
Large number of migrants Internal migration Socio-demographic 
change 
Lack of investments Foreign direct investments Economic policies 
Budget deficit and debt Fiscal consolidation Economic policies 
Macroeconomic stabilization Macroeconomic stability Economic policies 
 Potential for revenue 
generation 
Economic policy 
   
Parliamentary republic Political regime  Political factors 
Conflict of interests of different 
player 
Political coalitions  
Consolidation of political power Political power  
Lack of political will Political will  
Frequent changes in 
government 
Political stability  
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Unstable political situation Political stability  
Government commitment to 
reform 
Reform sustainability   
Government ownership to 
reform 
Reform sustainability  
Imperfect tax legislation Tax laws  
Influence of politics on tax 
system 
Politics of tax reform  
New ideas and approaches Policy ideas and management 
techniques 
New management 
ideas, External factor 
Chamber of tax consultants and 
professional associations 
Engagement of civil society Pressure from citizens 
Public advisory council Engagement of civil society Pressure from citizens 
Business associations of SMEs Participation of business 
associations 
Pressure from citizens 
Lobby by MPs and large 
business 
Lobby by political interest 
groups 
Pressure from PIGs 
   
Regional networks Clan politics Elite decision-making 
Patron-client networks Clan politics  
Weak politico-administrative 
elite 
Politico-administrative elite  
   
   
Events of March 2005 Tulip Revolution of 2005 Chance events 
Events of April 2010 Rose Revolution of 2010  
Global economic crisis of 19998 Global economic crisis  
Global financial crisis of 2008 Global economic crisis  
   
Changes in tax system after 
2008 
Tax code of 2008 Administrative factors 
Principle of compliant taxpayer Tax code of 2008  
Extended taxpayer rights Tax code of 2008  
Distrust of citizens to tax offices Legitimacy  
Absence of tax culture Tax culture  
Frequent changes in top 
management 
Administrative stability  
Tax collection as performance 
target 
Performance measurement   
High tax burden Tax burden  
Uneven tax burden Tax burden  
Tax exemptions and preferences Tax asymmetry  
Special tax regimes Tax asymmetry  
Self-assessment Voluntary compliance  
Financial accounting and 
reporting 
International financial reporting 
standards (IFRS) 
 
Administration of large 
taxpayers 
Large taxpayer unit  
Replacement of VAT by sale tax Indirect taxation  
VAT refunds Indirect taxation  
Fraud VAT invoices Indirect taxation  
Administration of sale tax Indirect taxation  
Administration of excises Indirect taxation  
Administration of property tax Local taxation  
Administration of land tax Local taxation  
Lack of tax professionals HR management  
No clear criteria for personnel 
hiring 
HR management  
Low motivation in tax offices HR management  
New types of business and 
operations 
Tax administration  
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Administration of indirect taxes Tax administration  
Bureaucracy in tax offices Tax administration  
Poor management  Tax administration  
Corruption  Tax administration  
No single database Technological change  
Incompatibility in information 
systems among agencies 
Technological change  
Out-dated technology Technological change  
Transfer of social contributions 
to STS 
Administration of social 
contributions 
Content of reform 
packages 
Transfer of local taxes to LSGs Administration of local taxes Content of reform 
packages 
Effective, simple and 
transparent tax system 
Principles of taxation Content of reform 
packages 
Decrease in number of taxes 
and tax rates 
Tax structure Content of reform 
packages 
Taxpayer education Taxpayer service Content of reform 
packages 
Decrease in number of tax 
inspections 
Tax audit Content of reform 
packages 
Cross-checking of taxpayers 
background 
Taxpayer registration  
 
Content of reform 
packages 
Fast payments system Tax payments  Content of reform 
packages 
Tax court  Tax appeals Content of reform 
packages 
e-filing of tax returns Tax filing Content of reform 
packages 
Overpayment of taxes  Tax refund  Content of reform 
packages 
Weak enforcement power Tax liabilities Content of reform 
packages 
Administrative sanctions and 
penalties 
Tax liabilities Content of reform 
packages 
Old information system Technological modernization Implementation process 
Inefficient business operations Business process 
reengineering  
Implementation process 
Resistance to organizational 
changes  
Change management Implementation process 
Inadequate institutional capacity Institutional capacity-building Implementation process 
Functional organization New organizational structure Results achieved 
Compliance risk management Risk-based audit Results achieved 
STS web-site Official web-site Results achieved 
Call-centres in Bishkek Call-centres Results achieved 
One-stop-shop in Bishkek One-stop-shop Results achieved 
ITAIS Integrated information system Results achieved 
New computers and SB New equipment and facilities Results achieved 
   
Role of development partners Donor support External factors 
Strengthened, platform and ‗best 
practices‘ approaches 
Donor support Content of reform 
packages 
Country development strategies Donor support Content of reform 
packages 
Aid conditionality  Donor support Content of reform 
packages 
Project implementation and 
monitoring 
Donor support Implementation process 
Lack of donor coordination Donor coordination Implementation process 
Harmonization of donor aid Donor harmonization Implementation process 
Effect of Customs Union Customs Union  
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It is also became evidential during the interviews in Bishkek that most taxpayers know 
very little about the tax system, in particular the tax administration in Kyrgyzstan, – as 
employees, the individual taxpayers pay only PIT and pension contributions through 
their finance departments and have to visit tax offices only once an year to submit an 
annual declaration. So, there is a large gap of knowledge between ordinary taxpayers, 
on one hand, and highly professional tax officers and financial accountants, on the 
other hand. In this regard, it would be simply unrealistic to expect citizens to express 
their opinion and expectations about the tax reform of which they know so little and 
about which they have limited incentives to learn – hence, taxpayer education and 
public engagement should be an integral part of the reform agenda. 
By data protection law, personal information cannot be disclosed to any third party 
without the consent of the participant. Only the researcher has an access to a storage 
place in order to transcribe, analyse and interpret the qualitative data. If possible, 
interview e-records would be created and saved in logical files structure on the network 
disk of the university. The hard-copy records – inform consent forms, handwritten 
notes, and backup – are indexed and stored in the secure locker at the university. In 
addition, most of the paper documents were transferred to an electronic format. As 
sensitive data is held on a computer, files are protected and data security is guaranteed 
by applying a password to the parent folder and by limiting access to the lockable 
storage area. At the end of the project, the records will be securely disposed in 
accordance with the retention schedule specified by either the university or the 
sponsoring organization.  
3.3.2. Analyzing Case Study Evidence 
According to Yin (2014: 132), the ‗Data analysis consists of examining, categorizing, 
tabulating and testing, or otherwise recombining evidence, to produce empirically 
based findings.‘ However, procedures on how to analyse case study evidence have not 
been well defined. While the absence of such guidebook could be partially 
compensated by the use of special computer programs, researcher is the one who 
must define the codes to categorize the data, as well as the techniques to logically put 
the coded evidence together into broader themes – hence, the researcher has to 
develop a unique algorithm and customize it for a particular case study.  
To start analysing the case study data, the researcher might begin with the research 
questions, and then identify the evidence that will help to address these questions. 
Alternatively, instead of questions, the researcher can start by ‗playing‘ with the data 
and searching for patterns, concepts or insights that may emerge as a result of such 
manipulations with data. For example, Miles and Huberman (1994) recommend to 
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systematically organize the data by putting information into different arrays, making a 
matrix of categories and placing the evidence within such categories, creating visual 
aids – flowcharts and diagrams – for examining the data, tabulating the frequency of 
different events, or presenting information in chronological order (Yin, 2014: 135). 
Another way to get started is to use memos or reflective notes about what have been 
observed in the data during fieldwork – basically, any clues or suggestions to give a 
hint on how to conceptualize the data. Any of these preliminary data manipulations – 
such as arrays, matrixes, graphics, tabulation, or memos – will help to move towards 
an analytic strategy. The purpose of this strategy is to connect the case study data with 
the theoretical concepts. In this sense, the concepts will provide a further direction in 
data analysis. To put it another way, the analytic strategy will help to define the priorities 
for what to analyse and to develop a systematic sense of how it should be done. 
Hopefully, the strategy will guide the researchers through the case study analysis and 
reduce potential analytic difficulties. Of course, the researchers can develop their own 
alternative strategies, but a helpful starting point is to consider the general analytic 
strategies described below – whether such a strategy is based on theoretical 
propositions, use of data from the ‗bottom up,‘ case description, or rival explanations. In 
the absence of them, data analysis stage will be a challenge. Hence, the best 
preparation for conducting high-quality analysis is to have an analytic strategy, or an 
own version, at hand (Yin, 2014: 136–168). 
General Analytic Strategies 
Perhaps, the most preferred strategy for analysing the case study data is Relying on 
Theoretical Propositions – the main component of the case study design. Sure, the 
propositions would help to set up the entire data analysis stage by pointing to what 
contextual conditions to be described as well as what alternative explanations to be 
tested. But at first, the theoretical assumptions based on ‗how‘ and ‗why‘ questions 
could be extremely useful in shaping the data collection plan and keeping attention on 
certain types of data, while ignoring the other. As an example, the study of tax reform in 
the Kyrgyz Republic starts with the theoretical proposition that the factors identified in 
the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model have significant effect on tax reform process. The 
basic proposition – the impact of economic forces, political changes, administrative 
system, elite‘s decisions, and chance events on the reform process – will be traced in 
‗within-country‘ explanatory case study. For each factor, the purpose of the case study 
is to show how the formation and implementation of the tax reform agenda occurred 
after the transition to a market economy, and how the main stakeholders acted on 
behalf of their interest groups. Instead of defining the theoretical propositions, the 
researcher may prefer to follow a contrast inductive approach to data analysis. 
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Whether because of the earlier data manipulations or noticing a particular pattern 
during a quick review of field notes or interview transcripts, it becomes evidential that 
the data can actually suggest a useful concept or additional causal relationships. In 
practice, the researcher could assign various codes to the data, where each code 
represents a concept or interesting idea. Such insight could yield analytic priorities and 
provide guidance for the case study analysis. For the case study of tax reform, the 
Working Data from the ‘Ground Up‘ strategy offers additional benefits as the study 
happens to collect both quantitative and qualitative data.  
At the highest level, the data cover the phenomenon that the case study is attempting 
to explain – the tax reform in a particular country. At the same time, the data is also 
related to the embedded units of analysis within the broader case study design. In this 
situation, the data are subjected to statistical analysis while the qualitative interviews 
remain critical in explaining the case study‘s key proposition central to the entire case 
study. As a result, a strong analytic strategy is built.  
Developing a Case Description could be an appropriate alternative strategy when the 
researcher experiences difficulty in making the other two strategies work. In other 
words, the researcher may have collected a lot of data without specifying the initial 
research questions or propositions, or may not been able to catch a useful concept 
directly from the data. Hence, a descriptive framework could be developed to organize 
the case study. In this situation, the original purpose of the case study may be rather a 
descriptive one, or such descriptive approach may help to identify the relevant 
explanation to be analysed further. 
During the course of the case study, the researcher does have to identify and test the 
plausible rivals. As a general strategy, Examining Rival Explanations works well with all 
of the other analytic approaches. That is to say, the theoretical assumptions may 
include rival explanations, ‗playing‘ with the data may produce inductive alternatives, or 
descriptive frameworks may rely on alternative descriptions for the case. For instance, 
the key proposition in the case study of tax reform in the Kyrgyz Republic is that the 
factors identified in the model have a substantial effect on tax reform process. In this 
case, the simple rival explanation would be that the observed changes in the tax 
system could be in reality the result of some other influences besides the main factors 
mentioned in the theoretical framework. The researcher should be aware of this direct 
rival explanation and then has to include rational attempts to collect evidence about 
these possible ‗other factors.‘ It is also recommended to pursue the data collection in 
more vigorous way – in fact, trying to confirm the full potency of these alternative 
conditions rather than immediately rejecting them (Patton, 2002: 553; Rosenbaum, 
2002: 8–10). Because of that, if no sufficient evidence will be found, there is less 
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possibility that the researcher will be accused of acting in favour of the original 
proposition. Besides the ‗craft‘ rival explanations widely recognized in the social 
science research, Yin (2014: 141) urges the investigators to carefully identify the ‗real-
life‘ rivals prior moving to the data collection stage (Table 3.3.5). 
Table 3.3.5. Case Study Analysis: Rival Explanations Types 
Type of Rival Description or Examples 
Craft Rivals  
The Null Hypothesis The observation is the result of chance circumstances only 
Threats to Validity e.g., history, maturation, instability, testing, 
instrumentation, regression, selection, experimental 
mortality, and selection-maturation interaction 
Investigator Bias e.g., ―experimenter effect‖; reactivity in field research 
Real-Life Rivals  
Direct Rival An intervention (―suspect 2‖) other than the target (Practice 
or Policy) intervention (―suspect 1‖) accounts 
for the results (―the butler did it‖) 
Commingled Rival Other interventions and the target intervention both 
(Practice or Policy) contributed to the results  
(―it wasn’t only me”) 
Implementation Rival The implementation process, not the substantive 
intervention, accounts for the results (―did we do it right?‖) 
Rival Theory A theory different from the original theory explains the 
results better (―it’s elementary, my dear Watson‖) 
Super Rival A force larger than but including the intervention accounts 
for the results (―it’s bigger than both of us‖) 
Societal Rival Social trends, not any particular force or intervention, 
account for the results (―the times they are a-changing‖) 
Source: Yin, R. K. 2014. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, SAGE 
Publications, Inc, p. 141. 
Sometime, such substantive rivals may not be so obvious until the researchers found 
themselves in the middle of data collection – hence, targeting them at that point is most 
desirable. Overall, the more rival explanations are addressed and rejected, the more 
confidence will be gained in final findings. 
Specific Analytic Techniques 
Given a general strategy, several specific analytic techniques – mainly, pattern 
matching, explanation building, time-series analysis, logic models, and cross-case 
syntheses – can be relevant for laying a firm foundation for the main conclusions of the 
case study. These techniques are especially intended to deal with the threats to internal 
validity and external validity in case study research. Still, comparisons to rival 
propositions and validity tests should be made within each single case. For all of these 
techniques, similar replication logic could be applied if a study includes multiple cases, 
as well. Yet, none of them is easy to apply following a simple set of analytic procedures 
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– in fact, all of them requires much practice to be used properly. Unsurprisingly, the 
data analysis is the most difficult, and troublesome, stage of doing case studies. 
Pattern Matching  
The most desirable technique to be used for analysing case study evidence is to follow 
a Pattern Matching, or congruence method. According to this technique, the 
empirically-found patterns – from the main findings of the case study – could be 
compared with predictions made based on the theoretical concepts (Trochim, 1989). To 
this extent, if the actual and predicted patterns do coincide, the results can strengthen 
the internal validity in case studies. At this point, it should be clarified that the pattern-
matching allows no precise comparisons between these patterns. Due to such a low 
level of precision, an important suggestion is to deal with gross (mis)matches or 
develop more precise measures. In an explanatory study, the pattern-matching logic 
may be related to the dependent or the independent variables (or both). By contrast, in 
a descriptive study, this technique still could be applicable, as long as the pattern of 
specific variables is stipulated in advance, before the data collection. 
Continuing the same case study of tax reform, the outcomes of the reform process 
represent non-equivalent dependent variables, and I will assess each of them with 
different quantitative benchmarks or qualitative measures. The overall pattern predicted 
per each of these variables is that the factors identified in the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s 
model has a strong effect on the main outcomes of tax reform in the Kyrgyz Republic. If 
the case study results are as predicted, then it is possible to make a solid conclusion 
that the tax reform is a complex event, influenced by variety of different factors and 
cannot be viewed within public economics context only – the politics and administration 
do matter. However, if the empirical results fail to show the entire pattern as assumed, 
the initial proposition would be questioned – probably, other factors, not mentioned in 
the initial theoretical model, also have significant influence on tax reform. 
Apart from being a good analytic strategy, examining rival explanations can also help in 
pattern matching for independent variables. For example, it is already known that the 
tax reform has a certain type of outcomes, so the line of inquiry will focus on ‗how‘ and 
‗why‘ they occurred in this case. This requires the development of the rival propositions, 
and hence the introduction of the alternative explanatory variables into the model. To 
identify the certain threads to validity of the pattern matching logic (Cook & Campbell, 
1979), it is highly recommended to conduct repeated comparisons or a literal 
replication by selecting and studying at least two cases of tax reform in similar 
countries – thus, the ‗two-case‘ study is a preferable design.  
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Explanation Building 
Explanation Building is a special type of pattern matching, but the procedures are more 
complicated – thus, a separate category. As the researcher attempts to analyse the 
case study data by building an ‗explanation‘ about a phenomenon in narrative form and 
by stipulating a possible set of causal links about it - ‗how‘ and ‗why‘ this happened, this 
technique is more relevant to explanatory case studies. Because the cause-effects 
relationships may be complex and the study narratives may not be precise, ‗the better 
case studies are the ones in which the explanations reflect some theoretically 
significant propositions, whose magnitudes might start to offset the lack of precision‘ 
(Yin, 2014: 147). And again the researcher has to return back to the beginning - the 
research questions and the theoretical propositions defined in case study design. For 
example, the causal links can reflect critical analytic insights into tax reform process. 
The theoretical statement about barriers to tax reform, if correct, can lead to better 
understanding of tax reform process in general and to recommendations for future 
planning and implementation of reform programs – including comparative analysis and 
evaluation of tax efforts. But before, the researcher has to make an initial theoretical 
proposition about the main factors influencing the tax reform process and compare the 
facts against such proposition, then revise the proposition and compare the case 
details against the revision. It is also important to compare the revised proposition to 
the evidence of other similar cases, whenever it is possible, repeating this process as 
often as possible. Because of this iterative mode, the conclusion may be fully finalized 
only at the end of a study in contrast to the pattern matching technique - in operational 
terms, the case study data are examined, theoretical statements are revisited, and the 
evidence is re-examined again from a new perspective. In this sense, the explanation-
building is rather a gradual process of refining the causal propositions, in which a 
crucial role belongs to plausible rival explanations. Similar to general pattern-matching 
analysis, if these rivals cannot be supported by a set of outcome data, the researcher 
has to return to an initial proposition. However, this process is full with dangers, as the 
researcher may slowly move away from an original topic of study. Constant cross-
reference with the research problems as well as with the possible alternative 
explanations, maintenance of a certain chain of evidence, and use of a case study 
protocol and a database may help to reduce this potential problem. 
Time-Series Analysis 
In general, the ability to trace changes across space as well as over time is a major 
advantage of case studies. If the events could be traced over time in some details and 
with certain precision – that is to say, a large number of data points are available, 
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including the starting or ending points for the single variable – the Time-Series Analysis 
would be an option, even if the case study relies on other analytic techniques, as well. 
The essential logic underlying a time-series design is to compare an observed trend 
and a theoretically-defined trend, or a rival one, specified before conducting the case 
study. In fact, the time-series designs can be very complicated if the trends are 
expected to be more complex – for instance, not only always rising or declining (or flat) 
trends but some mixed patterns within the same case. Greater complexity also occurs 
when a multiple set of variables – not just a simple time series with a single dependent 
or independent variable – are used in a case study and when each variable is assumed 
to follow a different pattern across time. Such situation can especially be familiar in 
embedded case studies – that is, the main study may be about a single case, but 
additional data should be collected to cover an embedded unit of analysis. The relevant 
statistical techniques could then be used for testing (non)linear models. For example, 
the case study of tax reform will involve descriptive statistics and variance analysis. 
However, the objective of time-series analysis is not in observing and assessing the 
time trends alone, but also in examining the relevant ‗how‘ and ‗why‘ research 
questions about the relationship between different variables over time, in developing a 
rich explanation for their elaborate patterns and in comparing the explanation with the 
results. To put it another way, when the use of the time-series design is relevant to case 
study analysis, a major point is ‗to identify the specific indicator(s) to be traced over 
time, as well as the specific time intervals to be covered and the presumed temporal 
relationships among events, prior to collecting the actual data‘ (Yin, 2014: 154-155). 
In the Kyrgyz Republic, following a series of public finance reform, the government took 
firm steps to improve the tax system. The reform program included the action plan for 
introducing new tax legislation, enforcing tax collection, installing risk-based audit 
system, and reorganizing the tax departments to hold tax officers accountable to 
taxpayers. First, I will describe all of these actions in sufficient details to make their 
potential effect on the tax revenue collection understandable and plausible. The case 
study then will present time series analysis of the annual amount and level of specific 
taxes over the last two decades. The case study will explain how the content of tax 
reform packages designed by various stakeholders, the contextual and institutional 
factors of reform efforts and the timing of the relevant actions by tax administration 
matched the changes in the tax revenue trends. I will cite the plausibility of these 
factors‘ effects, combined with the timing of reform implementation in relation to the 
changes in tax structure, to support the explanation for the increase in tax collection in 
the country at that period. 
Within this single-case study, many different patterns of events may be hypothesized 
over time. For instance, the predicted time-series pattern could be based on the 
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proposition that the new tax code would substantial increase the tax revenues, 
whereas the other pattern could be based on the assumption that no such effect will 
occur. Examination of the actual data – such as, the annual amount of tax revenue 
collected before and after the tax act was passed – then help to decide which of the 
proposed time series best suits the empirical evidence. In the same way, the 
Interrupted Time Series approach can be applied to other variables, too. Although such 
complex time series design could create extra problems for data collection, especially 
for units nested in the same case study, it also means that by contrasting the predicted 
and the ‗real-life‘ trends the stronger evidence for the initial theoretical propositions 
might be produced. 
In addition, this case study would allow to trace the progress of tax reform over a pre-
specified period of time by compiling a chronology of presumed causal events. Similar 
to interruptions in a time series, the Chronological Sequences involve different types of 
variables and provide insightful focus on important causal inferences. The analytic 
purpose is to compare the chronology with the sequence of events predicted by 
theoretical hypothesis or causal proposition based on the following conditions in a case 
study (Yin, 2014: 154): 
 Event must always occur before other event, the reverse sequence is impossible. 
 Event must always be followed by other event, on a contingency basis. 
 Events can only follow other event after a pre-specified interval of time. 
 Certain time periods may be marked by types of events that are substantially 
different from those in other time periods. 
If the actual events and the predicted sequence, not the rival sequence, of events are 
the same, the single-case study provides basis for postulating potential causal 
relationships. As usually, reference to other cases, as well as the explicit test to internal 
validity are needed.  
Logic Models 
In recent years, the Logic Models has become increasingly popular, especially in 
evaluation studies. For evaluation purpose, the researcher stages the events in 
repeated ‗cause-and-effect‘ sequence, where the dependent variable will become the 
independent variable at the next stage. As an analytic technique, the goal of logic 
models is to match the theoretically predicted and empirically observed events over an 
extended period of time. Thus, conceptually, the logic models may be considered as a 
special form of pattern matching, as well. However, due to the sequential design, they 
deserve to be separated from pattern matching. In practice, the researcher should 
make a choice among three types of illustrative logic models, applicable to different 
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units of analysis – such as, an individual, an organization or a program – prior to 
gathering the data, and then test the (non)linear model by checking how well the data 
fit it. For example, Gill (2000) presents the conceptual framework for diagnostics, 
design and implementation of the World Bank‘s projects in revenue administration. The 
congruence model pays particular attention to transformation processes, contextual 
and institutional elements of revenue administration, but offers only a set of 
performance indicators to compare administrative systems across countries. 
Cross-Case Synthesis 
Finally, the Cross-Case Synthesis can be used to analyse the multiple-case studies by 
aggregating the findings across a number of individual cases – whether the single case 
has been treated as an independent study or as a pilot for the larger study. In any way, 
this technique considers every individual case as a separate study. Conventionally, it is 
assumed that the multiple cases design will make the analysis much easier and the 
conclusions more robust than having only a single case. 
Although they are important, the quality of a case study analysis does not depend 
solely on the specific analytic techniques chosen. Equally important is that the analytic 
strategy covers the key research questions and that the researcher uses all the 
evidence available to make sure that the analysis is of the highest quality. Also, all 
plausible rival explanations should be addressed, whenever possible. Whether it is a 
single-case or multiple-cases study, the researcher will be able to demonstrate good 
analytic skills by focusing on the most significant aspect of the case study. Without 
doing so, there is a possibility that the analysis will be vulnerable to alternative 
interpretations because of the evidence that have been deliberately ignored, as well to 
accusation that the important issues have been avoided because of potentially 
negative findings. The strong preference for the researcher is to demonstrate expertise 
in conducting the case study analysis, and awareness of current knowledge and 
discourse about the topic – the tax reform in the Kyrgyz Republic. In this matter I 
organize the discussion part according to the main factors in the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s 
Model. Within each factor, the major stakeholders of the reform process are covered, 
following an embedded single-case design. Across case study, I will also provide 
extensive interview and other documentation analysis, showing the sources of the 
findings. To keep the narrative reading smoothly, much of the data are presented in 
footnotes and appendices. In addition, I use my own knowledge about the case study 
subject as a result of extensive personal exposure to the issues being studied, 
including educational background and professional experience in tax affairs. 
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3.4. Data Sources and Limitations  
Clearly, the value of the conclusions presented in this thesis is limited by the fact that 
they are derived from only one case study within one country in Central Asia. However, 
the within-country study does illustrate a variety of factors influencing the tax reform 
process in the Kyrgyz Republic. Moreover, by going down to the tax system 
‗component‘ levels – mainly, tax structure, tax policy and tax administration – through 
the reform history, the range of factors covered will be further develop. In this matter, 
the researcher attempts to also draw conclusions based on the quantitative study, as 
well as the review of the existing literature on tax reforms in developing and transition 
countries, wherever possible. Nevertheless, it is still a small sample from which to 
generalize to a broader theory. 
It is therefore critical to disseminate, and discuss, the results of this mixed methods 
case study in order to understand whether there are other factors, which have not been 
included and which might help to enrich the resulting conclusions and 
recommendations. It is also important to consider whether the insights presented here 
are supported by the opinions and by the experiences of tax practitioners and 
academic scholars. The dissemination process to interviewees envisaged by the 
researcher should allow for the findings to be tested through such feedback. 
Moreover, as the next step, it is vital that this study will be complemented by further 
research, which might build upon its insights. Wherever possible, additional case 
studies – preferably, other countries in Central Asia and the former Soviet Union states 
due to similar historical background, or even contrasting case studies – could  
deliberately test the ‗boundaries‘ of the conclusions emerged. If these case studies will 
utilize the same theoretical framework – the Pollitt‘s Model – and the same approach to 
the synthesis of results, this would allow the cross-country comparison, as well as 
unified evaluation of tax reform efforts over specific period of time. 
In terms of the fieldwork, the main findings could also be a subject to a number of 
limitations. Most notably, due to the fact that the fieldwork was conducted by the 
researcher within such short time periods, the range of the major stakeholders who 
could be interviewed was, of course, limited. Nevertheless, the depth of analysis 
possible for such detailed explanatory case study, undertaken in a new independent 
state, was adequate enough to justify the final conclusions. Yet, it also could be the 
case that the analysis might be biased by the subjectivity of the researcher, as well as 
the different perspectives of the main players directly involved in the reform process. In 
fact, the government officials and donor coordinators responsible for decision-making, 
managing and implementing the reform program – that is, politico-administrative elite – 
comprised the core of those interviewed. Whilst members of civil society organizations 
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and business associations dealing with tax reform issues were relatively limited in 
numbers. With regard to members of the Parliament and leading politicians, only a few 
were actually interviewed. 
On the other hand, due to evidence from fieldwork, the researcher is able to carefully 
triangulate findings, when possible. For many issues, systematic comparisons are 
made between the perspectives of tax administration and finance ministry, the views of 
different development partners and donors, the opinions of tax managers and junior 
staff, the experiences of the financial accountants and auditors, and the judgments by 
ordinal taxpayers. Prior to the fieldwork, detailed document review was undertaken, 
drawn on the extensive materials available on the Internet and from reports and 
dataset published by the central government departments and donor agencies. 
The documentation review is focused on the official publications, annual diagnostic 
reports, working papers, technical notes, transcripts, consultant reports, feasibility 
studies, policy statements, directories, and formal reviews of tax policy and 
administration reform projects and programs undertaken by international organizations 
and research institutions.  Archival materials are also used in form of legal acts and 
official reports issued by central government agencies.  Finally, census data will be 
analysed to evaluate a tax system performance. The assessment will involve a review 
of contemporary literature and datasets available, and discussion with governmental 
ministries and executive agencies, international donors, non-governmental 
organizations, oversight institutions and taxpayers with reference to the objectives of 
tax reform.  However, no work has been done to synthesize the literature and 
evaluation of the tax reform process in the Kyrgyz Republic.  
The collection of data on tax revenues in developing countries is quite a big challenge. 
Despite a lack of independent statistical information, there are some sources that might 
help to conduct research and to obtain definite results, including the multilateral 
organizations, the research institutions and think-tanks, the consortia of donors and 
academic institutions, and the individual bilateral agencies. Overall, the research will be 
constrained by a lack of sufficient and reliable analytical information and evaluation 
evidences of tax reform in Kyrgyzstan, accessibility to restricted internal government 
documents, along with eventual changes in budget classification, casual errors in 
datasets and translation issues.  
In short, the biases that might have been introduced into fieldwork by time limitations or 
by the composition of the participants interviewed are for the most part corrected by the 
mixed methods approach, and definitely are no greater than in other case studies of 
this kind. Overall, I am confident in the quality of the case study evidence – both 
qualitative and quantitative data – and temped to introduce explicit caveats within the 
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text, where the reservations have been made.  
The main sources of country data are the ministry of finance, the tax administration, 
and the national statistical committee. In practice, the statistical offices obtain data 
based on reports prepared according to the Integrated Macro-economic Data System 
and publish it annually in the socio-economic reports, or upload to the web-site. 
Officially, a statistical body does not carry out the controlling function, and information 
voluntarily submitted by companies and local agencies is strictly confidential and could 
not be used to impose fines, penalty fees and taxes. Regular updated secondary data 
is a core of effective statistical system and the statistical committee, as the only 
governmental agency responsible for data collection and aggregation, recognizes the 
possibility of data corruption and misreporting. In fact, researchers can face difficulties 
in assessing the quality of statistical information. Especially, it is hard to distinguish 
wrong and reliable information in countries affected by informal economy that could 
lead to significant overestimation of budget revenues and expenditures, and cause 
further perversities in tax analysis (Olken and Singhal, 2009). Also, the governmental 
annual financial reports should include comprehensive notes providing more detail 
information about changes in budget accounts. In reality, the international organizations 
tend to simply transfer official statistics directly to their database systems. 
Recently, the international organizations in support of the tax reform initiatives in 
different countries develop comprehensive databases which could be used by the 
government and development agencies to assessing the tax administration 
performance. The databases do not only aggregate country-specific data, but attempt 
to provide valuable comments regarding key definitions, data collection, methodology, 
and database limitations. 
Conclusions 
Nowadays, the growing attention has been given to recently emerged multiple methods 
approach ‗where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative 
research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study‘ 
(Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004: 17). It means that separate methods used in a case 
study are forced to share the same research questions, to collect supplementary 
datasets, and to conduct data analysis in an integrated mode (Yin, 2014: 65-67 ) – 
hence, to follow a mixed methods design. As such, this approach allows the researcher 
to address more complicated research questions and to collect richer, and stronger, 
evidence than can be achieved by using only one method. Depending upon the nature 
of the research problems, and the researcher‘s ability, and training, to apply different 
methods, mixing methods opens a whole new types of research designs. 
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In fact, the embedded case studies earlier discussed in this chapter already represent 
a certain form of mixed methods design – in short, the embedded mixed methods 
design. For instance, the case study could rely on particular data collection strategy for 
studying the main case, but then use either quantitative or qualitative techniques (or 
both) to collect more data about the embedded unit(s) of analysis. In this case, the 
researcher has an opportunity to combine other research methods within the single-
case, or multiple-cases, study. However, the researcher should be aware about the 
opposite situations.  The case study may be part of a larger-scale study. For example, 
the case study may help to explore the specific conditions within quantitative, or 
qualitative research. Or, in broader sense, the mixed methods research may not even 
need to include the case study as a research method at all. In any way, the scholars 
admit that mixed methods studies are more difficult to execute than those limited to a 
single method. But, the mixed methods research does help the researcher to answer a 
broader range of the research questions than any case study alone. As a result, case 
studies with multiple methods deserve its place to be among other research methods.  
The research method inquiry bases on the assumption that collecting diverse types of 
data sequentially in the embedded case study design will provide a more complete 
understanding of research questions than either quantitative or qualitative data alone. 
The study will begin with a broad statistical time-series analysis in order to provide 
general overview of tax reform process in the country and then, in a second phase, will 
focus on qualitative interviews to collect detailed views from participants about the 
barriers to tax reform. 
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4. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS  
The case study analysis begins with the research questions, ‗playing‘ with the data and 
searching for patterns. In this sense, theoretical propositions will provide a further 
direction in data analysis, and help to define the analytic priorities for what contextual 
conditions to be described and what alternative explanations to be tested. The study of 
tax reform in the Kyrgyz Republic starts with the theoretical proposition that the factors 
identified in the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model have a significant effect on tax reform. 
This basic assumption – the impact of economic forces, political changes, 
administrative system, elite‘s decisions, and chance events on the reform process – will 
be traced for each factor in the explanatory case study. On the other hand, it becomes 
evidential that the use of data from the ‗bottom up‘ can actually suggest a useful 
theoretical assumptions or additional causal relationships. Such insight could yield 
analytic strategy and provide guidance for the case study analysis. If the study results 
are as predicted, then it could be concluded that the tax reform is a complex event, 
influenced by variety of different factors and cannot be viewed within public economics 
only. However, if the data fail to show the entire pattern as assumed, the initial 
proposition would be questioned – probably, other factors, not mentioned in the initial 
model, also have significant influence on tax reform. Hence, the alternative explanatory 
variables should be introduced to the model. In particular, it needs to take into account 
the significant impact of the historical context and the cultural and institutional legacies 
of the centrally planned economy, and the role of the development partners in the 
reform process. 
At this point, the multifactor model of public management reform, introduced in Chapter 
2, will be referred to throughout the rest of the thesis. The purpose of this chapter is to 
connect the data with the theoretical proposition within the broader case study design, 
to show how the formation and implementation of the tax reform agenda in Kyrgyzstan 
occurred after the transition to a market economy, and how the key players acted on 
behalf of their interest groups. The theoretical assumptions are also extremely useful in 
shaping the data collection stage and keeping attention on certain types of data, while 
ignoring the other. For the study of tax reform, broad statistical analysis and document 
review provide general overview of the process and directions of tax reform over the 
last two decades, while the qualitative interviewing helps to collect detailed data from 
participants about the main factors, and the main forces, of tax reform. 
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4.1. Historical Factors 
Pollitt and Bouckaert do not include the historical factors in their model of contextual 
influences on the process and dynamics of public management reform. However, they 
admit that history does matter – so, the model could be further revisited. The direction, 
and process, of tax reform in the Kyrgyz Republic cannot be understood completely 
without a good knowledge of the main legacies of previous regime. In particular, it 
seems that the scope and intensity of the tax reform are largely determined by the very 
starting conditions, since, at least in the perception of main stakeholders, a need for 
reform is determined according to these factors. Indeed, the choice in regard to tax 
reform is influenced by the initial conditions – that is, the tax system of the Soviet 
Union21 from which the reform process took off (Tables 4.1.1). Like other former Soviet 
states, Kyrgyzstan experienced similar challenges in reforming its tax system such as a 
sharp decline in budget revenues, inadequate fiscal institutions, unskilled staff and 
pervasive corruption. The last two decades of transition indicate a gradual approach to 
tax reforms in the country as well as a lack of an established roadmap for moving from 
a command system to a market economy.  
Table 4.1.1. Interviews: Historical Factors 
Interviewee Themes Comments 
Government Agencies 
Tax Officer 3 Historical Factors 
Starting conditions are important 
Legacy of the previous system 
STS and other revenue agencies lack 
of appropriate institutional capacity, so 
the starting conditions do matter.  
International Organizations and Donors 
Tax Expert 3 Historical Factors 
Legacy of the Soviet Union 
 
The command system provided the 
candidates (former financial 
accountants, auditors, controllers) for 
open positions in the tax inspectorate. 
Tax Expert 5 Historical Factors 
Legacy of the Soviet Union 
 
The milestones of tax reform include 
the legacy from previous system and 
the best practice from Russia in 1991, 
help of IMF in 1993, informal lobby of 
the tax code in 1996 and learning 
process of business associations and 
tax consultancy later. 
Civil Society Organizations 
Tax 
Consultant 1 
Historical Factors 
Initial conditions  
 
 
The story of the tax reform in 
Kyrgyzstan started in 19991 with the 
adoption of the new tax code and ‗big-
bang‘ from the previous system.  
Educational Institutions 
Academic 1 Historical Factors 
Institutional and cultural legacy of 
the Soviet Union 
 
                                                 
21
The Soviet Union consisted of Armenian, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonian, Georgian, Kazakh, Kirghiz, 
Latvian, Lithuanian, Moldavian, Russian, Tajik, Turkmen, Ukrainian and Uzbek Soviet 
Socialist Republics.  
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The country inherited a system of public finances heavily relied on transfers from the 
central budget of the Soviet Union with budget planning focused on expenditures, while 
ignoring the domestic revenues capacity. For instance, in 1992 the level of budget 
revenue comprised only a half of the government expenditures (Mogilevsky and 
Omorova, 2011). The government attempts to cover the budget deficit by excessive 
monetary emission – the simplest method of deficit financing – have provoked an 
outrageous hyperinflation in the early 1990s. Consequently, in FY1995-1996, the 
government made a decision to abandon this practice and prohibited the NBKR from 
using direct credits to finance the deficit – instead, to focus its attention on external 
borrowing to balance the budget. Despite that effort, the deficit remained very high – 
around 1% of GDP (Figure 4.1.2) – which made the entire fiscal system extremely 
unstable and unpredictable. The global financial crisis of 1998 – mainly distributed 
through Russia and Kazakhstan – resulted in a currency devaluation, inflation growth, 
and decline in the GDP. Also, due to massive borrowing in 1990s the external debt 
exceeded the GDP level. So, following the crisis in FY2000-2001, the government 
faced dramatic cut in public expenditures from 33.5% of GDP in 1998 to 26.6% of GDP 
in 2001. This was achieved mainly through unadjusted government spending – the so-
called non-indexation by expected inflation level – while some categories of 
expenditures were, in fact, reduced in nominal terms. As a result, the deficit of the 
general government budget was pushed below 6% of GDP (Government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, 2013). Because of the economic growth in FY2002-2007, the budget 
prospect has been improved substantially – the zero-based budget was introduced in 
2008 due to simultaneous growth both in government revenues and expenditures. 
Unfortunately, after the global crisis, the situation changed dramatically and the deficit 
jumped again to the level of 10% of GDP in 2009. In this case, the only way to reduce 
budget deficit was to make significant improvements in tax collections – the biggest 
component of budget revenues. In FY2001-2008, the growth in tax revenue was mainly 
attributed to the expansion of import taxes – the administration of indirect taxes, such 
as VAT, excises and import tariffs, are the most problematic, and thus better-controlled, 
element of the tax system. In 2007, the import taxes comprised about 50% of total tax 
collection. Later, due to the adoption of a new tax code in 2008, the structure of tax 
revenue moved towards direct taxation and official transfers (Tables 4.1.2-4.1.10, 
Figure 4.1.1). 
Despite recent changes, PIT and CIT contribute to the budget only 20% of total tax 
revenue in 2013. Meanwhile, the taxpayers enjoy the unified flat rate of 10% for both 
taxes – originally, the top marginal rate was 33% and 30% for PIT and CIT respectively 
– and the collection rate is definitely better than few years ago. Nowadays, the highest 
nominal rate of 27.25% belongs to the national insurance contributions to the Social 
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Fund. At the same time, the small businesses, individual entrepreneurs and farmers 
pay much less in payroll taxes. Therefore, such discriminative regime, uneven burden 
and relatively high rates unveil the distorting nature of these contributions, which 
persistently pushing taxpayers into informal economy. And the same sort of problems 
appears in indirect taxation, as well. For instance, the nominal rates of indirect taxes for 
domestic production and import are the same, but their administration is overseen by 
two executive agencies – that is, the State Tax Service and the State Customs Service 
– and depends on the sector of the economy – for example, the agriculture is exempt 
from VAT. Therefore, collection from these taxes did not reach their potential level.  
4.2. Socio-Economical Factors 
According to IMF (2013), the share of tax revenue was around 20% of GDP in 2013 – 
which is still pretty low. Meanwhile, the uneven distribution of the tax burden is seen 
both by the government and the business community as one of impediments for the 
sustainable economic growth – hence, any substantial increase in tax rates is hardly 
possible in foreseen future. As it was mentioned during semi-structured interviews 
(Tables 4.2.1), the tax code of 2008 introduced several important changes to tax 
system – the main intention was to even tax burden among different categories of 
taxpayers, to decrease the tax rats and to eliminate cascading turnover taxes. As the 
results of these changes remain to be seen, probably the most radical change was 
reduction in VAT rate from 20% to 12%. Immediately, this resulted in a sharp decline in 
VAT collection in 2009. As it is not expected that in response to lower tax rate the VAT 
base will be broaden, the STS faces a crisis situation. Anyway, it seems that the tax 
rate for VAT will be increased soon, especially as following the advice of development 
partners the government is targeting to gradually cancel the sales tax – this tax 
introduces too much controversy to the tax system (USAID, 2013a). In the presence of 
growing budget deficit, any additional cut in tax rates seems unlikely in the medium-
term. Indeed, the regulatory tax rates for PIT, CIT and VAT are already aligned with 
respective taxes in other Central Asian countries on the wave of tax competition in the 
region – for example, PIT of 9% in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, and VAT of 12% in 
Kazakhstan (Baker Tilly Bishkek et al., 2013). The only reserve available is to play with 
a rate schedule for excises which are relatively below regional average or to introduce 
a new set of taxes not covered by the tax code – but, this will violate the principle of a 
simple tax system. Thus, no major changes in tax rates or a number of taxes are being 
expected. Still, the effective rate of tax collection could be increased through 
improvements in the tax administration and also due to the possible post-crisis 
response of the economy to tax incentives provided in the past.  
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Table 4.2.1. Interviews: Socio-Economical Factors 
Interviewee Themes Comments 
Government Agencies 
Tax Officer 1 Economical Factors 
Potential for revenue 
generation 
Shadow economy 
To mobilize more tax revenue, it is 
critical to address the unregulated and 
unregistered taxpayers, mainly 
bazaars and spontaneous trade, and 
new types of business. The tax code 
reduced the VAT rate to 12%. It was 
expected that after 2008 the tax 
collection will decrease by 40%, but in 
fact no changes as business went out 
of shadow and tax base increased.   
Tax Officer 3 Economical Factors 
Income legalization and tax 
amnesty 
 
It is assumed that tax amnesty and 
universal declaration campaign will 
mobilize more budget revenue, and 
reduce the size of the shadow 
economy. 
Tax Officer 10 Economical Factors 
Regional development 
Large taxpayers mostly reside in 
Bishkek and free economic zones, 
which affect the regional development. 
Kumtor raises not only economical, 
but political concerns. 
Tax Officer 12 Economical Factors 
Revenue forecasting 
The revenue forecasting has 
methodological issues, the budget 
proposal starts from expenditures 
planning. For example, Russia does 
not have revenue plan, but estimate 
according to economy forecast. The 
ministry of finance in Kyrgyzstan uses 
incremental approach – previous 
budget plus 30% growth. 
International Organizations and Donors 
Tax Expert 1 Economical Factors 
No correlation between tax 
revenue and real economic 
performance 
Economic policies  
The ADB‘s project is aimed to promote 
fiscal consolidation, macroeconomic 
stability and economic growth. 
Tax Expert 3 Economical Factors 
Quality of official statistics 
 
Tax court is needed for tax appeals, 
social insurance of part-time 
employees and individual 
entrepreneurs  
Tax Expert 5 Economical Factors 
International trade and re-
export  - the system is inelastic  
Large taxpayers (railway, 
mobile and mining industry) are 
main taxpayers 
The influence of donors and potential 
coalition on government and tax policy 
is significant. No research was 
conducted to study the dynamics of 
real tax base and effective tax rate.  
Tax Expert 6 Economical Factors 
Increase in tax revenue after 
the introduction of the new tax 
code in 2008 
The budget revenues have increased 
from 2009 due to mining tax from 
Kumtor company, the reduction in PIT 
to 10%, and CIT paid by large 
enterprises in mobile and textile 
industries.  
Tax Expert 8 Economical Factors 
Potential for revenue 
generation 
The reserves for revenue generation 
include the introduction of green tax, 
reduction in tax rates for excises 
(gasoline, alcohols, tobacco), which 
are lower that in other Central Asian 
states, and the general custom regime 
instead of simplified custom duties by 
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weight. 
Tax Expert 9 Economical Factors 
Fiscal decentralization 
Fiscal decentralization reform was not 
finished. Kyrgyzstan follows 
deconcentration of power among the 
central and municipal levels. The local 
self-governments are very dependent 
from the central government. The 
local budgets rely heavily on subsidies 
and transfers. 
Civil Society Organizations 
Tax Consultant 1 Economical Factors 
Differentiation of sale tax rates 
by industries 
Simplify depreciation of fixed 
assets 
No need in IFRS for small 
business 
The 2008 code incorporates the 
principle of taxation. For the first time, 
the civil society forced the government 
to accept more liberal tax code. 
Tax Consultant 2 Economical Factors 
Dependence on commodity 
prices in the international 
markets 
Potential revenue sources 
The mining tax is linked to basic 
commodity prices. New types of 
business and operations highlight the 
technical problems in the tax code.  
Tax Consultant 3 Economical Factors 
Politics and economy should be 
separated 
No big picture 
Divide the responsibilities between 
STS and local self-governments for 
administration of republican and local 
taxes, respectively. 
Tax Consultant 4 Economical Factors 
Tax policy 
The recommendations include to 
decrease the tax burden to 30-35%, 
cut tax rates, reduce pressure on 
taxpayers and bureaucracy in tax 
offices, promote the principle of 
compliant taxpayer and simplify 
payments through one-stop shop. 
Tax Consultant 5 Economical Factors 
Tax policy 
The goals are partially achieved. 
The tax rate for VAT decreased from 
20% to12%, sale tax from 4% to 2%, 
and CIT from 20% to 10%. Advertising 
tax, road tax and emergency 
allocations were eliminated.  
Taxpayers 
Taxpayer 1 Economical Factors 
Tax policy  
There should be a social contract 
according to which the government 
will set the rational burden and society 
agrees to pay taxes. If society refuses 
to pay, neither repression will help. 
The businesses will stay in shadow or 
move abroad. On the other hand, 
need for taxes is driven by 
expenditures, such as military, public 
order and security, medicine, 
education. Thus, social contract (or 
tax code) between the society and the 
government should include such tax 
mix and rates, which are as low to 
provide incentive for development and 
paying taxes, and as high to fill the 
budget. 
Taxpayer 2 Economical Factors 
Low adaptability of tax system 
to market relations  
The government should reconsider 
and adopt new tax code, more 
suitable to market economy. All 
depends on the government, tax 
policy and legislature.  
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Taxpayer 3 Economical Factors 
Lack of investments leads to 
bankruptcy and liquidation of 
firms 
Regular monthly inspections 
interrupt business development 
and profit generation 
It is necessary to remove the 
mechanism of bureaucratic operations 
in registration process, reduce the 
number of inspections and increase 
the quality of tax control. 
 
Taxpayer 5 Economical Factors 
Barriers to small and medium 
businesses 
  
Not all of goals were achieved. 
The primary goals are simple tax 
procedures and transparent tax 
collection process. 
Taxpayer 6 Economical Factors 
Low investment flow for 
research and modernization 
Budget heavily relies on tax 
collection, low taxes mean low 
budget revenues and cut in 
expenditures. 
 
Social Factors 
Low living standards 
It is important to update legal 
framework and provide incentives for 
business development. If do nothing, 
the country falls back. Tax reform 
should be part of structural reforms in 
other industries, not the blind adaption 
of best practices of other countries. 
Then, the tax policy has a chance for 
rehabilitation.  
 
Taxpayer 7 Economical Factors 
Weak economy 
At present, the reforms are significant 
and positive, although very slow.  
Taxpayer 9 Economical Factors 
Shadow economy 
The goals are not achieved as most of 
economy is in shadow. The tax reform 
is possible but it is a long-term 
process.  
Educational Institutions 
Academic 2 Economical Factors 
Large and uncontrolled 
migration  
Macroeconomic indicators provide 
positive picture but this does not 
reflect the poor performance of SMEs 
and social situation in the country 
Academic 3 Economical Factors 
Rational tax policy depends on 
the priorities of the government. 
Today it is the economic 
stability. 
Macroeconomic policy is 
focused on fiscal consolidation. 
It is important to cover fiscal 
deficit without increasing public 
debt.  
Taxation has dual nature. On one 
hand, low taxes can stimulate 
business development. On the other 
hand, government needs high taxes to 
collect more revenue and exercise its 
functions. So, the choice is between 
the simulative and restrictive tax 
policy. 
Academic 4 Economical Factors 
Budget planning by 
expenditures (Turkey, Georgia) 
Internal migration and regional 
development 
Regional development should be a 
priority, migrants from the south make 
investments in education and 
accommodation. 
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The other important source of budget revenue is non-tax revenues. In reality, these 
revenues are comprised of proceeds collected by the government institutions – usually, 
public schools, universities, hospitals, social protection, and utilities companies – from 
public services provided, and accumulated on their bank accounts. As a result, the 
government has a limited power over these cash receipts allowing the public 
institutions to use them on their discretion – moreover, the Special Means Tax on this 
kind of proceeds was just removed from the  code. Official transfers also play an 
important role in the budget revenue. In terms of expenditures composition, more than 
half is spent on social sector (Table 4.1.11-4.1.13, Figure 4.1.3). As part of capital 
expenditure, the government recently attracted substantial investments in energy 
generation and social infrastructure projects – in particular, construction of hydropower 
station ‗Kambarata 1‘ and building of road. In regard to budget financing, it looks that 
the domestically financed sources are not so important anymore. In addition, since 
1997, monetary emission was no longer available to close the deficit. As internal 
borrowing through government bonds and T-bills is marginal and not yet developed – 
due to genuine destruct of the general public in the government – the external 
borrowing becomes the only real possibility to balance the budget.  
As a sovereign state, Kyrgyzstan started its official history without any foreign debt – 
except for the Soviet Union and later the Russia. Extensive borrowing in 1990s led to 
gradual accumulation of significant debt (Table 4.2.2), which became unsustainable 
after the national currency devaluation of FY1998-1999. For this matter, Kyrgyzstan 
went through two rounds of Paris Club negations followed by a substantial debt relief 
on highly concessional terms (World Bank, 2014). In FY2006-2007 the country was 
very closed to receive further debt relief within HIPC framework – the initiative 
supported by such main donors as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and 
the IMF – but after a series of public protests against joining this initiative the 
government made a decision to drop this opportunity (World Bank, 2014). Overall, the 
debt situation has improved later due to putting the economy on the recovery path, as 
well as the appreciation of the national currency – and, consequently, the depreciation 
of mostly USD-denominated loans – and a change of the donors‘ aid portfolio in favour 
of the grants provision. It should be noted, however, that the situation is still fragile as 
the debt indicators started to deteriorate from 2008 due to extensive borrowing for 
infrastructure projects, almost-zero economic growth, shrink of exports and a drop in 
tax collection rate after the introduction of the new tax code in 2009. Foreign aid from 
international development agencies is extremely crucial for the budget financing. While 
its role visibly diminished in early 2000s as tax collection began to improve partially due 
to incremental tax reforms, the influence of donor assistance dramatically increased 
again in 2009 to the level above 5% of GDP – after the global financial crisis, the 
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government was in need for more external support. On the other hand, private 
borrowing from foreign investors is not popular in Kyrgyzstan. Nowadays, private debt 
is mainly associated with the largest investment project – Kumtor gold mine. 
Since early 1990s, a fundamental tax reform in the Kyrgyz Republic has resulted in 
establishing a tax system that is consistent with modem principles of a market-oriented 
economy. In general, the tax policy reforms in of the Kyrgyz Republic pursued the 
accomplishment of the following goals (USAID, 1993): 
 Develop an efficient, fair, simple, transparent and stable tax system 
 Encourage business activities, reduction of the tax burden 
 Improve tax administration 
 Ensure sustainable economic development.  
As a key output of the reform, the Tax Code has enhanced these goals towards a 
‗good‘ tax system that could encourage investments and achieve economic growth. 
Today, the only danger is that further changes in a tax structure misguided by 
government officials or politicians in pursuit of economic incentives or political assets 
could harm rather than improve the tax environment. Also, modernization of the tax 
administration must be a new focus for on-going tax reform (Jenkins and Peprah, 
2001). 
After a rapid tax reform in the early l990s, recent attempts to modernize the tax system 
have been rather fragmented. In practice, the revenue administration is split among 
four semi-autonomous agencies – that is, the State Tax Service (STS), the State 
Customs Service (SCS), the Social Fund, and the Financial Police, whereas their 
functional assignments are somewhat duplicative and contradictory, especially with the 
Ministry of Finance and the Treasury. Widespread tax evasion, under-provision of 
public goods, insufficient investment and chronic budget deficit are the primary 
consequences of the inefficient tax system, which in total hamper effective fiscal 
decentralization and sustainable economic growth. Together, these problems have 
frustrated the government‘s efforts to modernize and reform tax administration and 
have contributed to stagnant tax collections (World Bank, 2004a). In the Kyrgyz 
Republic, the distribution of tax burden among taxpayers and economic sectors is still 
highly disproportional. A proper tax administration would reduce the burden of 
collection and compliance both for tax authorities and taxpayers – thus, lines of control 
should be clearly assigned, information should be readily available, and inter-agency 
conflict and ambiguity should be eliminated. In prospect it should become a service-
oriented system of voluntary compliance, while assisting taxpayers to follow the tax 
laws and minimizing contact with them. As such, optimal integration of revenue-related 
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government agencies, open dialogue and partnership between the STS and taxpayers, 
improved taxpayer education, and a tax policy driven by universal taxation principles 
are all needed before a significant level of tax administration modernization can be 
achieved.  
The first description of a Kyrgyz tax structure could be found in the Law # 1473-XII 
‗Fundamentals of the Tax System in the Kyrgyz Republic‘ issued on June 14, 1994. The 
purpose of this act was to provide a clear definition of a tax system, to clarify the object 
and subject of taxation, and to prepare a regulatory platform for interaction between the 
taxpayers and tax authorities. Initially, the tax system was described as a mix of 
mandatory payments, duties and fees (taxes) and charges (non-tax payments) to a 
government according to tax laws. The primary aim of the tax system is revenue 
collection to the state budget. As the Kyrgyz Republic is a unitary state, the two-ties tax 
system was put in place. 
 Republican Taxes for which the tax base, tax rates, object of taxation, taxpayers, 
tax exemptions, collection and payment methods, and tax schedule are defined by 
the Tax Code on the whole territory of the Kyrgyz Republic. 
 Local Taxes applied by the local councils on their territories. 
The tax code of the Kyrgyz Republic, enacted on June 26, 1996, defines the tax as ‗a 
compulsory payment, collected from income/turnover, received by legal and individual 
entities and comprised of collections, fees, national duties and other compulsory 
payments (except penalties, repayment of debts, payments for work, goods and 
services provided) to the state budget‘ (Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, 1996, 
Article 3). Unlikely to the Tax Act 1994, the tax code has officially excluded budget 
allocations, custom duties, and government fees from a tax structure (Government of 
the Kyrgyz Republic, 1996: Parts III-VIII). The second version of the tax code extends a 
definition of the tax to ‗a compulsory, individually gratuitous monetary payment made 
by a taxpayer according to tax laws of the Kyrgyz Republic‘ (Government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, 2008, Article 19). As stated in the tax code of 2008 (Chapter 2, Articles 31, 
40), the current structure of the tax system in Kyrgyzstan consists of the following taxes 
and tax regimes: 
General Tax Regime: 
Republican Taxes  
1. Profit Tax 
2. Personal Income Tax (PIT) 
3. Value-Added Tax (VAT) 
4. Excise Tax 
Special Tax Regimes: 
1. Mandatory Patent 
2. Voluntary Patent 
3. Simplified Single Tax 
4. Contract-Based Tax  
5. Free Economic Zones (FEZ) 
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5. Subsoil Taxes 
6. Sale Tax 
Local Taxes 
1. Land Tax 
2. Property Tax 
6. High Technologies Park 
 
The most important sources of the tax revenue are VAT, CIT, PIT and excise taxes – it 
is important to note the growing role of VAT and weakened position of excises. A 
number of taxes such as local taxes, simplified taxation of the small businesses 
chronically collect insignificant amount of revenue. Amongst other mandatory payments 
and budget allocations, the contributions to the Social Fund account for a large share 
of the government revenue. According to the IMF (2012: 9), the tax revenues growth is 
hampered because of the following problems in the current tax system: 
 Uneven tax burden, big number of tax exemptions and privileges. 
 Insufficient use of modern technologies by tax administration. In order to modernize 
the STS, it is planned to introduce the automated electronic submission of the tax 
reports, and application of a modern IT system in the tax offices. 
 Corruption. To enhance public trust to the tax administration and decrease level of 
corruption, the STS will set up the call-centres of processing tax enquiries, 
introduce the corruption preventing programs in the tax offices and systematically 
conduct taxpayers surveys to detect the level of corruption as well as to assess the 
quality of tax services. 
An important characteristic of the tax system in Kyrgyzstan is its overreliance on 
indirect consumption taxes – such as VAT, turnover tax, sales tax, and excises. 
Altogether, these taxes account for about two-third of total budget revenues – which is 
relatively high than in most transition economies (World Bank, 2004a). In 1996, there 
were a total of 23 taxes and fees, excluding social contributions, collected by the 
central tax offices – among them, republican taxes (5), special turnover taxes (2), and 
local taxes (16). These taxes widely varied in terms of revenue yield and complexity – 
from a hotel tax and tax on tourists, which discouraged growth in potential industries, to 
a comprehensive VAT, close to EU 6 Directive standards. In 2001, the local taxes 
accounted for 14% of local budget revenues – almost all proceeds came from the land 
tax, sales tax and vehicle tax. From 2002, the land tax in rural areas was entirely 
retained by the sub-national governments, the retail sales tax was mainly collected in 
Bishkek, and vehicle tax was earmarked to the State Vehicle Fund for maintenance 
and reconstruction of roads. Most other local taxes fell in nuisance category, such as 
dog tax, or tax on the use of local symbols. As a result, eight taxes yielded less than 
KGS1 million were completely abandoned in 2006 – the taxes did not raise sufficient 
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revenue to cover their administrative costs. Accordingly, local governments, including 
both local administration and local self-governments, have little control over local taxes 
– for instance, the rates schedule for land taxes being set by the central government. 
This absence of own revenue sources became an impediment to further fiscal 
decentralization reform as it was a tendency to move more expenditures to sub-
national governments. As a response, the CIT, PIT and excises became regulated 
taxes shared between the central government (65%) and sub-national governments 
(35%). This arrangement – and the correspondingly reduced amount of proceeds from 
these taxes – has resulted in fewer resources being available for their proper 
administration and compliance enforcement. This, in return, creates a vicious circle of 
‗low collections, low enforcement.‘ The large number of taxes also strains 
administrative capacity as each tax requires a separate collection procedure, taxpayer 
services, and specific reporting system. Due to this, the total number of taxes has been 
gradually reduced from 15 in 2006 to 8 in 2009 (Table 4.2.3).  
  140 
Table 4.2.3. Kyrgyz Republic: Tax Structure, 1990-2012 
 1990 1992 1994 1996 2006 2009 
Republican Taxes 
and Budget 
Allocations paid on 
the whole territory 
of the Kyrgyz 
Republic 
 
1. Profit tax 
2. Income tax  
3. Turnover tax 
4. Profit tax and 
payroll tax from 
kolkhoz members 
 
1. CIT 
2. PIT 
3. VAT 
4. Excise tax 
5. Land tax  
6. Road tax* 
7. Emergency 
allocations**  
8. Profit tax and 
payroll tax from 
kolkhoz members  
9. Income tax  
10. Property tax on 
production 
equipment 
11. State registration 
and License fees  
12. Motor vehicle tax  
1. CIT 
2. PIT 
3. VAT 
4. Excise tax 
5. Land tax  
6. Road tax 
7. Emergency 
allocations 
8. Allocations for 
development and 
reproduction of 
mineral deposits 
9. Natural resources 
charge 
10. Property tax on 
production 
equipment 
11. Export and import 
custom duties 
1. CIT 
2. PIT  
3. VAT 
4. Excise tax 
5. Land tax  
6. Road tax 
7. Emergency 
allocations 
 
1. CIT 
2. PIT  
3. VAT 
4. Excise tax 
5. Land tax  
6. Road tax 
7. Emergency 
allocations 
1. CIT 
2. PIT 
3. VAT 
4. Excise tax 
5. Subsoil taxes 
6. Sale tax 
 
Local Taxes, Fees 
and Charges 
collected by local 
administration and 
self-governments 
on their territories  
 
  1. Health resort tax  
2. Right to trade fee 
3. Advertising tax 
4. Dog owners fee  
5. Cattle tax  
6. Local auctions 
and lotteries fee 
7. Growing and 
selling flowers tax 
8. Parking fee 
9. Local symbols tax 
10. Commodity 
exchange deals 
fee 
1. Motor vehicle tax  
2. Retail sales tax  
3. Parking fees 
4. Health resort tax  
5. Hotel tax  
6. Advertising tax 
7. Garbage tax 
8. Unused  
premises tax  
9. Dog owners fee  
10. Local auctions 
and lotteries fee 
11. Local symbols 
tax 
1. Motor vehicle tax  
2. Retail sales tax  
3. Parking fee 
4. Health resort tax  
5. Hotel tax  
6. Advertising tax 
7. Garbage tax 
8. Unused premises 
tax  
1. Land tax 
2. Property tax 
 
  141 
11. Video and movie 
making fee  
12. Garbage tax 
 
12. Commodity 
exchange deals 
fee 
13. Growing and 
selling flowers 
tax 
14. Hunting and 
fishing tax 
15. Tourists leaving 
for non-CIS 
countries tax 
16. Video saloons, 
concerts and 
shows tax 
Special Tax 
Regimes 
    1. Mandatory patent 
2. Voluntary patent 
3. Simplified taxation 
(Unified tax) 
4. Free economic 
zones  
5. Special means tax  
 
1. Mandatory patent 
2. Voluntary patent 
3. Simplified 
taxation (Unified 
tax) 
4. Free economic 
zones  
5. Tax contract 
6. High technologies 
park 
 
* Road tax for maintenance and repair of national, republican and local roads embarked to the State Vehicle Agency. 
** Allocations for prevention and liquidation of emergency situations to the Ministry of Emergency Situations. 
 
Source: Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union (1990) Law # 1560-I ‗Taxation of Enterprises, Institutions, Organizations and Individuals,‘ June 14, 1990 
Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan (1991) Law # 661-XII ‗Taxation of Enterprises, Institutions and Organizations‘  
Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan (1991) Law # 659-XII ‗Taxation of Individuals‘  
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (1996) Tax Code of the Kyrgyz Republic. Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic. 
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (2008) Tax Code of the Kyrgyz Republic. Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic.
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In terms of reform strategy, the parliament approved the Tax Reform Concept in 2001, 
which officially set out the objectives for reform and modernization of the tax system, 
predominantly tax administration reform, including reorganization of the agency 
structure and consolidation of the revenue necessary to fund this modernization. It also 
called for gradual removal of the Soviet-style cascading turnover taxes – which had a 
negative effect on investment and economic growth, a reduction in the tax rates on 
income and capital gains, and the simplification of the tax procedures for small 
businesses. Unfortunately, the lack of coordinated efforts within tax departments along 
with weak institutional capacity and culture, conflicting interests between executive 
agencies, and a tax policy measures mainly driven by fiscal crises have blocked any 
substantive move to further modernize the tax system. With these problems in mind, 
the government proceeded with the tax reform aimed at improving the revenue 
collection. As a result, the Fiscal Reform Strategy for 2005 was approved in 2002, and 
firm actions have been undertaken to ease the burden of bone-fide taxpayers, to 
simplify tax system and, hence, to increase budget revenues by eliminating unjustified 
tax preferences and exemptions, and by broadening the tax base (IMF, 2002). 
According to the country development strategy, the main goal of the tax reform in 
Kyrgyzstan for 2007–2010 was to encourage business activities by reducing the tax 
burden, make improvements in tax administration and ensure economic development 
(IMF, 2007). To fulfil these purposes, the new version of the tax code has been 
prepared and passed to the parliament in 2007. The intention was to build an effective 
tax system based on such key tax principles as predictability, transparency, and 
fairness, as stated in the Fiscal Policy Strategy for 2006-2008. Within this strategy the 
government proposed to improve the VAT administration while keeping the VAT 
threshold high, expand the tax base by revising the existing exemptions and 
deductions, keep the flat rate of 10% for PIT and CIT, continue cutting the social 
insurance contributions to 25%, simplify taxation for SMEs, gradually abolish the 
cascading turnover taxes, consider possibility to increase excise on alcohol, and 
introduce the property tax when the collection mechanism will be finalized. Since 
January 1, 2009, a tax code has been in effect – the unified document covering all 
types of taxes and tax operations. The most significant changes in the tax system 
include the reduction in tax rates for income taxes and VAT as well as in the total 
number of taxes, elimination of non-market road tax and emergency deductions, 
liberalization of the tax administration toward bona-fide taxpayers and introduction of 
the partnership mechanism between the STS and taxpayers (IMF, 2012). As part of the 
national development strategy, the Medium-Term Fiscal Policy Concept for 2013-2017 
was aimed to promote economic development by simplifying tax system and through 
improving business and investment climate – so far, these goals have not been 
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achieved level (IMF, 2014a). Therefore, the priority areas for 2017, as defined in the 
sustainable development program, are to develop an effective and stable tax system, 
simplify and improve tax administration, enhance transparency and apply anti-
corruption measures, and implement fiscal measures preventing the environment 
pollution (Figure 4.2.1). In relation to the international ‗best practice,‘ the tax system 
reforms in the five Central Asian republics could be characterized as partial reform 
(Mokhtari and Ashtari, 2012). The yeas of market-oriented transition in the Central Asia 
have generated a wealth of experience that could be instructive for the new economies 
in transition in developing a better tax system, formulating strategies and establishing 
modern institution. 
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4.3. Political Factors, Elite’s Decisions, and Chance Events 
Similar to economic reforms, the political reform in the Kyrgyz Republic started up with 
a strong impetus led by the president Akaev who was proclaimed as the most liberal 
leader in the region. The country‘s new constitution established a parliamentary 
democracy with extensive rights of citizens and mandated power between the three 
branches – that is, a unicameral parliament, an executive branch consisting of 
government and local officials, and a judiciary with Supreme Court and lower courts 
appointed by the president. Political parties, independent media, and civil society 
organizations mushroomed after the collapse of totalitarian regime of the Communist 
Party. The initial success of the political and macroeconomic reforms were highly 
praised by the global community, which named Kyrgyzstan as an ‗island of democracy‘ 
in the Central Asian region (Olcott, 2006). This euphoria has ended pretty soon. In late 
1990s, the positive image of a ‗rapid reformer‘ began to fade as the country‘s external 
debt and the corruption rating hit the charts (Gray et al., 2004, International Crisis 
Group, 2005a). Inside the country, opposition parties and mass media have reported 
rude intervention of the government into their activities. A series of amendments to the 
constitution as well as frequent changes in the political system became the common 
practice, resulting in imbalanced distribution of power within government structure with 
serious consequences for the legitimacy of the state and effectiveness of public 
institutions.  
In recent years, the socio-economic and political systems in Kyrgyzstan have 
undergone important changes that shape the strategy for future country development. 
Kyrgyzstan took firm steps towards statehood and reviving national culture, but the 
history of the Soviet period is still glooming. In the early 1990s, the fundamental 
political institutions were created, and the country became a member of many 
international organizations. At the same time, due to the inconsistency in the fiscal 
policy, the international observers started to refer to Kyrgyzstan as a ‗failed‘ state. The 
country spent the last two decades in the ‗survival‘ mode of the external indebtness. 
There were multiple attempts to improve the situation, including those with significant 
support from international organizations and donors – such as, comprehensive 
development framework for 2001-2010, national sustainable development strategy for 
2013-2017, and various industry-specific development programs. However, due to poor 
governance, corruption and criminalization of public institutions during the reign of the 
first two presidents these strategies did not give sufficient positive impetus to national 
development and have largely failed to achieve their objectives. 
Even before the 2010 event, Kyrgyzstan was ranked as the poorest in the 
commonwealth. This indicated the inability of the recently created system of political 
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institutions to ensure the rule of law and put the country on the path of sustainable 
development. As a result of multiple reforms, the political system has changed, but the 
methods used by government authorities in their routine activities have remained 
unchanged – in the so-called ‗command economy‘ style. There is lack of regular 
communications between central and local authorities – too often, the elite made a 
decision based on narrow or corporate interests and the solutions tend to be short-
lived. In brief, the governance system is fragile and prone to breakdowns, both 
horizontally and vertically.  The platforms for finding political solutions are not yet 
effective enough, which prevents from developing uniform approaches to resolving 
problems at the national level (Tables 4.3.1). 
Table 4.3.1. Interviews: Political Factors, Elite’s Decisions, and Chance Events 
Interviewee Themes Comments 
Government Agencies 
Tax Officer 3 Political Factors 
Frequent changes in 
government lead to frequent 
dismissal of STS directors 
 
Tax Officer 4 Political Factors 
Engagement of civil society 
 
Tax Officer 10 Political Factors 
Lobby by economic magnates 
and deputies 
Large taxpayers have 
enormous political and 
economic power 
While small in number, the large 
taxpayers pay the most, so in the 
high-risk category. In reality, their 
interests are promoted by oligarchs 
and deputies who usually own these 
businesses. 
International Organizations and Donors 
Tax Expert 2 Political Factors 
Conflict of interest among 
different officials 
 
The goal of tax collection was 
achieved. 
The tax system could be improved if 
the reform package will be 
successfully implemented in timely 
manner.  
Tax Expert 3 Political Factors 
New parliament  
Balance of different interests 
The parliament has to balance the 
interest of different clans and regional 
groups. 
Tax Expert 5 Political Factors 
Parliamentary Republic – 
changes to the tax code were 
made under the pressure of 
political parties, interest groups 
and parliament members but 
there is no coalition between 
them 
Political power consolidation 
 
Elite Decision-Making  
Weak political elite 
 
Chance Events 
The main reason of revolution 
2010 was discontinuation of re-
export 
The milestones of tax reform include 
the legacy from previous system and 
the best practice from Russia in 1991, 
help of IMF in 1993, informal lobby of 
the tax code in 1996 and learning 
process of business associations and 
tax consultancy later. Currently, there 
is no political coalition on tax issues. 
In short to mid-term no adjustments 
are needed, but for longer term 
changes should be made, in particular 
the political will and consolidation of 
political power to introduce these 
changes to the tax legislation 
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Civil Society Organizations 
Tax Consultant 1 Political Factors 
Significant influence of politics 
and civil society on tax code 
development 
Additional tax exemptions and 
preferences lobbied by 
deputies 
The 2008 code incorporates the 
principle of taxation. For the first time, 
the civil society forced the government 
to accept more liberal tax code. 
Tax Consultant 2 Political Factors 
The government-citizens 
dialogue  
The dialogue between the government 
and taxpayers has started. 
Tax Consultant 3 Political Factors 
Unwiliness to reform the tax 
system, in particular patent 
system 
Tax collection is the only priority 
for the government  
Decrease the number of tax 
inspections 
Simplify reporting system, and due 
dates for tax reports submission. 
Taxpayers 
Taxpayer 1 Political Factors 
Frequent changes in 
government 
Engagement of civil society 
 
 
There should be a consensus with 
society, a social contract according to 
which the government will set the 
rational policy and society agrees to 
pay taxes. If society refuses to pay, 
neither repression will help.  
Taxpayer 2 Political Factors 
Political instability in the 
country  
Imperfect tax legislation, 
including unclear tax acts, 
frequent changes in tax laws, 
too many changes and 
adjustments made to the tax 
code. 
The hiring of candidates to the STS 
should follow the objective evaluation 
criteria. All depends on the 
government, tax policy and legislature.  
 
Taxpayer 3 Chance Events 
Chance events in the country 
complicate the process of tax 
collection and business 
development 
It is necessary to remove the 
mechanism of bureaucratic operations 
in registration process, reduce the 
number of inspections and increase 
the quality of tax control. 
Taxpayer 4 Political Factors 
Weak political will  
Instability in political and 
administrative systems 
Strong political will is in need. 
Stability and consistency in 
administrative and political spheres. 
More engagement with civil society. 
Taxpayer 5 Political Factors 
Frequent change of 
government Different ideas of 
policy and decision-makers 
Citizens distrust to sate 
agencies  
Not all of goals were achieved. 
The primary goals are simple tax 
procedures and transparent tax 
collection process. 
 
Taxpayer 6 Political Factors 
Lack of political stability  
Politicians lobbying the reform 
of tax system have short-term 
goals 
It is important to update legal 
framework and provide incentives for 
business development. If do nothing, 
the country falls back.  
Taxpayer 7 Political Factors 
Unstable political situation 
Lack of political will 
Distrust of population to tax 
officers  
 
At present, the reforms are significant 
and positive, although very slow. 
Definitely, the barriers could be 
overcome, more public trust through 
social campaign (social-oriented 
clips).  
Taxpayer 8 Political Factors 
No high-level political will 
The goals of tax reform are not yet 
achieved. 
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Educational Institutions 
Academic 2 Political Factors 
Political instability disturbs 
institutional and organizational 
development in the country 
 
The government has to take care 
about the stability of the political 
system and carry on with the 
anticorruption measures in tax 
administration.  The frequent changes 
in the government contribute to 
organizational instability in STS.  
Academic 6 Political Factors 
Government-citizens 
partnership 
Public advisory council 
 
Elite Decision-Making  
Weak politico-administrative 
elite 
 
Chance Events 
Revolutions of 2005 and 2010 
Despite active civic engagement, 
weakness of the civil society 
organizations seriously affects the 
reform process. This was also led and 
controlled by weak political elite. It 
seems that revolutions 2005 and 2010 
proved to be no more than a limited 
rotation of ruling elites and regional 
groups within unstable political 
system. 
 
4.3.1. Constitutional Reform 
The Supreme Soviet of 1990 not only elected Akaev as the first president, but laid 
down the legislative foundation for the political transformation of the state – President 
Akaev was elected under a popular vote in an uncontested elections in 1991. Probably 
the biggest achievement in that early-independence period was the drafting and 
approval of the country‘s constitution in May 1993. Originally, the Parliament had the 
right to determine domestic policy as well as foreign policy, however, after a series of 
the constitutional changes, the president was in charge of both of them – overall, since 
1993, the constitution has been amended at least seven times. So, the changes 
initiated by the President Akaev heavily hindered the authority of the Parliament that 
already suffered by weak capacity and artificial standing in society, inherited from the 
Soviet Union where deputies‘ role was rather nominal – hence, setting a trend for 
further constitutional amendments. 
In many ways, however, the constitution of 1993 was not put into full force – most of 
the judgers has not been appointed and de-facto bicameral parliament, elected in early 
1995, did not really match the unicameral format prescribed by the constitution. Instead 
of making amendments, the government attained this structural change through 
national referendum in February 1996, which retroactively approved this the 
constitution by 94% of voters. Although the constitution called for a balance of power 
between all of three branches, in practice the proposed amendments strengthened the 
Office of President, only. As economic and social conditions quickly deteriorated in the 
early 1990s, President Akaev sought even more authority in dealing with economic and 
fiscal crises. Under these conditions, Akaev started to face growing opposition from the 
Parliament, and pockets of local opponents grew stronger in the southern provinces. 
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In 1998, further changes were introduced to the constitution. The number of legislators 
has been increased in the lower common house and reduced in the upper house. The 
referendum also approved a rule according to which the 25% of the legislators would 
be elected by party lists. Yet, these constitutional changes promoted progressive 
measures as well, such as private property rights and prohibition of laws limiting 
freedom of speech. In February 2003, closer to the end of his term, Akaev has 
succeeded in changing the constitution one more time, justifying this by the need to 
address the political crisis following the tragic event in Aksy. The changes not only 
made the existing regime stronger, but also granted immunity to the president and his 
family against prosecution upon his retirement – this provision was cancelled after the 
Tulip Revolution in March 2005. Next, it replaced the bi-cameral parliament with a 
unicameral body, and electoral system based on party membership with a single 
majoritarian system. Obviously, these changes were made to secure president‘s 
influence on political decisions by staffing the new parliament with the candidates loyal 
to him. Indeed, the March 2005 revolution was a reaction to such excessive 
manipulation of the parliamentary elections in February 2005 (Dukenbaev and 
Tanyrykov, 2001, International Crisis Group, 2005 -b).  
President Bakiev came to power in March 2005 promising the redistribution of the 
executive authority to other branches of the government, but did not keep his promise. 
Not only he did make efforts to delay the reform process, Bakiev in fact actively 
resisted to any redistribution of power. At last, at the referendum in October 2007, 
which was marred by massive violations, he introduced new changes to the 
constitution, which strengthened his powers and reintroduced elections to the 
parliament according to party lists. Then, Bakiev quickly called off the parliament and 
initiated new parliamentary elections in December 2007. These elections – as a 
repetition to the presidential elections in 2009 – were widely criticized as being heavily 
manipulated by the president and his supporters. As a result, the pro-president‘s party 
Ak-Jol wan 71 out of 90 seats, whereas the largest opposition party Ata-Meken did not 
get any seats despite its significant popularity among electorate. As expected, Bakiev 
has been re-election in July 2009 receiving 76% of the votes, and the OSCE and other 
independent observers registered massive violations of the electoral code and 
procedures.  
Furthermore, in December, 2009, president Bakiev submitted a new set of 
constitutional changes to the newly-formed Parliament, which quickly discussed them 
and sent the proposal to the Constitutional Court for further analysis – the court was 
supposed to get back to the parliament with its comments on the proposed changes 
within three months. This was the first time when the public has been left in the dark 
about the content of proposed constitutional changes. The media has stipulated that 
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this set of changes is related to the major changes in the government structure which 
the President Bakiev already enacted as part of the administrative reforms announced 
in September 2009. These changes have been proclaimed by the opposition and 
media as unconstitutional. One of the leaders of the opposition, the head of the Ata-
Meken party, Omurbek Tekebaev appealed to the Constitutional Court arguing that the 
president has acted beyond his authority by creating five new institutions and 
eliminating offices of security and state secretaries. It was looked like that through this 
set of constitutional changes, Bakiev was trying to bring on-going reforms in line with 
the constitution ad-hoc (Baimyrzaeva, 2011). Thus, through a number of changes in 
the constitution and informal practices, the political system turned into a dysfunctional 
one with excessive concentration of power in the presidency. The latter has little 
accountability and checks, but extensive authority. Unsurprisingly, the interim 
government led by Roza Otunbaeva has adopted the new Constitution in June 27, 
2010 to transform Kyrgyzstan into a Parliamentary Republic with reduced powers of the 
presidency. However, it too early to say whether this change is beneficial for the 
country – in reality, the political regime in the Kyrgyz Republic could be characterized 
as semi-presidential and semi- parliamentary republic. 
4.3.2. Judicial Reform 
The existing judicial system is largely inconsistent with constitutional principles and 
international standards, both in terms of its institutional structure, and administration 
capacity and procedures. A series of changes have been carried out in FY1994-2009, 
but did not allow the judiciary system to become a guarantor for the rule of law 
independent from the politics. Despite the measures undertaken to strengthen the 
status of judges, there were no improvements in the quality and culture of judicial 
system. The authority of the judges and the public trust in the courts system have 
actually diminished – there were multiple case when the judges used their status to 
abuse power or gain other benefits. Definitely, there is a need for an effective audit 
mechanism within the judiciary system as well as reliable anti-corrupt policy. In this 
regard, the control and monitoring procedures are not clearly defined, particularly in 
terms of judges malpractice, and failure to properly exercise judiciary functions. 
The existing court system lacks of accountability and transparent and does not provide 
an opportunity to correct judicial errors. The quality of administration system has 
decreased due to insufficient qualification of judges, dragging the authority of the courts 
beyond their designed capacity and undeveloped mechanisms for out-of-court 
negotiations. At the same time, court proceedings fail in their main task to provide 
access to fair and open trial, while court documents and archives are not publicly 
available. Overall, the cut in the public funding for the court system negatively affect the 
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quality of the judiciary system. 
Recently, there was a clear move towards an independent and effective judiciary 
system. Judiciary reform becomes one of the priorities in the government agenda – 
both the government and civil society agreed on the need to put more efforts into 
creating adequate and independent judiciary system (Government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, 2013). Further progress would require an overhaul of the current legal 
framework, including administrative, criminal, and civil laws, and reform in the laws-
enforcement organizations – the reform content should meet public needs, scientific 
knowledge, and international practice. The judiciary system should be open and 
transparent, and the information on the courts activities should be accessible to the civil 
society to oversee the reform process. As a result, the judiciary system will become 
independent, and free from corruption, political affiliations and ideological bias – in 
practice, it should become a guarantor of the rule of law and justice for the nation. A 
strong institution of justice will ensure the political stability and competitiveness of the 
economy. 
After 2010, the most reasonable and efficient approach is to modernize the existing 
judiciary system and law-enforcement agencies and move them into completely new 
level (IMF, 2014b). Meantime, structural changes should be gradual, while filling the 
institutional framework with substantially new contents. The presidential decree #147 
‗Measures to Improve Judiciary System‘ from August 8, 2012, identified the creation of 
an independent judiciary system capable to effectively protect the rights and freedoms 
of citizens as the strategic goal of on-going judicial reform in Kyrgyzstan. Accordingly, 
this would require the accomplishment of such key objectives as the reform of court 
system, improvements in the judiciary proceedings and modernization of the law-
enforcement agencies – that is, the Interior, Prosecutor's Office, national security and 
investigative bodies. The main objectives of tax reform include implementation of the 
concept of tax court following changes in administrative and criminal procedures within 
the judicial system. 
4.3.3. Legal Reform  
The legal system in Kyrgyzstan, in particular legislation, legal institutions, and legal 
culture – is inadequate for the needs and challenges of the modern society. The 
legislation is full of internal contradictions, such imbalance structure is caused by vest 
interests of various elite groups and regional networks. This significantly disturbs the 
operations of the government agencies as well as non-government institutions – 
mainly, public professional associations and advocacy groups. 
Complying with constantly changing, and sometimes contradictory, legislation becomes 
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a heavy burden both for the government and for citizens. Such environment gives 
incentives to politicians and government officials to use their authority at their discretion 
and in their personal interests. In particular, it becomes a common practice for the 
members of the Parliament to made changes to the tax code for the benefit of their 
businesses or patronage networks. This not only disturbs the integrity of the tax 
system, but also gives citizens a good excuse to openly disobey the law, and the state. 
In this regard, the chair of the chamber of tax consultants wrote an open letter to the 
parliament asking them to discontinue this practice immediately. Any amendment to the 
code should be well justified and undertaken with maximum caution. This situation is 
further aggravated by weak legal culture both in the public sector institutions and in the 
society – which is translated to so low taxpayer culture in the country.  
The rule of law based on the principles of protecting human rights is the main factor 
toward stability, sustainability of the state and successful economic and political 
reforms. Lack of the rules and disregard to the legitimate interests of Kyrgyz citizens 
have already led to tragic events in 2005 and 2010 (Government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, 2013). Therefore, the high priority is given to establish a state that is 
concerned with strengthening legal system and ensuring supremacy of the law in the 
country. Hence, Kyrgyzstan would need a plenty of resources and government 
commitment to be on track of this path. 
In practice, the process will begin with consolidation of the public institutions and 
improvements in the vertical structure of the executive government (IMF, 2014b). At the 
same time, as part of fiscal decentralization reform, the central government should be 
ready to delegate some of the functions and authorities to local government or public 
associations and to encourage the development of PPP. The state governed by the rule 
of law will evolve as a holistic body, in which all systems are functioning smoothly and 
consistently.  
Budget and Tax Laws 
The constitution provides legislative oversight over the executive government agencies 
and facilitates legal scrutiny in respect to the budget process. As set out in the article 
88, ‗The government shall ensure the implementation of financial, pricing, tariff, 
investment and tax policy; shall draft and submit to the Jogorku Kenesh the republican 
budget as well as takes measures for its execution; shall present to the Jogorku 
Kenesh the report on the execution of the republican budget.‘ So, as part of budget 
process, the Jogorku Kenesh (the Parliament) in consultation with the Budget and 
Economic Policy Committee is required to approve the budget proposal and to review 
the annual budget execution report submitted by the Chamber of Accounts (Supreme 
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Audit Institution) for end-of-year fiscal audit. The parliament has power to reject the 
entire budget, but cannot formally amend this budget or pass any legislation that has 
financial impact without a prior agreement with the government. The other major 
legislation acts are Basic Principles of Budgetary Law 1998, Treasury Law 1994, 
Chamber of Accounts Law 2004, and Procurement Law 2004. 
The Tax Code is the main codified document concerning legal relationships between a 
tax administration and taxpayers or taxpayer representatives, which covers all types of 
taxes and fees collected on the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic with the exception of 
customs duties and social insurance contributions, regulated by respective legislation. 
The executive agency authorized to collect all kind of tax payments, to ensure the 
implementation of tax legislation, to carry on taxpayer inspections and audits, and to 
participate in the preparation of intergovernmental tax treaties is the State Tax Service 
(STS) under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic. The Jogorku Kenesh has 
delegated the decision-making power to the local councils (local keneshes) and local 
self-governments with regard to assessment and collection of local taxes and charges 
as part of the fiscal decentralization program. The Customs Code defines and 
establishes the norms and the procedure for transferring of goods and transport 
vehicles through the boundary of the Kyrgyz Republic, for levying of customs duties 
and international taxes, for implementing the customs policy, and for conducting 
customs clearance supervised by the State Customs Service (SCS) under the 
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2004). 
The tax system of Kyrgyzstan24 as an independent state was brought into effect on 
January 1, 1992, by the tax laws ‗Taxation of Enterprises, Institutions and 
Organizations‘ and ‗Taxation of Individuals,’ which promulgated the beginning of a 
fundamental tax reform. These two acts had drawn a clear line for corporate and 
personal taxation in Kyrgyzstan.  
The first law#661-XII on taxation of corporate taxpayers, signed by the President Askar 
Akaev on December 17, 1991, officially replaced the turnover tax by VAT and excises, 
and introduced the land tax to a tax mix of Kyrgyzstan, while retaining profit tax and 
payroll tax from kolkhoz members (collective farmers) from the previous Soviet 
structure. Overall, the companies were liable to pay the profit tax, VAT and excise 
taxes, income tax (dividends, interests, capital gains, joint-stock company shares), road 
tax, allocations to emergency fund, land tax, state registration and license fees, and 
property tax (production assets) in early 1990s. As stated in the other law#659-XII 
                                                 
24
 Officially, the country name was changed from the Republic of Kyrgyzstan (RK) to the Kyrgyz Republic 
(KR) in 1992 due to similarity in abbreviation with the Republic of Kazakhstan (RK) and wiliness to be 
not associated with ‗-stan‘ countries. However, the promotional campaign was not very successful, the 
country is still listed as ‗Kyrgyzstan‘ in the international records (Official Code: KGZ). The ‗Independent 
Day‘ of the Kyrgyz Republic is August 31, 1991. 
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about individual taxpayers, the core of personal taxation was PIT, VAT, land tax, and 
motor vehicle tax. 
It is crucial to mention that these acts have cancelled the previous law#87-XII ‗Taxation 
of Enterprises, Institutions, Organizations and Individuals, ‘ quickly approved by the 
Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan on February 6, 1991, as a temporary 
mean on a way to an independent tax system. Besides the fact that this document was 
the exact copy of the Soviet Union‘s law#1560-I ‗Taxation of Enterprises, Institutions 
and Organizations‘ from June 14, 1990, its content included such obsolesce of the 
command system as turnover tax. The only difference between two legal documents 
was the road tax assigned to a special fund of the State Vehicle Inspection to finance 
the construction, repair and maintenance of the state, republican and local roads. The 
similar type of mandatory payments earmarked to the fund for prevention and 
liquidation of emergency situations became part of the tax system on March 01, 1992, 
according to the law act#760-XII ‗Allocations for Prevention and Liquidation of 
Emergency Situations in the Kyrgyz Republic.‘ It is obvious that due to a rapid collapse 
of the Soviet Union, the Kyrgyz government did not have enough time and expertise to 
design a new tax system aligned with modern principles of a market economy. A quick 
and simple solution was to follow the tax practice common for other post–Soviets and 
to keep an eye on recent changes in a tax structure of neighbours, especially Russia  
and Kazakhstan. Therefore, this resulted in relative homogeneity in types of taxes and 
tax rates amongst the majority of the former Soviet Union‘s states in early 1990s. 
In the period of 1992-1994, the tax laws have been frequently amended. According to 
Thirsk (USAID, 1993: 76), there was inconsistency in tax legislation ‗as a result of the 
variety of advisers the government has had, the Government of Kyrgyzstan‘s own lack 
of understanding, and political pressures, not the least of which is the desire to 
enhance revenue.‘ Yet, a number of changes were originally rejected despite their 
popularity – they would lead to net decrease in tax revenue. 
As taxpayers did not have previous experience with all kind of taxes, the State Tax 
Inspectorate under the Ministry of Finance regularly supplied them with tax manuals 
and commentary clarifying how to calculate and pay major taxes such as VAT, excises 
and profit tax. These instructions were designed to provide a help to taxpayers in 
understanding of new terms and to explain standard procedures in simplified manner, 
which sometimes contradicted with the main tax acts and caused misunderstanding 
and confusion amongst both tax administrators and taxpayers. Such practice was 
discontinued with an introduction of an unified tax code in 1996.  
The tax code was a joint effort of the Kyrgyz government and the tax experts of the 
USAID Barents Group with a financial support of the IMF. It was rumoured that the 
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code was a translation of the World Tax Code. As a result, its first edition was rather a 
bulky document aggravated by frequent changes and amendments. Besides, the 
foreign investments and FEZs (Bishkek, Naryn, Karakol and Maimak) were regulated 
by separate laws. They provided special tax preferences and exemptions, as well as 
special customs regime – the intention was to attract direct foreign investment (DFI) to 
designated areas of the country – which created a discriminatory tax environment for 
domestic taxpayers. For example, international and joint-venture companies had zero 
tax rate on profit earned during their first five years in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
The Tax Code of 1996 
Since its first enactment in July 1996, there has been a considerable amount of 
changes and amendments made to the tax code.26  It is understandable that every 
major tax act requires a revision and ‗fine-tuning‘ in order to correct errors made in the 
original text, but the degree of additions and changes proposed and approved by the 
parliament over the last two decades goes well beyond any imagination. The likelihood 
that the magnitude of these amendments will distort the integrity of just-established tax 
structure and erode its ability to function in an effective and sustainable manner is 
pretty high. If the tax system remains in such instable state of continuous changes, it 
will be extremely difficult for tax administration to develop a well-functioning 
administrative system. Once any necessary changes are made in tax legislation, it is 
recommended that the administrative processes and procedures will be set-up with no 
further changes for several years. The other problem is that taxpayers do not have 
enough time to gain a full understanding of the system. Equally important, tax evasion 
becomes much easier when the tax system has such volatile structure and compliance 
cost will increase drastically. Definitely, an erratic tax system is a significant impediment 
to effective revenues collection and better government performance (World Bank, 
2000: 46-48).   
Although the legal framework for a tax system in Kyrgyzstan is grounded on the tax 
code, there are types of taxes and categories of taxpayers which are covered by other 
separate acts, creating an excessive burden for both taxpayers and tax inspectors and 
contributing to the volatility of the whole system. According to the updated tax code 
(Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2008), only taxes specified in this unified 
document could be levied by the central government and local self-governments. 
Despite that fact, tax exemptions and preferences within special tax regimes, such as 
the Free Economic Zones and the High-Tech Park, are regulated by various laws 
                                                 
26
 The first tax code of the Kyrgyz Republic was approved by the parliament on April 15, 1996. From 1996, 
there have been made in total about 60 official additions and amendments until the introduction of a new 
tax code on October 17, 2008. 
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outside of the scope of the tax code. In addition, the national insurance contributions 
for pension, social insurance and unemployment compensation, that are earmarked to 
an extra-budgetary Social Fund, are in fact persuaded  as payroll taxes on wages and 
salaries. Besides, many ministries and executive agencies are allowed to accumulate 
their fees and charges on off-budget accounts towards own operating expenses. The 
other reason why such mandatory payments as road tax, emergency tax, mineral 
resources tax, water usage charges and forest fee were not covered by the tax code is 
the intention of the government to eliminate them gradually later. These taxes were 
considered as a temporary remedy to boost revenue of particular special funds for 
designated purposes (for example, road construction and maintenance fund, 
prevention and liquidation of emergency situations fund, mineral development fund), 
while been distortional in nature, but with a relatively high collection rate.  
The road tax and allocations for prevention and liquidation of emergency situations 
were introduced into the tax system of the Kyrgyz Republic by two separate laws in 
early 1990s and supposed to be revoked with the adoption of the first tax code in 1996. 
These compulsory payments were applied to enterprises, associations and 
organizations as a percentage of gross margin and had cascading structure – that is 
why it was so hard to substitute revenues from these taxes by receipts from other 
sources. Unfortunately, the need for such types of revenue was so high, that turnover 
taxes were in force until January 2009. Among the vivid arguments for their revocation 
were significant expansion in tax base, increase in a number of taxpayers coming out 
of the shadow economy and improvements in tax administration. 
The Tax Code of 2008 
The second tax code has been brought into action on January 1, 2009, by the tax 
act#231. The tax code of 2008, prepared by the state committee jointly with the 
business community and NGOs, was recognized as one of the best tax laws in CIS. 
The reasons for a new tax code (IMF, 2007) include a need to simplify taxation, use of 
lower tax rates and wider tax bases, evening up the tax burden between various types 
of taxpayers, restriction of various tax preferences and exemptions (tax asymmetry), 
setting equal conditions for local and foreign producers, and to reward compliant 
taxpayers. For all of this, the code for the first time officially introduces, and defines, the 
basic principles of taxation (Table 4.3.2). 
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Table 4.3.2. Tax Code: Principles of Taxation, 2008 
Principle of Taxation Description 
Rule of Law 
 
The tax code is the only tax law dealing with tax affairs in 
the Kyrgyz Republic. Taxpayers do not have to pay any 
taxes or fees outside of the code. 
Compulsoriness Every taxpayer has to pay taxes stated in the tax code, 
all taxes are universally compulsory on the territory of 
Kyrgyzstan.  
Uniformity of Tax 
System 
The Kyrgyz Republic has a unitary tax system. 
Publicity of Tax Law The tax acts should be publicly available to taxpayers by 
publishing them in the official information sources. 
Fairness Taxes should not be used to give favourable treatment, 
and the provision of individual tax exemptions to 
particular taxpayers is strictly prohibited. The STS 
applies non-discrimination policy and does not 
discriminate taxpayers on the basis of race, colour, 
national and ethnic origin, social status, religion, or 
gender in administering tax system. 
Principle of Good Faith By default, taxpayer and tax representative are assumed 
to be acting honestly in the event of formation, execution 
and termination of tax liabilities unless this presumption 
of bona fides will be overruled by the STS based on 
documentary evidences. It is an absolutely new turn for 
tax legislation in the Kyrgyz Republic as previously the 
taxpayers were treated as guilty in a tax offence in the 
first instance and had to proof their innocence to tax 
administration and court later. 
Principle of Legality The State Tax Service, the State Customs Service, local 
self-administrations and other government agencies have 
to act in accordance with the tax code. If there is a 
conflict or absence of regulatory norms in tax laws, the 
tax authorities and the court have to make a decision in 
favour of a taxpayer. The tax laws might have a 
retroactive effect in the case of tax cancellation, rate 
reduction, exemption from tax liability, additional 
protection or improvement in the state of taxpayers.  
Certainty The tax code should be explicit in defining the elements 
of taxation such as object and subject of taxation, tax 
base, tax rate, tax preferences and special provisions, 
tax period, methods of calculation, payment procedures 
and due dates (Articles 32-39). 
Source:  Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (2008) Tax Code of the Kyrgyz Republic.  
Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic, Articles 5-14. 
In comparison with the tax principles described in Chapter 2, the revised code still 
misses such basic canons of taxation as equity, efficiency and effectiveness, simplicity, 
neutrality, flexibility, transparency and visibility, which are in total the main 
characteristics of an ‗ideal‘ tax system. Instead, the tax code places more emphasis on 
legal issues of taxation.  
Nevertheless, the tax code of 2008 is innovative in many matters. Despite new taxation 
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principles, the tax code also introduced the factors of risk assessment. The other 
significant improvements include reduction in tax rate for major taxes, introduction of a 
single property tax instead of the motor vehicle tax and proposed real estate tax, and 
decrease in the total number of taxes from sixteen to eight by eliminating the cascade 
non-market taxes and small local taxes, and by aggregating a retail tax, road tax, and 
emergency allocations into a single national sales tax, as well as a number of 
administrative changes. In regard to tax service, the new code greatly expands the 
rights of taxpayers and clearly defines the rights and responsibilities of tax authorities, 
liberalizes the tax administration towards bona fide taxpayers, and establishes a 
partnership mechanism between the taxpayers and STS toward open and collaborative 
dialogue. Since 2009, there have been no substantial changes introduced to the code 
with exception for several tax incentives and amendments to VAT, profit tax and 
excises. The government raised the excise rates for tobacco and alcohol products, 
eliminated the special funds regime and reviewed the agreement with the Kumtor 
company regarding new gross income tax for gold-mining companies in the amount of 
13% (IMF, 2013). 
4.4. Administrative Factors 
During the last two decades, the Central Asian countries have put more emphasis on 
tax policy reform – given less attention to tax administration – trying to solve their 
administrative problems through refining the tax laws rather than empowering their tax 
administration to implement existing law. Radical tax reform has been a response to 
the urgent need for more budget revenue, weak tax enforcement, and a rapid transition 
to a market economy. Another reasons for improving tax system have been the role of 
the Russia as a ‗best practice‘ – as well as legacy of the Soviet Union – and a desire to 
remain competitive among neighbours. 
According to Mokhtari and Ashtari (2010: 20-21), the tax administration in the Central 
Asia had faced similar challenges and shortcomings since the early 1990s. 
Organizational structure was based on types of taxes rather than by functions, which 
caused overlap of functions within tax administration and higher compliance costs for 
taxpayers. Provision of taxpayer services also lacked any focus. There was no written 
procedures, or manuals, for the staff to guide them through their work. As a result, 
duties were not separated – the same tax officer could conduct audit and also collect 
taxes. Often, the skill of employees did not match their job descriptions – the only 
training provided was on tax laws. Risk-based audit necessary for efficient use of 
limited resources was not understood, and, hence, not developed. For the same 
reason, performance management and strategic planning were not implemented, and 
self-assessment and voluntary compliance were not promoted. In reality, judicial rather 
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than administrative collection was practiced. In addition, revenue targets were set 
arbitrarily – especially in the absence of government capacity for revenue forecasting 
and analyses – due to lack of data and human capital. The same set of problems 
became evidential during the analysis of interviews conducted in Bishkek (Table 4.4.1). 
Despite the need for computerization, the STS‘s staff used computers on limited basis, 
or not at all. Tax authorities did not develop a system to maintain up-to-date information 
about taxpayers – hence, proper taxpayer data were not collected or maintained. Non-
filers and stop-filers were largely ignored because there were not enough resources to 
identify them. On top of that, internal communications and information sharing in tax 
offices were minimal, as well as coordination and data exchange with other 
government agencies. 
Different identification numbers – instead of a unified one – used by various executive 
agencies have weakened taxpayer registration, imposed extra cost on taxpayers, and 
hampered cross-checking of the taxpayer background with other agencies. Staff 
remuneration was low – available funds, if any, were channelled to tax personnel based 
on an amount of taxes collected without any reference to their performance and 
method used. Internal control for prevention or detection of corruption was absent. In 
majority, tax audit was used for extracting bribes or as a tool for repression. Multiple tax 
audits conducted by several departments within the same organization – for example, 
External Tax Audit, Income Tax and VAT Divisions – encouraged the growth of the 
informal economy. 
Although the STS strives to improve its efficiency, these efforts are fragmented and 
bogged down by inflexible legislation, bureaucratic systems and a lack of a clear 
management structure with associated responsibility, transparency and accountability – 
there appears to be little information provided to the middle and low-level managers 
and the vision is not shared with them to improve their ability to manage the daily 
activities of their departments. The administration of the tax code becomes more 
difficult due to many changes made in the tax policy, whether temporary or permanent, 
– too many exemptions, preferences and exclusions distort the tax system. Moreover, 
most of them have been done on an ad hoc basis but with little analysis of their impact 
on policy direction and performance of the STS. Although the tax code of 2008 reduced 
the total number of taxes and cut the tax rates for CIT, PIT and VAT, the numerous 
special tax regimes and their requirements – in terms of which regime is appropriate to 
a particular taxpayer – are also confusing both for the tax authorities and the taxpayers. 
In this matter, a number of the development partners attempted to provide assistance 
in tax administration reform – the World Bank, IMF, IFC, USAID, DFID and ADB.  
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Simplification of the Organizational Structure 
The geographical distribution of regional offices should be reviewed and consolidated, 
wherever possible. Although customs offices are needed at the borders, the regional 
network of revenue-collection agencies may be bit excessive. Scarcity of limited 
resources means that training programs, and the technological upgrade could not be 
provided for all offices. Institutional consolidation undertaken together with the revision 
of internal procedures and the instalment of a new management information system 
(MIS) could significantly reduce costs. Such simplified revenue system could also help 
to gradually delegate the collection functions to the local self-governments. To do this, 
there should be clear allocation of responsibilities within the revenue agencies, and the 
current system of dual subordination, where tax offices collecting both the national and 
local taxes, should be discontinued. This creates double burden for STS, which the 
local administrations do not ready to undertake. 
Information Sharing 
The fragmented nature of the revenue system creates barriers to both information 
sharing and consolidating administrative functions, despite the significant steps been 
taken to integrate their information systems in recent years. These steps have included 
the generation of a unique Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) for all tax registrants 
from 1997, as well as successful completion of a pilot project in 1999 aimed to assign 
the same TIN for tax and social insurance purposes. Consequently, in early 2002, the 
government introduced a ‗One-Stop-Shop‘ approach for taxpayer registration, 
according to which a uniform TIN would be used by the Social Fund, STS, SCC, 
National Statistics Committee, and Ministry of Justice. Hopefully, this will help to finally 
integrate the information and communication systems (ICT) of all revenue-collecting 
agencies – mainly, the Ministry of Finance, Treasury, STS, SCC, Register Office, and 
Vehicle Inspection. However, at the beginning, it was very difficult to fully realize the 
opportunities provided by this initiative. For example, it was impossible to reconcile NIC 
returns used by the Social Fund with PIT payments – mainly, because of the poor 
quality and inconsistency in their databases. Moreover, customs data collected by the 
SCC are available to tax authorities only nominally, despite official agreements 
between the agencies, in majority due to technical difficulties. Furthermore, data 
integration will be especially challenging, as systems were designed independently 
and, hence, incompatible – in the case of the STS, the old collection system KITIS has 
been implemented only in several tax offices. Altogether, the uniform registration 
process, and consolidated accounting and auditing procedures could greatly enhance 
communication and data sharing between the agencies, as well as improve compliance 
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and update audit selection techniques – in 2010, the STS has launched the risk-based 
audit system. Thus, government accounting and reporting systems should be made 
consistent among agencies and data management systems should be consolidated 
under a common platform. An important aspect of the modernization process in tax 
administration will be to deal with the problems that have emerged with the 
reorganization of the STS and introduction of the new management information system 
– including the data processing and auditing blocks. It is also necessary to develop an 
institutional framework that would enable the different agencies to cross-check the 
background of taxpayers and to conduct joint audits – so, the audit reports should be 
accepted by all participating agencies. In the same way, restrictions, legal or technical, 
on data sharing between agencies should be reviewed and eliminated. 
Internal and External Controls 
Internal control mechanism within the tax system is weak. The main agency 
responsible for controlling and monitoring the STS is the Financial Police, created in 
1993 by merging the STI‘s Tax Police and Internal Investigation Department, and the 
SCI‘s Internal Security Department. It was an intention that the independence from 
these agencies will provide objectivity and reduce duplication. However, by becoming 
an independent, the financial police has lost its access to internal data in these 
agencies, due to their confidentiality and to technical and procedural issues. So, it 
could only monitor and evaluate agency performance and ensure their compliance from 
a distance, without noticeable impact on tax collection or on a reduction in corruption. 
Within the revenue-collecting agencies, the development of unified procedures for 
internal and external controls is limited by the lack of statutory authority to issue 
regulations or instructions – the result of a parliamentary decision to prevent abuses in 
law-making. In June 1999, the parliament adopted act that stopped the ministry of 
finance from issuing instructions and commentary to the tax code of 1996, which 
sometimes contradicted the tax laws and confused both the taxpayers and tax officials. 
Unclear jurisdiction power, and contradictive parliamentary decisions have seriously 
affected the collaboration between tax service and customs. The absence of legal 
regulations and administrative procedures often forced these agencies to bring all legal 
or administrative enquiries directly to the tax committee of the parliament, which is not 
efficient and transparent process. In practice, this was one of the main reasons for a 
series of revisions in the tax code and the customs code in 2008-2010.  
Penalties and Interest 
At present, the penalty system does not promote tax compliance and calculation of 
penalties is troublesome. Moreover, the STS gives penalties and interest a lower status 
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for collection purposes – the main focus is to receive the delinquent taxes in full as 
enforced tax collection is fairly long and complicated process. As the taxpayers have 
the possibility to pay the principal amount separately, that sets a lesser priority for 
repayment of penalties, administrative fees and interests, and results in a restructuring 
of overdue payments to cover the principal only. Accordingly, these payment 
procedures for penalties and interest provide a soft budget constraint for taxpayers – in 
the same way, as the lack of a transparent framework for the tax agency. This could 
become a problem if the government plans to eliminate offsets, compensations, and 
payments in kind. Taxpayers may find it economically efficient to delay payment – in 
that case the tax arrears will be well overloaded. It is important to align the structure of 
penalty system with tax incentives in order to improve compliance and reduce tax 
liabilities. The government, however, should make sure that the penalties and 
administrative sanctions are not excessive, since that often have an opposite effect. A 
balanced structure of penalties and interest is required to facilitate compliance and to 
get rid of the existing incentives to delay payments. Interest and penalties should have 
the same status as a collection of the delinquent taxes – in particular, interests should 
be accrued on all amounts due, and the provision of the Tax Code that places a limit on 
interest payable should be removed. In addition, the structure of all penalties should be 
revisited, and any discretion given to the tax officials should be terminated.  
Risk-Based Audit 
The low level of computerization in tax administration, coupled to the inadequate skills 
of tax officers – partly, due to low salaries and retention rate – contributed to the need 
to replace the existing quota-driven system of tax collections by a risk-based audit. 
Because of the lack of comprehensive database, inter-agency integrated information 
system and clear manuals, tax auditing today is a challenge. Universal audit was 
largely focused on formal controls and enforcement and, hence, presented an 
opportunity for corruption. A first step in improving the audit process was the 
development of the Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU) – eventually, the highest risk category. 
Since 2010, the government with financial support of the international partners – 
mainly, IFC and ADB – set up the basis to move to the risk-based audit system, where 
taxpayers are selected based on special criteria – such as, audit productivity, potential 
tax evasion, and tax collection. This system allows the STS to focus on high-risk 
taxpayers and reward the compliant ones. The testing results will be used to calibrate a 
model and improve the selection criteria.  
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Tax Appeals 
A tax system requires fully functional appeal mechanisms, internal and external. 
According to the official requirements, taxpayers have to, at first, file inquiries to the 
respective local office, which has 30 days to reply or appeal will be granted 
automatically – in practice, most filings are made to the tax offices in Bishkek and Chui 
region. In case of disapproval, the inquiry may be bring further to the STS‘s central 
office, which typically tends not to reverse previous decisions. Even though taxpayers 
have a reasonable chance to successfully defend the case, the decline may lead to 
alternative and perhaps improper solutions to taxpayer problems. From 2009, the 
principle of bona-fide taxpayer was introduced by the tax code, according to which the 
taxpayers should be treated as innocent until the administrative court pleats them guilty 
– priory a totally opposite approach was taken. The chair of the tax consultants also 
admitted the growing competence of both the taxpayers and the tax officers – with 
timely support of tax consultants, the taxpayers are able to professionally present and 
win cases in court (Tax Consultant 1). The institution of tax representatives set up by 
the new code contributed to this success, as well.   
All decisions of the STS or the finance ministry may be referred to the court. However, 
this is not common, maybe due to the perceived corruption within the judicial system or 
to the lack of specialized chamber in the court system. While the tax reform concept 
called for creation of a tax arbitrage within the civil court, or even a separate tax court, 
constitutional issues and judicial specialization in the court system prevented such 
actions. Appeals can also be sent directly to the tax committee of the parliament. As 
obstacles to the appeals system arise, the parliament becomes another alternative for 
external appeals. However, the capacity and expertise for such appeals are limited. 
Still, the business associations together with the CTC insisted on creation of the tax 
court, in particular during the high-level sessions of the BDIC in 2010. 
4.5. External Factors 
Since the 1950s, the policy debates on tax reforms in developing countries and 
countries in transition have been guided mostly by external partners whose policy 
advice has exerted a great pressure on the form and content of reform packages 
(Goode, 1993, Stewart, 2002). Stewart (2003) identifies at least three external players 
with a role central to tax reforms in low-income countries, while he also highlights a 
significant overlap in their activities. Historically, the governments of developed country 
have influenced tax reforms directly through imperial relationships (post-colonial 
reconstruction programs), foreign aid and technical assistance, and bilateral tax 
treaties as well as through financial contributions to the international institutions. The 
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period of 1945-1980 was dominated by tax experts, who are more familiar with the tax 
laws and fiscal practices of their original country (Stewart, 2003: 143). For example, 
among the leading scholars of public finance in developing countries are Vito Tanzi, 
Carl Shoup, Richard Musgrave, Nicholas Kaldor, Oliver Oldman, Richard Goode, 
Charles McLure, Malcolm Gillis, Roy Bahl, John Due, Glenn Jenkins, Sijbren Cnossen 
and Richard Bird (Stewart, 2002, Bird, 1992).  
From the 1970s, there has been a shift in the trajectory of tax reforms towards 
engagement of local officials and focus on tax administration reform. As a result, in the 
1990s the Harvard Institute for International Development delivered the Basic World 
Tax Code (BWTC) designed as a simple and comprehensive ‗model‘ primarily for the 
newly emerged countries. However, the BWTC approach to tax reform did not find 
universal approval. Particularly, Gordon (1996: 927, 928, 930) criticizes the ‗one size 
fits all‘ approach claiming that the tax policies that are ‗generally accepted as a matter 
of theory may not be appropriate in a particular situation‘ at the same time 
acknowledging ‗the value of existing drafts of legislative tax language, in the form of 
actual statutes or model laws, [as] absolutely essential tools in the technical assistance 
trade.‘ Also, Stewart (2003: 154) asserts that ‗the best legislative approach will depend 
on the unique economic, social and political conditions, as well as the legal and 
administrative style, of each jurisdiction.‘ According to Berkowitz et al. (2001) ‗the 
massive importation of legal code‘ into the transition countries commencing in the late 
1980s, not only supports this criticism of the wholesale ‗model‘ approach to tax reform 
but suggests that subsequent enforcement of transplanted law is weak and 
problematic, in particular where the transplanted legal code does not ‗fit‘ the history of 
development of legal structures in that country (Stewart, 2002: 35).  
Since the 1980s, the international institutions have expanded their interest in tax reform 
agenda. However, the ‗process of identifying and mapping the tax reform activities of 
these institutions has not always been easy, as tax reform is one of the least visible 
aspects of their work. Many of the institutions have more than one department or 
operational area that works on tax reform or policy and sometimes there seems to have 
been little or no apparent communication between the different departments. A further 
difficulty is that tax reform is often conducted as technical assistance and even in the 
new climate of transparency, there is continued secrecy regarding technical assistance‘ 
(Stewart, 2002: 14). Similarly, Tanzi and Zee (2000: 301) argue that ‗much of the 
material … is contained in confidential IMF technical reports prepared at the request of 
country authorities. Most of the country-specific references have, therefore, been 
suppressed, except in those few cases involving references to factual information that 
is readily available in the public domain.‘  
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Nowadays, the types of technical assistance carried out by the international institutions 
are ranged from substituting the external experts for local specialists and training local 
staff along with the transfer of knowledge and techniques to building of the market-
oriented local institutions and ‗good governance‘ (Stewart, 2003). In terms of fiscal 
harmonization, there have been recent efforts to increase coordination within and 
between international institutions and develop a more collaborative and systematic 
approach to tax reform. For instance, the International Tax Dialogue (ITD) was initiated 
in 2002 to encourage and facilitate discussion of tax matters among international 
organizations, regional development banks and national tax officials to share good 
practices and to provide a clearer focus for technical assistance (OECD, 2012). 
Besides, the PEFA program was founded in December 2001 as a multi-donor 
partnership to strengthen the ability of the country-recipients and donors to assess 
essential public financial management systems by providing a common pool of 
information for measurement and monitoring the progress of PFM system over time, to 
encourage country ‗ownership‘ and reduce the transaction costs, to enhance donor 
harmonization around the country strategy, to develop a practical sequence of reform 
and capacity-building actions and to maintain a common platform for dialogue (PEFA, 
2005). While external influences of the international institutions and donors on the tax 
reform in developing and transition countries are pervasive and inevitable, the stance 
of a domestic government is still important because these projects require enactment 
of laws and active role of chief executives and local bureaucracy. However, the power 
relationships between the government, internal interest groups and development 
partners are uneven (Stewart, 2003: 143). Tax reform may be externally proposed as a 
result of economic structural adjustments, technical assistance, policy debates, aid 
conditionality, and international negotiations within wider public management reforms. 
In the Kyrgyz Republic, the challenges with tax reform include unrealistic timescales, 
lack of government ownership and coordination among donors, insufficient institutional 
capacity, weak professional skills, and inadequate specifications of integrated 
information systems. It is already clear that the key factors for success are high-level 
political will, social and political stability, government ownership of country-specific 
reforms, institutional capacity-building, change management, donor cooperation and 
aid harmonization, and broader public engagement (Table 4.5.1).  
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Table 4.5.1. Interviews: External Factors  
Interviewee Themes Comments 
Government Agencies 
Tax Officer 1 External Factors 
ADB project on tax 
administration reform and 
modernization 
It is planned that ADB project will 
integrate the STS, treasury, national 
bank and commercial banks to one 
system. The payment system also 
needs modifications, in particular 
payment of taxes through terminals. 
Tax Officer 2 External Factors 
Donor assistance on risk-based 
tax audit and assessment 
criteria – IMF, USAID, ADB 
The test of risk-based audit system 
was conducted in the central office in 
Bishkek with national roll-out in 2014. 
Tax Officer 3 External Factors 
USAID support to legalization 
and universal declaration 
project 
Coordination among donors 
The universal declaration should be 
fill-out by all taxpayers, that is full 
coverage of individual taxpayers. 
However, the STS and other agencies 
lack of appropriate capacity for cross-
checking, so the starting date was 
postponed till 2016.  
Tax Officer 5 External Factors 
ADB project on tax 
administration reform and 
modernization (modules and 
technical assistance) 
Projects of USAID and DFID for 
public finance reform 
World Bank and IMF support to 
PFM reform and PEFA 
assessments 
From 2013, STS, Social Fund and 
SCS will be using the integrated 
information system and single 
database. It is necessary to include 
administrative sanctions to STS‘s 
classifier especially due to automation 
of their operations. 
The institutional and technical 
capacity should be adjusted 
accordingly.  
Tax Officer 12 External Factors 
Donor support with revenue 
forecasting  
The ministry starts to use 
comprehensive revenue forecasting 
models, with the support of the 
international organizations. 
International Organizations and Donors 
Tax Expert 1 External Factors 
ADB project on tax 
administration reform and 
modernization  
Government commitment to 
reform and ownership of reform 
 
The ADB‘s project is aimed to 
introduce modern technologies in tax 
administration, improve business 
operations, build institutional capacity 
and reduce corruption in line with 
objectives of the country development 
strategy. 
Tax Expert 2 External Factors 
Donor support with reform 
implementation 
The tax system could be improved if 
the reform packages will be 
successfully implemented in timely 
manner.  
Tax Expert 3 External Factors 
Lack of coordination among 
donors 
Controversial influence of 
international organizations – 
may be will be better not to be 
evolved from the beginning 
Customs Union – no unification 
in tariffs 
Potential outsourcing of tax collection 
to independent agent or company. 
 
 
Tax Expert 4 External Factors 
USAID Reforma projects on 
indirect tax policy and tax 
amnesty  
Government commitments 
Government commitment to sustain 
the reform and country-specific 
programs. 
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Tax Expert 5 External Factors 
Donors have a substantial 
influence on government and 
its tax policy 
The effect of Customs Union is 
indefinite 
 
The milestones of tax reform include 
the legacy from previous system and 
the best practice from Russia in 1991, 
help of IMF and USAID in 1993, 
informal lobby of the tax code in 1996 
and learning process of business 
associations and tax consultancy 
later. The influence of donors and 
potential coalition on government and 
tax policy is significant. 
Tax Expert 6 External Factors 
Active participation of 
development partners in reform 
process 
Contributions from Kumtor 
balance the budget. Kumtor 
plays important role in political 
and economic development of 
the country 
Potential impact of Customs 
Union 
The budget revenues have increased 
from 2009, as Kumtor starts to pay 
mining royalty. The main reason was 
the reduction in PIT to 10%, and CIT 
paid by large enterprises in mobile 
and textile industries. It is expected 
that VAT on import will be decreased 
due to Kyrgyzstan joining the 
Customs Union.  
Tax Expert 7 External Factors 
Overfocus on improvement in 
the business ratings conducted 
by the international 
organizations and donors 
The tax system of 1991 is better than 
after 2008 reform. It was planned that 
the taxpayer burden will be 
decreased, but in fact the burden 
grew to 69% as stated in the World 
Bank‘s Doing Business report.  
Tax Expert 8 External Factors 
Tax competition will lead to 
decrease in tax rates 
The reserves for revenue generation 
include the introduction of green tax, 
reduction in tax rates for excises 
(gasoline, alcohols, tobacco), which 
are lower than in other Central Asian 
states. 
Tax Expert 9 External Factors 
Local government initiatives 
 
Civil Society Organizations 
Tax Consultant 1 External Factors 
Role of the international 
organizations in the 
development of the tax code, 
and the tax system in general.  
 
 
 
The story of a new tax code started in 
2001 with a new concept on strategic 
development. In 2003, the working 
group of finance ministry, WB and IMF 
presented the new edition of the code, 
and chamber of tax consultants 
conducted independent analysis of 
this proposal in comparison with tax 
codes of Russia and Kazakhstan. The 
proposal did not pass parliamentary 
approval. To find a consensus, the 
joint working group has been 
established. For the first time, the civil 
society forced the government to 
accept more liberal tax code. 
Tax Consultant 2 External Factors 
Potential impact of Customs 
Union 
 
The Customs Union will lead to 
changes in tariffs and excise taxes. 
Tax Consultant 5 External Factors 
Tax competition in Central Asia 
Similar to other Central Asian 
republics, the tax rate for VAT 
decreased from 20% to12%, sale tax 
from 4% to 2%, and CIT from 20% to 
10%. Advertising tax, road tax and 
emergency allocations were 
eliminated.  
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Taxpayers 
Taxpayer 6 External Factors 
Donor‘s support to tax 
administration reform 
 
Tax reform should be part of structural 
changes in other industries, not the 
blind adaption of the best practices of 
other countries.  
Educational Institutions 
Academic 1 External Factors 
Donor coordination 
Aid harmonization 
 
Academic 5 External Factors 
USAID project on automation of 
the property tax system 
Property tax and land tax are the main 
revenue sources of local budgets. The 
property taxation requires the institute 
of independent assessors and 
established assessment process. 
Academic 6 External Factors 
Donor support to civic 
engagement  
Government commitment to 
reform 
Despite broader civic engagement, 
weakness of the civil society 
organizations seriously affects the 
reform process. This was also led and 
controlled by weak politico-
administrative elite. 
In order to meet urgent spending needs on one hand and to reduce budget deficit on 
the other, the Kyrgyz government has been subsequently implementing a series of 
public expenditure management reforms since mid-1990s which became an integrated 
part of the National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS) for 1996-2005. The nationwide 
strategy officially admitted that reform in pubic financial management (PFM) is one of 
the government priorities on its way to fighting poverty and achieving fiscal 
sustainability. As a result, the basic elements of PFM system were introduced, including 
a legal framework, budget procedures, and a treasury system.  
Initially, the government has made a decision to apply the main principles of a 
Strengthened Approach for enhancing and sustaining PFM reform process: 
 Country-led reform strategy and action plan  
 Integrated multi-year PFM program coordinated by international financial 
institutions (IFI) in alignment with the PFM reform strategy 
 Shared information pool based on common performance indicators.  
As a first step, the government had to formulate its own reform strategy and complete 
an action plan, making sure that this plan will be incorporated further into a national 
development strategy. At that stage, the high-level political leadership had a direct 
impact on the government‘s ability to effectively implement the strengthened approach. 
Donors have also agreed to consolidate their support and move away from an earlier 
fragmented provision of technical assistance to a better-coordinated and harmonized 
aid program. 
In cooperation with the main donors, the Ministry of Economy and Finance conducted a 
series of diagnostic studies of the country‘s PFM system, which have helped to design 
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a PFM reform strategy and to prepare an action plan in June 2006. The reform strategy 
was developed to improve the transparency and responsiveness of the public sector 
through enhancing personal accountability of political officials and civil servants, 
improving public access to official information, reducing financial incentives for misuse 
of regulatory and enforcement powers, and strengthening external audit and reforms 
aimed at increasing efficiency, effectiveness and accountability within the public sector 
and streamlining the structure of government ministries and agencies (PEFA, 2006). 
The strategy has also been actively supported by comprehensive donor assistance. 
For example, the major focus of the IMF assistantship was macroeconomic policy 
formulation and fiscal management. The World Bank and DFID through GSAC and 
GTAC programs have supported activities for establishing more strategic and 
transparent budget process, strengthening accountability and transparency in budget 
execution through removing constrains to resource management and reducing budget 
fragmentation, and modernization of the treasury system, improving external and 
internal control, transparency and accountability in public procurement. USAID 
provided technical assistance in capacity building of the government agencies in areas 
of revenue forecasting and gradual introduction of program budgeting. EU TACIS and 
Food security program supports reform of PEM in social sector and agriculture.  
PEFA PFM Assessment 2005 
In September 2005, consultants from the Oxford Policy Management undertook a 
PEFA assessment in the Kyrgyz Republic. The overall objectives of the performance 
study were to develop an up-to-date picture of the public financial management system 
in Kyrgyzstan, to benchmark its performance against a series of the internationally 
accepted standards for public finance and to establish a baseline for monitoring the 
progress of PFM reforms in future. Along with the Country Financial Accountability 
Assessment (CFAA), Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR) and various 
technical notes on budget preparation and execution, the PEFA Performance 
Measurement Framework provided a basis for the ministry of finance in preparation of 
a PFM Action Plan for 2006-2009. These were the first attempts of the government to 
justify a choice of the Platform Approach to PFM reforms and define the reform agenda 
(PEFA, 2006). The key areas of public finance reforms were announced as preparation 
and implementation of realistic budget, and improvement of intergovernmental finance 
and revenue management systems. The action plan, approved by the presidential 
decree #337 on June 29, 2006, has covered such topics as budget reform, budget 
process and development budget, new budget classification, decentralization and 
intergovernmental finance reform, tax policy and administration, and internal audit. The 
adoption of the PFM Action Plan in 2006 counted down the beginning of a systematic 
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PFM reform in Kyrgyzstan. However, since its initial implementation, there have been 
mixed results – the most targets have been achieved, but only in those areas where 
significant donors assistance has been provided. 
PEFA PFM Assessment 2009 
With the support of European Commission (EC), the government has drafted in 2008 a 
medium-term vision for PFM reforms. Though it still lacked prioritization, the vision was 
a good starting point to discuss the reform needs. The Ministry of Finance used the 
results of the second PEFA assessment to develop a PFM Medium-Term Plan for 
2009-2013. So far, progress in public finance reforms has been rather modest since the 
first performance assessment in 2005. The PEFA 2009 shows measurable progress 
only in few areas (Table 4.5.2). Improvements can be seen in the implementation of a 
new budget classification procedure ahead of the 2007 budget, introduction of the 
Chart of Accounts compatible with Governmental Financial Standards 2001 in 2009. 
Other important developments in the last few years include the automation of the 
treasury system, the multi-year fiscal forecasts, a new tax code of 2008 and upgrade of 
the KITIS database through the development of an Integrated Taxpayer Master File 
and application software based on new business processes. Nevertheless, many 
challenges remain, among which the need to review and update the legal framework 
for budgeting and ad hoc annual budget preparation and execution. Still, revenues 
forecasting remains a major issue, and intergovernmental finance, despite the 
Financial and Economic Basis of Local Self-Governments Law, is a subject to political 
adjustment. While the government has significantly progressed in approving Internal 
Audit Law towards the end of 2008 and establishing methodological framework aimed 
at strengthening budget preparation and execution, there is no technical assistance 
program designed to provide the necessary training to internal audit departments 
already opened in 20 ministries and governmental agencies (PEFA, 2009: 70). Such 
limited impact of the reform efforts is surprising given the enthusiasm of the 
government and donors that has been put forward to foster PFM system, followed by 
substantial funding and coordinated provision of TA. Undoubtedly, political instability 
and tragic events in 2005 and 2010 have contributed a lot to the slow pace of reforms, 
but further analysis of other reasons for the poor results needs to be done by all 
stakeholders involved before moving to a next phase of reform. The lack of qualified 
staff, frequent changes in the government, and inadequate institutional capacity in 
targeted areas have also been recognized as restricting factors for successful PFM 
reforms – it is essential to increase the technical knowledge, managerial capacity and 
understanding of audit functions among state officials. 
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Conclusions 
In the Kyrgyz Republic, the government is determined to consolidate its public finances 
over the coming years. Thus, strong revenue performance is important. In the short-
run, it is expected that changes introduced to tax policy, in addition to improved tax 
administration, will ensure sufficient revenue growth to balance the budget. Although 
tax revenue in Kyrgyzstan is above the average in comparison with other low-income 
countries, additional measures will be needed to sustain its growth. While existing 
measures for tax reforms are expected to improve the efficiency and transparency of 
the tax system and to generate much needed revenue, these efforts may be 
undermined by current system of tax incentives. So, more significant tax measures are 
required to reduce distortions in the tax system, and to cut administrative and 
compliance costs – hence, to support the NSDS for 2013-2017. In this regard, the 
government has to ensure the macroeconomic and political stability in the country, if 
higher economic growth is to be achieved.  
Historical Factors. The directions, and the main factors affecting these directions, of tax 
reform in post-Soviet transition countries cannot be understood completely without a 
good knowledge of the legacies of previous regime. Indeed, it seems that the choices 
in regard to tax reform in Kyrgyzstan were largely determined by the initial conditions – 
that is, the tax system of the Soviet Union from which the reform took off. The country 
inherited a tax system heavily relied on transfers from Moscow with budget planning 
focused on expenditures, while ignoring the domestic revenues capacity. Like other 
post-Soviets, the Kyrgyz Republic experienced similar challenges in reforming its tax 
system such as a sharp decline in government revenues, inadequate fiscal institutions, 
and pervasive corruption. The last two decades of transition indicate a gradual 
approach to tax reform as well as a lack of a roadmap for moving to a market economy. 
Socio-Economical Factors. In 2009, a new Tax Code was introduced to even the tax 
burden on compliant taxpayers and to simplify tax procedures. The main changes 
included the reduction in the total number of taxes to 8, decrease in the VAT rate from 
20% to 12%, introduction of a flat rate of 10% for PIT and CIT, enforcement of a new 
property tax, replacement of the cascading turnover taxes (road tax and allocations to 
emergency fund) by a single national sales tax, and establishment of the special tax 
regimes, such as the mandatory and voluntary patents, simplified tax, tax contract, 
HTP, and FEZs. So far, since 2009, no substantial amendments have been made to the 
tax code apart from several additions to the VAT exemptions and some tax incentives 
for income and excise taxes. In particular, the tax authorities introduced the VAT 
exemptions for agriculture producers while lifting them from the Internet and roaming 
services. They also raised the excises for tobacco and alcohol products, proposed a 
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new gross income tax for gold-mining companies in lieu of CIT in CIS, and removed the 
tax on special funds – previously, the special funds tax was part of the special tax 
regime.  
In total, tax revenue comprised about 20.81% of GDP in 2013, which is still pretty low. 
However, in terms of tax collection, the country performance was favourable, especially 
among other Central Asian countries. During the last years, collection of income taxes 
grew markedly mainly because of CIT. The CIT rate was finally reduced to 10% in 2006 
– after a series of reductions in 1996 and 2004 – which contributed to better 
competitiveness within the region. As, since 2006, the CIT rate remained unchanged, 
there is potential for further increases in its collection – mainly, through improved 
administrative system. Some of the other countries in the region have also push their 
CIT rates down, but not as rapidly as in Kyrgyzstan. In 2009, the VAT revenue in the 
Kyrgyz Republic dropped dramatically, in response to reduced rate, – in fact, the 
nominal rate was aligned with VAT rates in Kazakhstan. Interestingly, the Caucasus 
countries – like Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia – did not reduce their VAT rates, 
which were kept at 18-20% over the past years. After a sharp decline in 2009, VAT-to-
GDP ratio has gradually increased, but still the VAT collection is below the pre-2009 
level. Social contributions also rose steadily reaching about 9.90% of GDP in 2013. 
Rationalizing VAT exemptions should be a priority for the tax policy reform in mid-term 
aimed to achieve the broadest VAT base, if possible. Given that VAT exemptions could 
not be traced in the final price of the product, it is not recommended to use them for a 
provision of social benefits.  
Political Factors. The Kyrgyz Republic has undergone a series of chance events since 
its independence in 1991. Despite constitutional reforms, democratic elections and a 
peaceful transition to the parliamentary republic, the political situation is unstable and 
citizens are looking for sound socio-economic reforms that will curb inflation, reduce 
unemployment, attract DFIs, tackle corruption and improve public services. Adoption of 
the constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic was the main chance event in legislature in 
1990s. The last amendments to the constitution transferred more power from the 
president to other branches – the Jogorku Kenesh, the government, the judicial 
system, and local self-governments. Notwithstanding certain positive outcome of 
judiciary reforms, the quality of judicial system did not improve. The courts authority 
and public trust in them diminished – too often judges were accused of corruption and 
malpractice. Budget cuts also negatively affected the quality of justice administration. 
So, there is a need for substantial government support and use of additional resources 
to move the judicial system to a new level. The current socio-economic polices require 
an independent court system – and new goals, and objectives, for judicial reform. The 
judicial measures to improve the tax system include the implementation of the concept 
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of tax court, relevant updates of procedural laws, development of the effective conflict 
resolution mechanisms, and provision of professional legal assistance to taxpayers. 
The rapid pace of political, social and economic reforms conducted in Kyrgyzstan has 
intensified law making – and thus affected the quality and consistency of legislature. 
Besides, the capacity of CSOs is not fully realized – their experts can assist in drafting 
and consequent assessment of legal acts. The objective of the tax reform in the 
legislative area is to develop an effective tax code, eliminate conflicts and gaps in tax 
legislation, streamline existing tax laws, and create a favourable legal and institutional 
environment for taxpayers. The main issues in the legal reform are the development of 
a uniform law-making concept and harmonization of the current legislation with its basic 
ideas and principles, better coordination of activities among public sector institutions, 
active engagement with the civil society and improvement of legal culture, functional 
analysis of draft laws and clear mechanisms for their implementation, and adequate 
training of legal personnel. 
Administrative Factors. STS used the old software built in 1994 around the taxpayer 
ledgers – the personal cards that keep records of all taxpayer‘s activities. However, in 
practice, only 16 tax offices actually adopted this software (NALOG or KITIS). To 
improve VAT administration, the VAT invoice system has been developed with the 
database of excise stamps and labels accessible through Wi-Fi protocols. Currently, 
the urgent need is to make the taxpayer registration as easier and faster as possible. 
Specifically, most of taxpayers found registration process rather difficult and time-
consuming, especially in the regions. Also, the forms and administrative procedures 
should be simplified, and computerization in tax offices will help to improve their 
performance. According to the international best practices, the filing of tax returns 
should be convenient for taxpayers. In practice, however, they often have to submit 
returns to STS before paying to banks. In this regard, an electronic filing cold be a 
viable solution – currently as a pilot for LTU. As tax audit of each taxpayer should be 
conducted once a year, the risk assessment and cross-checking with the other 
agencies via integrated information network will allow to undertake targeted audits, 
save valuable resources and update the taxpayer records.  
Due to inadequate automation, about half of STS‘s workforce still processes the paper 
records manually. As the data are encoded twice, this leads to numerous errors, delays 
in processing, and possibility for corrupt practices. Such manual procedures are 
unnecessary – for example, instead of issuing manually, notification letters could be 
generated automatically by the system. With proper equipment and modern ICT 
system, the staff previously engaged in inefficient tasks could be relocated to cover 
other functions, previously neglected, for instance taxpayer services and education. 
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One of the options to reduce the total workload is outsourcing of the collection function 
– for example, to the commercial bank which wan the government tender and handles 
the majority of tax payments, or to other independent contractor (Tax Expert 3). 
Effective implementation of this scenario, in reality, will require the installation of the 
integrated system between the bank and the tax agency. Therefore, the priorities for tax 
administration reform are to improve the STS‘s organizational structure, integrate the 
automatic information systems among agencies and reconcile their database to easily 
transfer data between them, install the new hardware with updated software and open 
call-centres to enable client-oriented services, introduce a one-stop-shop to register the 
taxpayers, rollout the new risk-based audit system to all tax offices, establish an 
electronic platform for e-filing through the Internet to facilitate voluntary compliance and 
self-assessment, and to repair the tax offices and train the personnel to insure a proper 
environment for new business operations and efficient capacity-building.  
External Factors. At the international level, more high-level efforts should be done to 
establish the enabling environment between the development partners and aid-
dependent countries – more stable and predictable aid flows will be provided in return 
to government commitment to enhance domestic revenue mobilization in the shorter 
term. In particular, donors could provide a valuable help in negotiating and 
implementing tax treaties to ensure that multinational corporations (MNCs) will pay a 
fair share of taxes. This is important because it could set a consistent pattern for 
accountability between the state and the civil society – if tax laws are not applicable to 
certain categories of taxpayers, it will be much difficult for STS to persuade others to 
fully comply. From the same perspective of consistency, it is also important to re-
examining the tax treatment of aid-sponsored projects. And much more should be done 
to address the problem of tax havens where mostly illegally acquired funds from the 
developing world reside. 
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5. DISCUSSION  
The discussion chapter of the thesis will empirically review the specifics of the country‘s 
economic, political and administrative systems organized by model and its main theme. 
The first part will begin with a brief overview of the tax system of the Soviet Union 
which provided a baseline for understanding the dynamics of tax reform in Kyrgyzstan 
since 1991. The second part will offer a descriptive summary of the history and 
arrangements of the economic reforms in Kyrgyzstan during the past twenty years of its 
independence, in particular liberalization, deregulation, privatization, macroeconomic 
stabilization and structural reforms. In the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model the socio-
economical influences include a broad set of diverse factors, such as the Global 
Economic Forces, Socio-Demographic Change, and Socio-Economic Policies. The role 
of the political system in determining a tax reform agenda will be discussed in the third 
part – mainly, how the New Management Ideas together with Pressure from Citizens 
influence the Party Political Ideas. As shall be seen at the fourth part, the Elite 
Decision-Making is important for Central Asia, where historically the clan politics and 
regional networking thrive. According to Pollitt and Bouckaert, Content of Reform 
Package, Implementation Process and Results Achieved represent the more dynamic 
elements of the administrative system. These activities are the main focus of the fifth 
part, and their treatment will be closely related to donor-driven mini-case studies of tax 
administration reform and modernization in the Kyrgyz Republic. Finally, the sixth part 
will describe the main international development agencies and their programs at work 
in the country. It will also identify key issues that require close attention if international 
organizations and donors are aimed to improve the quality of their support for the tax 
reform in Kyrgyzstan. 
5.1. Historical Background  
In developing countries the tax reform has been recognized as a key success factor of 
economic transformation from central planning to market-based economy. However, 
the legacy of centrally planned economy dramatically defined the pace and timing of 
economic reforms in emerging countries, and problems of tax reforms could be traced 
back to the past where the tax systems were formed (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 
1999, Bakes, 1991). The main revenue sources in planned economies were turnover 
tax, payroll tax and profit tax, comprising together more than half of total tax revenues. 
Among these three taxes paid primarily by state-owned enterprises, the enterprise 
profit tax had the biggest revenue generation power, leaving the individual income tax 
substantially behind. Kodrzycki (1993) also highlights a significant gap between tax 
revenues collected from state enterprises and individual households in central planned 
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and market economies. However, the direct comparison of two completely different 
economic systems could be misleading. As state ownership was dominant, the private 
sector was underdeveloped and property tax was not an option for centralized tax 
structure.  
According to Soviet methodology, the consolidated budget revenues included not only 
state-owned enterprise profits and tax revenues, but also sales of state bonds, 
borrowing from the State Bank (Gosbank) and external borrowings. As a result, official 
statistics shows continuous growth in total budget revenues over the last decades. 
Historically, revenue played a secondary role in budget planning as the Soviet state 
had an ownership right for virtually all property and state enterprises in the country and 
consequently controlled their financial resources. Thus, there is no doubt that 
increasing budget revenues simply reflected the growth of expenditures. Moreover, 
some experts have argued that from the mid-1960s the budget revenues were 
chronically below than budget expenditures in real terms. In late 1980s, the share of 
total revenue to GNP dropped from 43% in 1988-1990 to 35% in 1991 (Alexashenko, 
1992).  
There was no well-established taxation system in the Soviet Union until 1991. The 
state was able to accumulate budget revenue by directly accessing the enterprises 
financial resources (profit and depreciation). The share left behind was a subject for 
constant negotiations between the enterprise management and the industrial ministry 
and could be changed during the year (Alexashenko, 1992). In 1984-1985, the first 
steps in the profit reallocation system took place as part of the ‗large-scale experiment.‘ 
The amount of profit retained in an enterprise was dependent on its financial 
performance assessed by result-oriented indicators – such as decrease in production 
costs, increase in labour productivity, increase in the share of production designated to 
extra-quality, economy in the use of material resources. Though these changes were 
not part of a comprehensive reform program, their initial results were positive as 
enterprises became more interested, to a certain extent, in their financial results. Next, 
the new norms for profits distribution were introduced in 1988. As a result, ministries 
issued per each enterprise the individual norms for capital expenses and personnel 
payments based on the adopted financial plans, as well as share of profit to be 
contributed to the state budget and to their ministerial funds. These norms were fixed, 
and ministries did not have an authority to revise them for a period of one year. At the 
same time, enterprises were allowed to use the rest of their profits as pleased. Initially, 
the contributions of SOEs and turnover tax were the prevailing revenue sources in the 
Soviet budget, comprising more than 60% of total revenue. In the mid-1970s, the 
revenue from foreign activity was introduced to the budget structure as the third 
substantial source (Alexashenko, 1993). 
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Turnover Tax 
The market-oriented economies did not have an analogue of turnover tax in their tax 
structures. Turnover tax was a unique predetermined margin between the retail price 
and operating cost of state-owned enterprises in the central planned system (Martinez-
Vazquez and McNab, 2000). The calculation of tax liabilities were extremely 
complicated as the taxpayers applied numerous different tax rates based on type of 
commodities or services and type of enterprises. Beside absence of a unified tax rate, 
the turnover taxes were not perceived as a ‗tax,‘ rather as a mechanism of price 
regulation and resources allocation. Within price-controlled system, the government 
had an ability to setup all retail and wholesale prices, and the turnover tax was actually 
hidden from customers and presented as a fixed mark-up of final price (Tait, 1988, 
Gandhi and Mihaljek, 1992). 
It necessary to mention that the turnover tax in the USSR was not a tax in a common 
sense. It was an integral part of the general economic mechanism for financial 
reallocation and allowed the maintenance of relatively low prices for raw materials and 
industrial products, and higher prices for certain consumer goods. Basically, the 
turnover tax was the difference (in absolute value) between wholesale and retail prices 
for individuals and producers. Evidently, the state officials did not forecast any inflation 
for 1991 in the context of annual financial planning and the numerous tax rates were 
not adequately prorated. In 1992, the turnover taxes were replaced by the value-added 
tax (VAT) in most of the former Soviet Union republics. 
Enterprise Profit Tax 
The profit tax was the most important revenue source in centralized economy used to 
mobilise revenues and to regulate enterprise cash flows (Bakes, 1991). As an owner of 
enterprises, the government controlled expense structure by revising accounting 
policies and managed initial investments by imposing required rates of return. As a tax 
collector, the government followed the tradition of a tax base negotiation and 
progressivity in tax rates differentiated by industry and enterprise, ad hoc deductions 
and exemptions from gross profit, and customization of tax liabilities for particular state 
enterprise (Gandhi and Mihaljek, 1992). In general, the term ‗enterprise profit tax‘ 
cannot be directly translated as a ‗corporate income tax‘ used in advanced countries. 
Unlike ‗income‘ in a market economy, the ‗gross profit‘ was perceived as a product of 
assigned profitability index and operating and non-operating expenses.  
At the end of 1980s, there were a lot of debates regarding the design of the Soviet tax 
system. The government was in favour for a ‗one-tax system‘ for SOEs (Alexashenko, 
1992). In summer 1990, the parliament approved the new tax law according to which 
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the profit tax virtually became a single tax on enterprises. Whereas the government 
suggested a tax rate of 60%, which was reduced to 55% in the final proposal, the 
parliament adopted a 45% rate. Later, the CIT rate was further decreased to 35% in 
accordance with the decision of the central government in April 1991, during the price 
liberalization reform. Though the effective average tax rate was about 26% in 1991 and 
corporate profit almost doubled as compared to 1990, the nominal yield from this tax 
increased only by 13%.  
Individual Income Tax. 
Individual income taxation was not so critical in central planned economies because 
the wage and payroll taxes were collected by state enterprises and earmarked as 
social expenditures (Gandhi and Mihaljek, 1992). According to state regulations and 
wage policy, the employers were responsible to determine gross adjusted income, 
prepare tax documents, accumulate wage fund, transfer the income tax to state budget 
and pay net-of-tax wage to workers. Because of absence of any experience in 
submission of tax returns, the employees did not have an opportunity to communicate 
with tax authorities. Therefore, the taxpayer education and voluntary compliance 
became the urgent issues to be solved during transition to a newly emerging market 
system. On the other hand, the compliance rate of individual income taxes in the 
previous regime was extremely high. As the fixed net wages were the only source of 
personal income, the government attempted to satisfy the equity principle by paying 
equal wages to each member of society and to correct employee behaviour by 
changes in labour law. On the other hand, the wage ceiling posted by the government 
taxed the individual income intrinsically. In terms of extra profit, Excess Wage Tax was 
introduced to discourage the distribution of enterprise surplus toward employee 
compensation and fringe benefits, to depress the size of growing wage fund and to 
retain more earnings at the enterprise level to be paid to the state budget. Moreover, 
the government used income tax system to balance the enterprise net profit 
contributions and budget expenditures (Bakes, 1991, Bogetic and Hillman, 1994).  
Personal tax had never been a revenue-generated source in the Soviet Union. The 
state could easily determine the levels of individual income, as all population categories 
received fixed wages and salaries while working in the state public sector. Therefore, 
the PIT existed in substance, but without content. During the last two decades, the 
marginal rate was uniformed at 13%, effective tax rate was flattened as 10% of 
personal income and the tax yield was only about 9% of the total budget revenue. Late 
1980s recorded a substantial increase in the yield from personal taxation up to 10.5% 
in 1989 and 12% in 1990 as a result of rapid growth in personal incomes and relative 
stability of tax rates. According to new tax law enacted on July 1, 1990, the marginal 
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tax rate for high-income group increased from 13% to 60%. In reality, this tax act did 
not have significant impact on the personal tax yield, because there were not so many 
people in this income threshold and several republics made a voluntary decision to 
reduce the marginal rate to 30%. Furthermore, as part of the pricing reform in 1991, the 
tax rates for low-income groups were reduced along with the increasing level of 
deductions and exemptions. Hence, the share of PIT in total budget revenue dropped 
back to 10%.  
In order to discourage the ‗undesirable‘ private activities, the income earned outside of 
state sector such as professional fees, honorarium of liberal professions (artists, 
composers, writers) and sportsmen, patents, royalties were taxed at highly progressive 
tax rate (Gandhi and Mihaljek, 1992, Owens, 1991). Capital gains tax and rent income 
tax were uncommon to tax structure of centrally planned economy. The only possibility 
to receive interest income in the government controlled financial market is to open 
special saving account in the local state bank or purchase treasury bills with fixed 
interest rate. 
Social Insurance Contributions 
Prior 1991, the social insurance system was financed by 40%-45 % from own revenue 
sources and the rest was covered through the state budget. In 1991, the system 
anticipated drastic move toward self-sufficiency. In particular, the Pension Fund and the 
Social Insurance Fund were removed from the budget system due to strategic 
importance of social expenditures – still until now, the Social Fund is not part of the 
budget system in the Kyrgyz Republic. Consequently, the average rate of the social 
insurance contributions increased from 14% in 1990 to 38% in 1991 – usually the 
employer paid 37% from official salary fund (labour cost) and the employee rate was 
1% of wages and salaries (Alexashenko, 1992). 
Trade Taxes 
Revenue from foreign business activity of state monopolies was the third important 
source of budget revenues in 1976-1990, representing 13-19% of total revenue. Due to 
the distorted domestic price system and artificial exchange rate (USD 1= SUR 0.6), a 
gap between domestic and world prices evolved over time. Export prices (raw materials 
and weapons) fell below the import prices (consumer goods). From the mid-1980s, 
external credits were recorded as budget revenue in addition to the foreign trade 
revenue. The share of this new revenue source in the total revenue increased from 
13% in 1986 to more than 35% in 1991. However, all new credits were used to service 
the external debt, and there was no practical reason whatsoever to put the external 
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borrowings to official budget classification (Alexashenko, 1992). Beginning in 1991, the 
government was looking to increase the trade revenue by introducing import and export 
taxes on one hand, and providing tax allowances to the state-owned trade firms on the 
other hand. As the share of these companies was about 87% of the total trade volume, 
it is not surprising that there was no tax collection at all. The collapse of Comecon trade 
and the reduction of oil exports by twice in size contributed to sharp decline in the 
budget revenue from foreign activity leading by a shrink of Soviet trade by 45% in 
1991. 
Tax Administration 
Within centrally planned economy the government prohibited the creation of small 
business and restricted any service provision, preferring to collect tax revenues from 
large state-owned enterprises. Thus, tax administration capacity was not designed to 
deal with mass enquiries from small-scale enterprises and individuals. Instead, the 
‗boutique‘ model was developed to concentrate the collection effort of tax 
administrators toward particular large enterprise (Ickes and Slemrod, 1992). According 
to Tanzi (1993) and Balcerowicz and Gelb (1995), the tax administration in central 
planning countries was underdeveloped. However, compliance rate remained 
extremely high as the tax administration was able to conduct a 100% audit of financial 
reports due to a limited number of large taxpayers (Kodrzycki and Zolt, 1994). 
Additionally, the state could easily manage enterprise cash flows and collect any 
obligatory payments through the one-level state banking system. Moreover, the state 
had full power to retroactively change tax structure and administrative procedures in 
order to meet revenue targets, contributing to institutional instability of tax system. 
Such practices were widespread as the state played two contradictory roles in the 
economy – taxpayer and tax collector. 
The absence of tax avoidance and tax evasion was a strong feature of the command 
tax system. As all enterprises as well as the entire banking system belonged to the 
state and tax payments to the budget were made regularly, according to the 
established schedule. Also, the total number of large enterprises in central-planned 
economy was relatively small – about 45,000 in industry and construction, and 50,000 
in agriculture – and the financial control network was able to monitor the calculation 
and payment of virtually all tax obligations, with an amazing almost 100% compliance 
rate. Moreover, industrial ministries also beard responsibilities to control the 
reallocation of enterprise recourses. As a majority of the population received their 
income from the state, the ‗Pay As You Earn‘ system worked perfectly. However, 
command tax system lacked of transparency, and taxpayers were not informed of the 
full taxes they were paying. Problems in tax collection began in 1988 with growing 
  181 
number of non-state enterprises. The new enterprises were small in size of income and 
turnover, but required the same amount of the control tasks as big enterprises. The tax 
collection staff did not have vital experience with voluntary compliance, their 
professional skills were not up to the task and a culture of negotiable tax liabilities 
prospered. Tax evasion became very popular and profitable, as legal ‗loopholes‘ did not 
lead to any punishment, if caught. Moreover, the ‗tax war‘ between the central 
government in Moscow and republican authorities made the situation even worse and 
created possibility even for state-owned enterprises to evade taxation. Overall, the total 
tax evasion in 1991 accounted for 20-25% of taxes collected. In order to understand 
the state of taxation after the collapse of the USSR, it is reasonable to look at the 
following aspects of the legacy of the command economy in fiscal affairs (Alexashenko, 
1994, Alexashenko, 1992): 
 Fiscal Balance has virtually disappeared in early transition years. The overall deficit 
of the budgetary system in 1991was estimated to be 22% of GNP or 34% based on 
international methodology. The on-going economic crisis and failed economic policy 
had eroded the budget revenues. The necessity of structural reform, conversion of 
the military industry and new social programs put extra pressure on the 
expenditures. 
 Institutional Changes could determine to a large extent what difficulties will face the 
successors of the Soviet Union in the future. In terms of tax reform, this included  
the establishment of a modern tax system and implementation of a well-functioning 
tax collection mechanism, including a special taxation regime for small business.  
 Ideological Stereotypes appeared in the USSR in 1989-1991 became widespread 
in the public and political discussions concerning the structure and functions of the 
fiscal system. For instance, the idea that lower tax rates are the only or primary 
basis for a nation‘s economic prosperity, and the idea of simplicity of the tax 
system. 
 Technical Background will present serious problems to the emerging economies. 
The absence of decent financial statistics, underdeveloped monitoring procedures 
and control mechanism, inability of tax administration to verify correct payment, lack 
of skilled professionals, corruption, expanding shadow economies and the great 
popularity of tax avoidance would require a lot of time to overcome. 
Therefore, the lasting characteristics of the Soviet system still protract the 
modernization of tax system in post-Soviet countries in transition in terms of a lack of 
experience with voluntary compliance, weak institutions, negotiable tax liabilities, and 
limited delegation of authority to the local government. 
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5.2. Socio-Economical Forces 
In the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model, Socio-Economical Forces are given an important, 
though not finally determinative, role in setting the background for tax reform. 
According to the model, the socio-economic factors represent a set of broad factors – 
such as, Global Economic Forces, Socio-Demographic Change, and Socio-Economic 
Policies. This part will offer a summary of the history and arrangements of the 
economic reforms in Kyrgyzstan within the framework of the model over the past two 
decades of transition to a market economy.  
5.2.1. Economic Reforms and Socio-Economic Policies 
In early 1990s, following the collapse of the central planned system, Kyrgyzstan‘s 
economy went through severe transitional shock as it was integrated into the economic 
infrastructure and markets of the Soviet Union – the economic growth was negative 
and GDP per capita dropped by 50%. The country was cut out from Moscow‘s transfers 
and subsidies that constituted about 10% of GDP at that time (World Bank, 2003, 
World Bank, 2007a). Partly because of this excessive external dependency, the 
government started seeking for funds from international organizations and donors in 
exchange for a commitment to socio-economic reforms. The most urgent topic on the 
agenda was macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms. Still then, international 
development partners have been actively engaged with provision of technical 
assistance and advice to most of these reforms - the World Bank, the IMF and the 
USAID were among the first to assist Kyrgyzstan with the PMF reform. In 1993, the 
IMF (2000) issued an initial loan on the condition that new government successfully 
completed the recommended transition reforms – the so-called ‗big-bang‘ approach 
consisted of the following components to be carried out simultaneously:  
 Liberalization of prices and elimination of trade barriers 
 Macroeconomic stabilization to bring inflation under control  
 Restructuring and privatization of public sector  
 Legal and institutional reforms to redefine the role of the state in the economy, and 
establish the rule of law. 
When Kyrgyzstan became independent in 1991, the path for its further development 
was largely determined by its geographical location as well as the structural and 
institutional legacy of the Soviet Union (Maps 5.2.1, 5.2.2). Among the most significant 
initial conditions were the location – small country, landlocked and remote from major 
economic centres, agro-industrial structure of the economy – most of the industrial 
facilities was integrated into the industry-military sector of the Soviet Union, lack of 
natural resources and minerals that are easy for extraction – most of the deposits are 
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in the remote areas difficult to explore, absence of any institutions typical for an 
independent state such as, the central bank, treasury, tax and customs administration, 
border control, and, finally, lack of experience with nation-building, democracy and 
market economy (Mogilevsky and Omorova, 2011).  
After gaining independence, the fundamental factors mentioned above have coincided 
causing economic instability – that is, severe inflation and unemployment at the late 
‗perestroika‘ period. The collapse of the USSR led to the immediate withhold of central 
budget transfers, termination of industrial tiers with other republics along with cheap 
energy supplies and low transportation costs, a drastic change in relative prices leading 
to prolonged crisis in interstate trade – so, suddenly the government had to quickly 
adapt to the rapidly changed conditions and urgently address a completely new set of 
tasks. Moreover, the population witnessed harsh social and economic consequences of 
the transitional crisis – as a result of stagflation, the enormous hyperinflation and 
stagnation of the economy – which resulted in the loss of about a three-quarter of 
industrial and agriculture production. High unemployment, decrease in the real wages 
and social benefits, and unfamiliarity with the principles of a market economy led to 
increased poverty and inequality which combined effect with socio-economic instability 
– including noticeable deterioration of education, health care, and social insurance 
systems – forced a large migration of high-skilled workers to neighbour-countries 
(World Bank, 2001). Hence, during the first half of 1990s, a series of complex social, 
economic and institutional reforms was conducted in order to build basic public 
institutions, overcome the output decline, achieve macroeconomic stability, and put the 
whole nation on ‗survival‘ mode. Unfortunately, these reforms were not always 
consistent and comprehensive enough. Many structural reforms – particularly, price 
liberalization, privatization, and external economic liberalization – were incremental, 
partial and incomplete. At the same time, these changes also helped new social groups 
such as entrepreneurs, private farmers, and traders to emerge. 
Nevertheless, at the end of 1990s, the negative trend was reversed – that is, by 1996, 
hyperinflation ended, and GDP increased by 2.1. While the banking system, securities 
markets, and registration of private property were established, only a few natural 
monopolies and social services have been left under government control (Musakojoev, 
1997). In 1998, Kyrgyzstan was the first among the post-Soviets to join the WTO. 
Meantime, the institutional component did not receive adequate attention in the reform 
package offered by the development partners. As explained by Baimyrzaeva (2010: 
265) because ‗during the second wave of reforms leading donors assumed that 
functional institutions would fill the ―institutional vacuum‖ once the macroeconomic 
policies and reforms were implemented.‘ So, the majority of international development 
agencies focused their attention only on government institutions directly involved in 
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economic functions of the state. At that time, the new government did not yet build the 
adequate institutional capacity to support the reforms – there was no appropriate 
institutional and regulatory frameworks established to deal with radical transition to a 
free market regime. On top of that, privatization was very poorly executed – more in the 
‗command economy‘ style where the quantity of enterprises privatized meant more than 
the open and fair process (Kobonbaev, 2004, Mikhalev and Heinrich, 1999). Due to 
lack of transparency and accountability, a few vested interests – mainly new financial 
leaders emerged from former nomenclatura and their allies – were able to take 
advantage of the situation, and even tailor the new legislation for their own benefit. All 
these flaws undermined the social and economic stability in the country and resulted in 
the financial crisis of 1998 – unbalanced state budget, macroeconomic destabilization, 
external indebtedness were among main problems. After the crisis, the socio-economic 
situation of Kyrgyzstan has improved – poverty rate has fallen drastically, prudent 
macroeconomic policy has managed to suppress inflation and created a more 
favourable tax regime for micro and small businesses.  
As the IMF (2000) acknowledged, in partial and incomplete reforms the vested 
interests were able to influence and modify government policies in order to generate 
income opportunities for themselves from persistent market distortions. Similar to other 
former Soviet Union countries, large amount of government assets were privatized by 
small group of elites. State-owned enterprises were auctioned at very low price as the 
process was not transparent, which allowed the government officials, and their families 
and friends, to take advantage of their position. These processes closely tied newly 
emerging entrepreneurs and political elites together - especially if business leaders 
seek political support to secure immunity against prosecution. This type of privatization 
is still under its way as the government is going to sell the remaining strategic assets – 
in particular, the energy, gas, and telecommunication companies. The main difference 
is that demand for privatization in this time is driven not by donors, but mostly by the 
local elites and regional leaders who retain more power now and have strong tiers with 
the Kyrgyz ‗White House.‘ Poorly designed macroeconomic policies, especially 
privatization, with weak transparency, and control over government‘s actions, facilitated 
the nexus between corrupt local networks and criminals – even worse, it has been 
strengthened over time under Bakiev Administration.  
In brief, enthusiasm about the progress of the economic reforms in early 1990s was 
replaced soon with increasing concerns about the survival of the country. Despite the 
initial successes – such as, reduction of inflation rates, price liberalization, and 
introduction of a national currency – in the next few years these reforms have resulted 
in widespread corruption, increased poverty and huge disparity in income (Pomfret, 
2006). Instead of a competitive business sector, there are loud allegations that the 
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country‘s economy is controlled by a small group of elites and local networks which 
manipulate the government decisions for their own benefit. Today, Kyrgyzstan‘s 
economy is characterized by extensive labour emigration due to high unemployment - 
while official statistics indicate ar8% of unemployment rate, the real situation could be 
even worse. Therefore, the legacies of the Soviet regime combined with poorly 
designed and implemented economic reforms prevented the emergence of a strong 
private sector capable to promoting economic development in the country as donors 
had expected. 
Initial Conditions and Choice of Transitional Strategy 
By the early twenty-first century all five Central Asian countries had essentially 
completed the transition from central planning. Within the common bounds of autocratic 
regimes and resource-based economies, they gradually became more differentiated as 
the national leaders introduced surprisingly diverse strategies for transition to a market 
economy.  As a result of similar initial conditions and diverging strategies, Pomfret 
(2006) has argued that Central Asia can be considered as a natural experiment for the 
success of different approaches to economic transition (Map 4.1.1). While the CARs  
differ from one another in a variety of aspects, they also share several common 
characteristics that virtually separate them from other former Soviet Union states. 
According to Mokhtari and Ashtari (2012: 170, 2010), low-income, huge hard-to-tax 
agricultural sector, unique regional specialization, widespread corruption, and large 
share of shadow economy are among the common features of the Central Asian 
economies that profoundly influence their approach to economic reforms and tax 
system modernization (Tables 5.2.1, 5.2.2) For instance, recent studies also show that 
the pre-transition size of the underground economy is an important predictor of the size 
of the unofficial economies in the post-Soviets (Schneider et al., 2010) and suggest 
that the estimated sizes of their informal economies are ‗to a large extent a historical 
phenomenon only partly determined by contemporary institutional factors‘ (Alexeev and 
Pyle, 2003: 153). 
It should be admitted that at the early stage of the transition, the Kyrgyz government 
did not have a clear vision of the reform program. There was no consensus among 
influential interest groups on the choice of economic reforms. In fact, the leading policy-
makers, and local experts widely discussed different approaches to economic changes, 
both inside and outside of the country (Abazov, 1999b: 202-203). 
 Conservative Approach was supported mainly by the members of the Communist 
Party and Soviet intelligentsia. In general, this approach could be characterized by 
their mistrust to market economy, and a belief in the so-called gradual model of 
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economic development and strictly regulated market – often referring as an 
example to experience of Uzbekistan. They also called for extensive state 
interventions, state control over resources and major sectors of the economy, and 
thus preservation of the main features of the centrally planned economy, especially 
the Soviet system of social welfare. Although they opposed de-collectivization of 
farms and voted against privatization of the SOEs, they understood the necessity of 
the private sector. As an influential faction in the post-independent parliament, 
especially until 1994, they openly criticized the liberal government and tried to block 
the radical reforms. 
 Moderate Approach was popular among the majority of public administrators and 
local economists. The main focus of this approach was a mixed economy which 
combined the principles of the market economy with intensive state intervention 
protecting the local market as well as an active role of the state in regional 
economic integration – however, this position has been changing frequently 
throughout the transitional period. Advocates of this approach highlighted the 
importance of public institutions in promoting economic growth through more 
gradual and ‗smooth‘ process of state-led privatization and industrialization, and 
argued for restoration of the state capacity to regulate the economy (Kobonbaev, 
2004). This group, mainly represented by leading economists from the National 
Academy of Science, received wide support in the Parliament and among various 
political groups. 
 Radical Approach was promoted by the ‗next‘ generation of young and ambitious 
economists and experts worked in the president‘s administration, and main sectoral 
ministries and agencies. Yet, at the beginning, they did not have a clear concept of 
economic reforms rather a general claim for market-driven reform, internal and 
external liberalization of trade and prices, privatization of all state enterprises, 
attraction of foreign investment and elimination of government regulation and 
control over the country‘s economy. Although the group enthusiastically welcomed 
the ‗shock therapy‘ approach implemented in Russia and Kazakhstan, their 
members also emphasized the importance of taking into account the specific 
context of the Kyrgyz Republic.  
President Akaev, who came to power in October 1990, won the election by calling for 
radical changes in the economy in his election campaign, on a wave of sharp criticism 
against the conservative approach of the previous leader. However, Akaev did have to 
make a choice between moderate and radical approaches – that is, between the ‗big 
bang‘ (shock therapy) approach and the gradual (evolutionary) reforms. In that mater, 
moderates supported the idea of intensive government intervention to the economy in 
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order to preserve certain level of industrial production and then to manage state-led 
reconstruction of the industrial sector by attracting more investments and introducing 
modern technologies to industries (Abazov, 1999b). Unlike the post-colonial countries 
in 1950-60s, Kyrgyzstan had a relatively large industrial sector, and there was a fear of 
possible de-industrialization of the economy because of lost technological and 
industrial ties with the other CIS countries. In contrast, the radicals have taken the view 
that the market only could determine which industries and enterprises would survive 
and make during the transition. Attitude of the Kyrgyz government towards a radical 
reform has raised a number of questions concerning its direction, methods and speed 
of reforms. However, ‗shock therapy‘ conducted in Russia has affected the final 
decision to speed up the reform process (Pomfret, 2006). Kyrgyzstan also kept an eye 
on its close neighbours – relatively radical Kazakhstan and gradualist Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan – in order to solve a dilemma of political and economic development 
(Kobonbaev, 2004). On the whole, during the 1990s, the transition strategy was 
targeting the three main tasks – internal and external liberalization and fiscal 
decentralization, macroeconomic stabilization and introduction of national currency, 
and deregulation, privatization and restructuring. 
Internal and External Liberalization, and Decentralization Reforms 
In the post-Soviet transition countries, liberalization and decentralization took a central 
role in the economic reforms program. But, it was not an easy task – radical reforms 
have had a negative effect on living standard of population, and a number of influential 
players tried to retain the existing economic system through which they had access to 
state resources. Among all, distorted internal price system persistently sent wrong 
signals about the performance of the national economy. Therefore, the liberalization of 
prices and trade, and decentralization of economic system became a priority. In this 
regard, Kyrgyzstan had followed the ‗big bang‘ approach – as a result, liberalized more 
than 90% of prices in one go. As of January 1992, only state subsidies for essential 
food, coal and public transportation were kept. At that time, the government 
substantially reduced control over enterprises and freed their economic activity on the 
domestic market. However, a sharp decline in production output in 1993 along with 
deteriorating standard of living provoked a series of selective state interventions. In 
1994, as an advice of the development partners the economic liberalization was 
resumed again. In terms of external liberalization, by 1994, the government removed 
almost all limitations on international operations, with the exception of imports of 
tobacco and alcohol (Abazov, 1999b).  
Having inherited a highly centralized economic system, that was poorly reformed 
during Gorbachev‘s perestroika in the late 1980s, the Kyrgyz Republic took firm steps 
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towards rapid decentralization reform (Abraliev et al., 2011, Moldogaziev, 2012). The 
decentralization process began in 1993 when the constitution, adopted in that year, 
established the legal background for local governments which will ‗govern local affairs 
in accordance with the law and at their own initiative.‘ In 1998, an amendment to the 
constitution had separated the local from national property. The Municipal Property 
Ownership Law of 2002 consolidated this effort, followed by the Local Self-government 
and Local Administration Law in 2001, and the Financial and Economic Basis of Local 
Self-government Law in 2003. The amendments to the Basic Principles of the Budget 
Law have authorized local councils to impose local taxes from a list, and within the 
limits, established by the Tax Code of 1996. On the whole, by 2001, the process of 
transferring of all administrative units in Kyrgyzstan to the principles of local self-
governance was formally finished. In 2002, the second phase of decentralization 
reform began with the implementation of the Decentralization of Public Administration 
and Development of Local Self-Government until 2010, approved on December 17, 
2002.   
Macroeconomic Stabilization and Monetary Reforms  
In the early 1990s, macroeconomic destabilization and hyperinflation became the main 
issue for transition countries. Even worse, unlike the Central and Eastern Europe 
countries, the CARs did not have a full-operational banking system and own 
currencies, and thus were not able to effectively regulate their economies. In reality, 
they were intended to use the Russian rouble as a common currency within a single 
economic space of the CIS – especially if Kyrgyzstan continued to receive in-kind of 
subsidies from Moscow. However, severe hyperinflation caused by divergent socio-
economic policies and different levels of liberalization and privatization in the republics 
undermined economic integration within the CIS. Therefore, despite initial intention to 
remain economically integrated with other CIS countries – in fact, keeping the rouble as 
a single currency was the initial IMF‘s advice (Dąbrowski et al., 1995) – the Kyrgyz 
government took a radical measure and introduced its own currency in May 1993. In 
fact, Kyrgyzstan was the first country among the CARs to move away from a single 
monetary zone – in such a short time, the Russian rouble was exchanged for Kyrgyz 
som (KGS) at the rate of 200 to 1 (Abazov, 1999b). Soon after, the som depreciated 
significantly, moreover, mistrust in a new currency resulted in increased demand for 
USD and the appearance of a ‗black market.‘ It should be noted that the government 
successfully dealt with this by establishing free exchange regime. Overall, the 
monetary denomination had a devastating effect on the economy – in particular, it 
disrupted the trade activity with the major CIS partners, such as Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan, which requested payments exclusively in USD, of which Kyrgyzstan 
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experienced a shortage. The transitional crisis in neighbours also cut off consumers 
demand for Kyrgyzstan‘s export – so, a number of industrial companies significantly 
dropped. However, the radical approach coupled with firm steps in mass privatization 
and liberalization led to stabilization of a national currency and economic recovery in 
late 1990s. Since 1995, KGS became one of the stable currencies in the region, in part 
with generous financial assistance of the international organizations and donors. On 
the other hand, it also means that precious funding was used to smooth the transitional 
crisis, which resulted in deep indebtness and new financial crisis later. 
Between 1995-1997, positive growth in the economy reinforced the government‘s 
intention to restrict the monetary supply (Dabrowski and Tomczyska, 2001). Following 
the global financial crisis and the collapse of financial markets in Russia in August 
1998, the Kyrgyz economy suffered a lot – during that period, the som lost about 35% 
of its value to the USD. Furthermore, the public lost confidence in the national currency 
and in the banking system, in particularly after the majority of country‘s largest 
commercial banks was accused in financial fraud activities. In general, the Kyrgyz 
Republic has directed its monetary policy along with the fiscal policy towards better 
governance and public financial management with a specific focus on internal 
resources and social benefits management. The country has observed sequential 
adjustment in the monetary system after the events in 2010. 
Deregulation, Privatization and Structural Reforms  
Since independence, the Kyrgyz Republic has undertaken significant structural reforms 
of its economy (Gürgen, 1999). In 1994, the IMF ranked Kyrgyzstan the fourth among 
the post-Soviet states, just behind the Baltic states, in the speed of economic reform. 
As elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, privatization 
received a high priority in the reform agenda. The goal of privatization has been to 
create new productive enterprises with efficient management system as well as to 
involve the population in the reform program (Abazov, 1999b). The process began in 
December 1991 with the adoption of the Privatization and Denationalization Law and 
creation of the State Property Fund, the agency designed to implement the program. In 
the next year, the parliamentary committee had drafted the concept note which 
reoriented the program toward rapid sale of small enterprises and privatization of state 
monopolies. Residential housing and small firms were mainly transferred to current 
occupiers and owners – in reality, citizens preferred to privatize the residential property 
rather than exchange their vouchers for shares in SOEs. Medium and large-sized 
enterprises were privatized through a voucher scheme and converted into joint-stock 
companies - about 35% of their shares were distributed to workers. Because the sale 
of shares was initially prohibited and the security market was undeveloped, almost no 
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public bidding for corporate shares occurred, and the state maintained significant 
control over the enterprises. The Privatization Law of 1994 has changed this situation 
by allowing competitive cash bidding and auctioning of all enterprise shares among 
individuals.  Ironically, the relative easiness of privatization process in the Kyrgyz 
Republic was due to the lack of valuable assets to be contested. By the end of the 
1990s, about 65% of industrial output came from the private sector. At the same time, 
the bankruptcy rate among small businesses privatized at that period was extremely 
high - in fact, most of them failed to survive in their first two years (Pomfret, 2006). 
Overall, the Kyrgyz Republic made considerable progress in its transition toward a 
market economy in 1990s. The country did fairly well in liberalizing price, trade and 
foreign exchange, privatizing the SOEs, and implementing various structural reforms. 
However, the transition process remains incomplete, particularly in the areas of 
competition policy, governance and enterprise restructuring, and overall infrastructure 
reform. It is clear that a number of major constraints and risks still slows the country‘s 
reforms process causing distortions and inefficiencies in the economy (ADB, 2012): 
 Infrastructure Constraints. Being a landlocked and mountainous, the Kyrgyz 
Republic has a small population dispersed over a vast area, and limited domestic 
market. Hence, the country has to overcome obstacles posed by the geographical 
isolation and difficult topography, which caused the deterioration of infrastructure 
and high infrastructure costs for constructing, rehabilitating, and maintaining roads. 
Recognizing the importance of road rehabilitation and power supply reliability for 
international trade and economic growth, Kyrgyz Republic became a member of 
several regional cooperation programs.  
 Fiscal and Institutional Capacity Constraints to Inclusiveness. Insufficient fiscal and 
institutional capacity resulted in inadequate delivery of socially desirable public 
services. 
 Governance Constraints. With a long legacy of command economy, the democratic 
regime has only recently begun to take hold. However, the transition was slowed 
down in the past decade due to weak governance, difficulties in cross-border 
trading, and undeveloped procurement and public financial management systems. 
 Risks of Frequent Natural Disasters and Other Risks. Every year, the country 
experiences various hazards, which include earthquakes, landslides, floods, and 
glacier lake outbursts. Other risks include regional conflicts, particularly in the 
south, where most of the ethnic minorities reside, which could erupt into social 
unrest, as well as vulnerable exposure to external shocks such as the global 
financial crisis in 2008. 
  191 
The global economic crisis of 1998-1999 has undermined social and economic stability 
in the country. Soon, the post-crisis socio-economic situation in Kyrgyzstan has 
improved, and poverty level has reduced significantly. Evidentially, in FY1996-2000, the 
average economic growth was 5.6% per annum, which was one of the highest in the 
CIS. However, economic performance has not been so robust over the next decade. 
The economic growth in FY2001-2011 fell to 4.3% - in fact, the lowest rate among all of 
the CIS countries. Even worse, in FY2008-2012 the country‘s economic growth hit 
3.2%. At the same time, per capita GDP increased by 20%, average annual inflation 
was 10.5%, and unemployment level officially reached 8.4%. In terms of fiscal 
performance, the budget revenue comprised 26.9% of GDP – that is 4.6% higher in 
comparison with FY2004-2008. On the other hand, the budget expenditures grew by 
24.7% on average and amounted 35.2% of GDP in 2012.The external borrowing for the 
PIP raised to 5.1% of GDP by 2012, and the budget deficit, including PIP, averaged to 
3.4% of GDP (Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2013). Thus, the government 
succeeded in one of the indicators of macroeconomic stability – notably, reduction in 
budget deficit – and managed to take control over the external debt, that slightly 
increased from 41.4% of GDP in 2008 to 46.9% in 2012, but still lower than the 
economic security threshold of 60% of GDP (Table 5.2.3). In short, the government 
admitted that the main reasons for such inconsistent economic results were the 
incompleteness of structural reforms. 
 Table 5.2.3. Kyrgyz Republic: Key Macroeconomic Indicators, 2013-2017 
Indicator Target  
Average annual real GDP growth rate Not less than 7% 
Inflation rate 5%-7% interval (from 2015) 
Budget deficit No more than 5% of GDP 
External public debt Up to 60% of GDP 
Source: IMF (2014) Kyrgyz Republic: Sustainable Development Program (2013-2017) -
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper IMF Country Report No. 14/247. 
Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund. 
High budget deficit in recent years became one of the major concerns for the 
government. Nowadays, debt service comprises the largest part of public expenditures 
– this requires additional cuts in already drained budget expenditures. In order to 
ensure sustainable economic development in the coming years, the government should 
be extremely cautious with external borrowing. Growing informal sector also adversely 
affects the budget deficit – officially, according to the National Bank of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, the unofficial economy accounts for 18% of GDP, in contrast, the 
international agencies report about 30-60% of the GDP (IMF, 2013). Despite 
government efforts, the macroeconomic stability is not yet achieved. Over the medium-
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term, the main priorities of the economic policy will be fiscal consolidation and 
economic growth through reduction in the budget deficit and external debt, even 
distribution of the tax burden, improving business and investment climate, gradual 
integration into the regional economic system, and attracting FDIs to prioritized sectors 
of the economy – mainly, energy, mining, agribusiness, tourism, and transport. 
5.2.2. Global Economic Forces 
As a sovereign state, Kyrgyzstan began the market-based reforms in the early 1990s. 
Together with a volatile external environment, these reforms led to an economic 
recovery during the period of FY1996-1999. The real GDP has grown by around 5.5% 
per annual – this was faster than in most of CIS countries, whose average growth was 
3.1%. After the Russian financial crisis in 1998, the economic growth was slowed down 
to 2.9% in FY1998-1999. At the same time, the current account deficit has widened to 
23% of GDP (Mogilevsky and Omorova, 2011). These have demonstrated that the 
open and small economy of the Kyrgyz Republic is particularly vulnerable to external 
shocks, including the fall-out from the global financial crisis in the trade-partners and 
price volatility in the international food and energy markets, as well as the high level of 
dependence on external aid to cover the budget deficit, which eventually are presented 
as threats in the SWOT-analysis (Table 5.2.4). Fluctuations in gold exports and growing 
domestic demand have further expanded the current account deficit. During FY2000-
2008, the annual deficit averaged to about 3% of GDP, comparing to 9% in FY2008-
2012. Much of this expansion can be attributed to an increase in trade deficit, which, in 
2012, comprised about 60% of GDP – in part due to a fall in exports from the Kumtor 
gold mine, and due to large imports of vehicles and fuel. It is expected that in FY2013-
2014 gold exports will improve, but non-gold exports – such as, electricity, textiles and 
dairy products – unlikely to show a sign of a recovery soon. At the same time, import 
growth remained steady because of extensive imports of materials for the Public 
Investment Programs (PIPs) and consumer goods to meet buoyant domestic demand. 
Hopefully, fiscal adjustment and sectorial spending reallocation would help to narrow 
down the external deficit. Following a slight drop in 2009 – as a result of the global 
financial crisis – the flow of remittances – mainly, from Russia and Kazakhstan – have 
remained in a range of 25-30% of GDP (World Bank, 2014).  
Meantime, the inflows to capital and financial accounts have exceeded the current 
account, leading to an increase in reserves. In recent years, the FDI accounted to only 
9% of GDP – mainly, earnings reinvested from Kumtor god mine, while international 
trade credits and external borrowing – mostly, for large donor-financed infrastructure 
projects – produced additional capital inflows. In that case, the interest amortization 
would remain low due to the concessional terms of the foreign debt. Hence, the 
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government was able to increase the reserves from USD1.7 billion in 2010 to USD2.2 
billion in 2013. Anyway, the high level of external debt led to the robust current account 
deficit – despite high concessionality, the total external debt reached USD6.8 billion in 
2013 or 94% of GDP. Still, this ratio is very high, and with the public debt close to half 
of the gross foreign debt the fiscal sustainability became a main concern. While 
nominally external debt was 44% of GDP in 2013, its present value amounted to 30% 
of GDP. According to the debt sustainability analysis (World Bank, 2014), the external 
debt ratios in the baseline scenario are below the threshold limits for developing 
countries with large inflows of remittances. Yet, stress tests show that the Kyrgyz 
Republic is still vulnerable to major external shocks, especially on the wave of 
significant donors support for the PIP. 
In recent years, the country‘s economy became dependent on Russia, both for trade 
and remittances, which also contributed to the vulnerability. In fact, Russia is an 
important trade partner for Kyrgyzstan, accounting to 15% of exports and 30% of 
imports in 2013. On top of that, in the lack of domestic job supply, Russia provides 
employment opportunities for more than 300,000 Kyrgyz labour migrants, who sent 
back almost 30% of GDP in remittances in 2012. The remittances were used to boost 
consumption – as families used remittances to buy food and consumer goods, the 
government was able to recover PIT foregone due to massive labour migration in taxes 
on consumption – and to push the poverty rates down to 32% in 2008, although it grew 
again to 38% in 2012. They have also helped to cover a rising current account deficit, 
which was 15.3% of GDP in 2012 and it seems will be not reduced in 2013. 
In general, the prospects for economic growth, in the mid-term, are favourable. In 2013, 
the growth returned to 10.5% of GDP, as the Kumtor resumed its normal operations 
after the glacier movement that disrupted production in 2012. Gold output, which has 
doubled in comparison with previous year, contributed to half of the total GDP growth. It 
is projected that the output level remains largely the same, reaching full capacity over 
the next few years. The slowdown in Russia could have negative affect on remittances 
and exports, but increases in wages for private sector and micro-financing for the small 
and medium businesses helped to keep domestic demand at relatively high level and 
stimulate the non-gold economy, which has expanded by 5-6% during the last three 
years. For the next years, due to strong domestic demand, economic growth are 
expected to be in the range of 4-5% per annum. Moreover, there is a possibility that 
China will become an important partner for public sector investments – mostly, 
infrastructure projects in the transportation and energy sector. At the same time, a 
strong focus on a few strategic sectors will help to keep external risks under control, in 
particular from a downturn in key trade-partners and drop in world prices for gold and 
food. Meantime, the fluctuations in the global food market could be translated into high 
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volatility of domestic inflation rate. In fact, today, Kyrgyzstan is a net food importer in 
which food comprised almost 60% of total consumption, but the transit rates for food in 
the country are among the highest in the Caucasus and Central Asia (IMF, 2013). A 
series of global food shocks observed up to 2008 have resulted in inflation rates of 
around 20% in 2008 and 2010. Nowadays, the annual inflation has dropped to 6.6% as 
the global food market relaxed in 2013. Nonetheless, more than average inflation of 
7.2% in 2013 could mean that macroeconomic policies have also contributed to 
inflationary spin.  
The government took advantage of the relative stable ‗pre-crisis‘ years in FY2003-2008 
and strengthened its fiscal position. During this period, revenues consistently increased 
to almost 30% of GDP in 2008, and enhanced consumption due to strong remittance 
flows and new job opportunities drove up the collection of PIT, VAT, and customs 
duties. The growth in tax revenues and incremental increase in budget expenditures by 
2% of GDP helped the government to achieve a balanced budget in 2008 – in 2000, 
the fiscal deficit was over 10% of GDP. However, ad hoc responses to external shocks 
and tragic events in 2010 resulted in an explosion in current expenditures during 
FY2008-2012. First, the government responded in 2009 to the global financial crisis by 
proving a fiscal stimulus and initiatives, mostly through permanent shifts in current 
expenditures towards wages and pensions. Second, following the Rose Revolution in 
2010, and the subsequent turmoil in the south, the government has promised to 
disburse additional benefits to victims affected by the April 2010 events and their 
families – hence, another structural shift in public expenditures. The available 
resources and substantial donors assistance were channelled towards rebuilding the 
Osh and Jalal-Abad – in particular, temporary accommodation for internally displaced, 
stabilizing the financial sector and protecting social expenditures. Finally, in 2012, the 
legacy of global financial crisis and public unrest in 2010 was put into the fiscal 
accounts – one-off payments to compensate the victims of 2010 have placed 
permanent burden on the budget, and additional compensations were negotiated with 
other public groups. Soon, pensions have become an extensively expensive 
component of the budget system, which required an urgent transfer of about 3% of 
GDP to the Social Fund to pay-off pensions on-time. Despite that devastated situation, 
capital spending increased considerably – mostly, through donor-financed technical 
assistance in the energy and transport sectors. In total, public spending raised from 
29.3% in 2008 to 39% of GDP in 2012 – this level is relatively high amongst low and 
lower-middle income countries. However, this trend was not sustained in 2013 – that 
means that strong GDP performance as well as wage freeze for most of the public 
institutions were not able to constrain the growth of budget expenditures in the 
medium-term. This leads to a large budget deficit, which leaves little room to respond 
  195 
to future shocks, and make further fiscal adjustments very difficult. Therefore, the past 
fiscal policies have generated spending commitments that the government is unable to 
fulfil within the current tax regime. Consequently, the structural deficit has increased 
from 0.3% of GDP in 2008 to 4.5% of GDP in 2012. While the government‘s actions 
may have been an adequate response to the changing environment, current fiscal 
trends are proven to be unsustainable. Unless drastic changes are made to fiscal 
policy, the budget deficit may be worsen, especially as the pension spending grows 
every year in line with the inflation, and the energy sector requires continuous 
government attention and support.  
Following a debt crisis in late 1990s, public debt has gradually declined mainly due to 
fiscal consolidation. But, it returned to a past trend in FY2009-2010 with a debt ratio of 
60% of GDP, as the fiscal deficit expanded and GDP stagnated. In recent years, a debt 
burden has fallen to 47% of GDP since Russia, Turkey and Germany agreed to write-
off part of the foreign debt. Still, it is high ratio for a country with relatively limited 
access to external borrowing, a shallow domestic loan market and a large structural 
fiscal imbalance. The recent debt sustainability analysis revealed that the public debt 
critically depends on concessionality of external financing and remains at moderate risk 
of distress – mainly because of its vulnerability and exposure to exogenous shocks of 
the economic growth, remittances, and gold prices (World Bank, 2014).  
The government authorities have started to apply certain measures to reverse a 
growing fiscal deficit. Fiscal accounts have been kept solvent by generous 
concessional external financing and debt write-offs, which are probably will not be an 
option in the future. It is obvious that as revenue-mobilization capacity improves the 
government should rely less on concessional and more on market-based borrowing. 
Robust macroeconomic performance is essential to build credit rating and ensure 
affordable cost of borrowing – indeed, the Kyrgyz Republic has a long-term ambition to 
apply for S&P, or Moore‘s, rating to ease the debt burden. In practice, the fiscal deficit 
was brought down to 4% of GDP in 2013, which in fact much below the 5.3% of GDP in 
2012. Further adjustment is envisaged, at least in the mid-term, with the deficit 
projected to be below 3% of GDP by 2016. However, the success of the 2013 fiscal 
deficit reduction is unlikely to last – the wage freeze on public sector salaries was a 
one-shot measure and could not be maintained for long, especially in the context of 
growing inflation (IMF, 2014b). At 35% of GDP, there is limited potential for the Kyrgyz 
Republic to generate more revenues. Tax reforms, at this point, would help to distribute 
tax burden evenly – currently, it appears that the burden is concentrated on a small 
number of the compliant large-scale taxpayers, and hence provides incentives for them 
to move to informal sector. The existing rates of social insurance contributions also 
added to a high tax burden on official employment, also contributing to informality.  
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In short, the Kyrgyz Republic has limited ability to respond to external shocks, and 
volatility is likely to remain a distinct feature of the Kyrgyz economy, reflecting its heavy 
reliance on gold production, consumption fuelled by remittances, and political 
instability. It is necessary for fiscal policy to effectively exercise its stabilization function 
– that is, to create a room to respond to chance events. However, the ability of fiscal 
policy to mitigate and absorb shocks has been reduced greatly over the last decade 
and fiscal stabilizers should be re-built again. While a more detailed revenue 
assessment is needed, the fiscal policy reform would require systemic measures in 
number of areas. In particular, it requires to consolidate the fiscal position, ensure that 
the fiscal adjustments do not have adverse effect on economic growth, improve quality 
of public services and allocate more resources for new technologies. 
5.2.3. Socio-Demographic Change 
Following the independence in 1991, the country has pursued reforms towards a 
market economy and democratic governance. However, privatization, internal 
liberalization and structural reforms have not yet been able to create sustainable 
livelihoods for the majority of the population (Abazov, 1999a). The current situation on 
labour market is characterized by several tendencies, including change in the structure 
of labour resources in terms of regional and sectoral distributions, lack of employment 
possibilities and high unemployment rates – and hence increase in migration flows, 
both internal and external. There is also tendency for decline in the quality of labour 
force and growth in proportion of low skilled workers, in part due to the deterioration of 
an education system and underdevelopment of the system of vocational education and 
training – thus, the inability of graduates to meet the requirements of the labour market 
(Musabaeva and Kuklin, 2009). Although most of the labour migrants are low skilled 
persons working in agriculture, trade, construction, and services, the drain of educated 
and experienced professionals causes a staffing problem for the Kyrgyz Republic  – 
today, public institutions experience difficulty in finding high-skilled specialists (ICMPD, 
2005, Elebaeva, 2004). 
During the past twenty years, Kyrgyzstan became a major supplier of labour migrants 
to the CIS countries as well as recipient of remittances – just after Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan (Tables 5.2.5-5.2.6). Lack of job opportunities, weak economy and 
widespread poverty force the population to leave the country (Schmidt and 
Sagynbekova, 2008). Regardless of the global economic crisis the massive return of 
the Kyrgyz emigrants has not been observed. The migration trends did not changed 
much for the last decade, especially if the emigrants received an opportunity to get 
citizenship in Russia or Kazakhstan (Figure 5.2.1).  
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In general, the situation in the labour market can be described as the excess of labour 
demand over supply, which leads to increase in unemployment. The recent growth in a 
number of unemployed is due to stagnation of the industrial sector, but also as a result 
of the on-going public administration reform aimed to rationalize a size of the 
government (Musabaeva and Kuklin, 2009). As of January 2012, the labour demand 
has exceeded the supply in about 30 times – in the regions the number is even higher 
(NSC, 2014). Nowadays, the capacity of the public sector to create new jobs is limited, 
so the only way is the private sector development – in particular, the SMEs and sole 
proprietorship (Babetskii et al., 2003). Nevertheless, the level of unemployment, 
calculated based on ILO methodology, has increased from 8.4% in 2009 to 8.6% in 
2011 (NSC, 2012). At the same time, around 160,000 – 170,000 applicants used 
services of the public employment centres to find a job. In 2012, the job centres 
registered more than 95,000 job seekers, including 61,000 of officially registered as 
unemployed (IMF, 2012). Undeveloped ICT system of the labour market, limited 
opportunities for professional development and (re)training of personnel create certain 
obstacles towards balancing the labour supply and demand. The role of the 
government should be to provide the appropriate incentive for the private sector growth 
which could substantially improve its performance in mid-term, as well as measures of 
social protection of officially unemployed. To promote the growth of the small and 
medium businesses, the government already introduced the simplified taxation and 
patents system – mainly, single tax, mandatory and voluntary patenting as part of the 
special tax regimes – along with a direct access to micro-financing. 
The basic factors for increased migration are high rate of unemployment, particularly in 
the regions, lack of proper infrastructure, low level of education and medical services, 
and insufficient social protection (Mogilevsky, 2005, ICMPD, 2011). Therefore, 
population, especially at the working age, decide to leave their place of residence and 
move to more developed regions or abroad. Demographic characteristics of labour 
migrants vary depending on the country of destination, region and specific location. 
The majority of labour migrants are in the demographic group of 20-35 years old – the 
average age is 32 years (Musabaeva and Kuklin, 2009). It is estimated that 20-30% of 
labour migration goes through organized channels (recruitment agencies or the job 
centres), while 70-80% of labour migrants do not use formal intermediaries. As a result, 
a large proportion of migrants work illegally without registration or work permits. So, 
they are often ended up in the informal sector, characterized by harsh conditions, 
minimum rights, and low wages (Marat, 2009, Elebaeva, 2004). As the socio-economic 
effects of migration is so significant, the government attempts several initiatives to 
address the issues of Kyrgyz migrants living abroad – mainly, to protect their legal 
status including social security and health care. 
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Recent events in 2010 have had a considerable impact on already complex migration 
situation in the country. The government tried to tackle the migration phenomenon in 
1990s by adopting labour code, developing state programs and setting an institutional 
mechanism for migration management – in particular, the State Committee for 
Migration and Employment was established in 2005 for policy-making and inter-
institutional coordination of migration policy in Kyrgyzstan. As part of the public 
administration reform, the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Migration replaced this 
committee in November 2009 (ICMPD, 2011). 
It is projected that demand for professions related to the energy sector, including hydro-
energy, mining and tourism industry would be increasing. It was also found that the 
demand for skilled workers on the domestic labour market as well as in CIS countries is 
in many ways similar. The types of professions on demand are mainly related to 
construction, service, retail, and textile industry. And technical professions are also in 
the top list. According to the National Statistical Committee (2012), emigrants from 
Kyrgyzstan worked in construction (46%), trade (36%), agriculture (6%), and in various 
service industries (3%). Given that the Kyrgyz Republic also experiences a lack of 
high-qualified specialists, this means that the country will compete for the same 
categories of labour force. It is obvious that in this battle Kyrgyzstan is losing due to 
huge differences in the wages and salaries. Skilled workers in Kyrgyzstan can earn an 
average salary in the range of USD 100-250 – for example, in 2013, the average salary 
was KGS 11,340.7 or USD 230 (Table 5.2.7) – while Kazakhstan and Russia can offer 
much more.  
Internal Migration 
Traditionally, there are at least two directions of internal migration within the country – 
that is, from southern regions to the north (Chui and Issyk-Kul provinces), and from 
rural and remote areas to the big cities (Bishkek, Osh and Jalal-Abad). Apparently, one 
of the main reasons of internal migration is ineffective land policy. In the past, land 
reform failed to promote the efficient distribution of land and land security, as well as 
the development of regional economy, which heavily relies on agriculture. Even worse, 
when carrying out the land policy, the government did not consider an opportunity to 
cooperate with agribusinesses – which produce and process the majority of agricultural 
products – with no in-depth legal, economic, and environmental analysis of the impact 
of the reform on land distribution. This resulted in considerable depopulation of the 
remote regions in Kyrgyzstan, which, in turn, will lead to imbalanced regional 
development, erosion of the tax base for local taxes, reduction of revenue-generating 
capacity of the local budgets and overload of the inter-budget transfer system – hence, 
massive failure of regional development policies and fiscal decentralization reform. In 
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2005, internal migration became more intense – and it is still on the move, which 
promotes further regional differentials (Table 5.2.8). After Tulip Revolution in 2005, the 
protestors from the south, who came to Bishkek to ouster the regime of President 
Akaev, quickly settled down nearby the capital by illegally acquiring the land – often 
agricultural land and recreational parks – they claimed the land as a reward for their 
participation in the revolution and as a promise for better life. Obviously, this creates a 
tension between the new residents and local farmers. As in such short time, the 
newcomers already built the residential property on the acquired allotments, the city 
council founded it impossible to force them to leave. As a result, the local government 
faced a problem to urgently manage and legalize the new property, as well as to 
provide infrastructure to growing mini-districts in the outskirt of Bishkek – not to 
mention the drastic expansion of the total population in Bishkek along with growth in 
unemployment and criminal rates. There were also a series of attempts to take-over 
the land to resell it later – thus, the government had to impose a moratorium on any 
land transactions, which substantially disturbed the real estate market and reduced the 
proceeds from the registration fees and property taxes. 
Internal migration trends were also affected by the tragic events in June 2010 when 
thousands of residents in the south became internally displaced. Although many of 
them have returned and received a monetary compensation to rebuild their places of 
permanent residence – mainly, through special emergency fund and international 
assistance programs – it is still too early to make any conclusions about the effect of 
these chance events on labour migration as well as on demographic composition and 
socio-economic development in the country (ICMPD, 2011). To promote the economic 
growth, the government also introduced the tax holidays and loans relief for businesses 
badly affected during the uprising in April 2010 – the taxpayers had to provide direct 
evidence to the special state committee that the losses occurred due to this event. The 
other reason for such support was the desire to retain companies in Kyrgyzstan and 
prevent them from moving away to more politically and economically stable 
neighbourhood – for instance, Kazakhstan has a long-way ambition to become the 
wholesale transit-hub for China and does whatever possible to attract more traders 
from nearby countries (Tax Expert 5, Taxpayers 5, 6, Academic 2). Despite negative 
forecast, the STS did actually meet the tax collection target in that year as a result of 
steady economic growth and better economic performance. These initiatives have 
showed that the government and business community are ready to constructive 
dialogue for benefits of both of them. Today, the members of civil society actively 
participate in the public advisory boards and contribute to the sessions of the business 
and investments council – but still the input is dominated by tax consultants and 
business associations, the most powerful business advocacy groups in tax affairs. It 
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also could be a next step towards developing national identity. These chance events 
stimulated public, and ethnic, awareness and, despite the menace of conflicts, it could 
have a positive impact on public consolidation and state-building. 
Since 2010, the government reviewed and made changes to the recent migration policy 
which will be more focused on the regional development (Government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, 2013, IMF, 2014b). In particular, the migration management program has 
been redesigned to support the agricultural sector and to encourage the growth of 
SMEs as well as ‗social jobs‘ in rural and remote areas. The program would also deal 
with the most serious employment problems in the regions. In this regard, to develop 
remote regions where income levels are relatively low and labour migration is high, the 
authorities proposed to decrease the CIT rate for newly opened businesses. If 
accepted, the tax rate for CIT will be temporary reduced for the period of five years – 
that is, 2% until 2015, 4% until 2017, and 5% until 2019. Given that lower CIT rates will 
be applied to start-up companies only, the STS did not expect any direct revenue 
losses. However, potentially tax revenues could be lost in the future if the SMEs would 
be started anyway, in spite of this initiative (IMF, 2013). In addition, as any tax initiative, 
reduced CIT rate could open new ‗routes‘ for evasion – hence, administrative and 
compliance costs could increase dramatically. Most commonly, businesses tend to use 
the ‗Transfer Pricing‘ to minimize their tax liability by moving subsidiary, or affiliated, 
companies to the remote regions where the tax rates are lower and the tax regime, in 
general, is more beneficial (Abdumanapova, 2012). So, as reflected in the tax code, the 
tax officers are allowed to revise taxpayers‘ pricing if they have a concern that the 
business transactions are conducted at non-market prices – mainly, barter or internal 
sale between related parties. For this reason, the STS requires the corporate taxpayers 
to submit the consolidated financial statements to the respective tax offices (Tax Officer 
10). 
5.3. Political System 
Pollitt and Bouckaert go to the heart of the matter when they make the point that it is 
not possible to review public management reform without taking into account country‘s 
political, administrative and institutional arrangements. As countries may well combine 
these elements in very different ways, these differences can significantly influence the 
choice and implementation of reform measures. Thus, the political system does play a 
highly important role in shaping a reform agenda. New Management Ideas together 
with Pressure from Citizens have a large impact on Party Political Ideas. As shall be 
seen at the end of this part, the Elite Decision-Making is of particular importance for 
Central Asia, where historically the clan politics and regional networking rule. 
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5.3.1. New Management Ideas 
The key constraint to successful tax reform lay in the limited policy ideas available to 
the government in designing and implementing reform package. In this matter, the New 
Management Ideas refer to the depth, breadth and suitability of the menu of ideas, 
which shape the design and implementation of reform initiatives. Lawson (2012: 72) 
also describes it as ‗policy space‘ that is a ‗range of ideas, which is open for 
consideration by governments wanting to initiate or deepen PFM reforms.‘ In many 
developing countries, the degree of familiarity of politicians and government officials 
with the models and approaches to PFM reform in general, and tax reform in particular, 
is relatively limited. Often, such countries turn to the development partners and their 
experts for guidance over a more appropriate type of reform models, which they might 
consider. It is important to mention, at this point, that even today tax reform is a 
relatively under-researched topic. The global community is still learning what types of 
reforms produce better results in different contexts. Besides, the initial models and 
approaches for public expenditure and revenue administration reforms, described in 
Chapter 2, were developed in 1990s, when the subject was in many ways unexplored.  
Most commonly to all post-Soviet country was the fact that after unexpected 
independence the government authorities were presented with a limited range of 
options by their development partners – and they were not particularly encouraged to 
discuss or to share more widely on the choice of reform models. Apparently, there were 
neither financial nor political factors that determined the choice of reform model – as 
simply as a lack of adequate ideas at that critical point of time. 
A tendency to seeking for the ‗best practice‘ models and apply them indiscriminately 
without any concerns for contextual differences and historical background was also 
part of the problem. This tendency of direct policy transfer was not only prevalent within 
the development agencies – political leaders and senior government officials in the 
developing countries had seen these models as what they called the ‗benchmark‘ and 
deliberately persisted on importing them directly to their own countries. Too often, the 
results of the reform were not as expected as the models applied were designed for 
developed and stable economies. In this regard, Fyson (2009: 12) also points out that 
‗donor-funded consultants, as the perceived legitimate holders of best practices in the 
implementation of government financial management systems, were given free reign in 
the determination of how to strengthen accountability in government finances, often to 
the detriment of government participation and understanding.‘ In Kyrgyzstan, the 
government generally valued the external advice it received since early 1990s, along 
with substantial external funding. However, certain reform ideas and directions, which 
continued to be pursued over longer periods, were obviously inappropriate or 
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irrelevant. For example, the ADB‘s tax administration project was based on a 
technology-driven model, which gave insufficient attention to the institutional capacity 
building and staff training needs, and to change management issues. As a result, two 
supplemental TAs were added to the main project. On the whole, insufficient 
knowledge of country context and a lack of experience in tax reform in transition 
economies on behalf of both the development agencies and the government authorities 
clearly played a crucial role in the persistent application of inappropriate reform models 
and decisions, as well as political constraints and institutional limitations. In reality, all 
this seems very tricky as the project coordinators might have their reputations seriously 
damaged by admitting to mistakes, and the external consultants implementing the 
project might bear financial loss. And there also could be additional costs for the 
government from losing the potential investments. Thus, the fundamental changes in 
the design of reform programs should be introduced slow, and donor should be passion 
in promoting reforms. 
Weaknesses in supervision and peer review processes for reform projects could be 
another part of the problem. It should be noted that the framework for the design of tax 
reform as part of PFM reforms is significantly different to the TA projects. For instance, 
the quality assurance process for the most of the standard projects could be 
undertaken at the design stage – hence, this allows the development agencies to 
conduct detailed ‗front-loaded‘ appraisal of project design from the outset. In contrast, 
the PFM reform projects cannot be developed to a high level of detail at that stage as 
they usually rely on preliminary diagnostic assessment done during the inception 
phase. They would also require an adaptive design. Consequently, the peer review for 
PFM reforms – which would need substantial coordination among international partners 
as well as harmonization of their efforts – and consultancy with the government is more 
likely to be effective during project‘s inception. It means that this stage should be more 
continuous and extensive than for other projects, and the development partners should 
be ready to provide this type of support. In the same way, drawbacks in monitoring and 
review processes in the countries-recipients do not allow to identify design flaws and 
promptly correct them. To enhance the implementation mechanism, the special 
steering committee was established in the State Tax Service – the main agent of the 
tax administration reform in Kyrgyzstan – for coordination and monitoring of the reform 
process and more effective learning during implementation – in particular, the 
committee oversaw the functional reorganization of the STS, as well as business 
reengineering of main operations and institutional capacity-building in 2010. 
Overall, it is evidential that capacities for design and supervision of the tax reforms 
within governments, and development agencies, have been improving since early 
1990s – although, more research is still needed. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
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success of tax policy and administration reforms in the developing and transition 
countries was to such extent undermined by the selection of inappropriate reform 
models should not be taken as a coincidence, rather as a warning trend. New 
management ideas have historically had a significant influence on the outcomes of 
reforms and it seems true that they are likely to continue to be of such great 
importance. 
5.3.2. Pressure from Citizens  
After independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan has transformed from one of the poorest 
republics in the Soviet Union to one of the liberal and democratic regimes in the Central 
Asia, with strong economic growth in the late 1990s, multi-parties system and the rapid 
development of civil society organizations (CSOs) heavily relied on external funding. 
Independence brought an opportunity to conceptualize the role of civil society in 
Kyrgyzstan (Musakojoev, 1997: 28-30). Donor‘s aid inflows flooded the country aimed 
to support the growth of CSOs along with a dominant Western neo-liberal philosophy 
(World Bank, 2003, Jailobaeva, 2011). And capacity-building process began with 
discussions about the definition and functions of civil society organizations32 (World 
Bank, 2007a). So this period was marked by mushrooming of various non-government 
organizations (NGOs), which were in general dependent on external support 
(Rothermel, 2014). However, only those of them based in Bishkek or with personal ties 
with the authorities had an access to the power. The Public Associations Law of 1991 
allowed citizens to create associations according to common interests. In 1996, this law 
was replaced by the Civil Code. Soon, the Non-Commercial Organizations Law of 1999 
clearly defined the scope and the types of non-profit organizations, their management 
structure, and financial reporting requirements (World Bank, 2013a). However, the lack 
of tax exemptions and deductions against earned income remains a weakness of NGO 
legislation. Legally, NGOs can be engaged in economic activity, but have to pay the 
same CIT as commercial enterprises. Only NGOs certified by the State Tax Service as 
a non-profit organization are exempt from income taxation but very few of them can 
meet the strict requirements to qualify (World Bank, 2013a). In part this may be due to 
confusion between the private sector and NGOs, which have been defined not very 
clear. 
In early 2000s, NGOs gradually strengthen their position in the society and started to 
                                                 
32
 The World Bank has adopted a definition of civil society developed by leading research centers as ‗the 
term civil society to refer to the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have 
a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on 
ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations 
(CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based 
organizations, professional associations, and foundations.‘ 
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build up a link with the state. The legal environment was supportive and CSOs 
successfully performed several programs together with the government. In 2001, the 
Public Council on NGO Affairs was established within the President‘s Office (World 
Bank, 2003). At that time, NGOs were active in a range of sectors, including economic 
activities, social protection, promotion of democracy and human rights. In particularly, 
there were cases of successful collaboration between NGOs and the local 
governments focused on the economic and social aspects – interestingly, one of the 
objectives of these projects was to spread a word and familiarize local communities 
with local taxes. However, initial influx of external funding began to fade by the mid-
2000s – it seems that it was time for NGOs to move to self-financing of their needs or 
the results achieved did not meet expectations of donors. Altogether, donors became 
more reluctant to support political NGOs, and aid flow switched towards government 
programs or watchdogs. In addition, donors reduced funding for organizational 
development and staff training, as well as a number of small grant programs – in 2006, 
from thousand registered NGOs, only about 500 were active and sustainable (World 
Bank, 2003).  
During the last decade the country went through two major chance events. After Tulip 
Revolution in 2005, hopes for political change were undermined by the monopolization 
of power by the ‗ruling family,‘ and a series of attempts were made to bring out the bill 
that will give the government discretionary power to close down NGOs, prevent them 
from participating in ‗political activities,‘ prohibit external funding and impose strict 
registration requirements on foreign NGOs. Nevertheless, the proposal was rejected at 
that time. Due to rising poverty and inequality as well as to weak and inefficient 
governance, the President Bakiev was force to leave the country in April 2010. Later, in 
June, following popular protests in Bishkek, ethnic violence in the south turned to a 
bloody event. Since then the situation has calmed down, with a peaceful presidential 
elections and legitimate regime transition of parliamentary republic in 2011. 
Consequently, the state-civil society relations also improved, especially for NGOs 
making substantial inputs into the revision of the constitution, the electoral law, judicial 
reform, and tax policy reform. Following the violence in 2010, there was an uprising of 
NGOs – new organizations emerged to provide the humanitarian aid to the internally 
displaced and build temporary accommodation for those who returned – and more 
funding became available for conflict-prevention programs (World Bank, 2013a). In 
total, more than 17,000 public associations and foundations were registered as of 
January 1, 2014 (Table 5.3.1). This may represent a pivotal point in civil society 
development in Kyrgyzstan, when more locally embedded organizations were created 
(World Bank, 2003, Jailobaeva, 2011).  A new constitution of 2010 gave the civil society 
more freedom. The Public Advisory Councils (PACs) were established in the parliament 
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committees as well as in most ministries and executive agencies, permitting improved 
monitoring and advocacy by NGOs, and providing the potential for more citizen 
participation and hence greater transparency and public accountability (Mikhalev and 
Heinrich, 1999).  
Public Advisory Councils  
Traditionally, multi-party system and fair elections are viewed as the primary means of 
public oversight for holding government accountable. However, election process has 
flaws especially during the regime transition from authoritarian state, when the balance 
of power is highly unstable and the change events make the elections episodic. A 
response to such deficit of democracy has been the creation of popular institutions that 
will influence policy-making, monitor government performance and help to reshape 
policies and procedures – the Public Advisory Councils (PACs) 33  attached as 
watchdogs to the country‘s ministries and executive agencies. After the April events in 
2010, in order to modernize the bureaucratic system inherited from the president 
Bakiev, the interim president Roza Otunbaeva established public monitoring bodies – 
first as pilot for ten key ministries and then for all government agencies. Initially, the 
PACs were designed to review the operations of public institutions and provide 
recommendations for improving their efficiency and transparency, eliminating 
favouritism in hiring practices, and reducing tribalism and corruption. It means that, as 
a civil society institution, these councils were limited only to recommending changes in 
bureaucratic practices. Thus, their assumed power over the ministries was to expose 
the misperformance through the mass media or to collaborate with sympathetic chief 
executives (Huskey, 2013). In general, the World Bank refers to them as institutions of 
diagonal accountability, which supplement traditional forms of vertical and horizontal 
accountability. 
In fall of 2010, the PACs began their activities on the wave of post-revolutionary 
enthusiasm. The members had regular meetings and produced progress reports for 
designated ministries and agencies – in fact, some of them managed to achieve very 
impressive results (Мoldogazieva et al., 2014). In 2011, the PAC was formed for the 
State Tax Service (STS) to ensure participation of citizens in managing tax reform, to 
carry out public control over STS‘s activities, to establish effective dialogue between tax 
authorities and citizens, to consider public opinion in formulating and implementing tax 
policy, and finally to effectively tackle corruption in tax offices. The STS welcomed the 
member of public associations – mainly, the chamber of tax consultants and business 
                                                 
33
 Public advisory councils are one form of interaction and cooperation of the public with ministries, state 
committees and administrative institutions. Establishment of the public councils does not exclude or limit 
other forms of interaction and cooperation as well as maintaining public monitoring over their 
performance. http://ons.kg/site/index.php  
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associations – as representatives of the civil society in the council.  
Meantime, the initial stage in the PAC‘s formation finished with the election of a new 
president, Almazbek Atambaev, in October 2011. Early evidence suggested that for a 
time being he was going to replace these oversight institutions by more traditional, and 
old-style, Committees for Public Control, but apparently became indifferent toward the 
PACs. This produced strong signal to those government officials and council members 
who were cautious in supporting this robust form of public engagement. So, when the 
two-year mandate of the PAC‘s members was about to expire in mid-2012, the future of 
the whole institution was uncertain (Huskey, 2013). In this situation, the PAC‘s activists 
set up Coordinating Council in order to strengthen communications with the media 
outlets, as well as to launch an advocacy campaign for the PACs. By June 2013, 
together with other supporters, they convinced the president Atambaev to issue a 
decree that extended their mandates till the end of that year. Soon, the Jogorku 
Kenesh prepared a new law on the PACs, but instead of signing the president returned 
the proposed bill to the parliament for further revisions.  
Although originally the leaders of civil society together with government officials 
selected up to 25 members for each council, by 2012 most PACs ended up with no 
more than 12-18 active members. It was claimed that despite initial motives to join the 
board – such as, better state through introduction of ‗best practices‘ of good 
governance, the networking and socializing opportunities for younger members, or 
access to inside information and financial benefits for rent-seekers – only patriotic and 
devoted members remained on such voluntary and unpaid positions.  Within such small 
cohort, only several active members – usually including the chair – played a decisive 
role in defining the objectives and direction of the advisory council. Unsurprisingly, 
dynamics of personal relations within such small group did matter. It was evidential that 
where the relationship was close and consensus-based the PAC mostly succeeded in 
providing helpful advices to the executive agencies, while the lack of a vibrant core of 
activists and different behavioural clusters among the members contributed to an 
opposite results – not to mention a diverse institutional landscape within the network of 
PACs (Tax Consultant 4). In the same way, there was a claim that their members do not 
represent the broader population. Indeed, in fact, many of them were residents of 
Bishkek with higher education and extensive professional experience, but with diverse 
employment background ranging from the business, academics or non-profits. 
Therefore, social, geographic, and educational, differences with the majority of the 
country's population is the main weakness of these CSOs – also, the work of the PACs 
is still unknown to ordinary citizens. Despite the mix of personalities in an individual 
council, its ability to hold a ministry or an executive agency accountable depended on 
the receptiveness of particular minister of chief executive to cooperate with the PAC 
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(Мoldogazieva et al., 2014). For example, the former head of the State Tax Service 
worked closely with the PAC to liberalize the tax code and modernize the agency. In 
fact, this government official was so impressed that he asked to create a similar one for 
the new agency he was assigned for in 2013 (Tax Consultant 3). 
As the PACs are self-governing bodies, which elect their members and made decisions 
based on majority vote, there were observed widely divergent results across the 
country's 33 PACs. Given its limited official authority and lack of funding, the PAC 
system produced an impressive record of achievement over a short period of time. The 
success story is even remarkable because of the severe political crisis due to transition 
to the new parliamentary regime, instability of government system and thus frequent 
change in top management of the public institutions - it became common for ministers 
or agency chair to leave the office in less than a year. The experiment in Kyrgyzstan 
showed that PACs can be a useful instrument for enhancing the accountability of the 
state and legitimizing it to society, and for reducing opportunities for corruption by 
improving transparency in governance, as well as an important training platform for 
rising a next generation of politico-administrative elite. 
Chamber of Tax Consultants  
One lesson from tax reform experience in developing economies is that NGOs can play 
an important role in designing and implementing tax reform program. In this regard, the 
creation of an association of tax consultants, accountants, and auditors is highly 
recommended for countries in transition, because this public institution contributes not 
only to minimizing tax burden within the existing legal framework but also serves as a 
guarantee to taxpayers that their interests are being protected against arbitrary tax 
procedures, corruption, and unjustified claims.  
Immediately after its foundation in early 1998, the Chamber of Tax Consultants (CTC)34 
started organizing informative roundtables for members of the Parliament to enhance 
awareness among the legislators about the needs for a new profession, the tax 
consultancy. As a result, the Tax Consultants Law has successfully passed the 
parliamentary approval on April 7, 1999. The introduction of an independent profession 
such as tax consultants is a major challenge to an existing tax system, as it often raises 
reservations amongst tax administration as well as amongst existing professions. The 
purpose of this public association is to promote tax legislation and literacy among 
taxpayers, and enhance a trustful cooperation between the tax administration and 
taxpayers which could lead to a substantial reduction in compliance and administrative 
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 The chamber of tax consultants is a public association created on January 5, 1998. The mission is to 
balance the interests of taxpayers and the government, and to develop and promote the profession of 
tax consultancy. http://pnk.kg/index.php  
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costs. The main advantage of the tax consultancy is that advices delivered by tax 
consultants are more reliable, full of expertise and competence in legal matters. 
Additionally, the results of tax consulting may allude to loopholes in the existing tax acts 
and thus help in the identification of the next tax reform targets. 
As most NGOs are membership-based, the members of CTC also have to pay a 
monthly fee in an equivalent of one minimal income index – that is KGS100 or USD2.5. 
The other important source of revenue is tax consulting. During the face-to-face or 
phone sessions, tax consultants provide the qualified professional assistance to both 
corporate and individual taxpayers in accurate estimation of their tax liabilities in 
accordance with the current tax laws as well as represent them in tax offices and 
courts. In 2008, the new tax code introduced the concept of tax representatives as an 
intermediary between the taxpayers and the tax administration allowing the members 
of professional associations and consultant firms to act on behalf of a taxpayer. The 
chamber also began publishing a journal ‗Taxes and Law‘ in March 2001 to address 
critical issues of taxation. The chamber also works closely with the STS and organizes 
training seminars for tax officials. The Chair of CTC‘s Board admitted the growing 
competence of the tax inspectors as majority of them successfully passed the 
comprehensive exams at the end of the training program (Tax Consultant 1). However, 
due to close cooperation with the tax agency and regular involvement in tax-related 
projects, the CTC has been criticized for becoming more pro-governmental. The other 
argument, mentioned during interviews with the taxpayers and business associations, 
is that the same small group of highly professional tax experts provides the same 
package of ideas and recommendations to the government and international 
development partners (Tax Consultants 2, 5, 6, Taxpayer 1). On the other hand, it 
seems that the business community by itself lacks of capacity and expertise to propose 
a set of comprehensive measures for fundamental tax reform – rather incremental 
changes in particular areas of interest.  
Coalition for Fair Taxation and National Alliance of Business Associations 
Advocacy and political lobbying also became an important part of CTC‘s activities. 
According to a survey conducted by the Bishkek Business Club (BBC)36 in 2004, the 
tax system and its administration have been ranked as the second largest barrier for 
doing business in Kyrgyzstan, just after corruption. The respondents (300 
businessmen) referred to this as ‗taxation pressure,‘ underpinning the complexity and 
inconsistency in tax laws. At that time, the Government was already aware of 
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 Bishkek Business Club is a public association formed in August 2002 and registered as a non-profit, 
non-governmental organization. http://www.bdk.kg/  International Business Council 
http://www.eng.ibc.kg/index.php/about-ibc/partners/bishkek-business-club  
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numerous contradictions in the tax code adopted in 1996 and acknowledged the 
necessity for its revision. The President Akaev signed a decree about further tax 
reforms in January 2004, and established a working group composed of the 
governmental and other stakeholders on elaboration of a new version of the tax code 
with as much as possible input from the business-associations and NGOs. It was an 
unprecedented decision of the political leader to invite the civil society in public 
discussion of important issues and to promote an independent and transparent review 
of tax policy. During the next four years, the Chamber of Tax Consultants actively 
participated in discussion about proposed changes to the tax code as part of tax policy 
reform agenda. Despite that effort, by and large, only few representatives from 
business and civil community have been included into the working group, so any 
suggestions from the private sector was mitigated. In fact, the government insisted on 
having more conservative version of the code with the amount of articles doubled from 
200 to 400 over time. As previously agreed, the VAT rate was reduced by 12%, but 
without any forms of tax incentives due to risk of unforeseen losses in tax revenue and 
absence of any substitutes. In response to such an ‗anti-business‘ code imposed by the 
government, the CTC urgently called for uniting all of its members and corporate 
partners behind an advocacy coalition. In 2006, it launched the Coalition for Fair 
Taxation, an organization of 23 businesses, to produce an alternative legal draft 
adapted to the needs of the business community. Although effort was already done to 
establish a constructive dialogue between the government and the business leaders – 
which eventually strengthened their capacity for advocacy – it became obvious that 
larger-scale protests would have greater impact, especially as was shown after the 
ouster of President Akaev in 2005. Taking the Coalition for Fair Taxation as a core, the 
Bishkek Business Club in partnership with the Center for International Private 
Enterprise (CIPE)37 set up the National Alliance of Business Associations (NABA)38 in 
2007 – the largest grassroots coalition advocating for market reform and democratic 
governance in Kyrgyzstan. The business alliance serves as a platform to enhance civil 
society participation in policy-making and to mobilize public support for a wider set of 
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 The Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) is one of the four core institutes of the National 
Endowment for Democracy. Since 1983, CIPE strengthens democracy around the globe through private 
enterprise and market-oriented reform. The key program areas include anticorruption, advocacy, 
business associations, corporate governance, democratic governance, access to information, the 
informal sector and property rights, and women and youth. http://www.cipe.org/about/overview-history  
 
38
 NABA‘s initiative group includes the Bishkek Business Club, the Chamber of Tax Consultants, Congress 
of Business-Associations, the American Chamber of Commerce, the Association of Market, Retail, and 
Service Sectors of Kyrgyzstan, the Association of Expediters of the KR, Trade Union of Entrepreneurs 
TRK  ‗DORDOI,‘  Women‘s Entrepreneur Support Association (WESA), Communication Statement 
Association, Association of Flow Properties, Tourist Trade Association of Silk Road, Association of Light 
Industry ‗Legprom,‘ Union of Entrepreneurs from Karakol city, Association of Customs Brokers, Agro-
Businessmen Association of Kyrgyzstan, Realtors‘ Association, Association of Transport Operators, 
Naryn Association of Agro-Business and Trades, Issyk-Kul Business Club, Association of Micro-Finance 
Organizations. http://naba.org.kg  
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reform priorities – mainly the tax code reform, the introduction of a moratorium on 
inspections of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and an anti-raiding policy 
to protect business property against hostile takeovers. Ultimately, the sheer number of 
business voices calling for legislative reform made it difficult for the government to turn 
down their recommendations.  
As soon as the NABA‘s members have accepted the so-called CTC‘s Tax Code at the 
First Annual Forum in November 2007, the tax proposal was introduced to the 
legislative process. The second step was the launching of an advocacy campaign to 
gain a broader support by the parliament members through direct communication with 
selected politicians and members of the Budget Committee, and by extending media 
outreach in support of the pro-business tax code. To the point when the government 
realized that the CTC‘s proposal could actually receive the majority of votes, the new 
working group was already in place delivering the compromised proposal. Both sides – 
the government and business community – have finally reached a consensus on the 
steps that should be taken to make a new code as ‗taxpayer-friendly‘ as possible. Next, 
the revised proposal was brought to open debate by all counterparts ready for ground-
breaking changes in the approaches and principles of taxation. It was the first ever 
case in the post-Soviet history when the civic institutions forced the government to 
replace its blueprint by more liberal version. This fact was widely appreciated in other 
CIS states, especially by public associations and partner chambers with which the 
Kyrgyz Chamber of Tax Consultants closely works with.  
Business Development and Investments Council 
The Business Development and Investments Council (BDIC) 39 was established in 2007 
with the support of the EBRD to serve as an effective and constant platform for 
dialogue between the government and the business community – the council members 
are business associations, government agencies, and international organizations. The 
council chaired by the prime-minister meets once a quarter to discuss the most actual 
issues initiated by the businesses, such as improvement of regulatory and licensing 
procedures, tax and customs, protection of property rights, and provision of public 
services, and provides recommendations for these  issues (Koichumanov et al., 2014) . 
In December 2010, BBC together with NABA published a white paper A Guide to 
Amending Tax Legislation, which consisted of legislative analysis, policy 
                                                 
39
 The Business Development and Investments Council is a consultative body set up by the government 
for developing and preparing recommendations regarding a unified policy for improving the business 
environment and investment climate, attracting investments into the social and economic development 
and providing the effective cooperation between the government agencies, business-associations and 
international partners (IG Resolution #149, August 5, 2010). This council replaced the previous 
Coordination Council created by the Interim Government (IG) of the President Otunbaeva just after the 
tragic events in April 2010 (IG Decree #300, April 30, 2010). http://investmentcouncil.kg/index.php/en/  
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recommendations for tax reform, and drafts of amendments to optimize the tax laws. 
Beforehand that event, the Chair of the CTC‘s Board, who was also elected as the 
Head of the NABA‘s Secretariat at that time, presented their recommendations to the 
council during a series of high-level meetings in 2010. At the council‘s meeting in 
August 2010, the CTC‘s Chair pointed out on necessity to transfer the administration of 
social insurance contributions from the SF to the STS to ensure the accountability and 
transparency of collection process. The timeline of this transfer – the second half of 
2012 – has been confirmed upon by executive agencies and approved by the 
Presidential Decree of August 19, 2010. But there were technical problems in data 
transfer because of differences in recording tax revenues and insurance contributions. 
In particular, the Social Fund and the State Tax Service used incomparable MIS that 
made it is impossible to integrate their databases. Also, the methodology for 
determining average salary which is a basis for calculation of insurance contributions 
and PIT should be improved. The business community seems it is unfair to compare 
the income generated in small businesses with such industries as finance and mining. 
As of July 2010, the regulatory wages have been officially increased in order to meet 
the outrageous social expenditures raised because of dramatic events in April and 
June. Given the complex situation in the country, the CTC‘s Chair claimed that is not a 
good time to increase any mandatory payments and contributions as this is a major 
factor for the existence of the informal economy. In due time, the Ministry of Economic 
Regulation had to prepare the proposals to expand the categories of taxpayers eligible 
for the special tax regimes (simplified taxation and patent system), and develop a 
strategy for fiscal policy with regards to SMEs in order to ease tax burden and to 
ensure stability, predictability and consistency in planning and carrying on the tax 
policy. Another issues discussed in November 2010 were the creation of tax (arbitrage) 
court and liberalization (decriminalization) of the penalty system for economic crimes. 
In summary, given the relatively passive attitudes of citizens towards taxation issues, it 
is not surprising that advocacy work by civil society organizations in support of stronger 
tax systems has limited influence on the pace and content of tax reforms. Perhaps the 
best illustration of the minimal influence of CSOs as a whole is the fact that in the most 
recent PEFA assessments the Kyrgyz Republic was not scored higher than a ‗C‘ on 
public access to fiscal information (PEFA, 2009). It seems that the lack of influence 
derives partly from the limited expertise of the CSOs working on tax policy issues, as 
well as from a lack of experience in advocacy work of the relevant professional 
associations. This does not mean that their work on such issues has been fruitless. 
Quite in opposite, the CTC and the Bishkek Business Club did an impressive work in 
political lobbying of a more liberal tax code in 2007 and actively participate in the STS‘s 
PAC. Definitely, this may help to create greater public awareness on tax issues and a 
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strong environment for citizens to challenge the tax service to be more efficient, but it 
must be a long-term objective. It means that pressure of citizens to improve tax system 
will not significantly affect the outcomes of tax reforms in the short to medium term. 
Meanwhile, more targeted campaigns on specific issues – such as tax amnesty and 
income legalization, electronic filing of tax reports and tax arbitrage court – may help to 
obtain faster results and thus to strengthen attitudes of citizens towards transparency 
and accountability. Overall, public professional associations were found to be relatively 
influential in generating constructive feedback and promoting peer-to-peer learning on 
tax reform issues. As the scope of influence of such CSOs could be expanded further 
by more substantial support, then clearly external funding and advice by development 
partners would be of benefit – however, an excessive funding could undermine their 
effectiveness (Lawson, 2012). It should also be mentioned that there is a range of 
societal factors that could decrease the ability of citizens and the civil society 
organizations to hold the government to account through the mechanisms of advocacy, 
media campaign and protest. 
5.3.3.  Party Political Ideas  
A multi-party system may be a prerequisite for a strong political system and democratic 
society, but this is not a case for Kyrgyzstan – the ‗multi-party‘ game is appealing only 
to local clans, elite groups and regional networks seeking for more power. It is a 
paradox of the Kyrgyz political system – there are too many political parties in the 
country, but there is no party diversity. In fact, it is ‗an imitation of democratic 
institutions and a replacement of the concepts connected with parliamentarianism, the 
electorate and civil society‘ (Bugazov, 2013: 52).  
Before the parliamentary elections in 2010, the Central Election Committee (CEC) 
registered 29 political parties. With so many of them, the political parties did not make a 
choice toward fundamentally different models of political structure – so, the assortment 
of party political ideas is quite simple. Moreover, despite the abundance of parties 
‗programs‘ and sound promises, they tend to duplicate each other, providing a similar 
package of broad socio-economic reforms and positioning themselves as the most 
appropriate candidates – they all stand for the interests of the general public, 
guarantee no return to the past, and that they will do their best in combating tribalism, 
nepotism, and corruption. Unsurprisingly, there is no place for specific reforms, in 
particular tax reform, in such a broad claim. This makes it is a difficult task to conduct 
comprehensive document analysis, because the content of their political programs and 
policy papers is pretty much the same – ideally, they should be more or less 
ideologically charged (Appendix B). The only difference between them is the access of 
their charismatic leaders to the levers of real power in Kyrgyzstan. And the greater the 
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gap, the greater desire to get there at any cost. The other commonality among them is 
the hieratical structure of party institution. The core is party members, who usually 
share a sense of kinship with the leader – that is, family members, relatives and friends 
– followed by lower and middle-level managers and party activists. All of them often 
perform their duties for a fee or a promise to be promoted within the party. The top is 
constituted by influential members upholding an ideological course as well as party 
finance – usually for the election campaign and certain arrangements with the 
electorate. 
An irony of democratization is that a weak party system in the post-Soviet countries 
commonly features a large number of parties, which number did not significantly 
decrease over time – eventually this is a sign of a persistently weak party system. The 
fact is that the political parties in Kyrgyzstan are leader- or clan-based and that such 
weak system actually enhances a traditional society resemblance to tribal structure and 
geographic split by the north and the south. Large number of political parties is not an 
evidence of real multi-party system, as they do not express the interests of diverse 
social groups– hence, they do not represent a significant political force. Many of them 
were just created before the elections and immediately disintegrated afterwards more 
in the tradition of the no-party system (Sanchez, 2009). Moreover, the Public 
Associations Law 1994, which also applies to political parties, extends to public 
associations and local communities the right to nominate candidates in parliamentary 
elections. This substantially weakens the position of the political parties by removing 
their ‗special‘ status and dilutes their strength by adding competition from public 
organizations not solely concerned with politics (Koldys, 2005). When public 
associations were allowed to compete with political parties in elections, they became a 
formidable political force in protecting the best interests of their constituents – 
apparently, overtaking the functions of the political parties in representation of the civil 
society. On the other hand, this law forced them to compromise their specific goals in 
efforts to gain more votes and seek alliances with other public associations to initiate 
particular changes in legislation. Akaev‘s decision to bring the CSOs in election 
process had controversial effect on democratic progress in Kyrgyzstan – the law 
facilitated the election of a highly fragmented parliament, which, in turn, led to a 
consolidation of more power at the presidential office. 
Boosting party system formation was the very reason of inclusion of the party list 
component into the elections process in 1995. President Akaev initiated the change 
admitting that a non-party system was a problem. Moreover, Bakiev also ‗endorsed 
proportional representation, which, by encouraging party formation, would reduce the 
dangerous emphasis on personality and loyalty to elites‘ (Radnitz, 2010: 141). It is also 
evidential that candidates elected to the Jogorku Kenesh were motivated by personal 
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interests, and perhaps in part by the parliamentarian immunity from prosecution. For 
example, many of the candidates were the new financial magnates who had made their 
fortunes from privatization of SOEs – hence, they were seeking both the safeguard 
against prosecution and political influence in the legislature (Abazov, 2003: 549). After 
the parliamentary election in 1995, Akaev doubted the single-locality method claiming 
that the elections were an opportunity for the old nomenklatura and criminals to get to 
power (Anderson, 1996: 331). So, he suggested to introduce a party-list component 
into the electoral system for the next elections. Not surprisingly, most candidates came 
from the Soviet ‗nomenklatura‘ heavily relied on kinship-based clan networks in order to 
dispense patronage and loyalties to ruling elites (Anderson 1996: 531). In this regard, 
Luong (2002) also mentions that the Soviet legacies have a profound effect on the way 
the formal and informal institutions were formed within administrative structure, and 
regionalism and personalism is a key feature of such structure. This is especially true 
for Kyrgyzstan where the president has no dominate power over the regional networks. 
To counter the problems of regionalism, proportional representation promotes the 
development of political society where parties provide incentives for collaboration and 
coordination of influential actors across various levels of government. Therefore, as a 
measure of fighting the clan-based system, the political parties have to actively 
participate in parliamentary elections and the government should be formed 
predominantly from party members.  
Unfortunately, the parliament composed of members representing various interest 
groups has been very fragmented and thus receptive to manipulation by the presidents. 
President Akaev took full advantage of the unmatured and unstructured post-
independent parliament, and he also make a deal with the regional elites to secure 
their support in mitigating the challenges presented by the legislature – unlike in the 
other Central Asian countries, the Kyrgyz MPs dared to challenge the president in his 
attempt to accumulate more power. As a result, in 1994, Akaev was able to get rid of 
the ‗Soviet‘ parliament and call for new elections in 1995 by encouraging the allies to 
boycott parliamentary sessions (Anderson 1996: 530). Sadly, the new Jogorku Kenesh 
was even more fragmented, tiered apart by internal disputes and incapable to enacting 
much needed reforms – this displayed the greatest weakness of the parliament as a 
collective body which later placed fear in the heart of those who proposed the transition 
to a parliamentarian regime in 2010. This enabled Akaev to initiate a series of 
referendums including a new constitution in 2003 (Koldys 2005: 356).  
In opposite to Akaev, Bakiev did create a pro-presidential party of power – even though 
the law forbid the president to be a member of any party. This approach did not mean 
that the presidents were seeking a different objective. It seems that Bakiev was 
adopting a rather different strategy for achieving the same goal – that is, ultimate power 
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and executive dominance over the parliament. In fact, the similar strategies were 
adopted by presidents in other post-Soviet countries lacking electoral incentives to form 
party systems – they took advantage of an unstructured legislature to consolidate more 
power or to promote development of a party system with a strong pro-presidential 
party. Interestingly, in Kyrgyzstan, both of these strategies were actually used – Akaev 
followed the ‗no-party system‘ approach, while Bakiev‘s presidency exemplifies the use 
of the ‗party of power‘ strategy (Riggs, 2013). 
At the local levels political parties played have the same role than they do nationally –
manipulation of local election results in favour of pro-presidential party which had have 
negative effect on political society‘s development. Hence, political parties have not 
been the basis for political mobilization, or coordination of political activity – instead 
clan and family ties determine election results, and the local elites maintain their 
influence via clan networks by dispensing patronage. Consequently, party system did 
not provide framework for the nationalization of politics. Connections among the 
various levels occur within the power structure of the state through pacting and 
exchanges of favours between those who already in power to stay in power. Without 
parties system and elite competition, the clan politics and tribalism re-emerged. A 
alliance between government ‗nomenklatura‘ and the new business elite delivered the 
next generation of political elite who, particularly after the first round of elections in 
1995, realized that clan-based networks were more effective in mobilizing political 
support than through weak parties (Abazov, 2003: 548, Abazov, 2007: 531). They 
received an access to government resources and gained personal benefits, dispensed 
via patronage networks that cemented the deal. This represented a fragmented 
structure of elites, because they were engaged in vertical network relations typical for 
patron-clientalism. After 2005, Bakiev captured this cooperative tendency by linking 
local elites and regional networks, which already formed loose ties before to turn down 
Akaev, as well as his supporters, by joining the ‗ruling‘ party of power – however its 
purpose was not to enhance competition, but rather to restrain the political society. In 
fact, he did this so successfully due to the weak party system which did not have any 
means to resist. Therefore, evidence of weak multi-party system is obvious.  
Overall, the results of the elections for the parliament and local councils show that 
family and clan ties still a primary source for collecting and coordinating political 
activities in the country. Without parties, these elections did nothing to promote broader 
civil society participation. Local politics is also driven by personal rather than political 
attributes because tribes, clans, and regional networks along with patronage rule 
politics at this level. It means that political elites are able to deliver electoral outcomes 
in their localities favourable for the president by dispensing patronage throughout their 
clan networks rather than genuine party participation. Consequently, this also affects 
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coordination between local and national levels. Therefore, there was a mutually 
beneficial alliance between presidents and elite groups – in particular, the ability of 
elites to mobilize votes for the president in exchange for the president‘s ability to 
coordinate government resources and administrative positions for the elites. 
A multiparty parliament, coalition government, and significantly weakened presidency 
are the main features of Kyrgyzstan‘s new political system – the Parliamentary 
Republic. Despite explicit scepticism, the political leaders claimed that parliamentary 
regime is the only way to prevent the concentration of power at the president office as 
well as creation of a pro-presidential party of power in the future. Meantime, the new 
constitution of 2010, in fact, set up a  mixed parliamentary regime – the president is still 
elected by popular vote and continues to perform certain executive functions – and 
introduced a controversial article, which prohibits any political party from getting more 
than a half (65 out of 120) seats in the parliament. Described as discriminatory, this 
precautionary measure aims to prevent a so-called ‗party of power‘ from taking-over 
the control in legislature – similar to Bakiev‘s Ak Jol in Kyrgyzstan, Putin's United 
Russia in Russia, or Nur Otan in Kazakhstan (Juraev, 2012).  
The parliamentary elections in October 2010 demonstrated that the ‗rules of the game‘ 
are changed. In contrast to 2007, when Ak Jol gained over 78% of the seats, in the 
2010 elections five political parties were able to pass the electoral threshold with a 
relatively even distribution of seats. To succeed in the elections, at least three of five 
national parties created a coalition to form a majority. However, such alliances were 
short-live, because allies are not interested in political programs of each others rather 
their own financial or political interests and ambitions. This creates a phenomenon of 
‗roving‘ politicians moving from party to party (Bugazov, 2013). Anyway, the eradication 
of a strong presidency and the monopoly of a single political group have been 
successfully achieved. However, while making any predictions is too soon, it is 
necessary to understand the main factors that support the current political 
arrangements – that is, societal and political fragmentation and diverse nature of 
politico-economical elites, and the strong ties between the political leaders and their 
local constituencies.  
According to Radnitz (2010), in the weak state, political and economic elites prefer to 
maintain close clientelistic relationships with the local communities – often, their tribes 
and clans as well as regional networks – which substantially erode the capacity and 
authority of formal political institutions. As the 2010 parliamentary elections 
demonstrated, the elite connections with localities remain salient and political parties 
continue to rely on party member‘s network to mobilize voters at the local level. This is 
best illustrated by the persistent efforts which certain party leaders made to change the 
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electoral system – the distribution of parliament seats proportionally to votes collected 
in respective localities. Thus, an important dimension of political fragmentation in 
Kyrgyzstan is regionalism – and regional differences in voting behaviour and election 
results show interesting patterns. The politico-economical elites contribute to the 
division of power between multiple power centres, as well. After independence, the 
post-Soviet political elite in Kyrgyzstan has grown into large groups that view the state 
as a source of plenty resources – usually for private enrichment. In this regard, Engvall 
(2011b) describes the state as an ‗investment market,‘ in which government posts are 
openly traded, particularly in revenue-collection agencies such as customs and tax 
offices. Hence, it is highly challenging for a president to distribute scare resources 
among wide elite networks. To put it more simply, the efforts of Bakiev to create a pro-
presidential party left powerful actors outside the game, leading to the tragic events in 
April 2010. In this context, it appears that the multiparty system could be an optimal 
solution – more elite groups could have a grip on their piece of the ‗pie.‘ As being 
noted, the parliament members and coalition government may share the same view on 
few policy-related issues, but this did not stopped them to reach agreement on how the 
resources and government positions will be distributed – so far, this has been sufficient 
to maintain a fragile balance.  
To sum up, it appears that political system that promotes pluralism and political 
competition could be a better match for Kyrgyzstan‘s highly fragmented society. Indeed, 
empowering fragmented national elites is an important barrier against the accumulation 
of power within a ‗ruling family.‘ Such a system may also lead to a more agreeable 
balance of power between various political actors fighting for resources as well as 
reduce incentives for radical change. However, a deteriorated socio-economic situation 
coupled with poor governance could potentially erode support for pluralism among the 
majority of society and create conditions conducive for reshaping of the regime. Also 
the gradual growth of one party over the others is still possible, which could eventually 
result in another constitutional reform (Juraev, 2012). In short, there are visible signs 
that the current system may not really strengthen government accountability and the 
rule of law. 
5.4. Elite Decision-Making and Chance Events 
Political elite with well-defined social attributes and a set of universal values is about to 
arrive to Kyrgyz Republic . There is no shortage of evidence that the existing political 
elite is completely ignoring the national interests for the sake of personal benefits (Tax 
Expert 5, Academic 6). Indeed, Kyrgyzstan is an authoritarian state, in which the power 
and resources are concentrated at the hands of one ‗ruling‘ family and its supporters. 
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On the other hand, it could be said that creation of a new elite might take years and the 
process is rather spontaneous (Bugazov, 2013). In early 1990s, after the 
independence, the country faced large labour migration – too many professionals 
previously occupying positions at the public institutions and law-enforcement agencies 
left the country. Sadly, at that time, the government did not pay close attention to such 
outflow of key specialists – previously, the ethnic Kyrgyz did not occupy this type of 
positions, the preference was given to other nationalities and central cadre from 
Moscow – and did not think of how to fill the open vacancies with candidates with 
equivalent education, qualification, and skills. As a result, the positions were filled with 
new untrained staff who, by and large, did not have any experience in government 
affairs. For these reasons, the major human resources problem in the country is the 
lack of experienced professionals with decision- and policy-making skills. Even worse, 
with each new ‗revolution,‘ the situation in the country aggravated. In fact, such small 
country as Kyrgyzstan simply does not have enough competent professionals to supply 
each ‗revolutionary team‘ with new candidates – those who left behind are separated 
by clans, tribes or regions. Anyway, democratic regime cannot be established by a 
small group of reformers, neither implanted by development partners. It is a long 
process to develop a certain political culture and two decades of independence is a 
short period. That is why financial support and external assistance do not produce the 
desired results, the country simply lacks of capacity to sustain them. In reality, it is 
more complicated as the so-called ‗national‘ elite is not homogenous in nature – in 
contrast, it is extremely fragmented. The ununified elite often cannot reach an 
agreement on a variety of issues due to their ambitions and self-interests. This is one 
of the reasons why assistance provided by international organizations and their experts 
was so ineffective. This also spreads confusion among donors not knowing what issue 
to address at first as elite groups place different requests over time. Again, expert 
advice and funding are wasted because they do not match the current interests of the 
dominant group. Hence, there is urgent need for creating a professional and effective 
administrative elite. However, it is only possible with the existence of such social base 
as the ‗middle class,‘ which unfortunately comprises only 10-15% of the population in 
Kyrgyzstan and continuously decreasing (Bugazov, 2013). 
In Kyrgyzstan, elites compete for power through informal patron-client networks – the 
core of this patronage pyramid could be a particular family, clan, or elite group, which 
extends the network and attract additional clients by using financial tiers. When one 
family manages to consolidate power, the state in response will reconstruct itself as a 
shield to protect the ruling family from the rest of society – hence, a battle for power is 
between personalities (Engvall, 2011a). Soon, clan networks and regional leaders enter 
the political competition. In early independence, pacts between different clans 
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determined the direction of the transition, including an extent of reforms. The deal was 
that the president would protect the needs and interest of the others, but over time the 
balance changed as the ruling clans attempted to cut off other members from the 
source (Collins, 2004). When the number of outsiders reached the critical mass, they 
were able to reverse the balance and overthrow the clan in power – the same logic 
could be applied to both the revolution in 2005 and the April 2010 revolt. Thus, the 
most appropriate way to look at the politics and state-building in Kyrgyzstan is through 
the logic of clientelism. 
In Kyrgyzstan, the politico-administrative elite is mostly disunited and ‗deeply distrust 
each other; interpersonal relations do not extend across factional lines, and factions do 
not cooperate to contain societal divisions or to avoid political crises‘ (Burton and 
Higley, 1987: 296). The Central Asian scholars conceptualize ‗disunity‘ or factionalism – 
the relationship between elites and their regional groups – as the clan politics (Collins, 
2002, Schatz, 2004), regionalism (Luong, 2002) or other kinship-based association. In 
that case, factionalism is seemed as a political and economic competition between 
clans, tribes, or regional network. Collins (2002: 142) refers to the Central Asian states 
as ‗clan hegemonial regimes‘ in which clan-based elite network captures the state. 
(Schatz, 2004: xx) sees this as a space between primordialist and constructivist 
approaches ‗to account equally for stasis and persistence as for fluidity and change‘ 
through ‗identifiable mechanisms of identity reproduction.‘ He identifies two aspects of 
modern clan politics which could be relevant for elite networks and identity politics – 
clan politics includes ‗networks that occupy illicit social niches vying for control over 
scarce resources‘ and ‗a broad discursive battle that plays on the on-going public 
stigma attached to clan divisions‘ (Schatz, 2004: xxiii ). Moreover, the interaction 
between state and factional solidarities is mutually inclusive. It is also important to 
mention that there is not so much difference between the contemporary state-building 
and ‗authoritarian high-modernism‘ introduced by the Soviet Union in Central Asia 
(Scott, 1998). Also, at the time of the political crisis, such as the Tulip Revolution in 
Kyrgyzstan (Reeves, 2006), identity groups ‗can crystalize, at certain moments, as a 
powerful, compelling reality‘ (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 5). Thus, two outcomes 
suggested by Schatz are present in Kyrgyzstan‘s elite networks. However, (Gullette, 
2007: 385) assumes that factions ‗do not represent actual groups.‘ Nevertheless, there 
is a great deal of discussions about the composition of elite groups which could be 
comprised of multiple social, economic and political forces. In Kyrgyzstan, interplay of 
opposing elite networks led to serious consequences in 2005 and 2010. Disunity 
among them has been the main driving force for polarization of different identities, in 
particular ethnicity and regionalism and their impact on patronage networks. Elite 
fragmentation, regionalism and patronage have become mutually reinforcing (Kitschelt 
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and Wilkinson, 2007). In post-conflict societies, ethnic, regional and kinship-based 
solidarity builds a solid basis for network construction and formation of political elites, 
as well as promotion of patron-clientelism. However, it is important to know that such 
divisions are due to the politics of elite and post-crisis responses. Although clientelism 
has a long history in Kyrgyzstan, its functionality is closely related to elite factionalism. 
Throughout the post-Soviet history, patron-client networks have persistently 
reappeared in the Kyrgyzstan in the form of ‗micro-societies‘ of tribes, clans, regional 
networks and economic leaders. Accordingly, national elites have to be engaged into a 
co-option, compromise and negotiation with other actors which then redefined the 
authority, power and legitimacy of the central government. Next, the ties of loyalty as 
well as corresponding responsibility will be developed between leaders and followers. 
However, the coalitions and oppositions formed in the changing context of political 
struggles within, or between, various groups are often fragile. As such, informal 
practices of nepotism, tribalism and favouritism will consume all aspects of state-
society relations. In the model of elite settlements, repression as a form of domination 
over the allies often was not successful in the context where societal forces are 
powerful and resilient to pressure (Rothchild, 1970). Therefore, ex-presidents Akaev 
and Bakiev have combined the repression policy with the accommodation approach, 
while building a complex network with clan leaders, and other powerful brokers. 
However, accommodation has been done following the patron-client format, which links 
the leaders of various tribal, ethnic and regional groups with the ruling elites. In this 
matter, the state has provided a market place for opposing elite networks to contest 
each other over who controls the power. Still today, patron-client relations are distinct 
characteristic of the daily politics in the Kyrgyz Republic, and Central Asia as a whole. 
In practice, they follow different form of patterns in which selective benefits are 
allocated among participants in exchange for their loyalty or political support – usually, 
during elections. Often, these hierarchical and uneven relations connect the factional 
elites, and their clients, to the state. With growing presidential power, former presidents 
were using state resources and key government positions to attract more elites groups 
and further consolidate their power. For all that, elites should be viewed as autonomous 
and factional actors, who could be found in horizontal and vertical networks. 
Factionalized networks could be based on multiple identities – such as tribe, clan, 
ethnicity, and regionalism – but made politically salient by elite manipulation. 
Clan Politics and Regime Transition  
In recent years, two schools of thought have shaped scholarly debate regarding the 
political development in Central Asia. From new institutionalism perspective, the 
regional identities shaped by institutional legacies of the Soviet Union are a primary 
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factor driving the state-building process and the developmental trajectories of post-
Soviet transition in Central Asia (Luong, 2002). A more traditional approach is that 
informal pre-Soviet identities are shaping political outcomes (Schatz, 2004). Collins 
(2006: 17, 25) expands the latter arguing that instead of the formal Soviet legacies, it is 
the ‗clan politics‘– the politics of informal competition and pacting between extensive 
networks of individuals linked by kin and fictive kinship identities in pursuit of clan 
interests – that is the dominant social and political force in Central Asia. She situates 
her argument that clan politics could be empirically analysed, and must be evaluated 
as causal element in regime trajectories, within broader literature on democratization. It 
should be mentioned, at this point, that clan networks as a strong and resilient form of 
social organization impede not only democratization and regime consolidation but also 
longer-term regime durability and can only be broken down by the institutionalization of 
a market economy. This means that their prolonged influence will lead to autocracy 
unless they are reconciled with Western-style economic and social institutions. In this 
regard, the clan politics is also viewed as ‗profoundly impacting both the nature and 
direction of regime transition and the potential for regime viability during and after the 
transition‘ (Collins, 2006: 21). In other words, the initially divergent trends of Kyrgyzstan 
(democracy), Tajikistan (regime collapse) and Uzbekistan (autocracy) in early 1990s, 
and their later convergence to autocratic regime, is highly contingent upon the 
influence of kinship clan dynamics (Table 5.4.1). To explain how clan politics has 
impacted the nature and durability of regime transition and long-term political 
trajectories, Collins argues that kinship (or ‗fictive‘ kinship) bonds produce social norms 
that reinforce clan identity at the meso and elite levels. This leads to emergence of the 
patronage networks where resources are distributed among major clans and tribes – 
hence, the networks of patronage tends to undermine institutional consolidation and 
create weak autocracy. In other words, elite behaviour constrained by the clan divisions 
limits the ability of regime to consolidate – thus, ‗clan-based societies severely constrict 
the influence of elite ideologies and elites‘ choices‘ (Collins, 2006: 208).  
For the Kyrgyzstan, the major division of clans is territorial – that is, between the north 
(Bishkek and Talas) and the south (Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken) – due to historical and 
geographical factors. The north-south parts of the country have been naturally divided 
by the mountains and stayed in this way since the pre-Soviet period, failed to establish 
close ties between their regions (Anderson, 1999). In terms of historical background, as 
Hvoslef  (1997) mentioned, ‗There has always been a great difference in opinions, both 
culturally and politically, between Northern and Southern Kyrgyz. The Kyrgyz from the 
north accuse the southerners of acting and behaving like Uzbeks, while the Southern 
Kyrgyz on their side, accuse the northerners of behaving like Russians and taking up a 
dominant role in politics.‘ So, while there is a variety of clans and tribes in the country, it 
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could be said that the political elite comes primarily from the north – localized in 
Bishkek – and thus retains far more power and controls far more resources than the 
south – at least, until Bakiev‘s accession in 2005. The kinship-based identities 
developed, throughout the history, on this dual regional discourse are profoundly 
important. And because of that Kyrgyz, as a nation, lacked cohesive national identity 
and often defined themselves as a member of a tribe with distinct dialect, traditions, 
national costume and political affiliation (Elebayeva et al., 2000). Besides, their loyalty, 
similar to other Central Asians, firstly lays with family, and clan (Huskey, 1997).  
Although the Soviet Union was able to isolate the political influence of clans and 
patronage networks, as soon as the regime collapsed, clans re-emerged as strong 
political actors, deeply penetrating into formal system of governance (Figure 5.4.1). In 
Kyrgyzstan, clans survived because of late formation of a state, national identity, and 
an economy of ‗deficit‘ – the post-colonial legacies of the Tsarist Russia and later the 
Soviet Union. Soviet system was co-opted by local elites and clan networks that 
retained exclusive control over the state, while the policy of local cadre development 
allowed native clans and regional networks to remain at power and maintain access to 
the resources. During the Brezhnev era the power of clan networks has been 
intensified as Moscow allowed a sort of indirect ruling. Accordingly, even though Soviet 
policies denied clan identities and informal institutions, they were actually responsible 
for reinforcing them.  
According to Collins (2006), clan networks also have a large impact on the process of 
‗pacting‘ and power balancing, especially during the transition period – informally, pacts 
put clans behind the power of formal institutions. In fact, the informal ‗clan pact‘ brought 
Akaev to power in Kyrgyzstan, which could explain the initial legitimacy and regime 
stability in early 1990s, while the absence of such pact led to instability and civil war in 
Tajikistan. The stability of pacts is depends on equal balance of power among clans, 
presence of a legitimate leader who can broker the pact, loyalty of military and security 
forces, and sufficient economic resources to divide among interest groups. 
Consequently, clan pacts, or absence of them, can explain the durability or fragility of 
the regime during transition due to unstable nature of clans, their tendencies to divide, 
and their changing roles in the state.  
In detailing the political changes of the post-1990 period, Collins argues that multiple 
factors led to authoritarian regimes. But, due to clan activities, none of these regimes is 
strongly consolidated – that is, deeply institutionalized. In the long term, however, clans 
negatively influence the political trajectory and regime consolidation due, at first, to 
clans using the state as a source of patronage and resources. This leads to the 
‗stripping‘ of state assets, ‗crowding out‘ of civic organizations – such as, political 
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parties, trade unions or public associations – and consolidation of power and resources 
in the hands of the ‗ruling‘ family – all these place the informal pacts at risk. 
Evidentially, this was a main reason for forcing President Akaev out of an office in 2005 
– the benefits were given only to his family and supporters, as opposed to the southern 
clans. Thus, formal state institutions were weakened while the president was forced to 
balance the competing interests of different clans placing the legitimacy at risk – at the 
end, Akaev found himself dramatically relying on clan support to keep him at power 
(Collins, 2004: 248). Ironically, Askar Akaev belongs to the biggest northern tribe, the 
Sarybagysh (Kemin), as well as was related to the regional Talas elite through his wife, 
Mairam Akaeva (Table 5.4.2). 
In Kyrgyzstan, clans are large networks that claim a particular shared ancestry in long 
history of nomadism – eventually, they were forced to settle under the Soviet regime. 
The local elites and regional networks can also be assumed under the term ‗clan‘ 
(Starr, 2006: 7-8). In this regard, a sense of definitional confusion emerges. In 
particular, it seems to be a little distinction between cultural understanding of clan and 
more economically specific concepts such as, clientelism, corruption and patron-client 
ties. There is also a sense of certain overstating of the power of kin-based clan 
identities. In fact, identities can be based on wider social networks as opposed to 
narrow kinship identities - for example, the tragic events in Asky in 2002 (Radnitz, 
2010) or the emergence of inter-elite socio-economic cleavages. Finally, recent events 
in Central Asia highlight the restricted explanatory power of a kin-based clan 
perspective and suggest that kinship ties are not as important as to be claimed. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary, at this point, to recognize the importance of ‗clan politics‘ 
in post-Soviet Central Asia. Individually, both the ‗formal‘ and ‗informal‘ approaches to 
Central Asian politics present a rather exclusionary framework – and maybe future 
studies could explore the interaction between the informal practices, elite actors and 
emerging public institutions. This would allow a more open approach to the diverse 
factors and agents impacting post-Soviet political development in Central Asia. 
5.5. Administrative System 
In the Pollitt- Bouckaert‘s model, Content of Reform Packages, Implementation 
Process and Results Achieved represent the key elements of the administrative 
system, which activities are the main focus of this part. The approach taken is to look at 
different tax reform measures, and correspondent donor-driven initiatives, within the 
overall national development strategies. It also analyzes the technological changes that 
have been influential, particularly the role of information technologies and the 
institutional and organizational changes at the central and local levels of tax system in 
Kyrgyzstan. As the tax offices are currently beset by out-dated equipment and facilities, 
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inefficient business operations, and inadequate institutional capacity, the tax 
administration reform is needed to install appropriate information system, instil the ‗best 
practices,‘ improve administrative processes, upgrade staff skills, and ensure that the 
operations are driven by modern technology. Thereby, these would enable the tax 
agency to improve its collection capacity and reduce compliance costs. 
5.5.1. Content of Reform Packages 
The content of the reform packages has been developed in close cooperation with the 
main development partners – the World Bank, IMF, ADB, and USAID. Reforming tax 
policy and tax administration is a key part of the country development strategy. It is 
expected that the tax reform will contribute positively to fiscal consolidation, economic 
growth and poverty reduction by establishing an effective, modern, and efficient tax 
administration system – the State Tax Service (STS) – that will help to sustain 
macroeconomic stability, provide fiscal space for social expenditures, reduce 
corruption, promote good governance and transparency, and encourage business 
development. 
Economic and Social Development Concept 1994-2000 
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the government focused on 
transforming the command system into a market economy. In 1994, the key 
development partners began providing technical assistance to the country – mainly in 
structural reforms and macroeconomic stabilization (ADB, 2012b). For instance, the 
IMF initiated the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility in July 1994, while ADB‘s 
Special Assistance started in December 2004. Until 2000, fighting inflation and 
reversing economic contraction became the government‘s top priorities under the 
Economic and Social Development Concept for 1994-2000. In 1994, the country 
experience hyperinflation of 181% which averaged to 27.3% in FY1995-2000. At the 
same time, GDP growth was negative, in fact about - 20% in 1994 and - 5.4% in 1995. 
In 1996, the government drafted the country‘s development plan – the Indicative 
Social-Economic Plan for 1996-1998 and the Economic Strategy for1996-2005 – with a 
main focus on building a competitive market system, public sector reforms, and private 
sector development. Infrastructure, enterprise sector, natural resource management, 
human development and social services, and public administration were selected as 
priority sectors. During the period of 1996-2000, GDP growth was substantial reversed 
from -5.4% in 1995 to 7.1% in 1996 or average of 5.6% per annum. From 2001, 
inflation was reduced to single-digit level. 
  225 
Interim National Strategy for Poverty Reduction (I-NSPR) 2001-2003  
The Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF) for 2001-2003 heavily promoted the 
revenue growth – both tax and non-tax revenues – instead of sharp reductions in public 
spending. In the light of the overestimation of budget revenues and the government‘s 
dissatisfaction with the current structure of the tax system, a strong package of both tax 
policy and tax administration reforms was needed. It was planned that, by 2007, the tax 
revenues would increase by about 3% of GDP – that is, 0.5% per annum (World Bank, 
2004b). However, this appeared to be a challenge as actual tax revenues in the 
Kyrgyzstan were, in fact, lower than they reported, given that the tax offsets, transfer 
and barter were still common practice in tax collection. Besides, the revenue level of 
16% of GDP was already consistent with other low-income countries as well as the 
limited administrative capacity. In this regard, the interim strategy advocated two 
approaches for raising revenue (IMF, 2001). First, better tools should be provided to the 
revenue authorities by launching a national program for the rationalization and 
modernization of revenue collection institutions. And such a program must be robust 
and comprehensive. In practice, it started by substantial investments in human 
resources development – mainly, personnel training, compensation and hiring policy – 
and in the necessary hardware updates that hopefully would reduce a number of 
decisions left to the discretion of tax officers, as well as direct contact between the 
taxpayers and tax authorities, to the maximum extent and, hence, reduce corruption. 
The program should also substantially modernize the existing structure of revenue-
collection agencies (both vertical and horizontal) and rationalize the budget procedures 
for revenue collection. However, this should be done in the context of a comprehensive 
diagnostic analysis of revenue administration, with assistance of development partners, 
to identify the scope and the costs of the modernization. Traditionally, the integrated 
approach to modernization in tax administration has focused on the improvements in 
tax policy and tax laws, computerization of tax offices and reorganization of tax service 
by functions, creation of large taxpayers units, staff training, and streamlining of basic 
tax operations, such as taxpayer registration, processing of tax payments and returns, 
and tax audit. This approach, as comprehensive and integrated as it sounds, would 
take into account both the traditional factors as well as non-traditional factors – 
particularly, the array of contextual factors that impede the revenue system, the effect 
of the history on the organization and management functions, and informal culture – 
but may fail to fully uncover the underlying causes of institutional and organizational 
malfunction, leading to partial solutions and underachieved results (Gill, 2000). Second, 
a series of fiscal adjustments to tax policy, tax base, and reassignment of local taxes 
and fees to sub-national governments should be made to promote better compliance. 
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Following the MTFF‘s objectives, these adjustments may include gradual phasing out 
turnover taxes and other ‗nuisance‘ local taxes and reduction in payroll taxes, and 
broadening the tax base through such measures as rationalizing the VAT exemptions 
along with revisiting special incentives and tax preferences for certain categories of 
taxpayers and importers. In addition, in order to improve compliance and accountability, 
the local governments should gain full responsibility for collection and reporting of local 
taxes as well as for tax education service to the local taxpayers. In reality, this could 
begin with the largest local taxes – for example, land tax, motor vehicle tax, retail tax, 
and later the property tax – and continue through a total restructuring of local tax 
system.  The reductions in the tax rates for CIT, PIT, and social contributions in 2001 
should also contribute to greater compliance. But first, there was a need for a better 
allocation of functional responsibilities between, and within, tax offices, combined with 
an alignment of incentives to maximize the tax collection. 
It is expected that these investments in institutional development and consistent tax 
policy efforts would produce fruitful results, as there is an ample room for strengthening 
the efficiency and transparency of revenue collection. Hopefully, the reform measures 
for the revenue-collection system would boost budget revenue – either by eliminating 
the loopholes in tax laws, or by expanding the tax base and evening the tax burden 
among various taxpayers – and facilitate business development. Such improvements 
as simplified taxation of small and medium enterprises, and decrease in a number of 
unjustified tax inspections, and excessive registration and licensing procedures – are 
central to promoting the growth of entrepreneurship and the private sector, and 
reducing corruption. In the same way, the revenue gained through the modernization 
and reform efforts would have to be sufficient to cover the fiscal deficit, at least over the 
mid-term. This, in turn, would eventually allow a further simplification of tax structure – 
broad tax base and lower rates for certain taxes and social contributions – to offset the 
consequences of the VAT reform, and to put to an end the tax advances procedure. In 
terms of reform sequence, it is important to start with the modernization program first, 
and to reduce rates only if the program shows corresponding improvements in revenue 
collections. 
National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS) 2003-2005  
In 2001, the level of tax collection reached 12.4% of GDP in comparison with 11.7% in 
2000. Despite that, it was still insufficient, although tax rates were relatively low. As a 
result, the budget revenue was not enough to cover the entitled public expenditures as 
well as to reduce public debt. At the same time, the tax system was far from promoting 
the economic growth. As it is known, there is uneven distribution of tax burden among 
economic sectors and regions, which place a heavy burden on compliant taxpayers. In 
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addition, there were cases when businesses were able not to pay any taxes, either 
because of tax exemptions or by escaping in the ‗shadow‘ economy – the scale of 
which is still large in the country (IMF, 2002). The development of a market economy 
was impeded by the continuing practice of private negotiations between the tax officers 
and taxpayers, and by payment of salaries, benefits and other expenses in kind. 
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the government attempted to introduce 
tax incentives for stimulating business and investment activities in the country. In this 
sense, theoretically, the VAT – the largest tax in tax structure – was the most 
appropriate candidate for this role. Unfortunately, due to numerous exemptions added 
to this tax in the last years, the VAT system has been distorted. In addition, the inability 
of the Customs Committee to stop the inflow of counterfeited and smuggled goods – 
many of which are subject to excise taxes – hindered the competitiveness of local 
producers and significantly reduced budget revenues from a source with promising 
revenue potential. In total, the effectiveness of the tax system was reduced significantly 
by the lack of cooperation and coordination among the revenue departments dealing 
with collection of taxes and other payments, their non-transparent and bulky 
administrative structure, and widespread corruption. With these problems in mind, the 
government proceeded with a PFM reform aimed at improving the revenue collection. 
As a result, the Fiscal Reform Strategy for 2005 was approved in 2002. Firm actions 
have been undertaken to ease the burden of bone-fide taxpayers, to simplify tax 
system and hence to increase government revenues – including republican budget and 
local budgets – by eliminating unjustified tax preferences and exemptions, and by 
broadening the tax base. In details, these measures included the reduction of a tax rate 
for CIT from 30% to 20% and for PIT from 33% to 20% along with an increase of the 
monthly minimum deduction from KGS 400 to KGS 650, termination of excise tax on 
fermented tobacco and VAT exemption on imported fixed assets, increase in the tax 
rate for retail sales tax from 3% to 4%, and introduction of mandatory patent regime to 
certain types of activities, where tax administration is rather difficult to apply, as well as 
a uniform simplified tax for small businesses that will replace CIT, sales tax, road tax, 
emergency tax for corporate taxpayers, and PIT and sales tax for individuals. The 
government also proposed the integration of the Tax Inspectorate, Customs Committee 
and the Social Fund into a single fiscal body responsible for all budget receipts – 
hopefully, this will make the tax and customs administration more efficient and 
transparent. It is clear that these measures are only a small part of the tax reform 
package, and significantly more efforts and more actions will be required to improve the 
tax climate in the country.  
In terms of the tax policy options, the reform was aimed to encourage budget revenues 
necessary for effective provision of public services and for speeding up the pace of 
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economic reforms. It is obvious that without enhancing the tax collection, the 
achievement of macroeconomic stability and sustainable economic growth is out of 
questions. Thus, only a strong economy, in which the tax burden is evenly distributed 
among various taxpayers, is able to generate the budget revenues sufficient for such 
purposes. In this regard, the government was planning to achieve a tax-to-GDP of 
15.5% by 2005. To meet this target, significant changes in both tax legislation and 
operations of tax offices were required. For all that, the main priorities of the tax policy 
reform were to wide up the tax base, smooth out major inequalities and strengthen tax 
administration. The result of this policy should be better conditions for economic 
development, and reduction in a size of the informal economy.  
To expand the tax base, it was planned to introduce the real estate tax and tax on the 
use of mineral resources – consequently, the deductions for reproduction and 
development of the mineral base should be revoked, to expand the list of activities 
eligible for patent taxation, and to rationalize the total number of tax exemptions – in 
particular, the exemptions for VAT. In the mid-term, special attention should be given to 
the Land Tax – the land cadastre and rates schedule for this tax should be based on 
the market value of land. This would eliminate distortions in land taxation and create 
equal opportunity for all economic agents. In the same way, the social insurance 
contributions would be reduced for employers, while the contributions to the Pension 
Fund paid by employees would rise from 8% to 9%. Of particular importance for tax 
administration is the elimination of all discrepancies and overlaps in tax legislation. In 
practice, all effort should be made to ensure that the Tax Code is the only legal act that 
regulates tax affairs – it means that all instructions and by-law regulations should be in 
compliance with the code. The further reduction in the tax burden could be achieved 
through full refund of valid VAT input credits directly to legitimate exporters and 
businesses, approximation of the allowed deductions for CIT and PIT against the real 
expenses, elimination of ineffective local taxes and fees, and, when it is possible, 
gradual phased out of cascading taxes – mainly, the road tax and emergency tax. 
Finally, measures on reforming the tax administration system should be implemented 
by optimizing the organizational structure of the tax service and strengthening its audit 
function, creating an integrated information system – which will include the Ministry of 
Justice, National Statistical Committee, Social Fund and other revenues agencies – so 
as to improve the registration of taxpayers and set up uniform accounting and reporting 
procedures, introducing the division to control the largest business, penalizing the 
taxpayers for failure to use cash registers, distributing security-protected VAT invoices 
only through tax offices, and applying strict administrative sanctions to tax officers for 
abuse of power or inadequate execution of their official duties. 
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Strong measures to reforming the tax system contributed to improvements in revenue 
collection and the reduction in the budget deficit. As a result, in 2003, the total revenue 
of the consolidated budget, including official transfers, and tax revenues have 
increased by 12,1% and 13,8%, respectively. At the same time, significant changes 
have been made to the tax laws. In particular, the tax rate for CIT was reduced to 20%. 
A new Real Estate Tax was introduced instead of the inefficient local tax on unused 
production and trade facilities. Moreover, all of proceeds from the tax will be collected 
and retained by the local governments (IMF, 2004). However, the Jogorku Kenesh and 
local councils (keneshes) did not yet prepare all the regulations necessary for proper 
enforcement – it is expected that the process will be finalized in mid-2004. In addition, 
the government made a series of changes in the VAT system – for example, the fixed 
VAT payment by agricultural companies was replaced by the VAT for supply of 
agricultural products. Meanwhile, the existing problems in VAT administration coupled 
with the unwillingness of large agricultural producers to register for VAT could explain 
the poor results of this initiative. In response, following the recommendations of 
development agencies, the government committed to make the registration process 
more inclusive. Another measure was the introduction of special VAT invoices to 
prevent fraudulent claims of VAT refunds. Therefore, it became clear that changes in 
tax legislation made in last years had a rather distorting effect on the integrity of the tax 
system – producing more discrepancy and leaving such areas of taxation as the patent 
system and small businesses without adequate legal provision. So, the need for a new 
Tax Code occurred. In practice, the structure of revenue administration bodies has 
already been revised. The tax and customs inspections became part of the Revenue 
Committee. And the Large Taxpayer Unit  (LTU) was established within the new 
committee. It is hoped that the LTU would improve the administration of the large 
enterprises that pay the biggest share of taxes collected in the country – majority of 
them resides in Bishkek. Other important reform measures have also been pursued. 
These include introduction of the tax on exploration and use of mineral resources and a 
One-Stop-Shop approach for the taxpayers registration, and creation of a unified VAT 
account for import and domestic production in order to simplify the reimbursement 
process for registered VAT payers. 
Country Development Strategy (CDS) 2007–2010 
According to the CDS for 2007–2010, the main goal of the tax system reform in 
Kyrgyzstan was to encourage business activities by reducing the tax burden, make 
improvements in tax administration and ensure economic development (IMF, 2007). To 
fulfil these aims, the new version of the tax code has been prepared and passed to the 
legislature in 2007. In practice, the new code was in need to simplify taxation, cut tax 
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rates and broaden tax base, even up tax burden between different groups of taxpayers, 
remove excessive tax preferences and exemptions, set up equal tax regime for local 
companies and foreign investors, and reward bona-fide taxpayers. The intention was to 
build an effective tax system based on such key principles as predictability, 
transparency, and fairness – as stated in the Fiscal Policy Strategy for 2006-2008. 
Within this strategy the government proposed to improve the VAT administration 
system while keeping the VAT threshold high, expand the tax base by revising the 
existing exemptions and deductions, keep the flat rate of 10% for income taxes, 
continue cutting the national insurance contributions to 25%, simplify taxation for small 
business for better accountability and transparency, gradually abolish the cascading 
turnover taxes, consider possibility to increase excise on alcohol, and introduce the 
new excise tax on imported vehicles along with a system of bonuses and royalty for 
mining industry. The property tax would be enacted once collection mechanism will be 
finalized. In terms of income taxation, the special preferences for Credit Unions and 
income tax for lottery prizes would be removed. Meantime, the government made a 
radical decision to close all free economic zones (FEZ) – except those in Bishkek and 
Kara-Kol The increased tax rates for vehicle owners have already been enforced since 
January 2006 – this would shift the tax burden towards wealthier payer. The land tax 
on non-agricultural lands has also been reviewed and raised. Because of 
unsatisfactory results, the VAT for agricultural supply was called-off – nevertheless, the 
government considered the scenario of lowering VAT rate. 
These measures would be successful along with comprehensive administrative reform. 
Major tasks on reforming and modernization of the tax administration were focused on 
balancing rights of taxpayers and tax agencies, reducing corruption in tax offices and 
enhancing the overall efficiency of the STS. Steps that would allow to enhance the 
efficiency and transparency in tax administration included the elimination of tax 
procedures that imply subjective decisions made by tax officers as well private 
agreements between taxpayers and tax authorities, strict control of violation of the 
general tax regime and clear procedures for enforced collection, development of 
partnership between the STS and business community, as well as unrestricted 
information exchange between the tax service and other government agencies. 
Hopefully, this would also encourage the development of the institute of tax 
consultancy in addition to taxpayer representatives. 
To optimize the tax service, it was planned to further reorganize the management 
structure of the STS, introduce the modern ICT and complete computerization of the 
tax offices, cease the possibility for corruption in the agency by reducing the direct 
contact with taxpayers – there were about 17 contact points – and by using One-Stop-
Shops for tax registration and filing reports, allow the taxpayers to submit the tax 
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returns online via STS‘s web-site, reduce the total number of tax inspections based on 
risk criteria – this will free up the time and resources for monitoring the larger 
taxpayers. In this matter, the training of the tax staff to use the modern high-speed ICT 
system, and risk-based audit system in particular, is crucial – this means the need for 
human resources management reform.  
During FY2007-2010, the government agencies should gradually discontinue to charge 
for their services, it was assumed that by FY2009-2010 they would be fully covered by 
the state budget – hence, e-reporting service should be free for all taxpayers. In regard 
to intergovernmental finance, clear distinction between the revenue sources assigned 
to different levels of budget system would make the tax collection more efficient and 
significantly improve the inter-budget relationships. It is important to identify and assess 
the income-generation potential of each local self-governments (LSG). That would 
require careful review of all exiting revenue sources – including the official transfers, 
shared taxes, local taxes and other fees – and provision of new local taxes in 
accordance with the expenditures policy and tax reform that are underway. The other 
issue that also should be tackled is the collection of exiting local taxes – until 2009, 
there were about sixteen local taxes and fees, and local councils were allowed to 
introduce even more. As stated in the Tax Code of 1996, the local taxes should be 
collected by the local governments, but, still, this administrative burden is placed on 
STS. Altogether, the regional tax offices will be more than happy to delegate this 
function to respective localities, when they will be ready, – in particular, the land tax 
and property taxation.    
For a purpose of attracting additional revenue to the budget and boosting economic 
growth, the government drafted the Tax Amnesty Act that hopefully would encourage 
the taxpayers to legalize their unregistered income and property and to come out of the 
shadow. So, greater attention would be given to legalization of informal economy, 
which accounts for more than 40% of GDP. In general, ‗grey‘ economy negatively 
affects tax system and leads to vicious circle of increased tax burden and expanded 
shadow sector. This causes unfair competition for compliant taxpayers and also 
substantial distortions in official statistics – hence, inefficient decision-making and 
policy implementation. Consequently, it should be admitted that informal economy 
could no longer be considered as a temporary phenomenon. Instead, it will thrive 
where there is no economic growth, high unemployment and unfair income distribution. 
Moreover, poverty and gender inequality accompany this event, as well. At the same 
time, legalization of shadow economy has a significant potential to generate new jobs, 
promote innovations and economic growth and, thus, help to reduce poverty. 
Therefore, a special commission was established – with an active support of the 
Ministry of Finance and civil society organizations – to develop and enact the 
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government initiative aimed to legalize the shadow economy, and to create favourable 
legal climate for business development. In particular, the start-up costs for new 
companies would be reduced and the commission recommended to make additional 
changes in small business administration – such as, extra benefits from tax registration 
and simplified tax regime that will prevent them from sleeping again to the informal 
sector.  
Medium-Term Development Program (MTDP) 2012-2014 
Since January 1, 2009, a new version of the tax code has been in effect – the unified 
codification document covering all types of taxes and tax operations. The most 
significant changes in the tax system include the reduction in tax rates for income 
taxation and VAT as well as in the total number of taxes and duties, elimination of non-
market cascading taxes, such as road tax and emergency deductions, liberalization of 
the tax administration toward bona-fide taxpayers and introduction of the partnership 
mechanism. At the same time, it appears again that the tax system is not favourable for 
economic development – the tax burden is unevenly distributed across sectors and 
regions, and within them. On the other hand, a large group of taxpayers is still able to 
avoid paying taxes by using either tax exemptions or by moving to the informal sector. 
On top of that, tax incentives for investments and exports – which are essential for 
economic growth – virtually not present. The liberal tax regime for the investors and 
exporters is very important for returning them to the legal framework, stimulating their 
productivity, and, correspondingly, this will lead to the growth of tax revenues - this has 
already happened in 2009. Interestingly, despite a series of the political events and 
downturn of the economy in 2010, tax collections were actually increased by 9.1% 
(KGS 3.3 billion), and, in 2011, the total budget revenue grew up by 34.7% (KGS 13.6 
billion) – mainly, due to significant foreign aid assistance. Achieved results allowed to 
improve the tax-to-GDP ratio up to 19.4%. The ratio was even better in 2012 amounted 
to 21.7% of GDP. In spite of this, the overall level of tax collection remains pretty low – 
due to weak tax enforcement and administration (IMF, 2012). In fact, the effectiveness 
of the tax system was reduced to a great extent due to a lack of proper coordination 
and exchange of electronic information between the STS and other executive 
agencies, poor accountability and transparency of the tax administrative system as well 
as widespread corruption in tax offices. The STS also has to set up administrative 
processes and develop relevant procedures for collection of enforced tax liabilities.  In 
addition, corruption in tax administration undermines confidence of the business 
community in the tax system and jeopardizes the stability of the PFM system as a 
whole. To sum up, the growth of tax revenues is hampered because of such existing 
problems in the tax system as uneven tax burden, a large number of tax exemptions 
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and special privileges, insufficient use of modern technologies by tax administrators 
and, finally, corruption.  
In the nearest future, the tax policy will be conducted under assumption of the budget 
deficit. Therefore, it is crucial for the government to establish efficient, fair and stable 
tax system in order to ensure the budget sustainability over the mid-term, and long-
term, period. To even the tax burden among taxpayers and encourage tax collections, 
the measures undertaken by the government will include drafting of the regulatory acts, 
and amendments to the Tax Code, aimed to simply the tax administrative processes 
and procedures, shorten a list of activities entitles for voluntary patent regime by 
gradually increasing the cost of patents and reducing the types of the activities, step-
by-step decrease in the tax rates of the Sales Tax – up to complete replacement of this 
tax by increased VAT during 2013-2016. Meantime, for purposes of recovering budget 
losses, the government made a decision to raise the sales tax rate for the mobile 
providers and communications companies, as one of the economy‘s fast-growing and 
most profitable industry, as well as to introduce windfall profits tax for gold mining 
enterprises. Rationalization of the existing system of tax exemptions and incentives is 
another area of the tax policy towards improving the income-generation capacity of the 
tax system, including elimination of inefficient and unjustified preferences and closing 
up any possibility for tax avoidance – hence, decreasing tax evasion.  
To modernize the tax administration system, it is recommended to introduce the 
automated informational system for submission of the financial statements and tax 
reports electronically and to encourage the use of the modern technologies in the tax 
offices in order to optimize administrative and compliance procedures, as well as to 
improve communications between the tax authorities and taxpayers and overall 
performance of the STS. In fact, the tax administration does need these improvements. 
The e-Reporting system will reduce a number of documents and streamline periods of 
their submission, while the automated system based on risk criteria will increase the 
effectiveness of tax audit and significantly save time and resources spent both by the 
tax officers and taxpayers. Finally, to enhance trust of the general public to the tax 
service, to encourage the civil society to participate in tax affairs and to decrease level 
of corruption in the STS, it is planned to set up the One-Stop Shops and call-centres in 
tax offices within the national program for detection and prevention of corruption in the 
government institutions – in particular, the ‗hot-lines‘ and systematic survey for 
assessing the level of corruption in the tax administration. Stability and consistency of 
decisions made earlier regarding tax policy options – particularly, gradual decrease and 
even distribution of the tax burden – should provide a further stimulus to economic 
development in the country.  
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National Sustainable Development Strategy (NSDS) 2013-2017  
The goal is to create an effective fiscal system in context of Kyrgyzstan‘s transition to 
sustainable development. Tax and customs revenues increased from 19% to 21.0% of 
GDP (KGS 36 billion to KGS 64 billion) or 1.8 times in FY2008-2012. Based on IMF 
estimates, fiscal performance in Kyrgyzstan has reached 70% of the possible level 
(IMF, 2014a). According to the Medium-Term Fiscal Policy Concept for 2013-2017, the 
fundamental tax reform is aimed to promote economic development by simplifying tax 
system and through improving business and investment climate – so far, the results 
have not been finalized. The main output of the tax efforts includes the tax code, which 
provides liberal tax treatment, in particular for compliant taxpayers. The tax burden 
averaged to 19% that is relatively low in comparison with other trade partners within the 
Customs Union – that is, 35% in Russia, 23% in Kazakhstan, 32% in Moldova, and 
34% in Belarus. At the same time, the tax burden is distributed unevenly between 
different branches of the economy. As a result, the heaviest load is put on industrial 
sector, while the agriculture is almost exempted from taxation – except land tax and 
property tax. The current tax administration experiences serious drawbacks. Complex 
administrative procedures paired with prolonged economic and political crises prevent 
taxpayers from fulfilment their obligations. Activities of tax officers involved in corruptive 
schemes undermine public trust in government and pose threat to the survival of the 
whole system. Frequent transfer of fiscal policy functions from one agency to another 
adversely affects the efficiency of revenue administration in general, especially in terms 
of human resources capacity. The institutional and regulation frameworks have 
substantial gaps. It should be noted that, notwithstanding relatively low tax rates, a 
number of institutional and administrative barriers have forced a part of business to 
move to the shadow or leave the country – often, for more politically stable Kazakhstan 
and Russia. In this view, the main objective is to reduce the size of the informal sector 
through tax amnesty initiative – including the legalization of income and property – and 
create legislative and other barriers diminishing its existence and growth. Furthermore, 
the lack of stable tax laws sends an alarming signal to investors and business 
community. Performance of the STS is significantly affected by the lack of proper 
information exchange between government agencies engaged in collection and 
enforcement of taxes and other fees.  
Taking into account the above issues, priority areas for the period till 2017 – as defined 
in the Sustainable Development Program (SDP) for 2013-2017 – are to develop an 
effective and stable tax system, simplify and improve tax administration, enhance 
transparency and apply anti-corruption measures, and implement fiscal measures 
preventing the environment pollution (Table 5.5.1). 
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Table 5.5.1. Sustainable Development Program: Tax and Customs Policy, 2013-
2017 
Priority Area Objectives Measures 
Development of 
an effective and 
stable tax 
system 
Streamline tax 
and customs 
services 
 Continue introduction of customs service automated 
information system including the electronic customs 
bill submission 
 Continue introduction of the tax service automated 
information system including the electronic tax report 
submission 
 Modify regulations on introduction of new 
technologies in tax administration to facilitate tax 
obligations fulfilment by taxpayers (inspections 
based on risk criteria, wide practical use of taxes 
charged, mandatory patent, tax contract) 
Improve human 
resources 
capacity of tax 
and customs 
bodies 
 Amend laws to promote or hold liable tax and 
customs service officers 
 Arrange training workshops for tax and customs 
service officers professional development 
Coordinate 
activities of law 
enforcement 
and other 
government 
bodies 
 Conduct systematic inspections in cooperation with 
the Kyrgyz Republic government Service for 
Economic Crime Prevention, Tax Service and 
Customs Service in order to identify foreign trade 
entities involved in smuggling, taxpayers with tax 
debts, as well as to identify and register economic 
entities not registered with tax authorities 
Simplification 
and 
improvement of 
tax and customs 
administration 
Even tax load 
and improve 
investment 
climate 
 Revise the list of activities run based on voluntary 
and mandatory patents 
 Develop a draft regulation preventing duplication of 
VAT and sale tax 
 Develop draft regulations on revision and 
optimization of the existing tax preference system 
 Develop a draft concept of fiscal policy for 2014-
2017 
Ensure tax 
collection 
completeness 
 Develop draft regulations aimed at tax and customs 
administration simplification 
 Introduce universal tax declaration 
 Develop draft regulations on non-cash payment of 
taxes and customs fees. 
Improvement of 
transparency, 
identification 
and elimination 
of conditions for 
corruption 
Improve tax and 
customs 
administration 
and automate 
reporting system 
 Establish electronic tax declaration processing 
centres 
 Interview taxpayers and foreign trade entities with 
respect to corruption in tax and customs bodies 
 Apply administrative measures to tax and customs 
officers involved in corruption activities 
 Implement continuous activities aimed at the tax 
reporting simplification 
Fiscal policy 
measures 
contributing to 
the environment 
pollution 
prevention 
Environment 
pollution 
prevention 
 Adopt a regulation on environmental fee for foreign 
vehicles entering the Kyrgyz Republic customs 
territory as the air pollution compensation  
 Adopt a regulation on the customs fee ex emption of 
imported electrically driven and hybrid-engine 
vehicles  
 Adopt a regulation on raising the customs fees for 
imported goods posing threat to environment 
Establish a system aimed at increasing customs 
officers‘ capacity for international conventions 
compliance 
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Source: IMF 2014. Kyrgyz Republic: Sustainable Development Program (2013-2017) –
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper IMF Country Report No. 14/247. 
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, p. 104-106. 
In the Kyrgyz Republic, a key challenge for fiscal policy in medium-term is to decrease 
aid dependency from the development partners and put public finance on a sustainable 
path. In the last three years, the main focus of fiscal reform was primarily on 
consolidating fiscal position and restoring fiscal sustainability – in fact, in 2013, the 
budget deficit dropped to 4% of GDP. In addition, the government also should create 
extra fiscal space for social expenditures – notably, social protection, education, and 
health (Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2013). To achieve these goals, decisive 
policy measures are needed both in terms of revenue collection and expenditure 
management. Creating an efficient, stable, transparent and fair tax system would be a 
key to overcome the challenges that fiscal policy is facing today. While 25.5% of GDP 
is a relatively high level for tax collection, it appears that tax revenues (except 
contributions to the Social Fund) in Kyrgyzstan are below the regional average. In order 
to increase tax revenues, it is recommended to rationalize tax exemptions especially 
for farmers and large agribusinesses, formalize measures preventing and reducing tax 
evasion and corruption as provisions in the Tax Code, strengthen the coordination of 
customs and tax administrations, optimize taxation of mineral resources, decrease the 
burden of social contributions, gradually phase out the sale tax and replace it with a 
presumptive taxation for taxpayers below the VAT threshold, and consider a possibility 
to moderately raise the tax rates for CIT, PIT, VAT and excises. Despite slowdown in 
economic growth, loss of non-tax revenue from the Manas Transit Canter and potential 
negative effects from the introduction to the Customs Union, these tax policy measures 
could potentially yield about 2% of GDP over the next five years – however, do not 
forget that any tax measures should be carefully designed in the current volatile 
political environment (IMF, 2014b). Yet, to support the productivity of proposed 
measures, the comprehensive tax administration reform should accompany tax policy 
reform, as well. In addition, the transfer of the tax policy analysis and revenue 
forecasting function from the ministry of economy to the ministry of finance is expected 
to improve the capacity and predictability of the tax system. Therefore, in line with the 
joint staff advisory note of IMF, WB and ADB, the STS should continue to develop a 
risk-based audit system piloted with the support of donors. The STS also need to 
increase capacity of its staff – through intensive training program – to adequately 
maintain the quality and usability of new Integrated Tax Administration System (ITAS) 
provided by ADB. In this context, realigning the internal operational processes to take 
full advantage of the new system would be very helpful. Moreover, the structure of the 
regional tax offices should be rationalized and the STS should improve the 
effectiveness of the central office (HQ) by clearly separating functions for organizing, 
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planning, and monitoring from the others. There is also a need to ensure that all large 
taxpayers are filing tax returns electronically and to analyse the dynamics of taxpayer 
population to define the optimum number that the LTU can handle.  
5.5.2. Implementation Process  
Reforming tax administration is an essential part of the national development strategy – 
in particular, the fiscal policy concept and the STS‘s development strategy. While the 
core for tax policy reform is the tax code, in terms of tax administration the government 
plans to optimize the organizational structure of the taxes service – with a special focus 
on the LTU – and introduce modern technologies in order to improve governance and 
achieve macroeconomic stability. And it is clear that more efforts should be done to 
combat corruption. To address these issues, it is necessary to foster the civil society 
participation in monitoring the performance of government agencies, strengthen their 
accountability and reporting requirements, and establish e-government to minimize 
direct contact and opportunities for corrupt relations between civil servants and 
citizens, as well as to improve the quality of public service delivery in general.  
Against this strategic framework, the tax administration reform faces significant 
challenges. The main obstacle is obsolete infrastructure of the STS, in particular the 
lack of modern ICT system. This deficiency undermined practically all the major tax 
functions – mainly, registration, filing, payments, processing, audits, and enforced 
collections. In fact, the previous operating software, Kyrgyzstan Integrated Tax 
Information System (KITIS), was used only in four offices in Bishkek – hence, utilization 
rate was less than 40%. Even worse, the regional tax offices were very poorly 
equipped with computers (16 out of 64) and the limited computer skills could be 
explained by inadequate ICT training of local staff. Consequently, most operations 
were conducted manually – such paper-based approach required multiple inputting and 
encoding of data. This made even basic operations prone to inefficiency, technical 
errors, data security breaches, and corruption. At that time, only LTU and two tax 
offices were electronically connected to headquarter, and the connectivity was an 
issue. It means that the only way to access the taxpayers were though audit due to 
undeveloped infrastructure – also, the lack of reliable post service and electronic 
submission of tax returns and payments. Information sharing between the STS and 
other relevant agencies – which is essential for cross-checking of taxpayers 
background for tax audit and detection of fraud activities – was not operational as a 
result of incompatibility in ICT systems among government agencies, as well as the 
lack of inter-agency coordination. For instance, because exporters are VAT-exempt but 
liable to CIT, the STS needs export data to verify their profits. However, tax offices 
have access only to import data to process the VAT returns (USAID, 2013a). The 
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facilities of tax offices are, in general, inadequate in terms of operational efficiency and 
taxpayer services. For example, several rayon tax offices in Bishkek are located in 
buildings initially designed for kindergartens, the LTU temporary occupied premises of 
the State Customs Service (SCS), which were hard for taxpayers to find, not to mention 
the complete destruction of the rayon tax office in Bishkek during the 2005 events. In 
addition, their layouts are inconsistent with operation management requirements. The 
STS‘s weak level of automation is another obstacle towards administrative efficiency. 
Nonetheless, modernization of tax administration require more than just 
computerization. Several non-ICT reforms will also need to be adopted to achieve the 
broader goal – particularly, business process reengineering and institutional capacity-
building. Accordingly, it is necessary, at that point, to highlight weaknesses in 
organizational structure, inefficient operational procedures, and inadequate human 
resources development that should be addressed together with technological 
modernization.  
Taxpayer Education and Services 
Taxpayer service is limited to dissemination of information about recent amendments to 
the code or changes in tax regulations. No arrangements were made to collaborate 
with the private sector and provide information on a continuous basis, which is vital to 
improve compliance. STS provided virtually no taxpayer education services due to 
excessive focus on tax collection and lack of budget allocated to this important 
function. Although tax offices have information boards and try to regularly update them, 
often this is a list of changes to the tax laws and tax procedures, so offices provide little 
follow-up activities and do not address taxpayers‘ concerns proactively. In that case, a 
fully functional web-site and call-centres could be of a great help for both the tax 
authorities and taxpayers. 
Taxpayer Registration  
To make registration easier for taxpayers, it is vital to establish One-Stop Shops for 
registrants, especially for those in remote areas, and to simplify registration forms and 
procedures – in particular, registration of cash machines. The modern MIS will allow 
the STS to timely update its records and crosscheck the background of new registrants 
with other government agencies.  
Tax Filing 
Despite taxation principle to make tax system as convenient as possible, taxpayers 
have to file returns at first to tax offices before making their payments at banks. In 
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practice, these two steps should be combined, and taxpayers should have an option to 
submit tax forms on-line, at least as a pilot for large taxpayers.  
Tax Payments  
The STS needs an efficient, reliable and fast payments system which does not rely on 
cash transactions and not vulnerable to corrupt practices. Currently, tax staff has to 
sort and encode payments manually, summaries have to be delivered in person, and 
reconciliation is prone to numerous errors. Generally, taxpayers have to pay through 
banks. Each tax office has an account at the corresponding bank, although taxpayers 
can use other banks, as well. After payments are received, the bank has to send the 
payment orders by courier to the treasury, which then allocate the tax payments 
between the republican budget and local budgets. Next, tax offices would receive the 
payments orders, and manually enter them into the information system, like KITIS or 
NALOG, or post to taxpayer personal cards if the local tax office is not yet 
computerized. Recorded payments should be reconciled with the relevant bank and 
regional treasury department on a daily basis. Therefore, the transfer of revenue-
collection data from the bank to the treasury and then to STS should be revised and 
computerization of tax offices should be carry on to enable the bank to transmit date 
directly to STS without involving the treasury.  
Tax Returns  
After filing, tax returns should be properly processed, this means that tax officers have 
to screen them for accuracy, generate the payment notifications, and send returns data 
into taxpayer‘s personal account. If tax offices do not have computer systems installed, 
this will be done manually or using calculators. Even if office does use KITIS, the 
system only shows the difference between the declared and computed value, so tax 
inspector has to verify the calculations manually. In addition, KITIS does not have 
capacity to reflect the changes recently made to the tax code. The multiple reviews of 
returns by various departments contradict to the goal of self-assessment and double 
the effort. Filing and processing of returns should be quick and cost-efficient carried out 
at the audit stage. 
Tax Audit and VAT Invoices 
According to the tax laws, taxpayers should be audited once a year, which is rather 
inefficient and burdensome for tax service. In this matter, the STS should use risk-
based criteria as well as interagency information system in selection of taxpayers for 
audit. Definitely, modern technologies and relevant procedures can help with these, but 
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tax personnel also need special training in new audit procedures (USAID, 2013a). 
Apart from upgraded ICT, the STS also needs to build its staff‘s capacity to undertake 
risk-based audit by recruiting more high-skilled professionals. The auditing of taxpayers 
in the ‗high-risk‘ category should be systematic and transparent, and should 
incorporate appropriate penalties and incentives mechanism in case of quick 
resolution. The VAT system is very complicated because VAT invoices is a security-
protected form available only at the tax offices – hence, the STS has to keep record of 
all invoices issued. VAT invoices could be monitored more efficiently using modern 
risk-based audit techniques, which would be applied after VAT returns and input credit 
claims have been received.  
Arrears Management 
Due to inadequate information support, detection of arrears is often a hard task. In fact, 
tax debt is highly concentrated as the two largest debtors – the state-owned energy 
companies – account for more than half of all taxes due. Also, the article 47 of the tax 
code regarding the order of the debt pay-off should be clarified – officially, in the case 
of bankruptcy and liquidation, the tax debt is the fourth in the waiting list, in reality it is a 
priority for the government. Despite all these shortcomings, the government laid a good 
foundation for tax administration reform and modernization. Moreover, the commitment 
to reform at the highest levels of the government and tax agency is strong. In January 
2006, the president Bakiev issued a decree on tax administration modernization. Later 
in March, the STS with support of IMF prepared an action plan to streamline its 
structure, retrain personnel, and introduce a merit-based compensations system. As 
part of the PRGF program, the government agreed to eliminate local government 
interference to the appointment of senior managers to the regional tax offices. In 
January 2007, the government adopted a tax administration reform strategy consistent 
with the action plan of 2006.  
The tax code, drafted with assistance of the global community and civil society, has 
been submitted and approved by the parliament in 2008. The code was aimed to 
simplify tax system, introduce key principles of taxation, improve tax administration, 
encourages voluntary compliance, reduce an excessive number of tax audits, and 
combat tax evasion. Several features of the code were expressly formulated to support 
tax administration reform. The code strengthens taxpayer rights and extends the period 
between audits. It also provides the legal basis for electronic reporting – in particular, it 
allows the taxpayers to file financial statements and tax reports on-line using digital 
signature – and for the first time explicitly permits the government agencies to 
exchange information for better tax enforcement. Accordingly, STS admits the 
necessity of data exchange with relevant revenue-collecting agencies, including the 
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SCS, the Treasury, and the Social Fund – the next step is close cooperation with law-
enforcement agencies. Finally, the tax code made a reference for risk-based method, 
which will be used in assessment and selection of taxpayers for audit – that is a sound 
beginning for the adoption of risk management techniques.  
As tax administration does not have sufficient resources to monitor all taxpayers, tax 
authorities have to focus their attention on voluntary compliance – that is, with limited 
involvement of tax officials – as well as to strengthen the LTUs. With voluntary 
compliance in place, taxpayers have to follow self-assessment procedures, calculate 
their liabilities and file returns to tax offices. In that case, tax personnel only provide 
tax-related information and consultations. Apart from minimizing administrative cost 
and saving resources, self-assessment can also help to put corruption down by 
reducing direct contact between taxpayers and tax authorities. However, since tax 
avoidance is inevitable, effective audit system should complement voluntary 
compliance to facilitate prevention and early detection of non-payers. Given that the 
resources are limited, the selection of taxpayers for tax audit should be conducted 
based on risk assessment criteria and statistical modelling. In case of prosecution, 
administrative sanctions and penalties should be appropriate and transparent. To apply 
these principles of efficient tax administration, the STS should introduce the 
performance management and strategic planning to their operations. Strategic planning 
should start with business process reengineering – a comprehensive review of 
operations flows in the organization in order to identify bottlenecks, decide what 
operations should be streamlined, and determine which processes could be automated 
– and strengthening the organizational structure and capacity – functional organization 
will help to improve performance and eliminate duplication. Then, the top management 
set up key performance targets and indicators for each functional department by 
translating the strategic goals into specific tasks and objectives. ICT‘s modification, as 
part of the institutional reforms, can greatly speed up the implementation of tax 
reforms. For instance, electronic filing of tax reports could enhance voluntary 
compliance, while a comprehensive information system could improve tax audits and 
provide solid background to deter delinquent taxpayers and corrupt practices.  
Nowadays, function-based organizational structure as well as special taxpayers units – 
such as LTUs and FEZs – is fully operational. On top of that, STS also has established 
an internal audit department and a division to combat misconduct and corruption. As 
large taxpayers now have to conduct self-assessment, the level of tax collections 
substantially increased. The current reform coincided with the completion of the 
USAID-DFID project for upgrading KITIS. Although KITIS is about to be replaced, it 
prepared a solid platform for the creation of a central database and Integrated Tax 
Administration System (ITAS), as well as the intranet extension to the local tax offices. 
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In addition, the supplementary TAs were intended to help the STS to implement the 
procedural recommendations provided by IMF. In this case, the modernization of the 
SCS overseeing by the ADB, and the World Bank‘s assistance to the Treasury and the 
National Bank provide a good opportunity to set up effective IT network among these 
public institutions – the consultations with technical staff and project managers of the 
World Bank and ADB were conducted to ensure that data exchange amongst STS, 
SCS, Treasury, and National Bank will be feasible. Moreover, the ADB‘s project on tax 
administration reform complemented the assistance for customs modernization. Both 
projects were aimed to increase revenue collection, improve governance and promote 
economic growth. Interestingly, the similar projects for enhancing tax administration 
reform are already conducted in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, but, as the ADB received 
the grant proposal from the Kyrgyz government first in 2007, the World Bank decided 
not to intervene and provide advice within joint donor assistance (Tax Expert 1). New 
ICT system and enhanced connectivity with relevant agencies would complement the 
government‘s efforts to establish e-government as a mean of improving public 
administration. 
On the whole, in Kyrgyzstan, the on-going tax administration reform combines at least 
three important components, such as technological modernization, including the 
installation of new ICT and the upgrading of facilities, business process reengineering 
and change management through optimizing STS‘s operations and skills to support 
ICT system, and institutional strengthening, in particular capacity-building based on the 
‗best practices‘ in tax administration, which enable STS to improve those procedures 
and skills that are independent from ICT adoption.  
Tax Administration Reform and Modernization Project 
The ADB‘s Project ‘39015-042: Tax Administration Reform and Modernization’ (USD 
10,000,000, 20017-2013) aimed to promote economic growth and governance by 
improving tax administration in line with the objectives of the Country Development 
Strategy for 2007–2010 – in particular, introduction of modern technologies in tax 
administration, improvements in operations, and reduction in corruption (ADB, 2009). 
To achieve these goals, the taxes agency has to acquire new equipment and software 
in order to develop a central database and a upgraded Management Information 
System (MIS), to set up a communication infrastructure which will link the central office 
to regional tax offices, to update facilities for the LTU and Bishkek office, and to 
establish taxpayer service centres, as well as a learning centre. Hopefully, proposed 
measures will help to increase the effectiveness of tax administration while contributing 
to sustained fiscal consolidation and macroeconomic stability. Therefore, the main 
outcome of the reform will be a modern and efficient tax administration that leads to 
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increase in tax collection (Table 5.5.2). In this regard, the project was accompanied by 
technical assistance (TA) grants, such as ‗39015-022: Business Process 
Reengineering and Change Management for Tax Administration Modernization’ and 
‗39015-032: Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building for Tax Administration 
Reform.’  
Table 5.5.2. Design and Monitoring Framework, 2007-2012 
Design 
Summary 
Performance 
Targets and 
Indicators 
Data 
Sources and 
Reporting 
Mechanisms 
Assumptions and Risks 
Impact  
Increased 
contribution of tax 
administration to 
fiscal consolidation 
and 
macroeconomic 
stability 
State tax revenues to 
increase from 14.6% 
of GDP in 2005 to at 
least 16% of GDP by 
2012 
Reports and 
official 
statistics from 
SCTC, MOF, 
and IMF 
Assumptions 
 Political and 
macroeconomic stability 
continues  
 The Government and 
fiscal agencies concerned 
remain committed to tax 
administration reform and 
modernization  
 Increases in tax revenues 
are appropriately used for 
prudent fiscal policy and 
productive expenditures 
Risks 
 Political shocks could 
reduce continuity of policy 
and administration  
 Political pressures could 
lead to distortionary tax 
policies that adversely 
affect revenues  
 Political pressures could 
lead to weakening of tax 
administration 
 
Outcome 
Effective, 
modernized, and 
efficient State 
Committee for 
Taxes and 
Collections 
LTU tax collections to 
increase by at least 
17% per year during 
2007–2012 
Number of new 
registrations to 
increase by 5% per 
year (from 1,884 in 
2006) during 2008–
2012 
Average time firms 
require to prepare tax 
returns reduced from 
204 hours in 2006 to 
170–195 hours by 
2012 
Average number of 
days firms spend in 
meetings with tax 
officials cut from 3.2 in 
2005 to 2.8 by 2012 
Periodic 
surveys 
conducted 
under the 
Project 
Surveys 
conducted by 
International 
Business 
Council 
(Bishkek)  
World Bank 
Doing 
Business 
Reports 
TA reports 
Assumptions  
 Continued Government 
ownership of reform and 
modernization efforts  
 Presence of leadership to 
support implementation  
 Good cooperation among 
relevant Government 
agencies   
Risks  
 Unwillingness of STS staff 
to adopt reform and 
modernization measures  
 Resistance by vested 
interests 
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Outputs 
1. Central 
database and 
management 
information system 
established 
KITIS 100% functional 
by May 2008 
Central database, 
management 
information system 
and emergency data 
recovery centre 
constructed by May 
2008 
KITIS migrated from 
LAN to WAN 
environment by July 
2008 
Consultations 
through the 
project 
steering 
committee 
and the 
project 
management 
office  
Surveys 
conducted 
under the 
Project and 
TA reports 
Assumptions 
 Continued Government 
ownership of reform and 
modernization efforts  
 Good cooperation among 
relevant Government 
agencies 
Risks 
 Delays in project 
implementation due to 
SCTC‘s lack of familiarity 
with ADB procedures  
 Unwillingness of SCTC 
staff to adopt reform and 
modernization measures  
 Resistance by vested 
interests 
2.Communication 
network for tax 
offices developed 
100% of tax offices 
connected to central 
database by 
November 2011 
Completion of data 
exchange capability 
among SCTC, SCC, 
SSSC, and Treasury 
by February 2009 
Electronic filing and 
payments operational 
for 100% of LTU 
clients by December 
2008, 50% of Bishkek 
tax office clients by 
June 2009, and 50% 
of all other tax offices 
by March 2011 
Average time required 
to complete audits 
reduced by 20% by 
June 2009 (from 8 
days in 2006) 
  
3. Special Services 
Building, with 
modern central 
facilities, 
established 
Completion of SSB by 
March 2008 
Installation of LTU and 
Bishkek tax office in 
SSB by May 2008 
Opening of taxpayer 
service center, 
including call center 
operations by 
December 2008 
50% of all taxpayer 
queries to be coursed 
through the service 
center (from 0% in 
2006), and to be 
addressed within 1 
day, by October 2011 
  
Source: ADB 2009. Kyrgyz Republic: Tax Administration Reform and Modernization 
Project Project Administration Manual. Manila, Philippines: Asian Development 
Bank, p. 3-5. 
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On the whole, the main project was designed to initiate technical, operational, and 
institutional improvements in tax administration system. Its design was based on the 
studies conducted during the induction stage, success stories draw on lessons learned 
from tax administration reforms experience in developing and transition countries, and 
extensive consultations with government agencies, private stakeholders, and 
international development partners. While the project, in general, dealt with the 
technological modernization of the STS as a whole, the TAs focused on the 
improvements in specific areas, such as institutional strengthening, capacity building, 
business process reengineering, and change management.  
 Central Database and Management Information System. The expected output is 
the instalment of ICT hardware and software to establish a central database and an 
MIS at tax offices. Based on the previous USAID-DFID projects to upgrade KITIS, 
this project will enable KITIS to be migrated from a local area network (LAN) to a 
wide area network (WAN), which is essential for establishing computer links whiten, 
and between, tax offices. It is expected that this output will entail the procurement 
of data warehousing and business analytics systems, enable electronic filing and 
establish emergency data recovery systems. To reach appropriate sequence and 
scale, these activities first will be tested in the LTU and the Bishkek Tax Office, due 
to their proximity to STS‘s regional offices and their large share of collection.  
 Communication Infrastructure for Tax Offices. The expected output is the 
development of the ICT infrastructure to support nationwide rollout of a new system 
to tax offices. But before that, the tax offices will undergo site preparation to help 
them to properly install ICT, maintain continuous links with the central database, 
and operate under an application virtualization and WAN environment. This will 
also include the development of electronic interface for integrated system with 
SCC, Treasury, SSSC, Financial Police, and Social Fund. While the goal is to 
connect all of tax offices to the central database, this will be done gradually, in 
order to ensure a smooth transition.  
 Modern Central Operations. The expected output is the establishment of a Special 
Services Building (SSB) which will eventually accommodate the central database 
and the MIS, LTU, the Bishkek Tax Office, the taxpayer service centre, and the 
learning centre. Accumulation of all these units in one place will ensure effective 
coordination – in particular, LTU‘s pilot e-filing program would require direct access 
to the central database – and efficient workflows.  
Officially, the project proposal was approved in November 2007, but implementation 
stage was delayed till June 2008, because of difficulties in selecting and engaging 
suitable local consultants. As a result, the timeframe and sequencing of TA activities 
  246 
were significantly changed – the project was extended for another year to complete 
activities as planned. The team leader oversaw project implementation, while the 
project manager position remained unoccupied. The national experts performance was 
at high standard and helped overcome some of these challenges. However, at the 
beginning, poor proficiency of project‘s staff in English created some communication 
difficulties with international consultants – while this was corrected later with 
subsequent changes in the Project Management Office (PMO), it shows that the 
professionalism and credentials of the project team and clear communications with 
external partners are critical. On the other hand, the overall performance of STS as an 
implementation agency was less than satisfactory, which contributed to delays in the 
reform implementation. Although the STS agreed on necessary organizational changes 
to be made towards a modern function-based structure, the implementation process 
was not actively championed by top management and constantly delayed. Over time, 
the STS referred to many reasons, including lack of necessary equipment, high 
turnover of employees, insufficient staff skills, and internal resistance of key personnel 
to changes, political instability and civil disturbances in the country. Moreover, STS‘s 
top managers were not always available due to their busy schedule and official duties. 
That is to say, the STS did not provide the proper infrastructure to implement and 
monitor the progress of reforms. Project of this magnitude also requires a full time 
involvement of the project manager reporting directly to the head of the STS. After the 
constant reminders of ADB, the STS finally recognized a need to establish a tax 
administration modernization unit in late 2010 for better coordination and monitoring of 
tax administration reforms. Altogether, the agency was, in general, pleased with ADB‘s 
assistance.  
In December 2013, the project was successfully completed with all outputs 
substantially achieved. The main component of the project – the Integrated Tax 
Administration System (ITAS) – has been developed and rolled out in all tax offices, 
including those in which all operations were conducted manually. As of June 2013, 
more than 66,000 taxpayers have been registered in the new central database. 
Protocol for electronic exchange of information with other government agencies has 
been written and tested. The STS has signed an information exchange agreement with 
the SCC on 30 April 2013, but integration of ITAS with the Treasury and commercial 
banks has been delayed due to on-going modernization of the Treasury system. After a 
series of positive tests at the LTUs, the e-filing system became available for all 
taxpayers since 2010 – today, more than 4,000 taxpayers are filing their returns on-
line. Communication network for tax offices is in place and all offices are electronically 
connected to the central database through Internet services provided by Kyrgyz 
Telecom. However, broadband capacity outside Bishkek City and Chui oblast is limited 
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– in this regard, the fibre-optic connection has already been used in the northern 
regions. The construction of the Special Services Building (SSB) was finished in 2010 
and the call-centre started operational in the SSB in May 2012. In fact, the ADB‘s team 
leader was really surprised by this Soviet-style building with a lot of separate rooms – it 
seems that the local architect was not familiar with an ‗open-space‘ concept of shared 
offices (Tax Expert 1). In 2010, One-Stop Shops with no-contact windows have been 
open in 22 offices covering over 250,000 taxpayers (ADB, 2009). 
Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building for Tax Administration Reform 
According to initial grant agreement, it was expected that the TA 4941: Institutional 
Strengthening and Capacity Building for Tax Administration Reform (USD500,000, 
2007-2010) will upgrade STS‘s staff skills, set up the performance evaluation and 
monitoring system, and improve taxpayers education services provided to enhance 
voluntary compliance and reduce compliance costs (ADB, 2011b). The intention was to 
bring international expertise to build staff skills and to introduce performance 
measurement techniques which will help to fight corruption, and promote voluntary 
compliance – all these expected outcomes are essential to tax administration reform. 
This will also require advance ICT systems and sustainable funding, both internal and 
external.  
In 2010, all of three expected outputs were broadly delivered within initial budget of 
USD 500,000 (92% of funding used) – although some targets were not fully met – 
which increases the probability of achieving the outcome – but not always within the 
initial timeline. Staff skills were upgraded and training courses were conducted in 
modern tax administration techniques – including audit risk analysis – and STS staff 
successfully completed exams. Framework for monitoring performance, including goals 
and indicators – were adopted. And to strengthen monitoring of corruption and 
misconduct, the Investigations and Security Unit was introduced to the Internal Audit 
Department, although this target was not delivered on time. Efforts were made to 
improve taxpayers services and voluntary compliance, in particular risk-based audit 
has been institutionalized and proceeded to the implementation stage. This helps STS 
be more effective in fighting tax avoidance and evasion. At the same time, a wide 
public awareness campaign has started along with consultative meetings with 
taxpayers and other stakeholders – but not as regularly as expected in the design 
stage. However, lack of internal funding limited the STS‘s ability to establish taxpayer 
service centres – in total only 5, instead of 15, One-Stop Shops were opened in five 
rayons.  
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The team leader spent considerable amount of time revising the implementation 
strategy but his effort made the implementation more effective and efficient – thus, 
leadership and appropriate funding as well as recruiting suitable local experts are very 
important for success. The achieved results are likely to be sustained, if political 
pressure and government commitment to tax administration reform continues. So, the 
development of the learning centre also helps to sustain results. It is likely that the 
incentives for voluntary compliance will increase if STS continues to build its capacity 
to fighting fraud activities and cutting the compliance burden (ADB, 2011c). Setting 
goals and targets are nice attempt but this should be part of the formal performance 
management framework complemented by effective reward mechanism – in order to 
increase staff motivation and career prospect. This could also help to reduce incentives 
for corruption in tax offices, as well. In broader context, as the taxation is a significant 
determinant for the business development, the policy measures that promote voluntary 
compliance and reduce corruption could be included to the Investment Climate 
Improvement Program. 
Business Process Reengineering and Change Management for Tax 
Administration Modernization 
The expected outputs of the TA 4940: Business Process Reengineering and Change 
Management for Tax Administration Modernization (USD500,000, 2007-2010) were to 
reengineer business processes in STS to allow the staff efficiently use modern ICT, 
familiarize personnel with the new MIS and advance their skills in ICT methods and 
business analytics, and initiate change-management program (ADB, 2011a). However, 
prior to project inception, USAID did not deliver an upgraded version of KITIS in the 
pilot offices along with necessary hardware, neither mapped any existing, or new, 
business processes – this means that requirements of STS and ADB for the modern 
ICT system were not met. Even worse, only USAID has the necessary ICT staff with 
sufficient knowledge to make the necessary changes in KITIS. It was assumed the 
KITIS would be a basis for the mapping of the new business processes in order to 
support a organizational structure developed in accordance with the international ‗best 
practices.‘ Then, ADB would be in charge for nationwide roll-out of ICT system. 
Consequently, the ADB and the government made a decision that new Integrated Tax 
Administration System (ITAS) should be developed as KITIS could no longer meet the 
necessary requirements. This was not anticipated in the original design, and placed a 
risk on the USAID project failing to meet STS needs. The major problem was that the 
initial grant proposal did not accurately reflect the real situation in the country. 
Information received from both the STS and USAID regarding status of KITIS update 
was not verified. It is, therefore, recommended that communications within donors 
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should be improved – in particular, between local teams and headquarter – as well as 
the coordination between them, especially if the project outcomes are dependent on 
the actions of others. This once again raised a question about cooperation between the 
international development agencies and harmonization of their efforts. 
Although the project design is rather flexible and allows changes, it was not sufficient to 
overcome the delay in developing the software. The project was also postponed due to 
the same reasons as the assistance on the institutional strengthening and capacity 
building. Therefore, the TA was rated as partially completed. Although it was extended 
for a year, a significant part of the project related to the software development for a 
central database and MIS was not completed. On the other hand, this delay allowed to 
adjust the sequencing of reforms, with the new business processes being introduced 
before updating the ICT systems. Not surprisingly, the only output achieved was the 
launch of the change management program. Meantime, training related to the central 
database and new MIS was not provided, as the new system should be designed and 
IT equipment was not available. So, STS‘s staff only went through basic computer skills 
program. Nevertheless, new business processes were mapped and procedural 
manuals written for five key operations – taxpayer education service, audit, collection, 
returns processing, and appeals – in compliance with a revised functional 
organizational structure. Still, the full implementation is in pending mode till the relevant 
IT solution would be developed and advanced ICT training provided. Thus, it is unlikely 
that the reform results will be sustainable. While change-management system could 
help the STS‘s personnel to adjust to on-going changes in the organization, the IT 
system should be based on well-defined business processes and functional 
organization. At this stage, STS has to invest additional resources to develop advanced 
ICT skills, acquire IT equipment and implement new business processes. 
This project was a good demonstration that introduction of new technologies and 
business processes into tax administration system is a complex task – hence, right 
scope and sequence of reform efforts are very important. In reality, it is highly risky to 
implement new ICT promoted by external development partners if the country-recipient 
does not have sufficient capacity to support software upgrades and maintain the 
system. Indeed, STS lacks of capacity in IT engineering to replace KITIS, but urgently 
needed to procure a new software system to support the reform process. 
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5.5.3. Results Achieved 
The tax service as a ministerial department was urgently created in 1990 by the 
decision of the Supreme Soviet. However, the law#875-XII ‗The State Tax Service of 
the Republic of Kyrgyzstan’ was enacted only on April 25, 1992, right after the agency 
became independent from the ministry of economy and finance. While the ministry had 
some reservations about this decision, the response of tax offices to be moved-out of 
the ministerial structure was uniformly positive. The main reason behind such a strong 
support was to stop ‗political interference and favouritism‘ in the administration of the 
country‘s tax laws (USAID, 1993: 27). The new organization was formed from 
professionals who already have extended experience in finance, auditing and 
controlling. At the same time, such hiring approach contributed to a prolonged human 
resources problem – new staff was previously employed in a centrally planning system 
and shared the same believes and expertise common for a command economy. Even 
worst, the government did not have a particular organizational model in mind when a 
new executive agency was established – hence, the institutional framework, 
administrative processes, internal procedures, legal platform, social protection scheme, 
and ICT infrastructure had to be created from a scratch. And much more training and 
effort are needed toward well-functional tax administration. Meanwhile, the tax service 
was acquired by the ministry again in 1994 and has changed its title and affiliation to 
the State Tax Inspectorate under the Ministry of Finance of the Kyrgyz Republic.   
In 2002, the government following the idea of combining the tax administration and 
customs administration together established the State Committee of Taxes and Duties 
under the Ministry of Finance, comprised from the State Tax Inspectorate and the State 
Customs Inspectorate. This decision was reversed in 2005 on the wave of the public 
administration reform. As a result, the tax office became accountable directly to the 
government in an attempt to separate tax collection and tax policy functions between 
the tax inspectorate and the finance ministry. In a sequence of two years, the agency 
was renamed to the State Committee of Taxes and Fees in 2007, and finally to the 
State Tax Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic in 2009. Obviously, 
such frequent organizational transformations and continuous changes in top 
management, along with small salary and compensation packages typical for public 
servants, have contributed a lot to high employees turnover, low retention of 
organizational values and professional culture, and hence poor quality in public service. 
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Organizational Structure and Procedures 
In general, the management structure of tax offices can be organized by type of taxes, 
by administrative functions or by type of taxpayers. While most of tax administrations 
prefer to use only one organizational model, some of them develop a combination. 
 Tax-Based Model is the oldest, simplest and most commonly used organizational 
structure. Each department is set up to administer a specific type of taxes and 
contains a full range of functions necessary for administration. 
 Function-Based Model. Each major administrative function is performed by a 
separate department throughout all types of the taxes and fees. The head of the 
functional department (line manager) is reported directly to a chief executive. 
 Client-Based Model is a relative new approach which becomes increasingly popular 
in public sector. The model is applied by establishing a separate department to 
provide a full set of administrative services to a specific group of taxpayers 
designated by ownership form, size and scale of operations, or economic sector. 
The initial structure of the tax service by type of taxes (Figures 5.5.1, 5.5.2) was 
originated in 1990 when a new agency was set up within the ministry of economy and 
finance (USAID, 1993: 33-36). Based on recommendations and technical assistance 
provided by international organizations, such as the IMF, World Bank, USAID and GTZ, 
the tax offices have gradually adopted the Function-Based Model, and in general follow 
those principles.  
The Bishkek Tax Office was the fist inspectorate experimentally moved toward this kind 
of functional structure. The results were promising enough to expand its use to other 
regional offices. By 2003, the reorganization of tax administration system by functions 
was successfully completed, as reported in the USAID‘s evaluation of fiscal reform in 
Kyrgyzstan (USAID, 2003). However, over the years a series of changes has occurred 
and new divisions and positions have been created due to their particular importance to 
tax collection – for example, the Large Taxpayer Unit, Free Economic Zone Unit, Ethyl 
and Alcoholic Products Unit, and Learning Centre – which have distorted the original 
functional lines. Hence, nowadays, the STS came up with rather a hybrid structure at 
the following administrative levels (Figures 5.5.3-5.5.16). 
 Central tax office, 41 the headquarter is located in Bishkek. 
 Interregional (3), oblast (7), and major cities (2) tax offices. 
 Rayon and minor cities (55) tax offices. 
                                                 
41
 The ‗Central Tax Office‘ in this thesis refers to the ‗Central Apparatus.‘ 
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Figure 5.5.1. Kyrgyz Republic: Organizational Structure of the State Tax 
Inspectorate, 1993 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:   Because of space constraints, sections under each department are not shown. 
The Departments of State Enterprises and Non-State Enterprises, for example, 
are organized by types of tax (VAT and Excise, Income and Miscellaneous, 
etc.). 
 
 
Source: USAID (1993) Tax Policy and Tax Administration in Kyrgyzstan. Final Report. 
Arlington, Virginia, U.S. Agency for International Development, Nathan 
Associates Inc. Economic and Management Consultants, p.46.
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Figure 5.5.2. Kyrgyz Republic: Organizational Structure of the Oblast Tax 
Inspectorate, 1993 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Not all subsections are shown. 
 
 
Source: USAID (1993) Tax Policy and Tax Administration in Kyrgyzstan. Final Report. 
Arlington, Virginia, U.S. Agency for International Development, Nathan 
Associates Inc. Economic and Management Consultants, p.49.
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Figure 5.5.3. Kyrgyz Republic: Organizational Structure of the State Tax Service, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Organizational structure of the State Tax Service presented in STS Internal Regulation ‗State Tax Service.‘ 
 
Source: State Tax Service of the Kyrgyz Republic
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Figure 5.5.4. Kyrgyz Republic: Organizational Structure of the Central Tax Office, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Organizational structure of the Central Tax Office approved by STS Order #41 on March 5, 2012.  
Source: State Tax Service of the Kyrgyz Republic 
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Central Tax Office 
The STS is responsible for the implementation of the tax laws and fair and transparent 
administration of the tax system. The central office should monitor the overall 
performance of the agency, and each local office, on a regular basis and initiate any 
corrective action where the targets were not met. The functional divisions of the head 
office report directly to the director in carrying out these tasks, set and review tax 
policy, collect statistical information about tax revenues for the Central Treasury and to 
the Ministry of Finance, and participate in the development of new concepts – for 
example, the STS Development Strategy for 2015-2017. Thus, the headquarter (HQ) 
does not undertake any operational work, but defines policy requirements and sets 
standards for each function and communicate these to the regional offices. This will 
reinsure that the local offices apply the processes and procedures according to the law 
as well as HQ‘s instructions and vision. 
As might be expected, the tax service is a highly hierarchical bureaucratic organization 
prevailed by an autocratic leadership style. The director is appointed by the prime-
minister and bears personal responsibility for achievement of all agency‘s performance 
targets. In reality, the only target that counts is 100% of tax revenue collection – that is, 
the actual tax revenue collected against plan. Until now, the STS continuously met this 
target – the usual outturn is 110% of a baseline set in budget proposal. However, the 
recent reform and modernization of tax administration, followed by introduction of a 
new MIS, revealed serious problems hidden within the organization. As all data should 
be entered into the information system, there was simply no place to hide the 
numerous miss-payments, mismatches and technical errors, ‗unsorted‘ taxpayers and 
transfers within the agency and between the tax offices and taxpayers – hence, the 
quality of the database to begin with was unsatisfactory. Later, the tax officials 
explained that due to on-going ADB‘s project, they did not have enough time to adapt 
to recent organizational changes as well as to provide adequate training for tax 
personnel dealing with new ICT system. The ADB did not take a blame arguing that the 
modernization process was conducted in several stages and the STS did have an 
opportunity to give constructive feedback before moving to a next stage. As a result, 
the ICT department was established at the central office, which oversees the 
‗technological‘ reform within the STS. For instance, apart from the brand-new IT 
equipment, the Duo-Core computers with 1TB memory, with a possibility to upgrade to 
another 1TB, have been purchased for tax offices, that substantially speed-up the 
processing time and secure the high performance of the system for at least 3-5 years. 
Moreover, a unique software program was specifically written for the STS‘s operations, 
and a comprehensive automated system was designed in a way to be further 
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integrated with other agencies in a single government network. Unsurprisingly, all these 
outcomes received great appreciation from the tax administrations in neighbour-
countries – in particular, the tax service of Tajikistan was very exited about these 
results. At the same time, the ADB‘s project manager was afraid that after the 
completion of the project the system could loose its functionality (Tax Expert 1). To 
sustain the progress, it is very important that the local offices input the operational 
information on daily-basis under persistent control of the regional heads – in this case 
the leadership is a critical factor to sustain a success. If the regional offices fail to do 
so, there is a good possibility that the system will turn to a very expensive ‗trash‘ of un-
processed transaction – hence, the donors provide the tool, and it is the responsibility 
of the STS to take care about the system in long-term. 
The other question arisen in terms of the STS‘s main target is the quality of revenue 
forecasting in the country. While the Minister of Finance employs various forecasting 
models, it seems that the government continues to follow the incremental expenditure-
driven approach in budget planning – that is, the budget revenue from previous year 
prorated by inflation rate. It looks like the STS collects revenue just to cover estimated 
expenditures, these is no correlation between the tax revenue and economic 
performance of the country (Tax Expert 5). Unfortunately, no study was conducted to 
evaluate the full capacity of revenue generation in Kyrgyzstan. 
In order to meet the target and secure his position, the chief executive has unlimited 
power in terms of human resources and cash management – in particular, he oversight 
hiring and promotion procedures. This means that every director brings his ‗own team‘ 
and shapes an organization structure and internal policy in alignment with his 
professional as well as personal experience. Over the two decades, the STS has an 
honour to have 20 chairmen in a position of the chief executive, from whom only 
several have previous experience with fiscal affairs and inside knowledge about the tax 
service – none of them was female (Table 5.5.3). In this case, the development 
partners – including the international experts and independent consultants – and STS 
staff expressed a deep concern that positive changes and innovations in tax 
administration, achieved during previous administration, could be seriously jeopardized 
by frequent changes in the government and, hence, respective appointment of a new 
chief executive (Tax Officer 3, Tax Expert 3). 
Programs Design and 
Adoption Department 
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Local Tax Offices 
The Local Office is the primary point of contact between the State Tax Service and 
taxpayers. In reality, it is the local offices that carries out the basic operational functions 
– that is, registration, taxpayer service, tax returns and payment processing, tax audit, 
law enforcement and the tax collection. The local managers are in charge for all 
aspects of management in their offices, and the head has to conduct the functional 
review of these offices. In practice, the local tax managers have to make sure that the 
performance of these functions meets the STS‘s targets – in terms of efficiency, 
effectiveness, time and speed of operation, number of taxpayers served and revenue 
collected. Although the managers are accountable to the head of the local offices for 
the overall performance, they also have to report to respective deputies for the 
implementation of their procedures, processes and targets - this duality is often missing 
when the functionality of the organization structure is documented. Consequently, the 
core responsibility of the office heads is to ensure that the central tax office did approve 
the operational methods and targets which supposed to be implemented within the 
local offices. Thus, they can use their managerial skills to adopt the office structure to 
the local context, but they cannot change the agreed plans, processes and procedures 
and they have to achieve all the functional targets assigned by the chief executive. The 
main functions of the State Tax Service should be the core of the Integrated Tax 
Administration System (ITAS) accompanied by procedural manuals developed for all 
centres of responsibility, control and accountability. The functional organization could 
lead to a huge change in culture within tax offices that should be addressed through 
change management program running alongside to assist with the different 
management styles.  
Traditionally, the STS‘s chairman personally selects and appoints the heads of regional 
tax offices. However, these appointments cannot be finalized without an approval of the 
local administration where the local office is located. Such ‗approval‘ is often referred 
by tax officials as a major obstacle toward fair tax administration because local 
governors are usually trying to negotiate special tax preferences for their relatives and 
friends in return. According to the STS Development Strategy for 2015-2017, the 
government aims to abandon this practice by 2015. 
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Large Taxpayer Unit 
Although, the Government has already announced that the tax system of the Kyrgyz 
Republic is one of the most liberal among CIS, CAR in particular, the system structure 
is rather asymmetric, skewed towards corporate taxation. There are at least three 
distinct groups of taxpayers which should be treated separately. Individual taxation is a 
highly controlled system element as the majority of PIT and social security 
contributions is collected and paid by employers. Small enterprises and sole 
entrepreneurs are almost beyond tax control because of an informal economy, driven 
by cash transactions and spontaneous markets, with weak tax compliance and 
negligible street-level corruption.  
The tax authorities admit that such types of business activities as bazaar retailing, 
portable Mobile Top-Up Kiosks, Utility and Phone Payment Terminals, and IT 
networking are completely out of scope. The bazaar-related problem has also a social 
content as it does not ‗worth‘ to catch-up and claim a tax payment from senior or low-
income persons who try to sale-out the second-hand items or fruit and vegetables, 
grown on small land allotments owned by them, to sustain an income and to survive in 
everyday life. The poverty rate in Kyrgyzstan is still very high. The fast-growing IT and 
Internet-based business opportunities is a relatively new focus for Kyrgyz tax 
administration. Whether it is high collection cost or a lack of legal regulations, the STS 
has to close this loophole urgently. Hence, thoughtful tax policy and efficient 
administrative system should be put in place soon. 
In between of these two extremes lies the large corporate taxpayers sector – mainly, in 
Bishkek. More than a half of large taxpayers (165 out of 235) use full range of LTU‘s 
services. However, for the rest services are restricted to tax audits due to infrastructure 
limitations, such as lack of reliable post service, electronic filing of tax returns, and 
information support. In general, LTU‘s performance has been satisfactory – the office 
met the IMF‘s PRGF target of 60% as s share of total tax revenues, and mostly of its 
clients follow self-assessment procedures. Given such solid results, the LTU was 
chosen for piloting electronic filing and payments system. Before that, however, 
substantially investments were made to upgrade the in LTU‘s facilities and ICT system. 
Currently, LTU and the Bishkek Tax Office are moved to a new SBS building (ADB, 
2011c). 
Taxpayer Education and Services 
The tax service is making continual efforts to improve its relationship with the 
taxpayers, and the Taxpayer Service Department is the first place that these efforts 
start. As stated in the tax code of 2008 (Article 11), the principle of compliance is to 
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accept faithfulness until proved otherwise. With this principle in mind the STS has to 
design control measures that could help them to accept the fact that taxpayers are 
paying the right amount at the right time. It is hoped that the measures will encourage 
tax compliance, while ensuring the actions will be taken when violations are detected. 
At the same time, the reporting and filing procedures should also be reviewed to make 
sure that submitting reports at the local office is no more arduous than filing on-line.  
With the introduction of the One-Stop Shop, the taxpayers have an opportunity to fulfil 
both the tax and legal registration requirements – stated by the Ministry of Justice – at 
one place, which is of great benefit for the taxpayers. This has had a positive effect on 
lessening the initial contact between taxpayers and the STS – for instance, the VAT 
Invoices could be bought well over 12 months in advance before any control or audit 
contact is undertaken. The introduction of the Risk-Based Audit System and the VAT 
Invoice Control System will provide input data for analysing tax compliance, but with 
the State Tax Service‘s precaution that there is a huge amount of fraud activities, some 
extra control mechanism needs to be imposed.  
International experience has shown that when the fraud activities are causing great 
concern tax authorities might decide to introduce the Educational Visits as a method of 
preventing and discouraging the problem. For example, many developed countries, 
including Australia, Canada, UK and Austria, already have risk screening and some 
kind of educational contact with new taxpayers shortly after registration.  
The concept is to visit to the taxpayer premises by Taxpayer Service staff within the first 
6 weeks of registration to give a friendly advice about the requirements and procedures 
for taxpayer in order to make the reporting process as easy as possible. At the same 
time, of course for tax collection purposes, during a visit the staff would confirm that 
there is evidence of a legitimate business being carried out and the registration details 
given are correct. As this is not a tax audit, it is designed to assist the newly registered 
taxpayers to make sure that they have followed the right accounting procedures and 
understand their rights and obligations described in the tax code (USAID, 2013a).  
To minimize the use of resource, once staff has been trained and relevant procedures 
are developed, the visits should take not more than 1-2 hours. Well-defined processes 
and procedures would help to identify the new registrants and to schedule a visit for 
further actions. Before the visit, background cross-checks should be conducted looking 
for previous history with the tax authorities and other businesses, and evidence of 
disaggregation as part of a pre-visit preparation. Telephone contact can be used for the 
appointments to be made with an explanation about the purpose of the visit and a 
simple leaflet could be designed and issued along with the registration certificate 
explaining what assistance to expect that will be offered.  
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Taxpayer Registration  
As mentioned before, the One-Stop Shop has been set up to assist taxpayers in 
everyday transactions – and in that regard it has been successful. On the other hand, it 
appears that any background checking and looking for paper-based evidence of 
previous activities has been complicated and now the STS is making an effort to have 
any procedures in place to replace this and to move to electronic documents. Sadly, it 
became obvious after the Tulip Revolution in 2005 when the buildings of the Central 
Procurement Office and one of the rayon tax offices in Bishkek – the ‗First May‘ is the 
central and prestige rayon in Bishkek - have been burned out and all archive has been 
lost. With the support of the development partners – mainly, IMF, WB and ADB – the 
STS has built up a comprehensive database over the past years and now has an ability 
to do advance cross-checking of suspect registrants immediately after the registration 
details are entered. This together with the educational visit is another way to identify 
the fraudulent registration much more quickly than at present. The Tax Registration 
Department also has to find ways to be able to search all the information held by the 
various law enforcement agencies in order to identity bona-fide taxpayers. To conduct 
such due diligence analysis, the government plans to integrate STS‘s ITAS with others 
– mainly, the Minister of Finance, the Treasury, the Social Fund, the Customs Service, 
the Register Office, the Vehicle Agency. There may be problems with the exchange of 
information as well as with the compatibility of different databases, but this will allow to 
extend the search as wide as possible. 
As part of the ADB‘s Project on tax administration reform, it was proposed to complete 
the integration stage by the end of 2013. However, the Treasury and the Social Fund 
delayed the process every time the due date approached – the original start date has 
been changed several times in 2013 – claiming that their systems are not ready to be 
connected despite on-going reform in these agencies. The ADB‘s project manager was 
really concerned with this situation – as time passes the resources and IT personnel no 
longer will be available (Tax Expert 1). The project was successful completed in 
December 2013 with only this component put on hold. 
Due to so much discussion taking place regarding the loss of tax revenue because of 
the ‗false‘ registrations, the State Tax Service should urgently review the requirements 
for (de)registration, especially for VAT (USAID, 2013a). Any business claiming to be 
over the VAT threshold should at least be asked to provide some evidence to 
substantiate the genuine trade transactions as well as a full list of previous customers. 
As the problem appeared be so serious for the new registrants, even more extreme 
actions should be done restricting their VAT invoicing. For example, the extra evidence 
could be sought to investigate the legitimacy of business – before any VAT invoices are 
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issued. Another option could be to make the first three or six months after VAT 
registration a probationary period. With a reverse charge for registered customers and 
a VAT-inclusive amount for non-registered customers, the input-output system will be 
offset against the total VAT inputs incurred for confirmed purchases during the 
probationary period. These proposed approaches would need specific processes and 
procedures to be further developed and probably changes in the respective law acts. In 
the same sense, the compulsory de-registration after two consecutive stop-filing 
periods seems not really like a penalty for the delinquent taxpayer. In fact, there is a 
possibility that this will rather encourage the fraudulent activity – as it takes so long for 
STS to respond, the business can simply disappear and go under the radar. Hence, 
other Stop Filer actions are needed besides waiting for deregistration period to be 
finished. Following the international ‗best practices‘ for a taxpayer deregistration due to 
closing down or changing ownership, firstly the Taxpayer Registration Department 
should prepare and issue final reports for the taxpayers to finalize their total liability. 
Once these reports are received, the Tax Audit Department can carry out a last audit to 
check if the tax statements and declarations were correct and full payment has been 
received. Only then, the Registration Department will complete the deregistration 
process and relieve the taxpayer of their tax obligations. Until that, the taxpayers are 
still registered and still subject to all the tax liabilities upon their registration. The action 
plan for this approach should be carefully designed to ensure that the timelines are 
specific and that each functional division involved understands their responsibilities and 
their role in the whole process. On the other hand, it was a cry among the taxpayers 
regarding the ‗draconian‘ deregistration requirements in Kyrgyzstan – it is much easier 
to setup a new business then to liquidate and deregister an existing one and to pay all 
the tax liabilities, especially if the final tax payment is calculated based on the net 
equity value from the liquidation balance sheet (Taxpayer 8). 
Taxpayer Identification Number 
An interesting one-year experiment was conducted in the tax office in the October 
Rayon, one of the four rayon tax offices in Bishkek. A unique Tax Identification Number 
(TIN) generated by a computer was assigned to each corporate taxpayer registered in 
FY1992-1993 in order to monitor tax compliance of each company. On-site 
observations of the USAID experts have confirmed that the project was quite 
successful at that point of time and may be extended nationwide (USAID, 1993).  
Within one or two days after tax registration, a taxpayer should receive a notification 
letter and information guidebook which includes a list of taxes to which the enterprise is 
subject to pay, taxpayer‘s calendar with important due dates, and requisites of a 
commercial bank approved to collect tax payments on the Regional Treasury 
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Department (RTD) accounts. If the taxpayers move from one jurisdiction to another, 
they will take a permanent ID number with them, this will allow to easily trace cross-
regional cash flows within the country. The 12-digits identification number is issued 
chronologically and sequentially, and should be used in all financial and accounting 
documents as a reference for tax purposes. Failure to display a correct TIN, tax code, 
purpose of payment or bank details could result in delay of tax payments with pending 
tax penalties and fees. 
Initially, a computer expert from the headquarter of the State Tax Inspectorate helped to 
establish a Management Information System (MIS) and provided a series of computer-
skills trainings to rayon employees. Hence, the organizational structure of the October 
Rayon‘s tax inspectorate has been changed to accommodate the computer staff, who 
also monitored the accuracy of tax calculations and collections. 
Following the success of the October Rayon experiment, the computerized network of 
master file systems was established at the state, oblast, and rayon levels. The new 
MIS created a basis for communication between the central tax office and regional 
inspectorates and linked master files of all levels in one database to safeguard the 
integrity of the system and to efficiently monitor the large body of taxpayers. The 
identification numbering system was designed to provide data for tax monitoring 
process and not aimed to collect extensive demographic or social data about the 
taxpayer. In this sense, the simple and centralized Northern American model was 
particularly appropriate for a small country like Kyrgyzstan, instead of a very complex 
and highly decentralized German or Swedish system.   
Tax Filing 
The recent edition of the tax code allows the taxpayers to submit financial statements 
and tax forms online via Internet which is convenient to both tax administrators and 
taxpayers (Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2008, Article 28). From January 1, 
2011, the STS provided opportunity to all taxpayers to subscribe for electronic 
document exchange service. In order to use this service, a taxpayer has to receive a 
free USB-key and special software compliant with a very popular financial accounting 
program ‗1С-Bugalteria.‘ Then, the taxpayer will be able to transfer a report from the 
accounting program already used or create a new document from templates provided, 
encrypt a file sealed with an electronic signature and send directly to the tax office 
through protected communication channels in 24/7 regime. Even more, there is an 
option to re-submit a corrected or adjusted report later. The service operator 
guarantees the confidentiality and security of documents transmitted, and bears legal 
responsibility for this operation. At the next step, a message will be generated by the 
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service operator with an exact submission date and a letter from a tax administrator 
confirming file integrity. If these notification messages will not be received within two 
days, the taxpayer has to file an enquiry to the service operator. According to the 
Electronic Document and Electronic Digital Signature Law, an e-document with an 
electronic signature has the same legal effect as a paper-based version. Still, this 
practice is relatively new for Kyrgyzstan and taxpayers need time to adapt to new 
practice (Tax Officer 1). Today, the e-filing is optional and taxpayers are able to submit 
the paper returns directly to a tax office.     
Tax Audit  
The Tax Audit Department has to cope with a change in culture due to introduction of 
the risk-based audit system and the ITAS, including Automated VAT Invoice Control 
System and Automated Property Tax System. Both systems are designed to take away 
human factor in an attempt to put in place a systematic identification of risks, increase 
the efficiency of the core tasks of tax audit, and also reduce corruption. However, it is 
not clear to what extend the tax inspectors have been trained about the risk-based 
selection process and the risk criteria used. With these systems installed, the State Tax 
Service has to make sure that the tax inspectors are prepared to use such new tools 
and techniques. The Audit Manuals should be updated to reflect new procedures 
developed to help them to deal with any mismatches, as well as to cope with any 
challenges, when the final blocks of the MIS system will go live – presumably, at the 
beginning of 2014. A well-written manual is essential to assist tax inspectors to exercise 
their role in effective and efficient way. Of course, training program should be carried 
out – a series of the Training-of-Trainers (TOT) seminars have already been conducted 
for the Central Tax Office and the regional offices on its way – but a good audit manual 
explaining all preparation and execution procedures is a valuable asset.  
The other tasks of the tax audit department are less clearly defined, probably because 
of the overlap with other law enforcement agencies like the Financial Police and the 
Economic Prosecution Office – mainly in identifying violations to tax laws. With the 
persistent reluctance of taxpayers to declare their true financial results and submit 
certified financial statements, more should be done to check their financial position – at 
this point the topical audit could be a good approach. Numerous evidence is available 
when taxpayers underreport turnovers in order to avoid the VAT threshold, or even 
choose their own tax regime, with little monitoring of their real status by the State Tax 
Service. The problem with fraudulent invoice is not helped by lack of follow-up with the 
recipients, as well as absence of any habit by taxpayers to request the receipts. That is 
why, the STS demands all taxpayers to use cash machines in their retail transactions –
the special models with memory.  The central office also often organizes the lottery, 
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prize-draws and rewards for customers collected the highest amount of receipts hoping 
to improve the culture among taxpayers. 
As the shadow economy is relatively big in Kyrgyzstan, the audit department has to 
come up with well-developed policies and action plans to confront this problem. The tax 
offices responsible for finding and registering non-filers, cross-checking their 
background, or establishing the liabilities of stop-filers, should know exactly what to do 
and whom to contact with when some violations are discovered, especially if not within 
their duties. In many countries, by contrast, the problem of the shadow economy and 
registration of non-filers lays not within the responsibility of the department. Instead, the 
STS has to identify the problematic issues and then assign them to a specific 
department. That department will then develop a communication strategy to ensure 
that knowledge is shared and actions are coordinated, as necessary. A complete 
review of the strategies should be undertaken and decisions should be made about 
which department has to deal with what issue and how any task that is not within their 
scope should be passed to the appropriate department.  
The question of VAT fraud and false invoices is always of high priority for tax audit. 
These cases should be analysed, and appropriate processes and procedures should 
be set-up to reduce the opportunity for it to continue. The audit office should be 
proactive in producing and introducing new techniques – especially for the field tax 
offices as they identify trends and actions that will further affect the true liability and 
declaration. In a refined organization structure, the functional divisions at the Central 
Tax Office should be in charge for developing relevant processes and procedures – 
including the internal manuals and strategic plans – rather than the general 
Methodology Department, as at present in Kyrgyzstan. Indeed, the functional divisions 
are closer to the real needs of both the tax officers and taxpayers, than a detached 
Methodology Department with a more methodological approach.  
In fact, the treatment of stop-filers is not clearly defined. As the non-filing of the tax 
reports in the first or second period could be an indication of the possible pseudo 
business and fraud invoice activities, it should be considered as an audit task and the 
tax audit department should take a lead to organize quick responses for these cases. 
In addition, the USAID REFORMA Project proposed an amendment to the tax code to 
make VAT taxpayers responsible for checking the authenticity of their suppliers VAT 
registration (USAID, 2013a). In this regard, if the faithful taxpayers have taken all 
possible steps to check authenticity, they could not be disadvantaged by VAT input 
credit being refused or denied.  
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Tax Refund  
The difficulties that the STS is having with tax refunds and repayments are similar to 
the problems that the tax administrations experience in most developing countries. 
First, there is a lack of cash in the state budget – not enough to pay out the tax refunds. 
Second, it seems like a great deal for tax offices to return excess VAT inputs without 
very detailed documentary check to verify the accuracy and reliability of the amount 
requested (USAID, 2013a). The shortage of money in the budget system is generally 
due to the fact that the VAT refunds and other tax repayments are considered to be an 
expenditure rather than a balancing account in the government accounting system – 
that should be an integral part of the VAT regime. The threat of fraudulent refunds is 
visible in Kyrgyzstan as in all VAT-operating countries but there must be systems 
installed and actions taken to detect and prevent these massive attacks on the VAT 
system. The areas at risk should be identified and analysed and procedures developed 
to cope with these risks on a regular basis.  
At present, the current filing procedures are demanding and the list of documents 
required to satisfy the application for VAT refund is extensive, but in compliance with 
the tax laws (Tax Expert 4, Tax Consultant 3). There appears to be little flexible when it 
comes to the refund procedures, and the tax officers have little incentives to do 
anything but require a full list of all necessary documents to be presented – even if 
some of them could be completely irrelevant for a particular taxpayer. It looks like a 
tradition within the STS to reject invoices, identify technical errors and simply disallow 
the whole application. The series of verifications the application has to go through if it is 
over KGS 300,000 is exhaustive with each stage trying to disallow the claim. The 
causes of abuse of the invoice system should be identified and then the STS has to 
develop procedures to tackle this situation at the earliest time. The solution is not to 
impose more obligations on all taxpayers and artificially inflate tax revenues – some of 
them do make legitimate claims.  
The STS should review, and probably reengineer, the whole repayment process in 
order to identify any bottlenecks that block all the decisions and procedures. This could 
be also repeated in an exclusive manner for VAT refunds. Any new procedures should 
be clarifies and developed so that the provisions of the law are maintained but 
opportunities for amendment or revision are available at the first review. The cases of 
the VAT invoice frauds should be analysed in details so that new measures of control 
and monitoring can be developed to identify potential cases of fraud and take early 
action to stop it. The continual increase of so-called ‗overpayments‘ for other taxes 
should be analysed, as well. The STS should be able to separate the various types of 
tax returns and overpayments that already contributed to the grand total. Once this has 
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been achieved it will then be possible to start developing methods or procedures to 
solve the problem. In practice, the other reason for tax rebates could be errors in the 
ITAS when taxpayers use wrong TIN in tax forms or enter incorrect code for tax 
payments – as instructed, each type of taxes has its own unique code. As a result, the 
entire payment could be allocated to different taxes or end-up in the ‗uncategorized‘ 
folder. The procedure to reclaim these payments is routine and complicated. 
Interestingly, there was anecdotal evidence during the execution of the ADB‘s project 
when the STS eventually decided to drop the Errors Correction block from proposed 
functional structure assuming that this element will be unnecessary. Consequently, 
after facing an enormous amount of ‗unclassified‘ payments from ‗unidentified‘ 
taxpayers, the block was successfully returned and implemented later (Tax Expert 1).  
Enforced Collection 
The responsibility for the Enforced Collection Department is to collect the tax arrears 
from taxpayers, as assessed and calculated by the STS. The enforced collection is the 
final stage in the control of taxpayers – so, its manual guidelines and procedures 
should be clearly defined and effectively implemented. At present, however, the 
enforced collection regime is rather confusing and overloaded with too much 
procedures and a lack of direction. In particular, the identification of tax arrears and 
stop-filers is brought together and the processes are set up in such a way that 
produces problems for implementing a routine procedure for enforcement or combat 
the stop-filers. Meanwhile, the Enforced Collection Department should not be in charge 
for assessing the assumed unpaid taxes generated in the shadow economy – but, 
currently, it seems to be the case. Overall, the enforced collection regime gains very 
little power – except for collecting a debt from the taxpayers bank accounts or go to 
court for permission to hold and sale their assets and property. The STS also needs to 
develop more effective management structure and filing system than are currently used 
(Tax Officers 6, 7). The inability to identify stop filers at early stages and employ an 
automated system for tax arrears is causing significant challenges. The enforced 
collection function should be organized in a manner that will produce clear instructions 
to the local offices and ensure that performance is monitored and actions are taken 
when targets are not met.  
The department should have the ability to develop an action plan to monitor and control 
the debts and arrears of taxpayers. It is widely agreed that the sooner a debt is 
identified and action taken to recover it, the better the chance of successfully collection. 
With this in mind, the department should be reorganized in a way that supports the 
local offices in their tasks and also allows them to identify recent trends – as a result, 
they will be able to take quick actions or develop new policies in order to detect and 
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confront any new taxpayer behaviours. It is also recommended that the department‘s 
structure includes such divisions as the Enforced Collection Policy, Enforced Collection 
Planning, Debt and Collection Technical Inspection, and Liaison with Legal and 
Personnel Department. While not all of these divisions may be incorporated into the 
STS‘s Enforced Collection Department at this time, these functions should be in place 
so that the local tax offices can carry out their responsibilities in a regular, routine and 
systematic way. If the reliable assessment system will be adopted, this could lead to 
substantial increase of enforcement cases – hence, a sound and effective process 
should be in place in order to take timely actions at each stage of the tax arrears 
collection. In brief, a complete review of the main responsibilities of a reorganized 
Enforced Collection Department should be undertaken to ensure the methods and 
procedures of the routine systematic collections regime are developed and reviewed, 
including bank account freezing or withdrawal actions. 
Human Resources Management  
The deficiency of skilled professionals was, and remains, a major problem in the 
administrative system of the Kyrgyz Republic which the new political leaders as well as 
development partners failed to properly address. And the legacy of the Soviet Union 
contributed to this situation a lot (Tax Expert 3, Academic 1). Raised in the command 
economy, political officials and bureaucrats of the centrally-planned regime were 
trained to follow the directives from the central government in Moscow and implement 
its policies, but not to design and develop them. Following independence, the 
bureaucracy remains the same, just change its shape to fit the new political regime. 
Unsurprisingly, the political-administrative elite in the independent Kyrgyzstan 
happened to comprise of the same members of the old nomenclatura (Tax Expert 5). 
Given the lack of experience of local politicians and civil servants with a market 
economy and democratic governance, as well as limited expertise in policy analysis 
and program evaluation, their decisions have been heavily relied on personal 
subjectivity – predominantly, in top-down direction. As a result, such decision-making 
process is not only of poor quality and lacks of public support, but it is also vulnerable 
to misuse by government authorities for personal benefits. This gap was partly filled by 
expertise of the development partners and their experts who provided policy advice on 
key issues, even though they did not always have adequate knowledge of the local 
context.  
The cadre system underwent drastic changes with the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
weakening the ideological position of the Communist Party. While the nomenclatura 
has also been officially disintegrated, its members continue to, and will do, work in the 
public institutions, although not always on the same position. During the previous 
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regime, the Communist Party has carefully selected, trained, and appointed the local 
cadres, whom it later monitored and controlled through official, and unofficial, channels 
– the service of public informants was widely encouraged (Baimyrzaeva, 2010). In the 
early 1990s, due to unstable political and economic situation, the leaders of the new 
government preferred to select their subordinates, and form their teams, from whom 
they know and trust the most – hence, relatives and friends. Moreover, in the absence 
of the tight control by the Communist Party, it was also much easier for them to 
intervene into hiring process. As a result, the new appointments were often based on 
kinship and friendship rather than according to the merit-based principles. Soon, it 
became a common practice when higher-level officials securing government positions 
for their relatives and close friends through direct orders or other forms of influence – 
mainly, personal favours and bribes. Such appointment practice penetrated the whole 
government – down to the lowest levels of hieratical system. This pattern has been 
further strengthened over time, and has a negative effect on the quality of the 
government‘s decision-making and capacity building, as well as on morale and 
discipline in public institutions. Business community is also familiar with this patron-
client practice referring to protection offered by high-level officials against excessive 
attention of the tax offices and other law enforcement bodies, of course in exchange of 
substantial monetary compensations. At the same time, the top leaders of the country 
began to openly trade the high-end positions in the newly-formed government. The 
sectoral ministries and revenue collection agencies are at the top of the list. There is a 
rumour that this was the one source of income for the president Akaev‘s family, and 
later the Bakiev‘s family. Ironically, the government ends-up appointing the same 
persons but on different positions – despite the fact that some of them already lost their 
credentials on the previous position and some of them simply lack of appropriate 
background and skills to fill the job.  
In the newly independent Kyrgyz Republic that creates a virtuous circle of corruption - 
just appointed officials did their best to recover their ‗investments‘ throughout the 
vertical structure of the organization. This places enormous pressure on middle and 
low-level managers and the latter place the same request on the customers – that is, 
the taxpayers. To prevent this practice, the STS tends to rotate the tax managers 
between different departments on (bi)annual basis. The tax personnel are also required 
to pass the annual attestation as well as to take a series of training courses at the 
STS‘s Learning Centre. As an extreme solution, the prime minister proposed to use ‗lie-
detectors‘ in hiring and attestation of all civil servants. However, it is unclear whether 
the polygraph had have any impact on senior management‘s decisions.  
Besides mandatory attestation, the STS‘s top management also wanted to assess the 
overall knowledge of tax employees about forthcoming institutional reform. The ADB 
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conducted the Tax Administration Survey in 2010 as part of pre-project evaluation, 
which delivered rather disappointing results – in majority, the middle and low-level staff 
had no idea about why and how the tax administration system should be reformed (Tax 
Expert 1). Hence, the tax authorities should establish clear informational channels 
within the organization in attempt to deliver clear messages to all levels and all tax 
offices. 
At the time to reform the tax administration system and make crucial, and urgent, 
strategic decisions, there is a sharp need for professionals with policy-making and 
analytical skills. Meanwhile, the STS experiences serious difficulties in retaining such 
high-skills specialists – the low salary and insufficient compensation package, typical 
for all public servants, and stressful environment amongst the main reasons (Tax 
Officer 8). A few specialists who have appropriate skills, expertise, and knowledge may 
be no longer available – some of them left the country, others moved to the private 
sector or work in the international organizations. With the lack of locally-trained 
specialists, decisions about tax reform have been made with the assistance of foreign 
advisers and experts supplied by the international organizations and donors. Those 
advisers were often unaware of country context and local realities that have sometimes 
contributed to the adoption of inappropriate reform programs. And Kyrgyzstan has to 
live with the consequences of such reforms. Interestingly, one of the local tax experts 
expresses a very negative opinion about the help provided by the development 
partners – it will be much better for the country if the government did not follow any of 
the foreign advises and built the tax system from scratch (Tax Expert 3).  
Overall, the participants of this research admitted the growing competence both of tax 
officers and taxpayers. For example, as mentioned by the CTC‘ chair, all of the tax 
inspectors enrolled in the training programs passed the comprehensive exam with a 
very high score – in comparison with the previous years. Since the introduction of the 
tax code and IFRS in 1990s, the financial accountants and auditors gained enough 
experience to deal with the tax officials‘ decisions in professional and legal way – in 
fact, the financial accountants became so highly-qualified and experienced that this 
seized any possibilities for corruption and unlawful payments (Taxpayer 1, Tax Officers 
2, 5, 6, 9). The STS also reached the point of understanding that the partnership 
between the tax administration and civil society is possible and vital for high 
performance of tax service. As a result, the tax code of 2008 was developed in 
cooperation with the civil society organizations – in fact, the tax code has been 
recognized as the most liberal in the post-Soviet space. In addition, the Public Advising 
Council was set up for the STS in 2010 which urged the necessity to reform the current 
tax administrative system and provided recommendations to implementing donors (Tax 
Consultants 1, 3, 4). Not surprisingly, according to the first Taxpayer Survey conducted 
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by centre ‗El-Pikir‘ on behalf of the ADB in 2013, the respondents rated the overall 
progress of tax administration reform above average (Tax Expert 1). On the wave of 
on-going tax reform, the STS welcomes the inputs from all stakeholders and interesting 
parties, however there are a lot of barriers to overcome. Still, the participation of civil 
society in tax affairs is relatively low, and the twenty years of reforms is not enough to 
change the attitude of taxpayers toward the STS and produce a new generation of 
ambitious and critical thinking professionals. 
Corruption 
It is expected that the good governance could reduce the costs of corruption. 
Corruption in tax administration is caused by variety of factors which aggregate effects 
have a negative impact on behaviour of major players and their motivations, and, 
hence, create opportunities for corrupt practices (Table 5.5.4). Driven by desire to 
protect their influence and control over the tax system, the key stakeholders might 
attempt to maintain the ‗status quo‘ resisting to any changes in the tax structure. Even 
tax officials could be strongly opposed to tax reform as they will loose the most from 
the simplification of complicated tax regulations and procedures. Of particular interest 
is that such deliberate strategy by tax servants to facilitate corruption would seriously 
damage ‗state-society‘ relationship – in particular, violate the social contract between 
the government and taxpayers. Citizens, in general, are against corruption and their 
disrespect for tax laws may pose a greater incentive to avoid paying taxes (Tax Expert 
3, Tax Consultant 3, Taxpayers 1, 3, 4, 6, Academic 4). Therefore, morality of tax 
officers is an important source of government trustworthiness – thereby, the legitimacy 
of the government. 
The government took firm steps towards comprehensive tax administration reform – 
the STS introduced the performance measurement system to institutionalize 
performance evaluation for staff members and incorporated revenue targets as well as 
quality and service indicators. Furthermore, the development agencies provided 
assistance in setting the goals and managing performance. Institutional capacity-
building, human resource management, and change management are the main tool in 
this endeavour. This will ensure that the STS does not rely only on technical update of 
equipment and software, but also employs complementary measures to improve its 
performance. Key performance indicators should include measures that will motivate 
the staff to improve the quality of services provided to taxpayers, such as the 
establishment of taxpayer education and services department, which became part of 
the STS’s Development Strategy for 2015-2017. Finally, in line with the World Bank and 
IMF recommendations, the STS intends to cut off compliance costs – including the 
losses due to informal sector and corruption – through the adoption of risk-based audit 
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system and reduction in number of arguable inspections, hence improving the business 
environment.  
To address the problem that the World Bank highlighted in its analytical report on the 
progress of the anticorruption policy in transition economies (Anderson and Gray, 
2006) – that is, the anticorruption efforts have been focused on changes in legislature 
with inadequate attention paid to implementation and enforcement – the ADB proposed 
a twofold approach to combating corruption in tax administration (Figure 5.5.17).  
Firstly, the Tax Code of 2008 made changes in tax legislation, and then the ADB‘s 
project on tax administration will ensure its proper implementation. In this sense, this is 
an innovative approach to improving governance and minimizing corruption in tax 
administration. In contrast to previous repressive approach, which often has only 
limited short-term effect, the reform program was designed to create built-in control to 
minimize opportunities for corruption. In addition, automated system and e-reporting 
will help to reduce contact hours between taxpayers and STS. Meanwhile, the central 
database and data exchange within integrated inter-agencies ICT system will enhance 
taxpayers monitoring and verification of data, as well as data accuracy and 
accessibility.  
The government and STS established Public Advising Council aimed to consult with 
relevant government agencies and private sector stakeholders – such as taxpayers, 
business associations, and international organizations – in order to minimize corruption 
and to practice good governance and transparency. With an active support of the 
committee, the STS Development Strategy for 2015-2017 was finally produced, and 
reforming tax administration is also in the agenda of the National Sustainable 
Development Strategy for 2013-2017. 
Risk-Based Tax Audit 
Recent years have witnessed major reforms in tax administration as government 
strives to better allocate scarce resources in order to optimise a tax system. Central to 
these reforms has been the establishment of business-like corporate governance 
practices, including taxpayer‘s self-assessment and voluntary compliance, promotion of 
risk management principles, functional structure of tax offices, equity and fairness 
concepts, focus on specialization, and client segmentation of the tax base (Khwaja et 
al., 2011: 2). As a result, tax authorities have given considerable attention to the 
development of a modern risk management system in a tax compliance context. 
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Figure 5.5.17. Tax Administration: Problem Tree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ADB 2007. Kyrgyz Republic: Tax Administration Reform and Modernization 
Project Reports and Recommendations of the President Manila, Philippines: 
Asian Development Bank, p. 22. 
Fragile economic growth and high poverty rate 
Tax revenues insufficient to ensure macroeconomic stability 
while financing priority development spending 
Inefficient tax administration with insufficient capacity 
for modern operations 
Inadequate 
equipment and 
infrastructure 
Inadequate staff 
skills 
Inefficient 
operating 
framework 
Weaknesses in 
tax policy 
Develop central 
database and 
management 
information system 
Develop 
communication 
infrastructure for 
tax offices 
Establish modern 
central facilities 
Develop staff skills 
in modern tax 
administration, 
basic and 
advanced ICT 
skills, data 
management, and 
business analytics 
Implement reform 
strategy 
Build capacity for 
best practices in 
tax administration 
Establish goal 
setting and 
performance 
management 
system 
Implement change 
management 
program 
Adopt and 
implement new 
Tax Code 
ADB project grant support 
and technical assistance 
 
IMF and DFID 
advice on 
drafting Tax Code 
 
  274 
Taxpayers are considered to be non-compliant if they do not meet any of the main 
requirements with registering, filing, reporting, or remitting of tax liabilities. Non-
compliance may be due to actions of taxpayers as well as weaknesses in a tax 
administration. In addition, taxpayers may technically satisfy all obligations, but their 
compliance will be in question because of interpretational differences in legislation 
across jurisdictions. In this case, the effect of tax system clarity of the taxation law 
represents a category of risk to be addressed either by changing the tax law or the way 
in which it is administered.  
In general, compliance risk management is a structured and systematic process for 
identification, assessment, ranking, and treatment of tax compliance, consisted of well-
defined steps to support strategic and operational decision-making. The process 
framework of this kind will help the tax administration to respond quickly to changing 
environments, identify major drivers of taxpayer behaviour, promote diversity in 
treatment strategies with a focus on activities of the highest priority, and establish a 
basis for evidence-based evaluation and strategic planning (OECD, 2004b: 8-9). 
It may be sounded paradoxical that the primary goal of tax administration is not only to 
collect taxes, but to manage and improve compliance with tax laws and sustain 
community confidence in a tax system and its administration. To that extend, the failure 
of taxpayers to comply with the law has been historically addressed only through tax 
audit and enforcement programs. While audit is still the main treatment of non-
compliance, the tax administration begins to recognize that there are other factors 
influencing the taxpayer behaviour. In this regard, the administration has to gain an 
understanding of what causes underlying non-compliance behaviour, rather that 
treating symptoms with a ‗single action‘ strategy (OECD, 2004a). 
STS has implemented a risk-based audit system in 2010, which will significantly reduce 
compliance costs for taxpayers, optimize efficiency and effectiveness of tax 
administration, and remove a barrier to growth and development for SMEs in the 
Kyrgyz Republic. Since the audit selection process was conducted randomly based on 
the subjective judgment of tax authorities, the effectiveness and fairness of taxpayer 
selection process was exclusively depend on professionalism of tax auditors. The 
reliable risk criteria will help tax administration to be selective in detecting tax evaders 
and allow easing burden of compliant taxpayers, which will have fewer interactions with 
tax officials. IFC‘s Investment Climate Advisory Services Project provided a technical 
assistance including support with the risk assessment methodology and developing 
comprehensive databases and IT software.  
The decision to introduce a risk-based system involves changing the way how the tax 
agency is dealing with taxpayers and requires developing a strong partnership between 
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taxpayers and tax administrators. The risked-based audit will allow the STS to reduce 
arbitrary audit selection and to save time and resources by focusing on high-risk 
taxpayers first. Moreover, the tax audit department is enable to keep the risk factors 
updated on annual basis and to make regular corrections to the running algorithm (Tax 
Officer 2). 
It is evidential that risk-based tax assessment system can be successfully implemented 
in countries with limited technical resources. However, data collection and analysis are 
at the heart of risk-based audits, and tax administration capacity in data management 
is crucial for prolonged success. Regional experience with risk management system 
has shown that there are numerous political, institutional, technical and cultural 
challenges towards fully-operational risk-based system. In fact, the use of risk 
management as a compliance tool (Figure 5.5.18) involves risk identification, analysis, 
assessment and prioritization, and finally treatment and evaluation (OECD, 2004b). 
1. Establishing the Context. Recognizing the operating context, focusing on 
compliance risks, monitoring the external environment, shaping internal capability. 
2. Identifying Risks. Starting with the big picture, identifying strategic and operational 
risks, narrowing the perspective, segmenting the market, recognizing a continuum 
of risk, using relevant indicators to identify risks, evaluating success in identifying 
risk. 
3. Assessing and Prioritising Risks. Establishing a sound framework for assessment, 
prioritizing risks, managing data and information requirements, utilizing data 
analysis tools. 
4. Analysing Compliance Behaviour. Establishing a forward program for treatment, 
understanding what influences taxpayer behaviour, recognizing a spectrum of 
compliance behaviour, discovering what drives specific behaviour, looking behind 
symptoms to causes.  
5. Determining the Treatment Strategies. Developing a balanced program based on 
sound principles, building community confidence, improving compliance, seeking 
additional leverage, escalating the severity of enforcement. 
6. Applying the Strategies. Building treatment capability, demonstrating efficient use of 
resources, engaging stakeholders in implementation, ensuring effective execution  
7. Evaluating the Outcomes. Planning for meaningful evaluation, developing an 
evaluation framework, carrying out the evaluation, recognizing the difficulties of 
evaluating compliance. 
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A point system will be used by STS to assess the risk level of taxpayers, similar to 
credit-rating system used by banks in evaluation of credit risk. The points will be 
assigned based on the possibility of a breach of the tax laws, where a low score 
indicates a low level of risk. The taxpayer scorecard includes a list of seven standard 
risk factors, described in a new tax code as follows (Government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, 2008, Article 101): 
1. Discrepancy between data declared by taxpayers and data collected and retained 
by governmental agencies at the point of registration 
2. Submission of the financial statements with losses 
3. Taxpayer burden is lower than the sectoral average by 25% or more 
4. Contradiction between financial indicators reported by a taxpayer with cross-
examination of other similar taxpayers 
5. Corrected financial statements and notes are not submitted upon a request of the 
Desk Audit Office 
6. Decrease in the estimated advance payment of CIT 
7. Other risk criteria used by the Field Audit Office. 
Based on a score received, a taxpayer will be allocated to high-risk, medium-risk, or 
low-risk category. By default, all large taxpayers are automatically designated as Group 
1 ‗High Risk Taxpayers,‘ which is already under a full surveillance of the LTU (Tax 
Officer 10). Each risk category (Groups 2-5) will be treated differently by local tax 
offices based on required frequency of audits and resources availability. In Kazakhstan, 
for example, the Tax Committee of the Ministry of Finance monitors the performance of 
high-risk taxpayers annually, medium-risk category is reviewed once in three years, 
and low-risk taxpayers will enjoy a regular check-up every five years. In terms of 
resource allocation, the distribution formula is 80% for high-risk, 15% for medium-risk, 
and 5% for low-risk taxpayers. Taking into account the risk assessment methodology, 
the quarterly audit plans will be delivered to the local STS offices at least 15 days in 
advance. The taxpayers, selected for audit according to their risk score (Groups 2-4), 
will appear in the first part of a plan. The rest of taxpayers (Group 5) will be a subject of 
random audits with a sample size of 5%. While the first half of the audit plan will not be 
disclosed to general public under any circumstances, the second part will be publicly 
available and placed as an open-source document on the STS‘s web-site and 
information boards (Tax Officer 2).  
Annual Audit Schedule is prepared by the HQ to determine a number of resources 
required to conduct the anticipated tax audit for a next fiscal year. The Risk-Based Tax 
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Audits Planning Department has the responsibility for annual revision of risk scoring 
criteria and recommending any changes based on trends uncovered by risk analysis. 
By October 31, the specialists of Risk Analysis and Scoring Section have to review the 
audit reports for a period of last 12 months and to make a decision whether 
adjustments should be made to the weights for any of the risk factors. After a 
management approval, the new risk factor weights will be tested to generate a 
preliminary annual audit schedule. The weighing factors are treated as secret 
information and cannot be shared except risk management staff dealing with the 
algorithm. For security reason the computer used for production of an audit list is 
completely autonomous and not connected to any office computers. Once the 
algorithm is operational and the risk weights are confirmed, the risk analysis 
department will input the taxpayer data into a risk management system to run a 
program. As a result, an audit list of taxpayers by risk order will be created. It is even 
possible to sort the scored output by size of taxpayer, date of last audit, type of taxes 
and economic activity. The main body of the list of audit cases is then segregated by 
regions and presented to the central office for a final clearance. If a taxpayer has 
recently being monitored, a case is not a subject for audit this cycle. Next, a copy of the 
final audit schedule and tax returns will be transmitted to a relevant city and rayon 
regional office. However, local taxes will be included to the list only upon special 
request from a head of regional office. Each office will assign audit cases to tax 
auditors based on individual workload and the quarterly audit plan. If there is possibility 
for a conflict of interest (tax officer‘s relatives, friends), the tax audit certificate should 
be issued to another inspector. As part of pre-audit procedure, the tax inspector has to 
retrieve a taxpayer risk profile (audit history, tax returns, financial reports, appeal file), 
check the taxpayer‘s filing and payment status and consult external sources, notably 
the Customs Service, Sate Motor Vehicle Inspection, State Registrar and Land 
Records. Therefore, cooperation between governmental agencies is vital to enhance 
tax compliance, and the effectiveness of risk management depends on the use of ITAS. 
Yet, the key challenges are creation of reliable intergraded databases in data-scarce 
and low-capacity environments, coordination between and within governmental 
agencies to harmonize data, and building understanding of the risk-based system 
among tax officials and the private sector counterparts. The Annual Audit Plan is an 
integral part of the Strategic Planning Cycle in the State Tax Service. If necessary, the 
relevant adjustments to the strategic plan may be made as a result of on-going 
changes in the audit operational plan with a reference to the strategic objectives (ADB, 
2009). 
Tax administration plays an important role in ensuring that the overall level of non-
compliance with tax law is kept to a minimum. In practice, there are many factors that 
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complicate achieving the best compliance outcomes as possible. The tax compliance 
literature identifies at least two approaches that can be valuable in terms of 
understanding what is influencing taxpayer behaviour (James et al., 2001).  
 Economic Factors. Financial burden, compliance cost, incentives and disincentives.  
 Behavioural Factors. Individual differences (gender, age, education, moral 
compass, industry, personality, circumstances, and personal assessment of risk), 
perceived inequity, perception of minimal risk, and risk taking.  
The empirical findings of the economic psychologist Paul Webley (2004) are also in 
alignment with these factors, confirming that the main reasons for non-compliant 
behaviour are perceived fairness and equity of a taxation system, opportunity for non-
compliance, individual differences, social norms, and dissatisfaction with tax 
authorities. Despite the scarcity of research in this area, the OECD Forum on Tax 
Administration‘s Compliance Sub-group has offered a BISEP Model – Business, 
Industry, Sociological, Economic and Psychological – as an aid to deeper 
understanding of behavioural drivers towards non-compliance and to categorising them 
in a consistent manner. The factors identified in this model of taxpayer influences in 
combination with different values, beliefs and attitudes may cause the individual or 
corporate taxpayers to adopt a particular ‗motivational posture‘ in relation to a tax 
authority and the tax system as a whole (Figure 5.5.19) It is important to mention that 
the four attitudes to compliance, such as disengagement, resistance, trying to comply, 
and full support, are not fixed attributes, and a taxpayer is able to adopt any of them at 
different times depending on circumstances. Thus, the model is robust enough to be 
used by the tax administration in selection and development of targeted treatment 
strategies which will motivate voluntary compliance and discourage specific non-
compliant behaviour.  
5.6. International Development Agencies 
The key assumption of the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model is that the government of a 
single country is taken as its framework. In practice, this is already a major over-
simplification, because, as noted in Chapter 1, international organizations and donors 
play important role in tax reform in countries in transition. Nonetheless, the main reform 
decisions are formally made by national governments, even if they proceed under the 
significant influence of the development partners like the World Bank, IMF, ADB, DFID 
and USAID. That is why the wider network of international development agencies is not 
part of the model. Nowadays, the topic of a role of the international partners in tax 
reform is one of the most hotly debated in the tax policy literature, and the conclusions 
are in great contrast – most of the early studies seeking to explore the impact of aid on 
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tax effort in country-recipients reported that aid discourages tax collection across 
countries, while others highlighted that this result of a negative correlation between aid 
and taxation is not robust and there is strong evidence that the impact is context-
specific and dependent on the capacity of particular institution. This part will describe 
the main organizations and programs at work in the Kyrgyz Republic. It will also identify 
key issues that require close attention if donors are aimed to improve the quality of 
their support for the tax reform.  
5.6.1. International (and Regional) Agencies  
Recent decades have witnessed a rapidly growing interest amongst a wide range of 
bilateral aid agencies, regional development banks, and other international institutions 
in building effective tax systems in the developing world, which reflects a concern for 
domestic revenue collection to finance public goods, as well as recognition of the 
centrality of taxation for economic growth, income redistribution and broader state-
building and governance goals. This interest is reflected in increased number of 
international forums and centres looking at tax issues, a growing funding for tax-related 
development assistance, and the increasing prominence of tax-related conditionality in 
assistance programs (Fjeldstad, 2013). An effective tax system is considered as a key 
mechanism for developing countries and countries in transition to escape from foreign 
aid or single natural resource dependency. 
The link between taxation, governance and development is also highlighted by the 
European Commission (2010). This is in no matter a suggestion that the donor 
involvement with tax reform is new for developing countries. Earlier, the reform efforts 
were heavily focused on the reduction of trade taxes as a major component of 
structural reforms in the 1980s and 1990s (Thirsk, 1997, Gillis, 1989). However, the 
current period of reform appears to be substantially different. The content of the reform 
agenda has been broadening, while external support for tax reform is becoming more 
diverse, in terms of both goals and actors (Prichard et al., 2012).  
European Commission  
The European Commission (EC) provides advice on taxation primarily to candidates to 
EU membership – in this context, it conducts harmonization programs between tax 
administrations of these counties. Occasionally, the EU financed programs to 
strengthen capacity of tax administration in non-EU member-states through a tender 
system. In 2010, the commission issued a communication on tax and development, 
calling for a strengthening of the EU‘s efforts on promoting good governance and 
economic reforms (European Commission, 2010d). 
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The EC has been providing assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic in transition to the 
market economy and implementation of political and economic reforms since its 
independence in 1991. The EU Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia was 
adopted in June 2009 as a framework for EU cooperation with Central Asia regarding 
security, stability, governance and diversification of energy supply in the region 
(European Commission, 2009). The priority areas for this strategy include human 
rights, rule of law, good governance and democracy, economic development, trade and 
investment, energy and transport, environmental policies, and intercultural dialogue. 
The Central Asia strategy was mainly implemented through such instruments as 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs),42 the Regional Strategy Paper for 
Assistance in 2007-2013 and DCI Indicative Programmes 2011-2013, as well as 
various thematic assistance programs (European Communities, 2007, European 
Commission, 2010a). Strengthening of political and economic reforms is a crucial 
element for ensuring stability in CARs. Public administration and public finance 
management reforms are of particular importance in enhancing the institutional 
capacity of public institutions, improving the management of public finance system, and 
strengthening the transparency and accountability of the government at all levels. This 
is also a major element in promoting good governance and combating crime and 
corruption.  
United Nations Development Program  
The Kyrgyz Republic became a full member of the United Nations (UN) on March 2, 
1992. Following government‘s request to begin the immediate implementation of UN 
projects and programs in the country, the first bilateral agreements were signed with 
the UNICEF and UNDP in mid-1992. The UN System in Kyrgyzstan operates on a 
programmatic basis, in close partnership with the governmental agencies and civil 
society organizations. The United Nations Development Assistance Framework 
(UNDAF) 2012-2016 for Kyrgyzstan was signed by the government and the UN in 
March 2011, with the grant financing of programs and projects44 in social inclusion and 
equity, inclusive and sustainable  growth, poverty reduction, effective democratic 
governance, and human rights.  
                                                 
42
 The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which was signed on February 9, 1995 and entered into 
force on July 1, 1999, has provided the legal framework for bilateral relations between the Kyrgyz 
Republic and the EU. As a result, EU-Kyrgyzstan Cooperation Council held its first meeting on July 
20,1999, after which annual meetings at different levels have taken place regularly. The European Union 
(EU) is represented in the Kyrgyz Republic by a Delegation of the European Union. 
 
44
 In line with global practice, the United Nations (UN) provides assistance exclusively in the form of a 
grant which does not contribute to the country‘s public debt. 
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The United Nations Development Program (UNDP)45 provides advice on taxation within 
the framework of Democratic Governance program, in particular public administration 
and local self-government. As UNDP country office in Kyrgyzstan is also involved in 
many other areas, it seems that its work specifically focused on taxation have become 
less frequent. In 2007, the UNDP‘s project Local Self Governance promoted 
transparent budgetary and financial procedures at the local level (UNDP, 2013). The 
decentralization process brought substantial imbalances and perverse incentives into 
local affairs due to a lack of financial autonomy and accountability. The project 
supported fiscal decentralization and capacity-building of local governments through 
mentoring and consultation services on new budget processes, and through increased 
local self-government capacities for revenue collection, tax administration and resource 
management. The project also aimed to strengthen local accountability frameworks 
and improve service delivery. UNDP Kyrgyzstan also launched the project on 
transparent municipal finances through improved local statistics to increase the 
capacity of central and local governments to better guide policy development and 
allocation of resources towards the most vulnerable groups and least developed areas 
at municipal and regional levels. The separate work was conducted with the NSC to 
improve local statistics and the quality of data collection, as Kyrgyzstan was going to 
roll out its fiscal reform in 2008.  
5.6.2. International Financial Institutions  
Starting in mid-1993 the Kyrgyz Republic embraced the philosophy of the Washington 
Consensus in return for generous technical assistance and financial support 
(Dabrowski and Tomczyska, 2001). Macroeconomic stabilization was an important 
achievement, but it came at a high price of external debt. In 1990s, the majority of 
foreign aid was in the form of low-interest loans which still had to be serviced and 
eventually repaid in 10-15 years. By mid-1998, over half of USD1 billion in external 
debt was due to multilateral financial institutions. Yet, the government used the foreign 
aid to smooth out the consumption shock from the dissolution of the USSR and 
transition to a market economy. As a result, the Debt/GDP ratio in 2002 was above 
100% - the worst in the CIS - which forced the Kyrgyz Republic to turn to the Paris Club 
for rescheduling. The Washington Consensus policy package exacerbated the short-
run costs of transitional recession, and both the IFIs and the Kyrgyz government failed 
to estimate the depth and length of upcoming crisis.  
                                                 
45
UNDP supports efforts to advance democratic governance by making public institutions more 
accountable and responsive to citizens, supporting national parliaments, public administrations and rule 
of law, promoting the principles of democratic governance (anti-corruption, human rights, women‘s 
empowerment and equal opportunity) and supporting country-led democratic governance assessments 
that help countries to assess their needs, monitor their progress and achieve their goals.  
  282 
International Monetary Fund  
The Kyrgyz Republic became a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank on May 8, 1992, and 
accepted the obligations of the IMF Articles of Agreement in March 1995.47 As of today, 
the role of the IMF‘s Resident Representative Office, established in September 1992, is 
to monitor and analyse economic and political developments in the Kyrgyz Republic, 
and to assist the Kyrgyz authorities in implementing macroeconomic and structural 
reform measures consistent with IMF-supported programs. The office is also engaged 
in maintaining close contacts with multilateral institutions and bilateral donors to 
facilitate the coordination of policy advice and technical assistance. The fund provides 
timely advice to its membership on following missions, as well as support for the 
countries‘ reform agenda and detailed review of their own tax reform plans: 
 Tax Policy missions differ widely in their coverage, from broad reviews of an overall 
tax system to very specific issues.  
 Revenue Administration missions typically focus on the design and implementation 
of revenue administration components, such as the organization and management 
structures, modernization procedures for assessment and collection, developing 
audit and enforcement programs, and implementing major revenue policy reforms.  
 Legal Drafting missions are focused on the translation into legislation of policy 
decisions made by the tax authorities.  
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the IMF has actively supported the on-going 
transition to a market economy in all of the former Soviet Union countries. In the initial 
years after independence, technical advisors made a significant contribution to 
improving the quality of the tax system and national statistics in Kyrgyzstan. In recent 
years, the IMF‘s TA has been mostly focused on strengthening the banking system, 
improving the tax administration and providing assistantship with the PFM reform. 
Thus, the assistance projects have complemented the focus of the economic 
programs, agreed between the government and the IMF. The IMF‘s Office also actively 
supports capacity building in the Kyrgyz Republic through a series of training courses 
for government officials, parliamentarians, and members of the press, aimed to expose 
the participants to the best practice techniques in the areas of macroeconomic 
analysis, fiscal and financial analysis, and the compilation of statistics. 
                                                 
47
 Under the Article VIII, the Kyrgyz Republic undertakes to refrain from imposing exchange rate 
restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions or from 
engaging in discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices without IMF approval. 
The Kyrgyz Republic‘s Governor for the IMF is the Chairperson of the National Bank of the Kyrgyz 
Republic. 
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Historically, technical assistance has been delivered to its members in loan financing 
as a key aspect of the IMF‘s help to tackle balance of payments problems, stabilize 
their economies, and restore sustainable economic growth. However, since 2009, the 
IMF effectively upgraded its lending instruments for developing countries, reflecting the 
changing nature of economic conditions in these countries, direct needs for short-term 
and emergency support, and their increased vulnerabilities due to the effects of the 
global economic crisis. To make its financial support more flexible and tailored to 
particular country, the IMF has established a Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust. 
Kyrgyz Republic received debt relief through end-2014 on all interest payments due to 
the IMF under such concessional lending instruments. 
World Bank  
The World Bank (WB) offers technical assistance in taxation to its members typically 
within broader Public Sector Development Program. Occasionally, exclusive assistance 
could be provided to strengthen the tax administration in particular countries. Technical 
assistance in developing countries was usually delivered by means of loan financing on 
highly concessional terms – no interest, only a service charge of 0.75%, and principle 
repayable in 40 years, including a 10-year grace period.  In the period of 2003 to mid-
2005, half of the World Bank‘s assistance to Kyrgyzstan was issued in grant 
format.  From July 2005, the Bank provides all funding to the country strictly on a grant 
basis. Currently, the World Bank is one of the largest development partners to 
Kyrgyzstan.   
The Joint Country Support Strategy (JCSS) for 2007-2010 was a joint effort of the main 
international partners to align their programs with the government‘s development goals 
– this core strategy was developed by the World Bank Group, ADB, the Swiss 
Cooperation (SC), DFID, and the United Nations agencies. It was agreed that the 
JCSS partners would focus their effort on the areas identified in the CDS for 2007-10 
as particularly important for poverty reduction goals, notably strengthening the budget 
process and cross-cutting reforms in public financial management, aligning financial 
management with government priorities, reducing corruption, and improving 
governance and effective public administration (World Bank, 2007b). Therefore, the 
JCSS was a medium-term and results-oriented framework for managing cooperation 
between the Kyrgyz government and development partners to align partners‘ support 
with the CDS‘s goals, to reduce transaction costs, and to ensure a coherent, well-
coordinated implementation of the strategy. The reform agenda in the JCSS broadly 
outlined the ways in which partners would support the government‘s efforts to achieve 
the CDS targets through donor engagement, policy dialogue, financial assistance and 
analytical work.  
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The Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for 2014-2017 marks the WB‘s return to a 
standard assistance framework for the Kyrgyz Republic (World Bank, 2013b). 
Following the instability in the country due to political turmoil and violence in 2010, the 
bank activities in 2011 were mainly guided by a Joint Economic Assessment (JEA) 
focused on the country‘s emergency post-conflict needs for budget support, 
humanitarian aid, and infrastructure repair and rehabilitation. In this regard, the CPS 
identifies three broad areas of engagement – such as, public administration and public 
service delivery, business environment and investment climate, and the management 
of natural resources and physical infrastructure. Indeed, efficient public administration 
and public services are important for political stability, effective public expenditure 
management, long-term economic growth and poverty reduction. Similarly, favourable 
business environment and investment climate, including a more transparent, rules-
based relationship between the state and the private sector, could promote 
competitiveness, diversification, and productivity as well as job creation. 
International Finance Corporation  
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) offers advisory services in taxation usually 
as part of the Investment Climate Advisory Services Project. As investors identify the 
tax system as one of the most important factors in making an investment decision, IFC 
helps to improve the business environment by reducing financial burden that firms incur 
in complying with tax regulations. IFC also provides specialized advice aimed at 
promoting effective, fair and inclusive tax systems that foster economic growth and 
political stability in developing countries. Often, IFC‘s technical assistance is conducted 
through facilities managed by IFC, but supported with funding from other donors and 
multilateral institutions.  
The strategy of IFC office in Kyrgyzstan complements the World Bank‘s efforts in 
private sector development by strengthening of financial intermediation to micro, small 
and medium enterprises (MSMEs), and by making selective investments in individual 
companies in mining, agribusiness and real sectors (IMF, 2014a). Strengthening 
financial markets infrastructure has been identified as a key IFC‘s priority in response 
to financial crisis. Additionally, IFC has implemented Advisory Services Projects aimed 
at implementing the regulatory framework for institutional and capacity building of 
financial institutions, developing corporate governance in local companies and 
improving investment climate. For example, IFC provided advisory services to develop 
the legal framework and an appropriate tax regime for leasing. Additional activities 
included a large public awareness campaign through the local media and capacity-
building trainings for local lessees. In 2002 the Kyrgyz president enacted the Leasing 
Law, and the parliament adopted tax amendments to the tax code in 2003 – both of 
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which have created the necessary legal foundation for leasing in Kyrgyzstan. In 2005, 
IFC has launched the second stage of leasing project which helped to pass proposal in 
May 2008 and create important tax incentives for leasing. In 2005, IFC also launched a 
Central Asian Regional Project to improve legal, regulatory and tax framework for 
housing finance and for creating favourable conditions for mortgage development.  
The IFC, through its regional Central Asia Tax Project, provided assistance in 
implementation of the risk-based audit system. It is expected that the introduction of a 
system will have a profound effect on the performance of the tax audit departments – 
but so far only 17 of the 64 tax offices have been connected to the system. The system 
has begun to remove the human factor from the audit process and has been successful 
in selecting and assigning the riskiest taxpayers for further review. This has resulted in 
reduction in the number of audit cases completed, but with more revenue collected. At 
this stage, however, it is not clear whether the application of risk-based measures will 
correspondingly lead to objective selection of taxpayers for tax audit – historically, tax 
inspectors have significant influence over this process and some of them even develop 
close connections with taxpayers through mentoring program.  
The IFC has also assisted the STS in implementation of the Automated VAT Invoice 
Control Program to manage the issuance and use of the VAT invoices (USAID, 2013a). 
Currently in the testing phase, this program will soon enable the STS to match 
customer copies of VAT invoices with supplier copies to ensure the legitimacy of VAT 
transactions. It is hoped that this will dramatically reduce the number of false invoices 
used for VAT input refund. However, the number of actual fraudulent translations is not 
known, and the STS does not have any analytical system in place that would help to 
identify suspicious activities as well as to track them down and prosecute immediately. 
The tax agency‘s desire to employ the invoice control system is a good example of the 
degree of effort it is trying to put over the VAT administration process. As the economy 
grows and businesses expand their activities, the cross-checking all invoices monthly 
will not be cost effective approach. Alternatively, STS has to focus on better risk 
analysis – hence, better tax audit and post-audit investigation – to identity and fight 
fraudulent activities.  
5.6.3. Regional Development Banks  
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is one of the major development partners in the 
country – the Kyrgyz Republic joined ADB in April 1994.  All assistance provided to 
Kyrgyzstan is from concessional Asian Development Fund (ADF). Since 2009, the 
country has been eligible for 50% grant and 50% of ADF loans – as of December 2013, 
the Kyrgyz Republic has received 27 grants and 36 ADF loans in total of USD 1.25 
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billion (IMF, 2014a). ADB approved the new Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) 2013–
2017 for the Kyrgyz Republic in August 2013, which main goal is poverty reduction 
through inclusive economic growth in line with the National Sustainable Development 
Strategy for 2013–2017. To achieve this goal, the CPS is aimed to address key 
constraints to economic growth, to improve the investment climate, and to reduce 
disparities in access to affordable finance (ADB, 2012b).  
In Kyrgyzstan, regional disparities and corruption are the main causes of political 
instability which constitutes the key challenge for ADB operations. Weaknesses in 
public financial management as well as in the rule of law pose risks for public 
expenditures. In this regard, ADB has been working with the government agencies on 
improving the business environment through customs and tax administration programs 
in order to improve the efficiency of tax payment and customs services, and technical 
assistance projects to introduce a risk-based audit system and automation of tax 
operations in the STS in cooperation with other development partners (ADB, 2007). 
Since 2003, key development partners have been learning to better coordinate policy 
dialogue, operations, and procedures. In 2012, the Kyrgyz government established a 
Development Partners Coordination Council, chaired by the prime-minister, to discuss 
common issues and coordinate sector support.  
Kyrgyzstan is also a vocal advocate for regional economic cooperation, and an active 
partner in the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program. In 
1997, CAREC48 emerged as a pragmatic and results-based program from a regional 
initiative organized by the ADB to promote and encourage regional economic 
cooperation in Central Asia (Table 8.3.1). However, the program is not a formal treaty-
based organization, but rather an informal forum focused on the core priorities of 
regional cooperation – transport, trade facilitation, trade policy, and energy (ADB, 
2012a, ADB, 2014).49 In practice, it not only supports infrastructure development in 
member-countries, but also facilitates coordination between multilateral international 
                                                 
48
 CAREC Program is a committed partnership of 10 countries (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, the People's 
Republic of China, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan), supported by 6 multilateral institution partners (Asian Development Bank, European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, Islamic Development Bank, United 
Nations Development Programme, and World Bank), working together to promote development through 
regional cooperation. http://carecprogram.org/  
 
49
 An annual Ministerial Conference provides overall guidance to the CAREC Program and determines 
policy and strategic directions. ADB serves as the CAREC Secretariat. Bi-annual Senior Officials‘ 
Meetings assess opportunities and identify options for CAREC from a regional perspective. The senior 
officials report annually to the Ministerial Conference. Each of CAREC‘s priority areas of transport, trade 
and energy is led by a committee comprising country and multilateral institution representatives. The 
four sector Coordinating Committees report to the senior officials of CAREC on a regular basis, sharing 
progress and emerging issues. Although it is financed by multilateral institutions, CAREC should be 
considered as a primarily Asian-based regional institution, because of its principal sources of funding 
and geographical scope. 
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agencies which have traditionally not cooperated with each other (Linn and Pidufala, 
2008, Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2012, Linn, 2012).  
Since 1997, the CAREC has provided a platform for members to discuss and resolve 
regional cooperation issues. As a landlocked country, the Kyrgyz Republic needs a 
strong regional cooperation with neighbours to improve its investment climate – 
essential for revitalizing the labour market and reducing poverty. Following CAREC 
initiatives, the Kyrgyz Republic is taking measures in transport and trade facilitation 
projects to support the government‘s goal of developing international trade activities. 
Specific initiatives include the reduction and simplification of tariffs, rationalization of 
VAT and excises on import and domestic goods, and eliminating quantitative 
restrictions on trade. According to the IMF‘s paper Trade Taxes in CAREC Countries 
(Bacalu, 2006), the overall level of import tariffs in CAREC countries is relatively low. 
However, the trade tax regimes are complex and subject to frequent changes. Based 
on this analysis, it is recommended that the reform of a trade tax system should 
promote a simple and transparent regime with low and relatively uniform tax rates, 
aligned with international ‗best practices‘ – in particular, tariffs and other trade taxes in 
CAREC countries where the cumulative average rate is high should be reduced below 
10%. However, neither the recommended policy actions or the indicative timeframes 
are legally binding obligations, rather the objectives that the government authorities 
and the international institutions will strive to achieve. 
5.6.4. Bilateral Aid Agencies 
UK Department for International Development  
Since 2013, the Department for International Development (DFID) has developed a 
new Operational Plan for 2011-2015 to promote democracy and good governance in 
Central Asia, in particular in the Kyrgyz Republic, which had the region‘s first peaceful 
transition towards parliamentary democracy in 2011 (DFID, 2013a). This strategy 
reflects a reassessment of how DFID can better promote development and security in 
the region. It focuses on private sector development and sustainable growth, and on 
opportunities for regional trade and cooperation, including labour migration. For 
Kyrgyzstan, DFID‘s priorities include strengthening democracy, promoting equality, and 
improving public financial management. 
To help ensure a coherent approach among donors and to reduce duplication of their 
effort, most of the programs are undertaken by DFID in collaboration with other 
development partners (DFID, 2013b). This helps to maintain a consistent and long term 
support even when particular donors withdraw their input. It allows sharing of good 
practice, and means that national governments can work with donors as a group rather 
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than individually – hence, reduce transaction costs. DFID remains fully engaged in 
project designing, monitoring the use of resources and assessing impact of the 
programs, while benefiting from wider range of activity made possible due to donor 
cooperation. This ‗value for money‘ approach ensures greater sustainability, makes the 
best use of limited resources, and reduces administration costs for international 
partners.  
In 2004, the DFID developed a technical assistance program to support the Kyrgyz 
government‘s effort in meeting the World Bank‘s Governmental Structural Assistance 
Adjustment Credit (GSAC) and Governance Technical Assistance Credit (GTAC) 
conditionality (DFID, 2004). Overall, the project focused on public finance reform and 
covered such issues as transparency of public finances, audit, budget preparation and 
execution, revenue generation, and capacity building of the MoF.50 The goal was to 
building the capacity of government to make the budget process strategic, transparent 
and comprehensive. It was also expected that the public financial reform program will 
help local civil society organizations to understand budget processes in order to hold 
government accountable for use of state funds. As  a next step, over the period of 2009 
to 2015, DFID will contribute GBP 5 million to a multi-donor initiative Strengthening 
Public Financial Management II, implemented by the Ministry of Finance to strengthen 
the effectiveness and accountability of PFM in the Kyrgyz Republic (DFID, 2013a, 
British Embassy Bishkek, 2014). This will be measured through PEFA indicator, which 
is directly correlated to DFID‘s support to PFM reform, which aim is to improve 
technical aspects of state budgeting. 
United States Agency for International Development  
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Treasury‘s 
Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) are the primary agencies involved in technical 
assistance in the tax area. However, they have different modes of operation – the 
Treasury contracts tax experts directly, while the USAID is biding out projects and 
hiring consulting firms to build up a tax expertise under publicly bid tenders. In this 
regard, the tax assistance provided by USAID is more diffused than the Treasury‘s 
OTA. Usually, USAID‘s tax policy advice falls within the Economic Policy and 
Governance Project as part of broader Economic Growth and Trade Program. Because 
of this generic nature, there is no specialized tax staff, neither a tax program as such at 
USAID. However, it does support specific tax projects - these projects can be 
                                                 
50
 Public Finance Reform project ran from October 2004 to September 2009 and was implemented by a 
Consortium led by WYG International in partnership with PKF, Crown Agents, University of Birmingham 
and Kappa Group. 
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characterized by wide variety of content, for example, tax policy design, legal drafting, 
public communications, and tax administration modernization. 
USAID designed REFORMA Project 51 to engage Kyrgyz partners in the delivery of 
reform activities which leverages their expertise and builds sustainable service delivery 
capacity of both the public and private sectors. REFORMA Project was also designed 
to remain flexible to respond to business reform priorities in the areas of mining, 
business regulations, and trade and tax policy. To manage and sustain these economic 
reforms, REFORMA launched comprehensive Human and Institutional Capacity 
Development (HICD) programs within government agencies and key ministries. As a 
result, the project can serve as a moderator for public-private dialogue by coordinating 
consensus-building activities among public institutions and the business community, 
and by providing advice in resolving policy and administrative difficulties. 
In response to requests from both the government and the business community, the 
USAID has selected MF-Consulting to undertake a study of Indirect Tax Policy and 
Administration in Kyrgyzstan. The relevance of this study was dictated by the fact that 
currently there are two indirect taxes in the tax structure – the sales tax and Value-
Added Tax (VAT) – with literally the same tax base (USAID, 2013a).  
Prior this initiative, the REFORMA team identified a number of administrative barriers 
that hamper the ability of the tax agency to efficiently and effectively manage VAT 
system. At the same time, businesses have argued that the VAT regime is burdensome 
in terms of tax compliance and fails to provide a number of benefits for which the VAT 
system was originally designed. The private sector demands to equalize the tax burden 
among enterprises, rationalize the existing sales tax, and improve VAT administration in 
a way to compensate for revenue shortfalls from the possible elimination of the 
duplicative sales tax. Consequently, REFORMA launched this project to map up the 
STS‘s business processes associated with VAT administration, while reducing 
administrative burdens for VAT payers. It results in specific recommendations to 
strengthen administrative processes in STS that will increase tax collections, reduce 
opportunities for VAT fraud, and ease private sector compliance with VAT requirements 
in invoicing, reporting, crediting and refunding. Eliminating these major bottlenecks may 
also provide an incentive for more businesses to obtain the legitimate benefits of VAT 
registration by voluntarily reporting revenue above KGS 4 million – the threshold that 
triggers mandatory VAT registration. Hence, the project‘s goal is not only to simplify the 
VAT system, but also to support the STS‘s efforts to curtail widespread fraud in 
voluntary VAT registrations. It will also improve the ranking of the Kyrgyz Republic in 
                                                 
51
 The USAID‘s REFORMA project is a three-year project (October 2011-September 2014) implemented by 
Deloitte Consulting to provide economic reform assistance in improving the business and investment 
climate in Kyrgyzstan. 
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the World Bank‘s Doing Business report, which helps to signal to potential investors 
about the government‘s commitment to reform. 
The study found that absence of an operations manual for VAT administration is a 
primary cause for the significant deviation in administrative procedures among tax 
offices in different regions. The project called for eliminating the submission of high-
security invoices and other duplicate information, which have proven not to deter fraud 
but rather are excessive burdens for taxpayers. Overall, the study revealed a low level 
of taxpayer awareness about their rights under the tax code. The experts examined the 
feasibility of a proposal to raise the VAT ceiling for SMEs, although determined that this 
would exacerbate the tax burden for larger firms. It would also lead to an unacceptable 
increase in the VAT rate to compensate for the drastic reduction in the number of VAT 
taxpayers. Unsurprisingly, this study also found that many business complaints about 
VAT policy were related to non-optimal tax administration processes imposed on VAT 
taxpayers, particularly in regard to fraudulent practices in VAT invoicing. The 
recommendations include the adoption of simplified VAT registration and reporting 
policies for small businesses, which would significantly reduce tax filing burdens while 
maintaining the integrity of the VAT system to curb the submission of fraudulent 
invoices and to implement a viable system of legitimate VAT crediting and refunding.  
The Tax Amnesty and Public Awareness Campaign project assisted the STS to launch 
a public outreach campaign to raise taxpayer awareness of the upcoming universal tax 
reporting requirements. Although the parliament recently delayed the introduction of 
Universal Tax Declaration until 2016, it remains essential that taxpayers understand 
their future tax obligations and prepare for eventual uniform declaration of income and 
assets (USAID, 2013c). At the end of 2012, the chamber of tax consultants was 
selected through competitive tender to undertake the public education and training 
program in 2013 (USAID, 2013b). It is planned that CTC will prepare public relations, 
advertising and promotional materials to be distributed through the official websites of 
the STS, the Ministry of Economy, and the CTC, as well as via social media outlets. A 
special logo ‗Declaration and Legalization in Kyrgyzstan‘ was created for the campaign 
to develop strong brand recognition within taxpayers. So far, issues covered in the 
public education campaign have publicized the reasons why Parliament postponed 
universal declaration until 2016, why it is beneficial for taxpayers to start filing 
declarations voluntarily in 2013, and what social and property-related tax deductions 
are currently available for them. In that occasion, the team placed banners on key 
websites reminding taxpayers to file their previous year tax returns before April 1, 2013. 
Moreover, taxpayers were able to ask questions and make comments on the 
campaign‘s Facebook page Universal Declaration in the Kyrgyz Republic and share 
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their experience through other popular Internet forums. 52  As the success of public 
awareness campaign depends not only on the quality, but the accessibility of 
information used in developing the tax education program, the USAID REFORMA 
introduces easy-to-understand animation into tax declaration campaign. On top of that, 
audio announcements were constantly aired on main radio-stations.53 
As tax amnesty is a preliminary step towards universal declaration, the president 
signed a Tax Amnesty Law, which provisions will allow all taxpayers to legalize income 
and other assets previously unclaimed without paying any penalties or tax assessment. 
The law provides amnesty for past tax obligations, but does not exempt from future 
taxes, customs, social payments and other mandatory payments. To obtain amnesty 
benefits, taxpayers have to submit notarized declaration to the STS from July1 to 
December 31, 2013. However, if the total value declared will exceed KGS 45 million, 
the filers have to make a one-time payment of KGS 450,000 (USAID, 2014). 
Conclusions 
On the basis of case study analysis provided in Chapter 4, the Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s 
model of public management reform could be further adapted to tax reform in post-
Soviet transition countries. In particular, it seems the content of reform packages and 
implementation process are highly dependent from country context, and the same 
policy tools will be differently utilized according to local culture, political regime, 
institutional capacity, history, and chance events. For example, the legacy of the Soviet 
Union still has a profound effect on the political and economic development in post-
Soviet, transitional countries. When the ‗big-bang‘ happened, the advantages received 
those who were prepared and had a new management idea for what to do next. 
Unfortunately, it was not the case for the Kyrgyz Republic – the government faced the 
sudden collapse of the Soviet Union unprepared, and had to refer to the global 
community for the reform ideas as well as external funding to sustain the reforms. The 
other example is a dramatic influence of chance events in 2005 and 2010 on a choice 
of the constitution in Kyrgyzstan and a new political regime, respectively. Overall, 
proper historical explanations should rely on what the past can yield for the present, 
and understanding of the main actors behaviour is crucial. 
                                                 
52
 Facebook ‗Всеобщее декларирование в Кыргызской Республике‘ 
https://www.facebook.com/deklaracia.kg, Diesel Forum 
http://diesel.elcat.kg/index.php?s=638eb6ce3d22af4c5b2334b7112261b5&showtopic=41989346&st=0&
p=56028329&#entry56028329 
 
53
 Биринчи радио, Кыргызстан Обондору, Радио МинКыялFM, Ретро FM, Еuropa plus, Марал FM, 
Радио ‗Волна Иссык-Куля,‘ Радио Артек (Yssyk-Kul region) и Радио Мост (Talas region). 
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Socio-Economical Forces. The open and small economy of the Kyrgyz Republic is 
particularly vulnerable to external shocks, including the fall-out from the global financial 
crisis in the trade-partners and the price volatility in the global markets for food, energy 
and gold. The country is susceptible to the influence by the international development 
agencies, and the possibility to manipulate the political situation in the country by the 
powerful forces, internally and externally, should not be ruled out. Without a sound 
strategic development program, Kyrgyzstan will remain highly prone to negative 
impacts of external shocks. A significant part of the society is still in a ‗survival‘ mode, 
and the layer of the country‘s high-skilled professionals has thinned significantly due to 
massive migration for other countries – mainly, Russia and Kazakhstan. Hence, there 
is no effective mechanism for creating and nurturing political and administrative elite. 
Political System. Insufficient knowledge of country context and a lack of experience in 
tax reform in transition economies on behalf of both the development agencies and the 
government authorities clearly played a crucial role in the persistent application of 
inappropriate reform models and the ‗best practice‘ approaches, as well as political 
constraints and institutional limitations. Thus, the fundamental changes in the design of 
reform programs should be introduced slowly, and donors should be passion in 
pursuing country-specific reforms. An important opportunity for building political support 
for tax reform lies in broader citizen engagement in tax reform. However, public 
debates on tax reform in the Kyrgyz Republic are to a large extent limited to decrease 
in number of taxes, tax rates and overall tax burden led by the professional and 
business associations. This is also reflected in parliamentary debates around changes 
to the tax code promoted by deputies and economic magnates to protect their interests. 
Thus, a broader public engagement in tax reform is missing. Unfortunately, there is no 
taxpayers association created in Kyrgyzstan. Despite the abundance of sound 
promises, the political parties in Kyrgyzstan tend to duplicate each other, claiming for 
similar package of popular socio-economic reforms. No surprisingly, there is no place 
for specific reforms, in particular tax reform, in such a broad claim. Thus, party‘s 
assortment of ideas is quite limited.  
Elite Decision-Making and Chance Events. Clans, politico-economic elites, and 
regional networks are a formidable presence in the politics of the Kyrgyz Republic. 
Working behind the scenes, they have placed leaders in power for decades and define 
the nature of politics today.  The political dynamic in the country is between the 
president and the parliament which are engaged in a constant struggle with the power 
brokers and elite networks they control. Any effort to build effective tax system and 
conduct successful tax reform must be built on the recognition of this reality. Soon after 
collapse of the Soviet Union in1991, the Kyrgyz government adopted a strategy to 
transform the economy from being command-driven to market-based by introducing a 
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liberal trade regime, privatizing state-owned enterprises, and introducing its own 
currency in May 1993. However, frequent changes in the government and internal 
disputes have disrupted the implementation of these reforms. In March 2005, the Tulip 
Revolution ousted the president Akaev, who had been in power since independence. 
Kurmanbek Bakiev elected as a president in July was forced to resign in 2010 following 
popular protests against poor governance. The situation was aggravated by ethnic 
violence in the southern cities (Osh and Jalal-Abad). An interim government took 
control of the situation, but at the expense of the state budget and humanitarian aid. In 
the following year, the budget deficit hit the highest level in post-independent 
Kyrgyzstan due to monetary compensations paid to victims, construction works in the 
south, and tax exemptions claimed by businesses in Bishkek against their losses. 
Political shocks, as a result of these events, could disrupt the continuity of the reform 
process, while political pressures – including from the parliament members and other 
vested interests opposing any changes in tax system – could hinder the reform‘s goals. 
Administrative System. The content of the reform packages has been developed in 
close cooperation with the main development partners as a key part of the country 
development strategy. It is expected that the tax reform will contribute positively to 
fiscal consolidation, economic growth and poverty reduction – an efficient tax 
administration will help to sustain macroeconomic stability, encourage business 
development, reduce corruption and promote good governance. Development partners 
have provided extended assistance for public finance reforms in the country, although it 
was mainly partial. The government took firm steps towards comprehensive tax reform 
– the functional organization was introduced, and the ITAS has been developed and 
rolled out in all tax offices. As technological modernization was a main component of 
recent tax reform in Kyrgyzstan, the new technologies can change the citizen‘s 
perception about tax administration. For example, the STS lunched a new web-site 
which provides full information to taxpayers about the tax code, e-filing procedures and 
a knowledge base. A change in technology can also alter the range of tasks and 
contribute to better monitoring and accountability. The risk-based audit system will 
completely change the tax audit processes and procedures along with STS‘s attitude 
towards compliant taxpayers. The one-stop shops and call-centre were opened to 
provide easy and fast service to taxpayers. The new ITAS brings together the tax 
offices, standardize their operations and improve overall coordinate within the agency. 
Technological change may also lead to changes in the job requirements for personnel, 
as tasks become more complex, higher levels of education and training may be 
needed. Apparently, this also will have a profound effect on taxpayers – they have to 
be able to file the tax reports electronically and participate in online forums – and 
hopefully enhance the public engagement. As soon as services can be provided online 
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rather than face-to-face there is a good possibility to tackling corruption in tax offices. In 
this regard, the STS made a decision to reengineer its business operations and 
introduce change management that will help the staff to adjust to a new framework. 
External Influences. The global community has to take into account the political 
economy of donors, in particular, the impact of different types of aid modalities and 
conditionality on domestic accountability and transparency. Regarding political 
incentives for taxation, the main questions are whether technical changes in tax 
structure could encourage taxpayers to engage more in political bargaining with the 
state, and how the tax reform agenda could be more focused on governance and state-
building aspects. This might involve exploring the opportunities to facilitating 
constructive dialogue with international experts and encouraging networking with 
existing tax centres of practice. In fact, the international institutions and donors could 
play a special role by giving greater priority to regional initiatives on governance-
enhanced tax reform – in particular, by supporting international meetings for senior tax 
officials and peer-to-peer training and learning programs, especially between local 
specialists in the same region. Such efforts could serve as a basis for multilateral 
collaboration, capacity building and technical assistance designed to support tax reform 
from a governance perspective.  
With their membership and exceptional mandates as impartial partners, the 
international organizations and donors could play a crucial role in helping to bridge the 
potentially diverging short-term interests of the key actors, engaged in a new ‗Great 
Game‘ played in the detriment of the region. The main challenges in this endeavour are 
their fragmented approach with traditionally weak coordination amongst them, the 
limited resources and leverage that each of them individually has, and the risk 
averseness that comes from having to satisfy many different stakeholders, among 
them. However, there is clear indication that the multilateral institutions are playing a 
more active role in Central Asia. Their close cooperation efforts in support of the ADB‘s 
Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program, in preparation of the 
poverty reduction programs, and in development of the millennium development goals 
along with joint-country strategies and collaborative projects are prominent examples. 
The development partners can also serve as brokers and as a source of analytical 
support for regional cooperation and integration initiatives, as well. In that case, they 
should reach out to regional organizations and forums by offering their technical 
assistance and financial support for ‗win-win‘ infrastructure investments in transport and 
trade facilities, border and transit management, and institutional capacity. 
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6. FINDINGS  
The findings chapter will show that the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model is useful to 
incorporate the range of factors affecting tax reform but it needs to be adapted for use 
in the Kyrgyz Republic and other similar contexts of transitional, post-Soviet states. In 
particular, it needs to take more account of significant influence, and involvement, of 
the civil society organizations and development partners in the reform process. 
6.1. Socio-Economical Forces 
As the Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s model proposes, macroeconomic policy does influence public 
(financial) management reforms. The most significant constraints to economic 
development in Kyrgyzstan are remote and inland geographical location, agrarian and 
service-orientated economy, and lack of easily extractable mineral resources 
Mogilevsky and Omorova, 2011). After independence, these factors have coincided 
with the macroeconomic instability of transition period – that is, inflation, 
unemployment, and shortage of consumer goods. The breakup of the Soviet Union led 
to termination of subsidies from the central budget and supplies of cheap energy, trade 
crisis with other Soviet republics, drastic increase in transportation costs, and a need to 
respond to entirely new types of challenges which the country was not ready to deal 
with. As a result, there have been undesirable social and economic consequences, 
such as hyperinflation and dramatic decline in industrial output by two-thirds, 
devaluation of wages and social benefits, high unemployment and unfamiliarity of living 
in a market economy. Massive labour migration, and deterioration of education, health 
care, and social protection systems caused the increase in poverty and income 
inequality (World Bank, 2001). 
While institutional and socio-economic reforms in the early 1990s helped to establish 
basic public institutions and overcome decline in industrial production, the monetary 
reform – the national currency was introduced in 1993 – allowed to achieve initial 
macroeconomic stabilization and sustain social expenditures. Price liberalization, 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, and deregulation were the main components 
of the transition strategy (Abazov, 1999b). Consequently, the private sector has finally 
arrived and new social groups have emerged, such as small and medium business, 
private farmers and traders. Unfortunately, these reforms have not always been 
consistent or comprehensive. Hence, the budget remained unbalanced, and many 
structural reforms were not completed.  
Global Economic Forces 
Pollitt and Bouckaert ascribe a large and dominate influence to the global economic 
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forces. Some of these factors can be thought of as structural, as they are deep-rooted 
and have long-lasting effect. The dependence from external financing would be a good 
example. It may be not immediately recalled that reliance on development partners and 
foreign aid would have much effect on tax reform, but that would be a mistake (World 
Bank, 2014). The country is susceptible to the influence by the international 
development agencies, and their debt conditionality. Also, the possibility to manipulate 
the political situation in the country by the powerful interest groups should not be ruled 
out.  
The open and small economy of the Kyrgyz Republic is particularly vulnerable to 
external shocks, including the fall-out from the global financial crisis in the trade-
partners and the price volatility in the international food, energy and gold markets 
(Mogilevsky and Omorova, 2011). Therefore, the situation in Russia and Kazakhstan – 
which are major export markets, and major recipients of Kyrgyz emigrants – can 
strongly affect economic growth in Kyrgyzstan. As they did pretty well in the recent 
years due to rise of oil prices, this is also translated into the growing demand for 
Kyrgyzstan‘s exports, strong inflows of FDI, boost of remittances and reduction in 
unemployment rate. The Custom Union may place much stricter procedures for border 
control and higher custom tariffs, and in this way may inhibit the Kyrgyz exports and 
especially re-exports of Chinese goods to the CIS. Large import is another channel of 
vulnerability to external shocks. The recent increase in global prices for food and fuel 
substantially affected domestic prices and pushed inflation to grow. Kyrgyz exports are 
diversified, so fewer price shocks are transmitted there, while world prices for gold – 
which is the largest export item – do influence export revenues significantly. However, 
due to relatively little connection of the gold production to other sectors of the economy, 
any change in gold prices does not have much effect on macroeconomic situation in 
general. Without sound strategic development program, Kyrgyzstan will remain highly 
prone to negative impacts of external factors. 
Socio-Demographic Change 
Socio-demographic change is the second background pressure of significant 
importance in the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model. In the Kyrgyz Republic, labour 
migration became an urgent issue in the recent years that has a considerable impact 
on the political and economic development in the country. Complex socio-economic 
situation, high unemployment and lack of job opportunities, particularly in the regions, 
lead to strong migration flows, both internally and externally (NSC, 2012). The 
migration has a negative effect on the availability and quality of labour force as well as 
on the demographic structure of society – the major problems are staffing in public 
institutions, and aging and depopulation of rural and remote regions (IMF, 2012). At the 
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same time, taking into account the large share the remittances have in GDP, they could 
be seen as an important instrument to be used for improving national economy and for 
addressing certain issues in the labour market (Musabaeva and Kuklin, 2009). To 
promote the growth of the SMEs, the government already introduced the special tax 
regimes, such as simplified taxation and mandatory and voluntary patenting – hence, 
similar to the global economic forces, the impact of the socio-demographic pressure on 
tax reform is indirect. 
On the whole, there is a paradoxical situation on the labour market in Kyrgyzstan 
(Marat, 2009). On one hand, there is an excess of labour resources mainly due to 
socio-demographic factors and limited capacity of the internal labour market to 
accommodate all the economically active population. On the other hand, there is a 
shortage of qualified personnel in many sectors of the economy. A significant part of 
the society is still in a ‗survival‘ mode, and the layer of the country‘s high-skilled 
professionals has thinned significantly due to massive post-independence migration. 
Hence, there is no effective mechanism for creating and nurturing politico-
administrative elite. 
In practice, the graduates of universities and vocational schools experience difficulties 
in finding jobs relevant to their degree, while at the same time employers report about 
difficulties in finding the appropriate candidates. Such situation could be explained by 
decline in the quality of education, and out-dated technologies (ICMPD, 2005, 
Elebaeva, 2004). Differences in wages and high unemployment are among the most 
important factors for citizens of Kyrgyzstan to leave for Russia and Kazakhstan – these 
two countries are the most viable economies of the CIS and there is no visa regime 
between them. Knowledge of Russian language and familiarity of the cultural space 
due to common history is also an important factor.  
Socio-Economic Policies 
According to the model, the combined effect of the global economic forces and socio-
demographic change mentioned above reflect themselves in the socio-economic 
policies in the country. In the last two decades, the Kyrgyz Republic has maintained 
macroeconomic stability and achieved steady growth, despite economic and political 
shocks. In 2013, the economic growth reached 10.5%, primarily driven by the gold, 
construction, trade, and communication, and inflation was less than 4% due to 
depreciation of the Russian ruble, and devaluation of the Kazakh tenge in early 2014. 
The current account deficit slightly fell from 15.1% of GDP in 2012 to 14.1% of GDP in 
2013 as a result of a narrow-down of the deficit in the balance of services along with an 
increase in current private transfers. The performance of the balance of goods was not 
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so impressive, because of higher import and lower gold prices – although this effect 
was mitigated later by strong growth in gold production (World Bank, 2014). The 
regional downturn, especially in Russia, had an adverse effect on the Kyrgyz economy 
primarily through remittances and international trade. High poverty and unemployment 
rates are a major concern for the government. In fact, the poverty rate increased from 
36.8% in 2011 to 38% in 2012, and unemployment is estimated to be much higher than 
official level of 8.5%.  
It seems that ad-hoc fiscal responses to frequent shocks has had limited effect on 
mitigating their impact on economic growth. Over the period of 2003-2012, the average 
GDP growth was about 4% per annum, varying from 8.5% in 2007 to -0.1% in 2012. So 
wide variance was a result of external and internal shocks – for instance, a glacier 
movement at the Kumtor gold mine had caused a sharp decline in GDP by above 10% 
(IMF, 2013). The price shocks in the global food market and the political turmoil in 2010 
also contributed to this drop. In response to these shocks, the government used a 
number of measures including increase in wages and pensions for the public sector, 
revision of the social allowances, and the expansion of much needed PIP. Despite 
these measures, the balance of fiscal accounts and debt indicators have deteriorated 
quickly – a fiscal protection mechanism built during 2000-2008 have been eroded. 
By 2012, the Kyrgyz Republic reported one of the highest fiscal deficits in the Europe 
and Central Asia (ECA) region, along with a dramatic increase in public debt (World 
Bank, 2014). At the same time, the fiscal position remained solvent mainly due to 
concessionality of external borrowing and debt relief by main donors. However, budget 
deficit of 4-5% means that the government will continue to rely on external financing 
and ad-hoc fiscal policy, unless structural changes will be made to enhance revenues 
and cut specific public expenditures. Therefore, fiscal adjustments are needed to 
reduce volatility and sustain economic growth. More specifically, it is necessary to 
continue with fiscal consolidation in order to achieve fiscal sustainability and develop 
resilience to future shocks, ensure that the fiscal arrangements do not harm economic 
activity, improve the quality of public goods and invest more resources in new 
technologies and infrastructure development. In addition, a tax policy reform should 
create incentives for compliant taxpayer to stay within the formal sector by reducing 
and evening tax burden under the general tax regime and making tax system more 
equitable and transparent – definitely, some gains can be attained from broadening the 
tax base and cutting the tax rates. Presently, the country capacity for growth is limited 
by the overreliance on a few prioritized sectors – mainly, energy, mining, transportation, 
and tourism – and extensive external financing. A prudent fiscal policy together with 
rational sectoral strategies could contribute to further diversification of the economy 
and reduce vulnerability to shocks in long-term. 
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6.2. Political System, Elite Decision-Making and Chance Events 
The current state of political system in the Kyrgyz Republic deserves criticism. The 
analysis of the previous measures of political reform indicates not only inadequacy of 
efforts to bringing the government into compliance with the rule of law, but also shows 
inconsistencies in the approaches to the reform. The changes were made not in 
reforming government operations, but mostly in brushing up the old practices. 
According to the functional review undertaken, there were changes in the government 
structure, but no improvement in a way how they manage the socio-economic 
development processes. Government agencies still lack the client-focused orientation 
and quality management approach to their services, which continues to distort the 
whole system. The capacity of the central government and local administrations is still 
weak – the professionalism, competence, morals and ethics in the public institutions fall 
short of what is supposed to be. Therefore, the main objective of the NSDS for 2013-
2017 in regard to political system is to restore confidence of citizens in the institutions 
of government – notably, legislature, judiciary and executive government. The task is to 
establish a robust system of public administration, to modernize the government 
structure, in particular the law-enforcement agencies and the judicial system, to 
improve the quality of the public services provided to the citizens and to mitigate the 
negative effects of corruption, weak accountability, as well as tribalism and regionalism. 
The current constitution defines the structure of the government, headed by a popularly 
elected president. However, the constitution lays down only the foundation of ‗good‘ 
governance, with the specifics to be filled in by respective laws and regulations. At the 
moment, many aspects of the relationship between political institutions remain 
unaddressed. The confrontation still exists between the executive government and the 
parliament – there are on-going disputes about the limits of their functions and 
authority. It is necessary to create a performance management system in the 
government agencies for regular assessment and monitoring of their performance. It is 
also important to carry on with the legal reform, because many progressive laws are 
often left unimplemented. In this regard, action plans should be developed to improve 
legal culture and literacy among citizens and to increase professionalism of 
government officials through comprehensive training system. 
To increase public confidence in the government and improve its public image, there is 
an urgent need for effective collaboration with the civil society – indeed, civil society 
organizations must be actively involved in public affairs. In this matter, it is vital to 
formalize, both in terms of legal requirements and administrative procedures, the 
appropriate methods of collaboration. There are also plans to facilitate a dialogue 
between the government and civil society – including the business community – with 
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regard to the country development strategy. In order to improve the transparency and 
accountability of government system, the role of public advisory councils in government 
agencies should be enhance. In addition, it is necessary to encourage civic 
participation in assessing the quality of public goods, using best international and 
regional practices. For each government agency a specific set of targets and 
measures, understandable for citizens, should be developed. Inclusion of CSOs into 
monitoring of government performance as well as constant feedback to the public at 
large about main achievements should become an integral part of a new strategic 
management and performance framework. 
New Management Ideas 
In contrast to the structural constraints, there are also dynamic elements in the political 
system. One of them which is of particular importance for the Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s model 
is the massive inflow of new management ideas into the public sector reforms. Indeed, 
over the past two decades there has been a considerable amount of inter-country 
borrowing of different ideas about how to manage the public finance reform, facilitated 
by the international organizations and donors (Lawson, 2012). There can be no doubt 
that these development agencies and their consultants have profound influence on 
political leaders and civil servants in transitional economies. Most commonly to all post-
Soviet countries was the fact that after unexpected independence the government 
authorities were presented with a limited range of options by the development partners. 
Apparently, there were neither financial nor political factors that determined the choice 
of reform model – as simply as a lack of adequate ideas at that critical point of time. 
Too often, the results of the reform were not as expected as the models applied were 
designed for developed economies. Of course, management ideas very rare could be 
transplanted directly into specific country context, rather they join a large pool of ideas 
drawn from a variety of sources by politico-administrative elite. Nonetheless, specific 
approaches and management techniques, such as strengthen approach, platform 
approach and functional organization, have already been used in tax reforms in 
Kyrgyzstan. These and, to a larger extent, other approaches discussed in Chapter 2 
can be combined to produce more coherent model. It should be mention that previously 
the approaches and models derived from micro-economic theory have been 
extensively used for reform and modernization of tax system. Due to growing 
internationalization of public financial management, the ministries and government 
agencies charged with tax administration reform – chiefly, the Ministry of Finance, the 
Treasury and the State Tax Service – have created their own network of international 
supporters. The IMF and USAID were a focal point of this network from early 1990s 
onwards. Later other players join the club, including the World Bank, IFC, DFID and 
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ADB. By and large, insufficient knowledge of country context and a lack of experience 
in tax reform in transition economies on behalf of both the development agencies and 
the government played a crucial role in the persistent application of inappropriate 
models and approaches, as well as political constraints and institutional limitations. 
Thus, the fundamental changes in the content of reform packages should be 
introduced gradually, and donors should be passion in pursuing country-specific 
reforms. 
Pressure from Citizens 
The second influential factor concerned with the political system in the Pollitt and 
Bouckaert‘s model is represented by pressure from citizens. However, it should be 
immediately clarified that tax reform is not usually at the top list of the citizenry‘s 
priorities, neither a topic upon which they can immediately offer specific 
recommendations. As the tax reform in this thesis is defined as deliberate changes in 
the tax system, it should be admitted that most citizens know very little about the tax 
structure, neither the tax administration in Kyrgyzstan – as employees, the individual 
taxpayers pay the PIT and social insurance contributions through their finance 
departments and visit tax offices only once an year to submit an annual declaration. 
The same results were confirmed during the interviews in Bishkek – in reality, there is a 
large gap of knowledge between ordinary taxpayers, on one hand, and highly 
professional tax officials and financial accountants, on the other hand. In that case, it 
would be simply unrealistic to expect citizens to provide concrete suggestions for 
reforming the tax system of which they know so little and about which they have limited 
incentives to learn – hence, taxpayer education and training should be an integral part 
of the tax reform program. Although citizens are unlikely to come up with a detailed 
proposal for better tax system, occasionally they can exert pressure for change. For 
example, as citizens become more familiar with Internet and modern technologies, they 
start to be progressively frustrated with tax services, which are slow, time-consuming, 
inflexible and stressful. Such discontent with inefficiency in the STS may then be 
expressed to political representatives, who will deliver them to the politico-
administrative elite, alongside with to the mass media. In the Kyrgyz Republic, there is 
widespread belief that tax inspectors are corrupt and that the tax burden is very high 
(Table 4.4.1), so public opinion may be mobilized to produce pressure for particular 
changes in the tax system. While the views of citizens could rarely be the driving force 
for reform, CSOs are likely to be crucial intermediaries in fostering state-citizens 
bargaining around taxation. Indeed, an important opportunity for building political 
support for tax reform lies in broader citizen engagement (World Bank, 2013a). 
However, public debates around tax reform in Kyrgyzstan are to a large extent limited 
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to decreases in number of taxes and tax rates led by professional public associations 
and specific tax exemptions and preferences lobbied by deputies and large business. 
This is also reflected in numerous amendments to the tax code due to frequent 
changes in the government and political instability (Table 4.3.1). As a result, a broader 
public engagement of the civil society is missing – unfortunately, there is no taxpayer 
association yet created in Kyrgyzstan to protect the interest of individual taxpayers.  
Party Political Ideas 
In the model of public management reform, Pollitt and Bouckaert identify party-political 
ideas as an important background influence on management change. In contrast to 
political parties in the developed countries, weak multi-party system in the Kyrgyz 
Republic cannot support this argument. Despite the abundance of ‗programs‘ and 
sound promises, the political parties in Kyrgyzstan tend to duplicate each other, offering 
a similar package of broad social and economic reforms. Not surprisingly, there is no 
place for specific reforms, in particular tax reform, in such a broad platform. Thus, 
party‘s assortment of ideas is quite simple (Bugazov, 2013). According to the model, 
the party-political ideas could be generated internally as part of special political agenda 
prepared by party activists. Political parties may also acquire fashionable or 
ideologically influential ideas about how they would like to govern, including issues of 
structure, style and process, from the business experts or academic consultants, or 
from the popular movements of the CSOs – that is, they may come from the New 
Management Ideas or Pressure from Citizens. In relation to tax reform in the Kyrgyz 
Republic, the reform ideas are extensively influenced by the development partners and 
international advisers which communicate them directly to the elite – hence, without the 
participation of the political parties. Interesting, the volume and force of these idea 
flows could be greatly enhanced by amplification in the mass media. The more 
exposure the reform idea achieves on national TV or press, the more political attention 
it will receive. While technical details of reform package – such as the distribution of tax 
burden or level of tax expenditures – are unlikely to catch public attention, more 
general statements – for example, significant decrease in tax rates for major taxes or 
widespread corruption in tax administration – may attract broader media exposure, 
including the Internet and social media, and hence increase pressure for tax reform. It 
means that there is a strong bond between political system and the mass media. 
However, Pollitt and Bouckaert have not included media as a separate force in the 
model. Due to its general influence, the mass media can strengthen any part of the 
diagram and facilitate public discussion of various issues. 
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Elite Decision-Making 
At the centre of the model lies the process of elite decision-making that is surrounded 
by three large groups of factors – namely, socio-economic forces, political system and 
intellectual factors, and elements of the administrative system. It is from the interaction 
between these broad factors that changes in tax system occur. In practice, most of the 
changes tend to begin in the top, rather than low level of the government, which allow 
the measures of reform – the specific instruments, techniques and approaches – to be 
chosen by political leaders and executive government. Pollitt and Bouckaert also 
distinguish the difference between the elite perceptions of what reforms are desirable 
and what reforms are feasible. This difference reflects the fact that there are many 
obstacles – economic, socio-demographic, political, legal, and institutional – as well as 
conservative forces within tax administration that resist changes. Often, the elites find 
themselves in the position of desiring more changes than what was actually proposed – 
notice, what is desirable does not necessary mean optimal. In this regard, restraining 
their aspirations in order to produce a lesser reform package could have more chances 
of being accepted by the parliament and public. Equally, perceptions of reform 
feasibility depends on the expectations and requirements of the key stakeholders, and 
institutional capacity of the government to implement the reform packages – hence, as 
expected, there is strong connection between Elite Decision-Making and Administrative 
System. 
In Kyrgyzstan, alongside with internal pressures from the economic and political 
factors, elites are heavily influenced by ideas and conditionality of the international 
development partners – so, their plans could be easily changed over the course of the 
reform due to influx of the New Management Ideas from the international organizations 
and regional associations, as well as overreliance on external funding as part of the 
Global Economic Forces. This explication of the model hopefully makes it clear that 
elite decision-making is a process that is shaped by much wider external context. 
However, it does not mean that elites could not change their composition over time – in 
fact, they have very distinctive channels of recruitment (Bugazov, 2013). In reality, the 
politico-administrative elite is not homogenous in nature – by contrast, it is extremely 
fragmented. The ununified elite often cannot reach an agreement on a variety of issues 
due to their ambitions and self-interests. This is one of the main reasons why the 
technical assistance provided by the development partners was so ineffective, and a 
series of economic reforms failed. More than that, elites compete for power through 
informal patron-client networks – the core of these patronage networks could be a 
particular family, clan, or elite group, which extends the network and attract additional 
clients by using financial tiers. Although the Soviet Union was able to isolate the 
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political influence of clans and patronage networks, as soon as the regime collapsed 
clans re-emerged as strong political actor, deeply penetrating into formal government 
system. It should be mentioned, at this point, that clan politics as a dominant social and 
political force in Central Asia impedes not only democratization but also longer-term 
regime durability and can only be taken down through the institutionalization of a 
market economy (Collins, 2002). 
Chance Events 
The influence that operates outside the main groups of the Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s model is 
the effect of the chance events such as natural or technogenic disasters, accidents, 
scandals, and tragic events. For example, in March 2005, the Tulip Revolution ousted 
the president Akaev, who had been in power since independence. Kurmanbek Bakiev, 
the second president, was forced to resign in April 2010 following bloody protests 
against his regime – the situation was aggravated by ethnic violence in June 2010 in 
the south. Whilst they can clearly be part of any socio-economic and political factors, 
the definite features of these events are their newsworthiness and unpredictability. The 
impact of such events on the direction and content of tax reform programs may not be 
so obvious, but occasionally it is significant. The Rosa Revolution in 2010 had a 
devastated effect on budget expenditures, forcing the government to revise the tax 
treatment of businesses affected during these tragic events and promoting dialogue 
between the government and business community. Also, such events have a tendency 
to translate into organizational, or institutional, changes. Even more, the 2010 events 
led to adoption of the new constitution and the first in post-Soviet Central Asia peaceful 
regime transition to the parliamentary republic. At the individual level, the ministers and 
chief executives are prone to a variety of other ‗accidents‘ – for instance, ethical 
misbehaviour, sexual indiscretions, or health issues – and eventually persons with 
strong reforming ideas and leadership may arrive or leave for reasons unrelated with 
their management priorities and leadership style – in Kyrgyzstan, too often, due to 
political instability and frequent changes of the government. Political shocks, as a result 
of these events, could disrupt the continuity of the reform process, while political 
pressures – including from the parliament members and other vested interests 
opposing any changes in tax system – could hinder the reform‘s goals. Thus, accidents 
and disasters could come in different forms and sizes. It also should be remembered 
that disasters can go globally and that the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 came 
quite unexpectedly and suddenly. Soon after independence, the Kyrgyz government 
adopted a strategy to transform the economy from being command-driven to market-
based by introducing a liberal trade regime, privatization of state-owned enterprises, 
and monetary reform in 1993. However, political turbulence and internal disputes have 
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disrupted the implementation of these reforms. As expected, the impact of the global 
economic collapse of 2008 was so vast. The small economy of Kyrgyzstan was hit by 
the financial crisis through the downturns in Russia and Kazakhstan, couples with the 
introduction of the new tax code in 2009 and the April events in 2010. 
6.3. Administrative System 
The tax administration reform could contribute to achieving sustainable growth and 
poverty reduction. Indeed, the increase in tax revenues will help to foster 
macroeconomic stability, which is an essential for economic growth, as well as provide 
a fiscal ‗space‘ for socio-economic expenditures that will enable country to achieve its 
MDGs. 
Content of Reform Package 
In the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model, the content of the reform packages are the 
product of the interaction between the desirable and the feasible in the elite decision-
making. In the Kyrgyz Republic, the reform programs have been developed in close 
cooperation with the main development partners. Moreover, fiscal policy and tax 
administration is a key part of the joint donor‘s country development strategies. It is 
expected that the tax reform will contribute positively to the macroeconomic stability, 
fiscal consolidation, and economic growth by establishing an effective, modern, and 
efficient tax system – in general, it will help to provide a fiscal space for social 
expenditures, reduce corruption, promote good governance, and encourage business 
development. However, reform announcements in Kyrgyzstan come to rather little – in 
reality, there were unforeseen challenges in terms of donor coordination and 
institutional capacity of the tax administration. 
Implementation Process 
The process of implementation is an important stage of reform process. However, the 
liner model presented by Pollitt and Bouckaert is too simple – the complexity of the 
implementation process, running from reform ideas to actual results, may go well 
beyond original model. Indeed, it should be admitted that frequently reform programs 
are delivered through a network of different organizations rather than by a single 
agency. For tax reform, the network includes revenue administration bodies, law-
enforcement agencies, independent consultants, business community, non-profit 
associations, as well as fragmented elite groups. Furthermore, it also involves the 
international development agencies. Of course, the development partners have 
provided extended assistance for public finance reform in the country, although it was 
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mainly piecemeal and random (ADB, 2009). For example, IMF has been advising on 
tax policy and tax administration, including VAT administration and LTU, tax 
administration procedures and legislation, and drafting the tax code. Similarly, DFID 
has given advice on procedures for tax audits and tax appeals, and developing 
revenue forecasting capability. The USAID, in addition, helped to update MIS in the 
central office and assisted in the computerization of LTU. Finally, World Bank oversaw 
projects to modernize the treasury, chiefly by computerizing expenditure management, 
and ADB conducted a project on customs modernization to ensure the data exchange 
amongst the STS, SCS, Treasury, and National Bank. Currently, the ADB‘ project on 
tax administration reform complemented its assistance for customs. Both projects were 
aimed to strengthen revenue collection capacity and fiscal space in the country, 
improve governance and transparency, and promote economic growth. Therefore, the 
implications of this entire network to tax reform are very complicated. For tax reform to 
be successful and effective, it seems that all stakeholders should be taken as a ‗unit of 
analysis,‘ rather than just the STS. The multi-factors approach of the Pollitt and 
Bouckaert‘s model could easily be adequate for such a task. However, the ideas about 
how to manage networks of different types of players are in short supply – that is why, 
the government refers directly to the international organization and donors for 
appropriate policy advice and reform model rather than relies on weak political parties.  
Another problem that could occur during the implementation stage is that individual 
reforms may contradict or slow down the other reforms carried out at the same time. In 
particular, it became evidential in terms of the integration and automation of the whole 
network of the revenue-related agencies – each member, such as the Treasury, STS, 
SCS, Social Fund, National Bank, masters its own reform agenda not in compliance 
with the others. And the single authority to oversee this effort does not yet exist – this 
was the main reason why the ITAS was not incorporated to the treasury‘s MIS. This 
indicated that the government should pay more attention to the scope, and timing, of 
other structural reforms. 
Implementation is also a crucial stage as it allows to directly feedback to the elite about 
what to do next – whether to continue a chosen path or change the track. For example, 
a comprehensive ITAS was implemented in the STS‘s central office in 2010. By 2012, 
as all blocks were tested and corrected by the ADB‘s IT personnel and the improved 
system rolled nationally to all tax offices, it was recognized that the business operations 
should be reengineered to optimize the use of new ICT system, as well as training 
program should be designed to improve the staff‘s skills in new technologies. With this 
concern in mind, a series of the technical assistance was delivered on business 
processes reengineering and institutional capacity building (ADB, 2011b). 
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Risks during implementation of the reform packages could arise mainly from potential 
delays due to STS‘s lack of experience in conducting tax administration reform, 
previously the main focus was on tax policy reform, potential difficulties in integrating 
STS‘s central database with the ICT systems of other agencies, and inability of tax staff 
to adjust to new procedures and facilities. These risks could be mitigated during the 
designing and induction of the project. STS should adopt specific measures to control 
and monitor the progress of the reform. The development partners are also looking for 
government assurance that the reforms will be continued and results sustained (ADB, 
2009). To address these risks, STS‘s key managers should receive intensive 
orientation from the donors about the goals, process and expected outcomes of the 
‗country-specific‘ reform program and disseminate this information to all levels.  An 
overview of the ‗best-practices‘ and lessons learn from developing and transition 
countries could be helpful. Additionally, external consultants could provide assistance 
to STS‘s staff during implementation to ensure that the achieved results comply with 
the requirements and quality standards of the development partners. At that step, it is 
important that the local experts are also fully engaged, whose knowledge of the local 
context is indispensable. It is vital that the STS reaches an agreement and signs a 
memorandum of understanding with relevant government agencies for effective 
integration of their ICT systems. Also, the non-ICT components should be incorporated, 
including institutional strengthening and change management that would help the 
STS‘s staff to adjust to a new framework.  
The other treats could also include inadequate funding for maintenance and 
functionality of the new ITAS and difficulties in recruiting and retaining competent ICT 
personnel. The government has to make sure that adequate funding will be provided 
during implementation and afterwards to sustain the results. Hopefully, significant 
increase in tax collection due to successful implementation of the reform measures 
would enable STS to continually upgrade the system and improve its operations. STS 
also plans, under its reform strategy, to introduce a merit-based pay system which will 
hopefully motivate the staff to perform better. Broader risks are associated with political 
instability. Political shocks could disrupt the continuity of the reform process, while 
political pressures – including from the parliament members and other vested interests 
opposing any changes in tax system – could hinder the reform‘s goals. Definitely, these 
risks could be mitigated by the government commitment to pursuing prudent tax policy, 
fiscal consolidation and structural reforms under the NSDP for 2013-2017 (IMF, 2014). 
The tax code of 2008 also helps to establish a favourable environment for tax 
administration reform. 
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Results Achieved 
Like the implementation component, the final results accrued from the reform are likely 
to feedback into elite perceptions of what types of change are desirable and feasible. In 
practice, however, the impact of the reform is often difficult to identify and catch with 
confidence. It is expected that the main outcome of the reform would be a modern and 
efficient tax system that leads to increase in tax collection (ADB, 2009). The 
government took firm steps towards comprehensive tax administration reform – the 
functional organization was introduced to the STS, the ITAS has been developed and 
rolled out in all tax offices, and the e-filing system became available for all taxpayers 
since 2010. Communication network for tax offices is in place and all offices are 
electronically connected to the central database. The construction of the SSB was 
finished in 2010 and the call-centre started to operate in the SSB in May 2012. In 
addition, the one-stop shops have been open in 22 tax offices. Efforts were made to 
improve taxpayer services and voluntary compliance, in particular risk-based audit has 
been institutionalized and proceeded to the implementation phase. Also, the non-ICT 
components were introduced, including human resource management, institutional 
strengthening, and change management that would help the STS‘s staff to adjust to 
changes. Although new functional structure and business processes are unmistakably 
established, it is often a challenge to know how far the specific impacts could be 
attributed to the preceding reform efforts – there is a variety of causal influences, of 
which a tax reform is only one of them.  
STS should adopt specific measures to control and monitor the progress of the reform. 
The development partners are also looking for government assurance that the reforms 
will be continued and results sustained. It is important to mention that the impetus for 
reform and modernization of tax administration is coming from the top government 
officials, senior tax managers and civil society organizations – that is, the ‗top-down‘ 
approach. As the benefits of modernization process become visible and the reform 
outcomes sound, additional players join the course, including business associations – 
which are vocal for simplified taxation and additional VAT exemptions for small and 
medium-sized enterprises and reduction in compliance costs – as well as STS‘s staff 
as better-designed operations and training program help to increase their skills and 
commitment for reforms. 
The reform program should incorporate important lessons derived from decades of 
international experience in tax administration reforms, particularly involving tax 
agencies that have already adopted ICT systems with an active support of the donors. 
In practice, successful tax administration reforms require more than computerization 
and system upgrading, it also entails complex institutional change, affecting 
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organization and human resource development. In that case, the optimal approach is to 
move personnel away from low-productive tasks toward more specialized and higher-
value. And training must be provided early to facilitate country ownership, and ensure 
that proper attention is given to government commitment and ownership, as well as 
adequate financing. Performance should be monitored using a holistic set of indicators, 
not just revenue targets. Performance indicators should also measure quality, 
productivity, service orientation, and sustainability. Fostering taxpayer‘s culture, 
especially towards voluntary compliance, is very important. This would require an 
effective taxpayer education and service program. The automation of business 
operations will allow to free more staffing for the taxpayer outreach functions.  
Additionally, close attention should be given to a sequence and scale of the reform. 
Initially, the pilots were introduced in the LTU and the Bishkek Tax Office as these 
departments provide the best venues for launching automated system. For similarly 
reasons, e-filing and online tax payments were piloted in LTU. It is also important to 
pay more attention to civil society participation in tax affairs, as well as business 
development. Private stakeholders – such as, the Chamber of Tax Consultants, 
business associations and public advocatory groups were already in the board of the 
Public Advisory Council (PAC) which sent an official request to the government in 
support of the comprehensive tax administrative reform in 2010. 
Technological Change 
As technological modernization was a main component of reform package for tax 
administration reform in Kyrgyzstan, the Technological Change should be a valuable 
part of the model to analyse the effect of reform on tax service. Apart from better 
provision of information and services, new technologies can substantially improve 
existing patterns and divisions (Bellamy and Taylor, 1998: 150), and can lead to a 
change in the citizen‘s perspective in tax administration. This could not only include the 
physical relocations of offices and contracting out, but also a shift to web-based 
systems of citizen-state interaction. In reality, this will allow to reduce costs and 
improve staff recruitment (Norris, 2001). For example, the STS launched a new web-
site which provides full information to taxpayers about the tax code, e-filing procedures 
and knowledge base. A change in technology can also alter the range of tasks and 
contribute to better monitoring and accountability. The introduction of the risk-based 
audit system completely changes the STS‘s attitude towards compliant taxpayers – so, 
new audit processes and procedures should be established. The One-Stop Shops and 
call-centre were opened to provide easy and fast service to taxpayers. The new ITAS 
brings together the tax offices, standardizes their operations and improves overall 
coordination within the STS. Unsurprisingly, upgraded tasks demanded new skills from 
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the tax officers – as a result, a learning centre was established and a training program 
launched. Technological change may also lead to changes in the job requirements for 
personnel, as tasks become more complex, higher levels of education and training may 
be needed. It also means that certain types of positions used to be very common may 
be disappear (Pollitt, 2011). Apparently, this also have a profound effect on taxpayers – 
they have to be able to access the Internet to send the electronic tax documents and 
participate in on-line forums – and hopefully enhance the civic engagement. As soon 
as services can be provided on-line rather than face-to-face in tax offices there is good 
possibility to moving offices away from expensive locations and accommodation. In 
addition, new technologies could increase profit and make savings, but first they would 
require substantial initial investment – and the financial support and expertise of the 
development partners is truly indispensable. Often, new technologies enable new 
practices that sometimes contradict with the old rules. In this regard, the STS made a 
decision to reengineer their business operations and introduce change management. 
The new linkages and new inter-relationships between government agencies as part of 
the integrated ICT system ultimately question the existing jurisdictional boundaries and 
lines of institutional accountability – this would require a wide inter-agency effort to 
define organizational borders. The final proposition is that technological change shifts 
the customer‘s perception of space and time. Indeed, nowadays the e-government 
could be found in cyberspace, which can have significant impact on how the public 
programs could be designed, implemented and evaluated. The other crucial element 
that should be mentioned is management initiative, creativity and leadership. Even 
when a context is favourable for a given system, successful technological change 
would require leadership. This is very critical for the Kyrgyz Republic, after the 
completion of the project the new ITAS would require continuous effort to maintain the 
system as well as the leadership of the key tax officials to sustain the results. 
6.4. External Influences 
The lack of the External Influences is substantial weakness of the Pollitt and 
Bouckaert‘s model. Without it the learning process about tax reform in transition 
countries is not possible. The success of the tax reforms depends on whether there is 
strong political will to support them, whether the models are tailored to the country 
context and its institutional capacity, and whether donor coordination is in place to 
monitor and guide the reforms. Hence, if these vital conditions are not met, tax reforms 
are unlikely to succeed. Still, the provision of poor advice and promotion of 
inappropriate models by IDAs remain an unfortunate feature of many reform packages. 
So, greater attention should be given to the appropriateness of a policy advice, along 
with an adaptive approach to reform implementation. 
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As mentioned above, successful tax reform depends on political leadership and 
government commitment to reform – indeed, reform works well when it has strong 
political support. It is a common mistake to perceive tax reforms as purely ‗technical‘ 
exercise – this assumption should be corrected from the very beginning in order to 
achieve a wider support for reform. It should also be kept in mind that the motivation for 
tax reform is not only economical but political – that is, to expand public spending and 
to meet the development goals specified in the national strategy. Hence, it is essential 
to take into account the political context when designing a reform program.  
Clear communications across government and transparency over the results achieved 
can be beneficial in building political support. Besides, reforms need to be ‗sold‘ to the 
politicians, including the possibility to sensitize the opposition and the general public to 
the urgent need for reform, in order to ensure continuity of reform in case of any 
chance events. Strong leadership and commitment to reform is required both at the 
political and administrative levels, as well as adequate coordination between them. On 
the other hand, neither government commitment nor pressure from legislative bodies 
and external stakeholders – mainly, donors and civil society – prove sufficient enough 
to generate political will. Although they may help to sustaining it, where it already exist. 
The impact of civil society organizations – mainly, the chamber of tax consultants and 
business associations – on tax reform in the Kyrgyz Republic is founded to be limited 
due to their minimal experience in regard to advocacy work and due to absence of a 
culture of public accountability. At the same time, the international ‗best practices‘ 
suggest that their influence will be more effective over the longer term. In order to 
improve the effectiveness of CSOs in short-run, they have to be more focused on a 
narrower set of popular topics, such as the corruption in tax offices or tax amnesty 
campaign. Reforms must be owned by country – it is not possibly to imposed them 
outside as a condition for aid disbursement. Of course, reform will progress much 
faster when linked to financial support, but it is more likely to be sustained if the country 
ownership is developed – ‗Without ownership, reform stops when the money stops‘ 
Lawson (2012: 21). 
The ‗big-bang‘ approach has advantages as the revenue-related reforms tend to move 
in the same direction. It is also important to consider the main characteristics of a 
reform – notably, breadth, speed and depth. In terms of a ‗breadth,‘ it is a conventional 
proposition that the reform should be holistic, covering the whole system. Although ‗big-
bang‘ seems the best approach for countries in transition, lessons from less developed 
countries suggest to implement it gradually in small pieces based on government 
priorities. On the way to choosing a ‗depth,‘ the reforms should be consistent with the 
real needs of the state and its capacity to implement them – still, reform is capacity-
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driven process. A pace of reforms should be consistent with the institutional and human 
capacity, notwithstanding the fact that external support often neglects it. Thus, the 
development partners do have to pay attention and take into account the existing 
capacity. It is recommended that they invest in the initial stage of the reform process, 
and then stand back and allow the reform to realign with existing level. However, such 
aspects of change management are often overlooked. Reformers tend to 
underestimate the time and effort involved in fomenting sustainable changes in 
organizational culture and practices. 
It is important to recognize that development partners could be part of the problem, as 
well. In some occasions, the governments find it is difficult to rely on donor support, in 
part because of the use of off-budget accounts and the lack of accountability in the 
relevant agencies. Foreign aid could boost reform in those countries where the context 
and tools were right for success, and where external funding is spent on the 
government-led program. On the other hand, in the recent years, governments in the 
developing and transition countries show a willingness to co-finance their reform 
initiatives. Direct funding by the governments becomes more common than generally 
expected, particularly where the domestic resources and revenue inflows became 
available for discretionary spending, after certain stages of reform have been 
successfully implemented. 
However, the governments often found themselves constrained in terms of the New 
Management Ideas, where the menu of available policy choices and reform models did 
not fit the specific country context and institutional capacity. External advice can help to 
bring a new perspective to an old problem, with which the government definitely is 
struggling. It is obvious that poorly designed advice could close ‗policy idea‘ space and 
exaggerate existing problems. External agencies have a responsibility to ensure their 
advice is well informed and the best in the quality and, if this is not possible, to ensure 
that a joint effort of the government and other partners, including regional institutions 
and professional associations, provides an adequate solution. 
There is a possibility that reform outcomes will be more favourable if a better range of 
policy options is available. As policy advice could not be always correct, some degree 
of experimentation is also necessary. To make sure that countries do not suffer from 
repeated implementation of inappropriate models and approaches to reform, it is 
important to put monitoring mechanism and donor coordination in place. Meantime, this 
requires that the government introduces a lesson-learning culture and adaptive 
approach into an evaluation framework. In practice, aid-dependent countries face the 
growing need to adapt their public finance systems to the specific requirements of the 
external partners.  
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So far, donor pressure to develop a comprehensive reform agenda and to establish a 
clearly defined monitoring and assessment procedures has a positive impact. By 
contrast, their attempts to influence either the speed or the content of reforms through 
aid conditionality have been rather ineffective. Nevertheless, external support in the 
form of technical assistance projects on tax administration reform and modernization 
has been of a great help to Kyrgyzstan. In particular, the most productive donor 
interventions are those with specific tax measures explicitly defined in the ‗country-
specific‘ program. On the other hand, donor promises to improve the utilization of the 
integrated information system did not progress very far. In that case, external support 
would be more helpful in the reengineering of the business operations and updating the 
STS staff‘s skills in the new learning centre, which might raise awareness at the 
administrative level and emphasize the need for reform. 
Conclusions 
In the Kyrgyz Republic, fiscal consolidation continues to be an important component of 
the socio-economic policies. On one hand, budget deficits should be kept under tight 
control to maintain macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability. On the other hand, 
economic and social expenditures should be increased in order to meet the national 
development goals and to promote economic growth. Still, the country faces fiscal 
challenges arising from the political instability, frequent changes in the government, aid 
dependence, limited diversification of the economy and vulnerability to external shocks. 
To reconcile these challenges, a buoyant tax base, the liberal tax code and effective 
tax administration would be needed. Yet, while tax collection steady increased, its level 
remains low in comparison with other post-Soviet countries – and likely below potential 
level. For instance, the EU‘s TACIS project estimated in 2002 that the gap between 
potential and actual tax receipts from the VAT, PIT, CIT, and excise taxes was about 
19.5% of GDP (ADB, 2009). At the micro level, the weak tax administration provides 
opportunities for corruption and creates barriers to business development in the form of 
uneven tax burden and high compliance costs – this also reflected in the negative 
rating in business surveys and responses to interview questions. While restrictive tax 
measures could generate additional revenue, there is a consensus that high tax rates, 
especially for income taxation, positively correlated with the growth of the shadow 
economy and tax evasion. Accordingly, the tax rates for PIT and CIT have been 
reduced to 10% and VAT to 12% in order to promote the income legalization and 
stimulate labour market. To beset the potential revenue losses due to drop in tax rates, 
significant improvements in tax administration are required.  
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Socio-Economical Forces. It may be not immediately recalled from the Pollitt-
Bouckaert‘s model that dependence from external financing would have much effect on 
the progress of tax reform in Kyrgyzstan, but that would be mistaken. The country is 
susceptible to the support by the donors, and their debt conditionality. So, the model 
needs to take into account the significant influence, and involvement, of the 
development partners in the reform process. The open and small economy of the 
Kyrgyz Republic is particularly vulnerable to external shocks, including the global 
financial crisis and the price volatility in the international markets. Without sound 
development strategy, Kyrgyzstan will remain highly sensible to these shocks. The tax 
reform could contribute to achieving sustainable economic growth and poverty 
reduction – the increase in tax revenues will help to foster macroeconomic stability, as 
well as provide a space for fiscal consolidation. 
After independence, labour migration became an urgent issue that has a considerable 
impact on the economic development in the country. Complex socio-economic 
situation, high unemployment and lack of jobs lead to strong migration outflows, both 
internal and external. The migration has a negative effect on the availability and quality 
of labour force and the demographic structure of society – the major problems are 
staffing in government agencies, and depopulation of rural and remote regions. Due to 
massive migration, the layer of the country‘s high-skilled professionals has thinned 
significantly. Hence, there is no effective mechanism for creating and nurturing politico-
administrative elite. To promote the growth of the small and medium businesses, the 
government already introduced the special tax regimes, such as simplified taxation and 
patents. Thus, similar to the global economic forces, the impact of the socio-
demographic changes on tax reform is indirect.  
Political System. Over the past two decades, there has been a massive influx of new 
management ideas about how to manage the public financial management reform, 
facilitated by the international organizations and donors. There is no doubt that these 
development partners and their consultants have profound influence on decisions 
made by the political leaders and government authorities in transition countries. Most 
commonly to all post-Soviets was the fact that after the break up of the Soviet Union 
the governments were presented with a limited range of options for reform. However, 
the results were not as expected as the solutions designed for developed economies 
could not be transformed directly into specific country context – rather they join a large 
pool of ideas accumulated from a variety of sources by political and administrative 
elites. According to the model, the party-political ideas could be generated internally as 
part of special political agenda under the pressure from citizens. In reality, the 
management ideas and consequently the content of reform packages are extensively 
influenced by the external players which communicate them directly to the elite groups 
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– hence, without the participation of the weak multi-party system. In the Kyrgyz 
Republic, there is widespread belief that the STS is corrupt and that the tax burden is 
very high, so that public opinion may be mobilized to produce pressure for particular 
reforms. While the views of citizens could rarely be the driving force for changes in the 
tax system, civil society organizations are likely to be crucial intermediaries in fostering 
state-citizens bargaining around taxation. Indeed, an important opportunity for building 
political support for tax reform lies in broader public engagement in tax reform. 
Elite Decision-Making. In Kyrgyzstan, besides internal pressure of the economic and 
political systems, elites are heavily influenced by policy ideas of the development 
partners, as well as overreliance on foreign aid. This makes it clear that elite decision-
making is a process that is shaped by wider external context. In reality, the politico-
administrative elite in the country is very fragmented – the ununified elite groups often 
cannot reach an agreement on a variety of issues due to their ambitions and self-
interests. In fact, this is one of the reasons why the joint assistance provided by the 
development partners was so ineffective, and a series of economic reforms failed. 
More than that, elites compete for power through informal patron-client networks – the 
core of these patronage networks could be a particular family, clan, or elite group, 
which extends the network and attract additional clients by using financial tiers. It 
should be mentioned, at this point, that clan politics as a dominant social and political 
force in Central Asia impedes not only democratization but also longer-term regime 
durability and can only be taken down through the institutionalization of a market 
economy. 
Chance Events. The chance events could come in different forms and sizes – for 
example, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990s and the global economic crisis of 
2008. The impact of these events on the direction and content of tax reform may not be 
so obvious at the beginning, but eventually it is significant. Rose Revolution in 2010 
had a devastated effect on budget deficit, forcing the government to inflate its spending 
and introduce the tax holidays for businesses affected during these tragic events, but 
this also stimulated the constructive dialogue between the government and business 
community. Often such events have a tendency to be translated into organizational, or 
institutional, changes. At the individual level, the politico-administrative elite is prone to 
a variety of other ‗chance events‘ and occasionally persons with strong ideas and 
background may arrive or leave for reasons unrelated with their management skills and 
leadership style. In Kyrgyzstan, political instability and frequent changes in the 
government leads to frequent changes in the top management of the public institutions. 
Political turbulence and internal disputes, as a result of the chance events, could 
disrupt the continuity of the reform process and pose a question about the sustainability 
of its outcomes.  
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Administrative System. Similar to other transition countries, the content of reform 
packages in the Kyrgyz Republic has been developed in close cooperation with the 
development partners, as part of the national development strategy. However, during 
implementation, the government faced unforeseen challenges in terms of donor 
coordination and institutional capacity of the tax agency. Indeed, it should be admitted 
that often reform programs are delivered through a wider network of development 
partners and public institutions rather than by a single agency. However, the implication 
of this network to tax reform is very complicated, and the ideas about how to manage a 
network of different players are in short supply – that is why, the government refers 
directly to the global community for policy advice and appropriate approaches to reform 
rather than relies on weak political parties. 
It is expected that the main outcome of the reform would be a simple and efficient tax 
system that leads to increase in tax collection. The government took firm steps forward, 
in particular the functional organization was introduced to the STS, the ITAS has been 
developed and rolled out in all tax offices, and the e-filing system became available for 
all taxpayers since 2010. In addition, the call-centre and one-stop shops have been 
open in tax offices. Additional efforts were made to improve taxpayer services and 
voluntary compliance, and risk-based tax audit has been institutionalized. ICT network 
for tax offices is in place and all offices are electronically connected to the central 
database. As technological modernization was a main component of a reform package 
for tax reform in Kyrgyzstan, the technological change should be a valuable part of the 
Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s model to analyse the effect of reform on tax service. 
External Influences. To provide more coordinated support to organizational changes in 
the tax system, donors could strengthen a link between the government and the civil 
society – mainly, business associations, trade unions, professional organizations and 
even political parties – aimed to increase pressure for improved responsiveness and 
accountability, and share information about on-going reform efforts. With those 
members in mind, donors might secure access to better public information about tax 
revenue and compliance, and stimulate political debates about the impact of taxation 
on public spending, as well as on governance. Further links could be made to a broad 
range of local and international NGOs which are taking growing interest in taxation and 
governance seriously. But more systematic efforts are needed to document the ‗best 
practices‘ in strengthening tax administration in developing countries and to evaluate 
different approaches to tax policy reform – for example, sector-wide approaches, which 
benefit from potential synergies with other parts of PFM – as well as identify entry 
points for donor harmonization.  
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CONCLUSION 
The thesis aims to identify and describe factors influencing tax reform in the Kyrgyz 
Republic since 1991 using Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s Model of Public Management Reform. In 
doing so it critically reviews the applicability of the Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s model in this 
context and implications for how the model could be adapted to fit the context (Figures 
7.1, 7.2). The first section provides overall summary about influences of the Pollitt-
Bouckaert‘s model on tax reform in the Kyrgyz Republic. The second examines the 
findings about the socio-economic forces, political factors and administrative system as 
well as the importance of clan politics in elite decision-making. It argues that the legacy 
of Soviet history in affecting these structures needs to be taken into account. It is also 
suggested that the external factors and the role of international development partners 
is a category of forces that needs to be explicitly introduced into the model. 
It goes without reservation that the period of independence cannot be understood in 
isolation from the seminal events of the early 1990s, culminated by the unforeseen 
disintegration of the Soviet Union which legacy has left a long-lasting impact on 
trajectory of the economic and political development in the country. As a diagram of 
main factors of the public sector reform, this model could be further adapted and 
modified for tax reform purposes. As the topic is rather vast, there are many elements 
that could not be engaged with. However, as a generic model, the theoretical 
framework is sound and coherent, especially in terms of prospective comparative 
studies of the tax reform initiatives in Central Asia. Of course, model should be 
adjusted to country-specific circumstances and it is an absolutely logical process of 
adding or removing some explanatory variables in force-boxes and directional 
influences. 
Since the early years after independence, international organizations and donors have 
played a significant role in shaping the public sector reforms in developing and 
transitional countries and overarching their macroeconomic policy. Pollitt and 
Bouckaert are correct to warn out that the global economic forces should not be 
understated in a reform agenda. From perspective of the global community, Kyrgyzstan 
has been seen to be doing the ‗right things‘ in terms of reform indexes and international 
ratings as an ‗island of democracy‘ in the region while the excessive foreign aid 
exacerbated the short-run costs of transition recession leading to a devastated fiscal 
crisis later. 
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Figure 7.1. Model of Public Management Reform: Kyrgyz Republic  
 
 
Adapted from Pollitt, C. & Bouckaert, G. (2011) Public Management Reform: A 
Comparative Analysis-New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo-
Weberian State, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, p. 33. 
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The socio-economic and political landscape was also highly influenced to a far greater 
degree by previous centrally planning regime. While not captured by the model, the 
legacies of the Soviet Union‘s economy have left a long-lasting impact on trajectory of 
the economic development in the country, although it is itself highly influenced by 
various chance events. This may be one of the model‘s few shortcomings. 
The Kyrgyz case elucidates that it is rather difficult to discern between Party-Political 
Ideas and Elite Decision-Making due to the extent of clan politics and regional networks 
dominance in the political system. The distinction is also maintained through the 
pressure that business associations place on the government and tax administration in 
promoting their interests within the civil society movements. It is clear from the 
arguments in this thesis that the political party has not been significantly more 
influential than civil society, but both have nevertheless played a role in elite decision-
making on tax-related issues. 
The elite and party leader‘s ambiguity towards new management ideas – NPM, neo-
liberalism - is one of the reasons why they have only been poor-presented in the reform 
programs. The Administrative System – particularly, the content of tax reforms – has 
largely been determined by developmental partner‘s requirements. But, it is also 
evidentially constrained by institutional capacity of the central government – mainly, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Treasury, the State Tax Service – and the need to balance 
global donor perception with the interest of a state, notwithstanding its birth in difficult 
negotiations. Because of the disparity between kin-based elites and  developmental 
partners, implementation processes often run in contradistinction with the initial goals 
of reform packages. Unfortunately, achieved results do appear to have little impact on 
elites‘ decisions.  
Taking a broader view, the changes in tax system in the last twenty years can be also 
explained by an intensification of a number of factors, in particular the Global Economic 
Forces, and the supply of new management ides attributed to growing influence of 
development partners. However, these factors soon have to withstand against 
countervailing forces – including the resistance of various groups with a vested interest 
in retaining the status quo. It means that existing way of doing things may be fixed by 
law, administrative procedures or cultural norms which take time and government 
commitments to be changed – in Kyrgyzstan it required an amendment to the country‘s 
constitution in order to transfer to a new political regime. Furthermore, even if it is 
evidential that the current administrative structure and processes are inadequate to a 
new context, the elites found it is difficult to agree on what to do next – partly due to 
factionalism of politico-administrative elite. Do not forget that desired changes in the 
administrative system need considerable investments in new ICT system, new facilities 
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and new training program for staff involved, before they can be put in practice – hence, 
Technological Change was added to the administrative factors (Figure 7.1). All these 
factors can be viewed as the cost of changes which could help to define the timescale 
of change – in reality, the government and international agencies tend to underestimate 
their importance until they move to the implementation stage. In post-Soviet states the 
cost of change can be associated with the dismantling of the previous command 
system in order to make a room for market-based. Therefore, historical background, 
political negotiations and elite settlements are count in building the new system. Similar 
to tax reform, staff has to abandon the Soviet-style mentality and embrace a new way 
of working with taxpayers. While old networks of information and influence were 
disrupted, government officials who were used to particular influence within the tax 
agency now have to get used to new functional structure and procedures, and probably 
it will be more difficult for them to engage in corrupt activities. By and large, however, 
this model is a strong and instructive tool to analyse tax reforms in post-Soviet 
transition countries. Given the multivariate complexities of the specific country‘s 
situation, it is impressive that the model stands the test – especially having it been 
designed for the developed world. 
Socio-Economical Forces 
In the model, Pollitt and Bouckaert underpin a significant influence to the Global 
Economic Forces, mostly referring to the globalization process, which continuously 
provides more and more new opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion – in 
particular, profit-shifting by multinational corporations is an increasing concern by the 
global community. In the Kyrgyz Republic, reliance on development partners and their 
foreign aid has a great effect on tax reform. The open and small economy of the Kyrgyz 
Republic is particularly vulnerable to external shocks, including the global financial 
crisis and the price volatility in the global markets. The recent increase in global prices 
for food and fuel substantially affected domestic prices and caused inflation to grow. 
Due to relatively little connection of the gold production to other sectors of the 
economy, any change in gold prices does not have much effect on macroeconomic 
situation in general.  
Socio-Demographic Change is the second background pressure of significant 
importance in the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s Model. In contrast to rapid retirement of baby-
boomers generation in the developed countries, in Kyrgyzstan labour migration 
became an urgent issue in the recent years that has a considerable impact on the 
socio-economic development in the country. Complex economic situation, high 
unemployment and lack of job opportunities lead to strong migration flows, both 
internally and externally. The migration has a negative effect on the availability and 
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quality of labour force as well as on the demographic structure of society – today the 
major problems are staffing in public institutions, and aging and depopulation of rural 
and remote regions. A significant part of the society is still in a ‗survival‘ mode, and the 
layer of the country‘s high-skilled professionals has thinned significantly due to massive 
post-independence migration. Hence, there is no effective mechanism for creating and 
nurturing politico-administrative elite. At the same time, taking into account the large 
share of the remittances in GDP, they could be seen as an important instrument to be 
used to improve national economy in general, and to address certain issues in the 
labour market. In order to promote the public sector development, the government 
already introduced the special tax regimes, such as simplified taxation, and mandatory 
and voluntary patenting – hence, similar to the global economic forces, the impact of 
the socio-demographic pressure on tax reform is indirect. 
As the Pollitt and Bouckaert propose, macroeconomic features do have significant 
influence on tax reforms. According to the model, the combined effect of the global 
economic forces and socio-economic change reflect themselves in the Socio-Economic 
Policies. For instance, in 2013, fiscal policy has remained sound – fiscal deficit was 4% 
of GDP which was 1.2% below the target of 5.2% as a result of strict control of 
expenditures and modest increase in tax collection. Meantime, higher than expected 
imports led to an increase in VAT, customs, and excises. Yet, tax revenues were slightly 
below the target due to harsh weather conditions for agribusiness and the temporary 
closure of borders. Nowadays, the country faces the dual fiscal challenge in 
maintaining its prudent fiscal policy to sustain macroeconomic stability and economic 
growth, while managing social expenditures. To cope with this challenge, it is 
necessary to boost tax collection. For all this, fiscal consolidation continues to be vital 
for improving economic performance. However, the tax service experiences difficulty 
with inadequate equipment and old facilities, inefficient operational practices, and 
inadequate staff skills. Consequently, tax collection remains below potential level, 
operations are prone to technical errors and corruption, and the tax code is not 
perceived to be conducive to business development. There is a need for urgent reform 
of the tax administration system which will contribute to achieving sustainable growth 
and poverty reduction. Indeed, the increase in tax revenues will help to foster 
macroeconomic stability, which is an essential for economic growth, as well as provide 
a fiscal ‗space‘ for socio-economic expenditures that will enable country to achieve its 
MDGs.  
Political System 
One of the dynamic elements of the political system in the Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s model is 
the New Management Ideas. Indeed, over the past two decades there has been a 
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considerable amount of inter-country transfer of different ideas about how to manage 
the tax policy reforms, facilitated by the international organizations and donors. There 
can be no doubt that these development partners have profound effect on political 
leaders and civil servants in transitional economies. Most commonly to all post-Soviet 
countries was the fact that after unexpected break-up with the Soviet Union the 
government authorities were presented with a limited range of options by the 
development partners. Apparently, there were neither economic nor political factors that 
determined the choice of reform model – as simply as a lack of adequate ideas at that 
critical point of time. Too often, the results of the reform were not as expected as the 
models applied were designed for developed economies. Of course, management 
ideas very seldom could be transformed directly into specific reform program, rather 
they join a large pool of ideas drawn from a variety of sources by politico-administrative 
elites. It should be mentioned that previously the theoretical approaches and 
techniques derived from public economics have been predominantly used in regard to 
tax reform. By and large, insufficient knowledge of country specifics and a lack of 
experience with transition economies on behalf of both the development agencies and 
the government played a crucial role in the persistent application of inappropriate 
models and approaches, along with political constraints and institutional limitations.  
The second political factor according to the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model is the 
Pressure from Citizens. Definitely, an important opportunity for building political support 
for tax reform lies in broader public engagement. Although it is unlikely that citizens will 
come up with a detailed proposal for tax reform, but occasionally they can exert claim 
for changes in tax system, which then may be passed to the politico-administrative elite 
with the help of the mass media or political representatives. In fact, the views and 
opinion of citizens rarely form a pressure for reform, instead the CSOs are likely to be 
crucial intermediaries in encouraging a dialogue between the government and civil 
society around taxation. Thus, an important opportunity for building political support for 
tax reform lies in a broader public engagement which is missing in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
Despite the abundance of sound promises, the political parties in Kyrgyzstan tend to 
duplicate each other, claiming for similar package of popular socio-economic reforms. 
No surprisingly, there is no place for specific reforms, in particular tax reform, in such a 
broad claim. Thus, party‘s assortment of ideas is quite limited.  
In the model, Pollitt and Bouckaert identify Party Political Ideas as an important driver 
for changes in the management system, but ‗no party‘ system in the Kyrgyz Republic 
cannot support this argument. Moreover, in relation to tax reform, the new management 
ideas are extensively delivered by the development partners and civil society 
organizations which communicate them directly to the politico-administrative elite – 
hence, without the participation of the weak political parties.  
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Administrative System 
In the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model, the Content of Reform Package is the product of 
the interaction between the desirability and the feasibility in the elite‘s perception about 
a reform. In the Kyrgyz Republic, the country development strategies as a guide for 
reform programs have been developed with a help of the development partners. It is 
expected that the tax reform will contribute positively to the fiscal consolidation, 
macroeconomic stability and economic growth. However, during implementation, the 
government faced such challenges as insufficient donor coordination and institutional 
limitation of the tax agency. 
Implementation Process is an important part of the reform process. However, the liner 
representation of this process is too simple. Indeed, it should be admitted that 
frequently reform programs are delivered through a network of different organizations 
rather than by a single tax agency. in addition, this network also includes the 
international development agencies. Of course, the development partners have 
provided extended assistance for tax administration reforms, although it was mainly 
piecemeal and random. Thus, the implications of all these networks to tax reform are 
very complicated. To manage networks of different stakeholders, the multi-factors 
approach of the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model could be used. Implementation is also a 
crucial stage as it allows to directly feedback to the elite decision-makers about what to 
do next – whether to continue a chosen path or change the track. Another problem that 
could occur during the implementation is that individual reforms may contradict or slow 
down the other reforms carried out at the same time. In particular, it became evidential 
in terms of the integrated reform of the whole network of the revenue administration 
agencies – each member masters its own reform programs not in compliance with the 
others. And the single government body to oversee this integration effort does not yet 
exist. Risks during implementation of the reform package could also arise from 
potential delays due to STS‘s lack of experience in conducting administrative reforms. 
The other treats could include inadequate funding for sustaining new ITAS and 
difficulties in recruiting and retaining competent personnel. Broader risks are 
associated with political instability – political shocks could disrupt the continuity of the 
reform process, while political pressures could hinder the reform‘s goals. Thus, the 
government should pay more attention to the pace, scale and timing of the structural 
reforms. 
Similar to the implementation process, the Results Achieved eventually accrued from 
the process of reform are likely to feedback into elite perceptions of what types of 
change are desirable and feasible. However, the impact of the reform is often difficult to 
identify with confidence. It is expected that the main outcome of the reform would be a 
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simple, fair and efficient tax system that leads to increase in tax collection. In practice, 
the new functional structure and business processes were introduced, the integrated 
information system has been developed and rolled out in all tax offices, and the filing of 
e-documents became available for all taxpayers since 2010. Also, the non-ICT 
components were incorporated, including institutional strengthening, human resource 
management, and change management that would help the STS‘s staff to adjust to a 
new framework.  
As technological modernization was a main component of tax administration reform in 
Kyrgyzstan, the Technological Change should be a valuable part of the Pollitt and 
Bouckaert‘s model to analyze the effect of reform on tax service. Apart from better 
provision of information and services, new ICT can lead to a change in the citizen‘s 
perspective in tax administration. This could not only include the physical relocations of 
offices and contracting out, but also a shift to web-based systems of citizen-state 
interaction. A change in technology can also alter the range of tasks and contribute to 
improved transparency and accountability. The introduction of the risk-based audit 
system completely change the STS‘s attitude towards compliant taxpayers – so, new 
audit processes and procedures should be established. Unsurprisingly, upgraded tasks 
demanded new skills from the tax officers – as a result, a learning centre was 
established and training program launched. Technological change may also lead to 
changes in the job requirements for personnel, as tasks become more complex, higher 
levels of education and training may be needed. Apparently, this also have a profound 
effect on taxpayers – they have to be able to access the Internet to file the electronic 
tax documents and participate in on-line forums – and hopefully enhance the civic 
engagement. As soon as services can be provided online rather than face-to-face in 
tax offices there is good possibility to relocate offices as well as to reduce corruption. In 
addition, new technologies could increase profit and make savings, but first they would 
require substantial initial investment – and the financial support and expertise of the 
development partners is truly indispensable. Often, new technologies enable new 
practices that sometimes contradict with the old rules. In this regard, the STS made a 
decision to reengineer their business operations and introduce change management. 
The new linkages and new inter-relationships between government agencies as part of 
the integrated ICT system ultimately question the existing jurisdictional boundaries and 
lines of institutional accountability – this would require a wide inter-agency effort to 
define organizational borders. The technological change also shifts the customer‘s 
perception of space and time, which can have significant impact on how the public 
programs could be designed, implemented and evaluated. The other crucial element 
that should be mentioned is management initiative, creativity and leadership. Even 
when a context is favourable for a given system, successful technological change 
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would require leadership. This is very critical for the Kyrgyz Republic – after the 
completion of the project the new ITAS would require continuous effort to maintain the 
system as well as the leadership of the key tax officers to sustain the results. 
Elite Decision-Making 
At the centre of the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model lies the process of elite decision-
making that is surrounded by three large groups of factors – namely, socio-economic 
forces, political pressure, and elements of the administrative system. It is from the 
interaction between these broad factors that changes in tax system occur. The 
difference between elite perceptions of what reforms are desirable and what reforms 
are feasible reflects the fact that there are many obstacles – economic, socio-
demographic, political, legal, and institutional – as well as resistance to organizational 
changes within tax administration. Often, the elites find themselves in the position of 
desiring more changes than what was actually proposed. In this regard, restraining 
their aspirations in order to produce a narrower reform package could have more 
chances of being accepted by both the parliament and the citizens. Equally, 
perceptions of reform feasibility depends on the expectations and requirements of the 
key stakeholders, and institutional capacity of the government to implement the reform 
package – hence, as expected, there is strong connection between Elite Decision-
Making and Administrative System. 
In the Kyrgyz Republic, elites are heavily influenced by ideas and conditionality of the 
development partners – so, their plans could be easily changed over the course of the 
reform due to influx of the New Management Ideas from the international organizations 
and regional associations, as well as overreliance on external funding as part of the 
Global Economic Forces. This hopefully makes it clear that elite decision-making as a 
process is shaped by wider external influence. However, it does not mean that elites 
could not change their composition over time – in fact, they have very distinctive 
channels of recruitment. However, the layer of the country‘s ‗middle-class‘ has thinned 
considerably due to massive labour migration. So, there is no effective mechanism in 
place for creating and nurturing politico-administrative elite. 
In Kyrgyzstan, the politico-administrative elite is not homogenous in nature – by 
contrast, it is extremely fragmented. The kin-based elite often cannot reach an 
agreement on a variety of issues. This is one of the main reasons why the donor 
support was so ineffective, and a series of economic reforms failed. More than that, 
elites compete for power through informal patron-client networks – the core of these 
patronage networks could be a particular family, clan, or elite group, which extends its 
network and attract additional clients by using financial tiers. Although the Soviet Union 
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was able to isolate the political influence of clans and patronage networks, as soon as 
the regime collapsed, clans re-emerged as strong political actor, deeply penetrating 
into formal government structure. Clans, elites groups, and regional networks are a 
formidable presence in the political system of the Kyrgyz Republic. Any effort to build 
an ‗optimal‘ tax system must be based on the recognition of this reality. 
Chance Events 
The influence that operates outside of the main factors in the Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s model 
is the effect of the chance events. While they can clearly be part of any factors, the 
definite features of these events are their unpredictability and newsworthiness. The 
impact of such events on the direction and content of tax reform may not be so 
obvious, but occasionally it could be significant. For example, the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union came quite unexpectedly, similarly the global financial crisis of 2008 
followed by the Rosa Revolution in 2010 had a devastated effect on budget deficit 
(Figure 4.2.1). In response, the government introduced the new tax code with special 
tax regimes for business development as a joint effort between the government and the 
business community. Political shocks, as a result of these events, could disrupt the 
reform process, while political pressures from the parliament members and other 
interest groups could pose a question on the continuity of the reform. In Kyrgyzstan, 
due to political instability and frequent changes in the government, chance events led 
to institutional, and organizational, changes. Even more, the 2010 events resulted in 
the adoption of the new constitution and the first in post-Soviet Central Asia peaceful 
regime transition to the parliamentary republic. 
External Influences 
The key assumption of the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model is that the government of a 
single country is taken as its framework. In practice, this is already a major over-
simplification, as development partners play important role in tax reform in transition 
countries. The lack of the External Influence as a key factor is substantial weakness of 
the model. Without it the learning process about tax reform in Kyrgyzstan is impossible. 
Hopefully, the revised model could be a useful tool in creating a common 
understanding of the main factors, and forces, influencing tax reforms in post-Soviet 
transition countries. Moreover, as a generic model, it could also be used for 
comparative analysis of tax reforms in Central Asia. At the same time, the main tax 
policy recommendation is that the donors should make more effort to harmonize aid 
programs with each other – mainly, the World Bank, IMF, USAID and ADB – and to 
promote broader public engagement to make reform more effective. Insufficient 
knowledge of country context and a lack of experience in tax reform in transition 
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economies on behalf of both the development agencies and the government clearly 
played a crucial role in the persistent application of inappropriate models and 
approaches, as well as political constraints and institutional limitations. To be 
successful, tax reform needs strong political support and government commitment to 
reform. Also, the reform outcomes will be more favourable if a better range of policy 
options will be available. However, the government often found itself constrained in 
terms of the New Management Ideas, where the menu of available policy choices and 
reform models did not fit the specific country context and institutional capacity. 
To sum-up, the Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s model of public management reform could be further 
revised to fit the context of the post-Soviet transition countries. In particular, it seems 
that the Content of Reform Packages and Implementation Process are highly 
dependent from contextual factors, and the same policy tools will be differently utilized 
according to political regime, institutional capacity, historical background, culture, and 
chance events. In this regard, the legacy of the centrally planned economy played an 
important role in the development of tax systems in transition countries. It is critical to 
understand that the initial conditions and practices inherited from the previous regime 
continue to provide a solid background for tax reform today. 
When the collapse of the Soviet Union happened, the Kyrgyz government faced this 
chance event unprepared, and referred to the global community for policy ideas as well 
as external funding to support the reforms. This demonstrated that elite decision-
making as a process is shaped by wider external influence. The course of the reform 
could be changed due to the New Management Ideas supplied by the public 
associations and development partners, which communicate them directly to the 
politico-administrative elite – hence, without the participation of the weak political 
parties. As a result, the Party Political Ideas in the model could be easily substituted by 
the policy ideas generated and transmitted by the external players – the development 
partners and civil society organizations. The elite decisions are also influenced by 
conditionality of the donors – that is, the dependence on foreign aid as part of the 
Global Economic Forces (Figure 7.1).  
As expected, there is a strong link between Elite Decision-Making and Administrative 
System with an active participation of the development partners. Similar to other 
transition countries, the Content of Reform Packages in Kyrgyzstan has been 
developed in close cooperation with the international development agencies, as part of 
the national development strategy. However, during implementation, the government 
faced unforeseen challenges in terms of donor coordination and institutional capacity. 
Indeed, it should be admitted that often reform packages are delivered through a 
network of public sector institutions not just one government agency. As the 
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international organizations and donors have so significant influence on socio-economic 
forces, political changes and administrative system in the country, the External 
Influences should be a valuable part of the Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s model (Figure 7.2). It is 
assumed that the tax reform will contribute positively to macroeconomic stability, fiscal 
consolidation and economic growth. As technological modernization was the main 
component of tax reform in Kyrgyzstan, the Technological Change should be added as 
an element of the administrative system. Apart from better provision of tax services, a 
modern technology can help to change the citizen‘s perception about tax 
administration. 
Figure 7.2. Revised Model of Public Management Reform 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from Pollitt, C. & Bouckaert, G. (2011) Public Management Reform: A 
Comparative Analysis-New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo-
Weberian State, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, p. 33.  
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The revised model shows that the Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s model of public management 
reform, which is a framework for discussion of the main factors of tax reform, could be 
easily adapted to the context of post-Soviet transition countries – tax reform as part of 
broader public (financial) management reform went through the same stages and 
influenced by the same factors. Indeed, it is a strong and instructive tool to review the 
reform process in transition economies. In particular, it helped to address the questions 
of what are the main directions, and what are the main factors, of tax reform in the 
Kyrgyz Republic during the first decades of transition to a market economy. But the 
direction of tax reform in the country cannot be understood without a good knowledge 
of the initial conditions, and the main institutional and cultural ‗legacies‘ of the previous 
regime. In this regard, the thesis admits the importance of the politics of tax reform as 
well as significant influence, and participation, of the external players – that is the civil 
society organizations and the development partners. Therefore, this thesis theorizes 
the links between the tax reform and the socio-economic, political and administrative 
factors by applying the Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model to this context and by offering 
contributions towards an advance theoretical and methodological position.  
The thesis makes a significant contribution to knowledge by developing a new 
standpoint to examine the tax reform effort in post-Soviet transition countries where 
socio-economic forces, political pressures, elements of administrative system, 
technological innovations and international development partners are accorded as key 
factors influencing the reform. This step is of significant importance as it orientates the 
field toward a more critical and multifactor perspective and away from traditional public 
economics approach. Furthermore, the thesis is original in that no existing piece of 
work has examined the history of tax reform in the Kyrgyz Republic – it has not been 
systematically documented elsewhere and new evidence concerning the development 
of tax system in Kyrgyzstan not published previously, nor has there been an attempt to 
review the tax reform in transition countries as multiparty contemporary phenomenon.  
As scholars very rarely look at these countries, and Kyrgyzstan in particular, its 
methodological contribution is conducting research in this context. So, it is important to 
be native speaker who understands the context but who also has relevant training in 
methods and understands the theory. The other achievement of this research is the 
multiple methods approach which allows to address more complex research questions 
and to collect richer, and stronger, evidence than can be achieved by using only one 
method. It means that separate methods mixed in a study are forced to share the same 
research questions, to collect supplementary datasets, and to conduct data analysis in 
an integrated mode. This is based on the assumption that collecting diverse types of 
data in the embedded case study design will provide a more complete understanding of 
research questions than either quantitative or qualitative data alone.  
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In general, the revised model could be extremely useful in creating a common 
understanding of the main factors, influencing tax reforms in countries in transition. On 
the other hand, notwithstanding the fact that the framework was specifically changed to 
fit transitional countries, which by itself is an important contribution, the revised model 
is now less general and probably would need further adaptation – if it would, for 
example, to be applied in the developing countries without history of moving from 
central planning to market-style economy. This is the limitation of the study for 
contribution to understanding theory. The main argument is that the Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s 
model is a good universal starting place but needs to be adapted to broad contexts, of 
which post-Soviet transition countries is an important context. 
As a next step, it is vital that this study will be complemented by further research, which 
might build upon its insights. Wherever possible, additional case studies – preferably, 
other former Soviet Union states due to similar historical background, or even 
contrasting cases of developed countries – could deliberately test the ‗boundaries‘ of 
the conclusions emerged. If these case studies will utilize the same theoretical 
framework – the revised Pollitt and Bouckaert‘s model – and the same approach to the 
synthesis of results, this would allow the cross-country comparison, as well as unified 
evaluation of tax reform efforts over specific period of time. But before this, modified 
model could be used for development of comprehensive econometric model to 
evaluate the progress of tax reform in transition countries, followed up by comparative 
analysis of tax reforms in the five Central Asian republics on the wave of growing 
regional integration and tax competition – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – or members of the Eurasian Economic Community 
(EurAsEc) as the Customs Union in the future will be a common influence on particular 
countries. 
According to the revised Pollitt-Bouckaert‘s model, in order to avoid the  common 
mistakes in tax reform, it is recommended that the content of reform packages will be 
based on detailed diagnosis, not just broad impressions. Politicians, government 
authorities, policymakers and external consultants have to deliver a clear statement of 
the problems that are to be remedied. In addition, there was a failure to build a 
sufficient coalition for reform, so that the reform is just seen as a project of a small 
group of politico-administrative elite. This is particularly dangerous in countries where 
governments change rapidly due to various chance events – once a government falls 
or elite is ousted, the reform loses its roots and simply dies. It should be remembered 
that tax reform is not just a technical adjustment but rather, and almost always, also a 
political action, and therefore it requires a coalition of supporters. Ideally this support 
should include political leaders, senior civil servants and civil society activists, as well 
as important development partners. 
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Too often reforms were launched without ensuring sufficient implementation capacity. 
Government officials and development agencies should make sure that tax service 
obtains the required set of skills to implement the new management ideas and to 
sustain the reform outcomes. Also, it means that the general direction of recent tax 
reforms, including the relative shift to indirect taxes and the emphasis on tax 
administration reform, is broadly correct. It was also observed the haste and lack of 
sustained application. The fundamental reforms may take years to be fully developed, 
and the process of improving tax systems will continue to be slow and incremental. It is 
important for external stakeholders to give a reform the time, and patience, – it will 
need all this to come to fruition. Not to mention the over-reliance of the international 
organizations and donors on external expertise rather than experienced locals. It is 
crucial to maximize the use of both internal and external experts. External advisors 
certainly can bring an extra experience and knowledge of ‗best practices,‘ but by itself 
this is not a substitute for local knowledge. Finally, it is important not to ignore local 
cultural factors. It is essential to assemble an accurate picture of the organizational 
culture and institutional capacity of the tax offices which are to undergo reform, and use 
this to stress points of compatibility with cultural norms, whilst also identifying likely 
points of resistance. And still, the major knowledge gaps in existing literature have 
been identified in three broad areas that aim to achieve better understanding of the 
main factors of tax reform – mainly, relations between taxation, good governance and 
civil society, links between taxation and economic growth, and taxation and foreign aid. 
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APPENDICES   
Appendix A. Interview Guide 
 
Introduction 
Setting-up the interview, information sheet  
Explaining the purpose of interview and the research (role minimization) 
Having the interviewee to sign a consent form  
Giving a copy of the form to participant 
Asking permission to record the interview 
 
 
1. Personal Information 
 
Position ____________________________________________________________ 
Organization  ________________________________________________________ 
Bio/Carrier Experience  
What was your position in that time?  
Probe: Tell about your background, position/job, training and situation/events in 
chronological order (time horizon). 
 
 
2. Tax System 
 
2.1. General Information 
What do you think about the tax system of the Kyrgyz Republic? 
Taxpayer: What do you know about taxation in the Kyrgyz Republic in general? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Recommendations  
What do you recommend to improve in the tax system of the Kyrgyz Republic (tax 
structure, tax administration, tax law, tax policy)? How to do that? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Code 
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3. Tax Administration 
 
3.1. General Opinion 
What do you think about tax administration of the Kyrgyz Republic? 
Taxpayer: What was your experience with the tax service? Any difficulties? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Performance Management  
What targets and indicators can be used to evaluate performance of the tax service? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Legitimacy of Tax System 
How did taxpayers persuade a new tax system? 
How to improve the relationship between taxpayers and government/tax 
administration? 
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4. Tax Reform 
 
4.1. Goals of Tax Reform 
What were the reasons/goals of tax reform? 
What changes have been done during that period? Why? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2. Barriers of Tax Reform  
What were the main obstacles/barriers of tax reform? What are your 
recommendations/comments to overcome them? 
Civil servants: What problems did you experience in implementation of your 
idea/plan? 
 
Political 
 
Economical 
 
 
Social 
 
 
Administrative 
 
 
Other (cultural, etc.) 
 
4.3. Perspective 
Do you think that the tax reform was successful? Did government achieve initial 
goals? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Comments 
 
Wrap-up Interview 
Do you have to add something? 
 
Questions to Researcher 
  
Thank You Notes 
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Appendix B. Political Parties  
Party, Leader  Role in April 2010 events  Number of 
seats 
Ata Jurt (Fatherland)  
Kamchybek Tashiev  
Not active in April events; known for 
ethno-nationalist claims and strong 
support base in southern Kyrgyzstan; 
often accused of links to Bakiev clan 
and labelled as ―revanchists‖ 
28 
(II) 
Social Democratic Party 
Almazbek Atambaev  
Active in April events; active 
opposition to Bakiev‘s rule in the 
parliament; interim president 
Otunbaeva was a member 
26 
(I, II, III) 
Ar Namys (Dignity)  
Feliks Kulov  
Not active in April events; strongly 
supported by the Russian media on 
the eve of elections; received most 
votes in areas with significant ethnic 
minorities 
25 
(III) 
Respublika  
Omurbek Babanov  
Not active in April events; created 
after April events; often referred to as 
a party of oligarchs/businessmen; 
includes many leaders of Ak Jol 
(Bakiev) 
23 
(I, II, III) 
Ata Meken (Fatherland)  
Omurbek Tekebaev  
Active in April events; one of oldest 
opposition parties; heavily attacked by 
the Russian media on the eve of 
elections 
18 
(I, III) 
Total   120 
 
Source:  Juraev, S. 2012. Is Kyrgyzstan‘s New Political System Sustainable? Policy 
Memo No 210. PONARS Eurasia, p.5. 
 
Ata-Jurt. The Ata-Jurt Party 66  was founded by Roza Otunbaeva and three other 
opposition leaders in December 2004, in preparation for the 2005 parliamentary 
elections. Otunbaeva was then barred from running for office due to a recently enacted 
residency requirement.  The political base of the Ata-Jurt is in the south of the country, 
but the headquarter is located in Bishkek. The party, led by Kamchybek Tashiev, has 
been accused of being nationalist and attempting to restore the presidency of ousted 
Kurmanbek Bakiev, but it denies all charges. At the same time, the party has called for 
the return of a stronger presidency and claimed that it was more popular than the 
interim government. During the parliamentary elections on October 10, 2010, the party 
won the largest share of the vote from its traditional southern electorate, though it 
barely passed the threshold in the capital and the Chuy region, with 8.8% of the ballots, 
giving it 28 seats in parliament. It was one of five parties to clear the 5% threshold, 
although 29 parties participated in the election. Ata-Jurt formed a ruling coalition with 
the SDPK and Respublika in December 2010, but the coalition fell apart after SDPK 
pulls out in December 2011. Ata-Jurt, currently the governing coalition, moves to 
opposition after the SDPK, Respublika, Ar-Namys, and Ata Meken form a coalition. 
                                                 
66
 Ata-Jurt Party www.atajurt.kg  
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Social Democratic Party. The Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK)67 was 
formed in October 1993, but did not register with the Ministry of Justice until December 
1994. Abdygany Erkebaev served as the party's first chairman, and Almaz Atambaev 
replaced him on July 30, 1999. The majority of the party's membership is drawn from 
the country's entrepreneurs. On 20 May 2004, the SDPK agreed to join the For Fair 
Elections electoral alliance. In October 2004, the larger El Party led by Melis 
Eshimkanov merged with the SDPK in preparation for the 2005 parliamentary 
elections.  The party played a visible role in the Tulip Revolution and rallies in Bishkek 
in April and November 2006. Temir Sariev joined SDPK in 2006, but left the party due 
to his disagreement with Atambaev and became a prime minister in March 2007.  The 
SDPK received 8% of eligible votes in the 2010 parliamentary elections, which gives it 
26 of 120 seats in the parliament. Public administration, social and economic policy, 
national security and defence, civil society development, and multinational culture are 
focal points of the party‘s program. In particular, the economic program covers such 
broad issues as anti-crisis management, strategic sectors development, transparency 
of customs and tax administration, optimization of budget revenues, and fiscal 
decentralization reform. 
 
Ar-Namys. The Ar-Namys Party 68 was founded on July 9, 1999 by Felix Kulov, who 
quickly became the best-known opposition leader. The party attempted to participate in 
the 2000 parliamentary elections but was denied registration. Later that year, Kulov 
was arrested for corruption and sentenced to seven years in prison by a military court. 
In 2001, the party established a coalition with three other opposition parties – Kulov 
was elected as a chairman – and joined the For Fair Elections alliance in 2004. After 
the 2005 events, Kulov was released from prison and cleared of all charges. Then he 
joined Bakiev and became a prime minister, serving until his cabinet resigned in a 
dispute over the new constitution in November 2006. Parliament rebuffed his 
renomination in early 2007. Kulov then became one of Bakiev‘s most outspoken critics. 
After the April 2010 uprising, Kulov was not invited to join the interim government, 
putting his party in the opposition. Ar-Namys received 7.74% of voters in the 2010 
parliamentary elections, giving it 25 of 120 seats. The party‘s political platform 
recognizes the importance of economy, social policy, national security and defence, 
foreign policy, and effective governance in promoting the economic growth. In terms of 
the tax policy, the party surprisingly proposes a detailed action plan, including 
simplification of the tax system, decrease in the number of taxes, automation of tax 
administration, electronic submission of tax reports, and fighting corruption in tax 
offices. 
 
Respublika. The Respublika69 was formed in June 2010 and considered to be a pro-
parliamentary party. Its current chairman and founder is businessman Omurbek 
Babanov, who was the prime minister in 2011–2012. The party campaigned for the 
2010 parliamentary elections on a platform stressing the ethnic diversity of Kyrgyzstan. 
Respublika received 13% of eligible voters in the 2010 parliamentary elections, giving it 
23 of 120 seats in parliament. On December 17, 2011, Respublika formed a coalition 
with the SDPK, Ar-Namys, and Ata Meken. However, this coalition collapsed and re-
established later without Respublika in September 2012. The party promotes closer 
relations with Russia and greater engagement in the regional cooperation – Eurasian 
Economic Community, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization. The party‘s platform is focused on unity in Kyrgyzstan‘s 
ethnic groups, regional development, and foreign and socio-economic policy. The 
economic program includes fair rates for electricity, better mortgage conditions and 
accessible credit for farmers, supply the south with cheaper Kyrgyz gas by building 
pipelines, construct roads and housing, and strict control on food prices by 
antimonopoly agency.  
                                                 
67
 Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan http://www.sdpk.kg/  
68
 Ar-Namys Party http://www.ar-namys.org/  
69
 Respublika http://republic.kg/ru/  
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Ata-Meken. The party was registered on December 16, 1992 following a split between 
Tekebaev and the conservative party Erkin Kyrgyzstan. Chairman and founder of the 
Ata-Meken Party 70  is Omurbek Tekebaev, who is a former speaker of the Kyrgyz 
Parliament. Ata-Meken is considered as a liberal and pro-Western party. The party's 
platform calls for a democratic state, economic reforms and evolutionary social 
development. It favours reasonable compromise between various social sectors and 
government bodies. The party supported Tekebaev in the presidential elections in 
2000, where he came second with 14%. On May 20, 2004 the party joined the For Fair 
Elections electoral alliance in preparation for the parliamentary elections in February 
2005 - the party won one seat in the first round of the elections. In 2010, Ata -Meken 
received 5.6% of eligible voters, giving it 18 of 120 seats in the parliament. Similar to 
other parties, public administration, civil society, social and social policy, foreign policy 
and national security are essential parts of the program. Interestingly, the party has 
very specific suggestions regarding prudent tax policy, such as decrease in tax rates 
for major taxes and social contributions, even tax burden, elimination of non-market 
taxes, such as the road tax and emergency allocations, introduction of the property 
taxation and promotion of patenting and simplified taxation regimes for SMEs. 
 
                                                 
70
 Ata-Meken Party http://www.atameken.kg/  
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Appendix C. Tables, Figures and Maps  
Table 2.1.1. Alternative Approaches to Tax Reform 
 
Approach  Key Concerns Typical Policy Advice 
Public 
economics  
 
Microeconomic 
efficiency; equity; 
optimal taxation 
Tax structure should be neutral; zero 
tax on intermediate goods; benefit 
taxes and taxes on immobile tax bases 
should be assigned to local 
government; taxes on mobile tax bases 
should be assigned to central 
government 
Macroeconomic Short-term stability; 
Long-term 
accumulation 
 
Aggregate tax take should stabilise 
public debt; tax structure should 
emphasise stable revenue flows rather 
than counter-cyclical fluctuations; tax 
structure should promote accumulation 
for long-term growth 
Administrative Administrative 
efficiency; 
effectiveness 
Tax structure should be simple for both 
collectors and payers; tax 
administration should be professional 
and bureaucratic-rational 
Political Societal legitimacy; 
institutional capacity; 
political development 
Tax reform requires approval from a 
variety of social actors; taxation should 
be clearly linked to expenditures and 
should improve equity; tax policy and 
administration should be transparent 
and accountable 
 
Source:  Victor Lledo, Aaron Schneider and Mick Moore (2004) Governance, Taxes and 
Tax Reform in Latin America IDS Working Paper Brighton: Institute of 
Development Studies, p. 2. 
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Table 4.1.2. Kyrgyz Republic: General Government Revenue, 1990-1997 (KGS thousand) 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
General Revenue 11,455.40  16,779.40  122,155.50  829,947.00  1,871,984.00  2,691,013.00  3,747,546.00  4,840,458.00  
Tax Revenue 10,985.40  14,226.80  112,203.70  795,772.00  1,763,921.00  2,432,199.00  2,946,970.00  3,839,220.00  
Personal Income Tax 979.50  1,976.60  12,883.20  73,359.00  225,202.00  287,034.00  288,152.00  331,841.00  
Corporate Income Tax 2,101.80  3,876.80  39,617.80  229,978.00  434,642.00  433,228.00  372,123.00  336,122.00  
VAT 5,859.90  5,843.90  39,775.30  233,916.00  528,750.00  739,758.00  1,247,527.00  1,728,320.00  
Excise Tax - - 13,699.00  74,190.00  172,382.00  308,329.00  254,732.00  451,473.00  
Retail Sales Tax - 1,529.40  - - 52,808.00  167,826.00  114,193.00  - 
Production Property Tax 24.00  26.50  - 7,711.00  10,062.00  18,550.00  28,525.00  -654.00  
Land Tax 0.00  18.10  491.60  4,920.00  58,214.00  72,369.00  122,323.00  274,291.00  
Emergency Tax - - - 55,207.00  104,319.00  140,951.00  159,188.00  212,099.00  
Motor Vehicle Tax  0.10  666.20  5,071.70  33,756.00  59,584.00  79,677.00  81,786.00  106,989.00  
Mineral Deposits Tax       3,938.00  17,179.00  22,803.00  21,748.00  34,421.00  
Customs Duties 16.00  5.00  369.60  29,906.00  47,349.00  134,288.00  196,563.00  244,934.00  
Social Fund 1,800.00  14,500.00  76,700.00  455,720.00  718,900.00  1,313,200.00  1,868,900.00  2,369,300.00  
Non-Tax Revenue 450.80  2,391.80  9,023.90  33,479.00  107,724.00  258,459.00  524,843.00  868,447.00  
Official Transfers - - - - - 54,904.00  201,841.00  194,537.00  
                  
Deficit/Surplus -3,468.00  -6,642.30  -102,968.70  -377,821.00  -921,585.00  -1,864,603.00  -1,269,281.00  -1,605,388.00  
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic
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Table 4.1.3. Kyrgyz Republic: General Government Revenue, 1998-2005 (KGS thousand) 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
General Revenue 6,090,661.00  7,873,730.00  9,280,060.00  11,917,661.10  13,588,109.90  15,747,879.80  17,619,968.10  19,974,656.40  
Tax Revenue 4,865,016.00  5,953,983.00  7,675,519.00  9,187,901.70  10,474,720.80  11,912,032.70  13,980,508.10  16,361,416.80  
Personal Income Tax 405,436.00  546,215.00  753,794.00  960,934.90  1,083,251.40  1,207,994.80  1,442,885.40  1,744,162.80  
Corporate Income Tax 452,365.00  567,579.00  572,772.00  993,662.70  967,614.00  912,356.50  918,569.70  1,283,151.00  
VAT 1,965,780.00  2,253,056.00  2,976,221.00  4,221,413.20  4,793,678.70  5,522,896.30  6,829,925.50  7,088,563.40  
Excise Tax 722,191.00  1,252,579.00  1,518,372.00  1,102,615.10  1,081,985.20  1,164,010.30  1,245,230.20  1,149,721.90  
Retail Sales Tax 150,674.00  186,617.00  231,903.00  305,060.10  410,388.80  470,822.50  548,020.40  605,070.60  
Production Property Tax 50.00  129.00  180.00  89.60  193.30  106.10  0.50  1.70  
Land Tax 290,944.00  198,900.00  178,677.00  208,708.90  318,240.40  312,160.90  335,159.50  318,979.60  
Emergency Tax 288,426.00  382,750.00  589,133.00  580,333.00  651,344.20  728,758.70  835,367.90  937,211.50  
Motor Vehicle Tax  133,314.00  183,536.00  469,524.00  409,533.80  378,530.50  444,059.80  478,034.10  514,420.10  
Mineral Deposits Tax 22,760.00  18,863.00  24,339.00  24,848.10  191,497.70  427,171.90  568,757.90  518,488.30  
Customs Duties 380,501.00  306,646.00  275,108.00  301,427.60  418,858.60  422,791.40  449,374.60  1,663,997.00  
Social Fund 2,584,100.00  3,027,400.00  3,374,700.00  3,896,600.00  4,601,200.00  5,184,800.00  5,812,800.00  6,452,500.00  
Non-Tax Revenue 1,136,123.00  1,771,255.00  1,580,997.00  2,672,624.00  2,983,864.10  3,699,135.70  3,414,684.70  3,567,145.40  
Official Transfers 196,625.00  278,824.00  608,198.00  622,029.10  823,596.60  461,162.00  715,762.10  392,645.70  
                  
Deficit/Surplus -1,035,623.00  -1,220,500.00  -1,279,106.00  283,959.40  -776,907.70  -681,544.80  -505,793.00  224,055.40  
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic
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Table 4.1.4. Kyrgyz Republic: General Government Revenue, 2006-2013 (KGS thousand) 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
General Revenue 24,812,436.20  35,988,436.00  46,597,635.40  55,669,435.60  58,013,219.20  77,880,385.60  87,008,116.10  101,940,850.90  
Tax Revenue 19,981,176.60  26,544,779.40  35,901,356.20  36,097,770.40  39,362,731.00  53,017,364.00  63,911,400.30  72,842,388.50  
Personal Income Tax 1,820,328.90  2,322,908.20  3,276,249.70  3,921,457.90  4,407,025.80  5,558,072.30  7,134,129.90  7,544,756.90  
Corporate Income Tax 1,191,575.80  1,736,107.90  2,603,098.40  1,735,596.60  1,931,555.10  2,844,520.50  4,098,290.80  4,267,839.10  
VAT 9,150,612.10  12,701,561.20  16,539,977.70  13,467,394.00  14,602,029.30  20,352,945.00  25,769,332.40  30,083,176.30  
Excise Tax 1,205,353.90  1,448,203.30  1,575,019.20  1,668,559.80  1,689,335.00  2,187,004.80  2,826,729.50  4,089,720.80  
Retail Sales Tax 771,761.50  1,121,234.70  - - - - - - 
Sales Tax - - - 3,932,566.60  3,698,930.20  4,128,382.50  4,988,932.90  6,494,242.30  
Property Tax - 713,437.50  228,649.80  468,191.70  865,301.10  920,472.60  967,131.40  1,176,339.20  
Land Tax 411,909.40  586,849.80  665,519.40  917,260.70  798,837.50  761,821.90  757,077.10  888,209.10  
Road Tax - 636,254.00  962,899.20  138,419.30  48,383.50  3,623.80  4,192.70  28,082.20  
Emergency Tax 1,032,122.60  1,277,195.80  1,916,568.70  264,404.30  -5,903.80  5,986.00  -404.00  1,546.00  
Motor Vehicle Tax  629,119.80  - - - - - - - 
Mineral Deposits Tax 407,739.10  - - - - - - - 
Subsoil Taxes - 457,616.00  881,439.40  682,756.30  205,687.40  385,824.70  632,702.60  885,910.70  
Unified Tax - - 72,044.80  102,201.60  130,972.20  141,416.40  151,261.70  145,208.90  
Mandatory and Voluntary 
Patent - - 957,677.40  1,688,623.80  1,492,668.60  1,528,717.60  1,378,491.70  1,695,495.80  
Special Means Tax  - - - 870,784.80  784,263.10  982,655.60  1,231,253.50  - 
Customs Duties 2,803,253.60  3,789,465.00  4,633,588.20  4,138,921.50  4,347,699.90  7,146,782.70  9,429,531.50  11,886,221.00  
Social Fund 7,717,500.00  10,031,100.00  13,539,000.00  17,764,200.00  22,279,100.00  27,510,300.00  33,907,800.00  34,650,500.00  
Non-Tax Revenue 4,693,214.40  7,188,829.80  8,179,699.30  9,058,446.60  11,000,234.40  15,654,627.80  17,252,409.80  19,770,469.20  
Official Transfers 266,084.50  1,789,524.20  1,399,763.10  10,201,145.80  7,022,062.10  8,752,288.20  5,608,258.60  9,189,224.50  
                  
Deficit/Surplus -218,089.90  129,085.00  1,565,606.30  -2,958,773.50  -10,767,978.70  -13,663,711.10  -20,232,313.40  -2,330,482.30  
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic
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Figure 4.1.1. Kyrgyz Republic: General Government Revenue, 1990-2013 (KGS thousand) 
 
 
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic
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Table 4.1.5. Kyrgyz Republic: General Government Revenue, 1990-1997 (% of Total) 
 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
General Revenue 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Tax Revenue 95.90% 84.79% 91.85% 95.88% 94.23% 90.38% 78.64% 79.32% 
Personal Income Tax 8.55% 11.78% 10.55% 8.84% 12.03% 10.67% 7.69% 6.86% 
Corporate Income Tax 18.35% 23.10% 32.43% 27.71% 23.22% 16.10% 9.93% 6.94% 
VAT 51.15% 34.83% 32.56% 28.18% 28.25% 27.49% 33.29% 35.71% 
Excise Tax - - 11.21% 8.94% 9.21% 11.46% 6.80% 9.33% 
Retail Sales Tax - - - - 2.82% 6.24% 3.05% - 
Production Property Tax 0.21% 0.16% - 0.93% 0.54% 0.69% 0.76% -0.01% 
Land Tax 0.00% 0.11% 0.40% 0.59% 3.11% 2.69% 3.26% 5.67% 
Emergency Tax - - - 6.65% 5.57% 5.24% 4.25% 4.38% 
Motor Vehicle Tax  0.00% 3.97% 4.15% 4.07% 3.18% 2.96% 2.18% 2.21% 
Mineral Deposits Tax 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.47% 0.92% 0.85% 0.58% 0.71% 
Customs Duties 0.14% 0.03% 0.30% 3.60% 2.53% 4.99% 5.25% 5.06% 
Non-Tax Revenue 3.94% 14.25% 7.39% 4.03% 5.75% 9.60% 14.00% 17.94% 
Official Transfers - - - - - 2.04% 5.39% 4.02% 
                  
General Revenue Growth   46.48% 628.01% 579.42% 125.55% 43.75% 39.26% 29.16% 
Tax Revenue Growth   29.51% 688.68% 609.22% 121.66% 37.89% 21.16% 30.28% 
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic
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Table 4.1.6. Kyrgyz Republic: General Government Revenue, 1998-2005 (% of Total) 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
General Revenue 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Tax Revenue 79.88% 75.62% 82.71% 77.09% 77.09% 75.64% 79.34% 81.91% 
Personal Income Tax 6.66% 6.94% 8.12% 8.06% 7.97% 7.67% 8.19% 8.73% 
Corporate Income Tax 7.43% 7.21% 6.17% 8.34% 7.12% 5.79% 5.21% 6.42% 
VAT 32.28% 28.61% 32.07% 35.42% 35.28% 35.07% 38.76% 35.49% 
Excise Tax 11.86% 15.91% 16.36% 9.25% 7.96% 7.39% 7.07% 5.76% 
Retail Sales Tax 2.47% 2.37% 2.50% 2.56% 3.02% 2.99% 3.11% 3.03% 
Production Property Tax 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Land Tax 4.78% 2.53% 1.93% 1.75% 2.34% 1.98% 1.90% 1.60% 
Emergency Tax 4.74% 4.86% 6.35% 4.87% 4.79% 4.63% 4.74% 4.69% 
Motor Vehicle Tax  2.19% 2.33% 5.06% 3.44% 2.79% 2.82% 2.71% 2.58% 
Mineral Deposits Tax 0.37% 0.24% 0.26% 0.21% 1.41% 2.71% 3.23% 2.60% 
Customs Duties 6.25% 3.89% 2.96% 2.53% 3.08% 2.68% 2.55% 8.33% 
Non-Tax Revenue 18.65% 22.50% 17.04% 22.43% 21.96% 23.49% 19.38% 17.86% 
Official Transfers 3.23% 3.54% 6.55% 5.22% 6.06% 2.93% 4.06% 1.97% 
                  
General Revenue Growth 25.83% 29.28% 17.86% 28.42% 14.02% 15.89% 11.89% 13.36% 
Tax Revenue Growth 26.72% 22.38% 28.91% 19.70% 14.01% 13.72% 17.36% 17.03% 
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic
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Table 4.1.7. Kyrgyz Republic: General Government Revenue, 2006-2013 (% of Total) 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
General Revenue 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Tax Revenue 80.53% 73.76% 77.05% 64.84% 67.85% 68.08% 73.45% 71.46% 
Personal Income Tax 7.34% 6.45% 7.03% 7.04% 7.60% 7.14% 8.20% 7.40% 
Corporate Income Tax 4.80% 4.82% 5.59% 3.12% 3.33% 3.65% 4.71% 4.19% 
VAT 36.88% 35.29% 35.50% 24.19% 25.17% 26.13% 29.62% 29.51% 
Excise Tax 4.86% 4.02% 3.38% 3.00% 2.91% 2.81% 3.25% 4.01% 
Retail Sales Tax 3.11% 3.12% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Sales Tax - - - 7.06% 6.38% 5.30% 5.73% 6.37% 
Property Tax - 1.98% 0.49% 0.84% 1.49% 1.18% 1.11% 1.15% 
Land Tax 1.66% 1.63% 1.43% 1.65% 1.38% 0.98% 0.87% 0.87% 
Road Tax #VALUE! 1.77% 2.07% 0.25% 0.08% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 
Emergency Tax 4.16% 3.55% 4.11% 0.47% -0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 
Motor Vehicle Tax  2.54% - - - - - - - 
Mineral Deposits Tax 1.64% - - - - - - - 
Subsoil Taxes - 1.27% 1.89% 1.23% 0.35% 0.50% 0.73% 0.87% 
Unified Tax - - 0.15% 0.18% 0.23% 0.18% 0.17% 0.14% 
Mandatory and Voluntary Patent - - 2.06% 3.03% 2.57% 1.96% 1.58% 1.66% 
Special Means Tax  - - - 1.56% 1.35% 1.26% 1.42% - 
Customs Duties 11.30% 10.53% 9.94% 7.43% 7.49% 9.18% 10.84% 11.66% 
Non-Tax Revenue 18.91% 19.98% 17.55% 16.27% 18.96% 20.10% 19.83% 19.39% 
Official Transfers 1.07% 4.97% 3.00% 18.32% 12.10% 11.24% 6.45% 9.01% 
                  
General Revenue Growth 24.22% 45.04% 29.48% 19.47% 4.21% 34.25% 11.72% 17.16% 
Tax Revenue Growth 22.12% 32.85% 35.25% 0.55% 9.04% 34.69% 20.55% 13.97% 
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic
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Table 4.1.8. Kyrgyz Republic: General Government Revenue, 1990-1997 (% of GDP) 
 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
General Revenue 26.76% 18.14% 16.48% 15.50% 15.57% 16.67% 16.02% 15.77% 
Tax Revenue 25.67% 15.38% 15.14% 14.86% 14.68% 15.06% 12.59% 12.51% 
Personal Income Tax 2.29% 2.14% 1.74% 1.37% 1.87% 1.78% 1.23% 1.08% 
Corporate Income Tax 4.91% 4.19% 5.34% 4.29% 3.62% 2.68% 1.59% 1.10% 
VAT 13.69% 6.32% 5.37% 4.37% 4.40% 4.58% 5.33% 5.63% 
Excise Tax - - 1.85% 1.39% 1.43% 1.91% 1.09% 1.47% 
Retail Sales Tax - 1.65% - - 0.44% 1.04% 0.49% - 
Production Property Tax 0.06% 0.03% - 0.14% 0.08% 0.11% 0.12% 0.00% 
Land Tax 0.00% 0.02% 0.07% 0.09% 0.48% 0.45% 0.52% 0.89% 
Emergency Tax - - - 1.03% 0.87% 0.87% 0.68% 0.69% 
Motor Vehicle Tax  0.00% 0.72% 0.68% 0.63% 0.50% 0.49% 0.35% 0.35% 
Mineral Deposits Tax 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.14% 0.14% 0.09% 0.11% 
Customs Duties 0.04% 0.01% 0.05% 0.56% 0.39% 0.83% 0.84% 0.80% 
Social Fund 4.21% 15.68% 10.35% 8.51% 5.98% 8.13% 7.99% 7.72% 
Non-Tax Revenue 1.05% 2.59% 1.22% 0.63% 0.90% 1.60% 2.24% 2.83% 
Official Transfers - - - - - 0.34% 0.86% 0.63% 
         
Deficit/Surplus -8.10% -7.18% -13.89% -7.06% -7.67% -11.55% -5.42% -5.23% 
                  
Nominal GDP 42,800.00  92,500.00  741,300.00  5,354,700.00  12,019,200.00  16,145,100.00  23,399,300.00  30,685,700.00  
GDP per capita, KGS     167.27  1,188.58  2,665.41  3,513.05  5,020.32  6,482.25  
GDP per capita, UDS     207.78  148.02  247.71  324.96  397.88  373.28  
GDP Deflator     3.02  25.07  70.41  100.00  135.34  161.43  
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic
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Table 4.1.9. Kyrgyz Republic: General Government Revenue, 1998-2005 (% of GDP) 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
General Revenue 17.82% 16.15% 14.20% 16.13% 18.03% 18.78% 18.67% 19.80% 
Tax Revenue 14.23% 12.21% 11.74% 12.44% 13.90% 14.20% 14.82% 16.22% 
Personal Income Tax 1.19% 1.12% 1.15% 1.30% 1.44% 1.44% 1.53% 1.73% 
Corporate Income Tax 1.32% 1.16% 0.88% 1.34% 1.28% 1.09% 0.97% 1.27% 
VAT 5.75% 4.62% 4.55% 5.71% 6.36% 6.58% 7.24% 7.03% 
Excise Tax 2.11% 2.57% 2.32% 1.49% 1.44% 1.39% 1.32% 1.14% 
Retail Sales Tax 0.44% 0.38% 0.35% 0.41% 0.54% 0.56% 0.58% 0.60% 
Production Property Tax 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Land Tax 0.85% 0.41% 0.27% 0.28% 0.42% 0.37% 0.36% 0.32% 
Emergency Tax 0.84% 0.79% 0.90% 0.79% 0.86% 0.87% 0.89% 0.93% 
Motor Vehicle Tax  0.39% 0.38% 0.72% 0.55% 0.50% 0.53% 0.51% 0.51% 
Mineral Deposits Tax 0.07% 0.04% 0.04% 0.03% 0.25% 0.51% 0.60% 0.51% 
Customs Duties 1.11% 0.63% 0.42% 0.41% 0.56% 0.50% 0.48% 1.65% 
Social Fund 7.56% 6.21% 5.16% 5.27% 6.11% 6.18% 6.16% 6.39% 
Non-Tax Revenue 3.32% 3.63% 2.42% 3.62% 3.96% 4.41% 3.62% 3.54% 
Official Transfers 0.58% 0.57% 0.93% 0.84% 1.09% 0.55% 0.76% 0.39% 
         
Deficit/Surplus -3.03% -2.50% -1.96% 0.38% -1.03% -0.81% -0.54% 0.22% 
                  
Nominal GDP 34,181,400.00  48,744,000.00  65,357,900.00  73,883,300.00  75,366,700.00  83,871,600.00  94,350,700.00  100,899,200.00  
GDP per capita, KGS 7,109.75  9,995.88  13,278.73  14,871.54  15,033.36  16,531.96  18,370.11  19,444.08  
GDP per capita, UDS 348.30  259.84  277.92  307.01  320.43  378.31  431.21  474.08  
GDP Deflator 176.13  242.21  308.24  330.90  337.62  351.14  369.08  395.33  
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic
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Table 4.1.10. Kyrgyz Republic: General Government Revenue, 2006-2013 (% of GDP) 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
General Revenue 21.80% 25.36% 24.79% 27.67% 26.33% 27.23% 28.02% 29.12% 
Tax Revenue 17.56% 18.71% 19.10% 17.94% 17.86% 18.54% 20.59% 20.81% 
Personal Income Tax 1.60% 1.64% 1.74% 1.95% 2.00% 1.94% 2.30% 2.16% 
Corporate Income Tax 1.05% 1.22% 1.38% 0.86% 0.88% 0.99% 1.32% 1.22% 
VAT 8.04% 8.95% 8.80% 6.69% 6.63% 7.12% 8.30% 8.59% 
Excise Tax 1.06% 1.02% 0.84% 0.83% 0.77% 0.76% 0.91% 1.17% 
Retail Sales Tax 0.68% 0.79% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Sales Tax - - - 1.95% 1.68% 1.44% 1.61% 1.86% 
Property Tax - 0.50% 0.12% 0.23% 0.39% 0.32% 0.31% 0.34% 
Land Tax 0.36% 0.41% 0.35% 0.46% 0.36% 0.27% 0.24% 0.25% 
Road Tax - 0.45% 0.51% 0.07% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 
Emergency Tax 0.91% 0.90% 1.02% 0.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Subsoil Taxes - 0.32% 0.47% 0.34% 0.09% 0.13% 0.20% 0.25% 
Unified Tax - - 0.04% 0.05% 0.06% 0.05% 0.05% 0.04% 
Mandatory and Voluntary Patent - - 0.51% 0.84% 0.68% 0.53% 0.44% 0.48% 
Special Means Tax  - - - 0.43% 0.36% 0.34% 0.40% - 
Customs Duties 2.46% 2.67% 2.46% 2.06% 1.97% 2.50% 3.04% 3.40% 
Social Fund 6.78% 7.07% 7.20% 8.83% 10.11% 9.62% 10.92% 9.90% 
Non-Tax Revenue 4.12% 5.07% 4.35% 4.50% 4.99% 5.47% 5.56% 5.65% 
Official Transfers 0.23% 1.26% 0.74% 5.07% 3.19% 3.06% 1.81% 2.63% 
         
Deficit/Surplus -0.19% 0.09% 0.83% -1.47% -4.89% -4.78% -6.52% -0.67% 
                  
Nominal GDP 113,800,100  141,897,700  187,991,900  201,222,900  220,369,300  285,989,100  310,471,300  350,028,000  
GDP per capita, KGS 21,686.12  26,827.82  35,149.84  37,137.65  40,231.00  51,693.72  55,563.35  62,022.44  
GDP per capita, UDS 540.59  719.83  959.42  864.29  875.11  1,120.48  1,181.77  1,280.17  
GDP Deflator 432.47  496.80  611.89  636.50  700.36  857.82  939.70  958.47  
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic
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Figure 4.1.2. Kyrgyz Republic: General Government Revenue, Expenditures and Deficit, 1990-2013 (KGS thousand) 
 
 
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic
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Table 4.1.11. Kyrgyz Republic: General Government Expenditures, 1990-1997 
 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
  KGS thousand  
General Expenditures  15,900.4 24,374.8 231,081.9 1,225,770.0 2,812,753.0 4,610,518.0 5,202,357.0 6,695,680.0 
General Public Services 235.4 463.3 3,777.4 37,470.0 105,087.0 339,861.0 579,504.0 850,354.0 
Defence and Internal  Affairs 20.1 330.8 12,173.9 82,023.0 310,860.0 558,397.0 699,235.0 955,021.0 
Education 3,236.9 5,554.9 37,342.0 227,184.0 730,765.0 1,064,901.0 1,222,830.0 1,514,035.0 
Health Care 1,588.0 2,823.5 21,286.3 137,408.0 418,311.0 627,419.0 732,917.0 977,072.0 
Social Security 2,055.4 5,122.3 25,516.8 118,327.0 370,030.0 915,360.0 884,862.0 1,055,305.0 
Housing and Public Utilities 816.3 883.5 10,164.3 68,948.0 131,086.0 221,067.0 297,789.0 279,644.0 
Recreation, Culture and Religion 355.7 490.5 2,890.4 17,593.0 71,190.0 162,183.0 125,011.0 148,034.0 
Fuel and Energy  0.0 0.0 2,670.1 25,650.0 28,923.0 6,041.0 78.0 7,676.0 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 2,808.6 2,724.0 24,455.2 117,722.0 86,259.0 158,485.0 181,077.0 238,283.0 
Mining and Construction 199.2 351.6 2,017.9 7,220.0 32,281.0 66,411.0 43,956.0 67,358.0 
Transport and Communications 347.5 617.1 4,535.3 31,279.0 65,642.0 97,988.0 98,771.0 169,839.0 
Other Expenditures 4,237.3 5,013.3 84,252.3 354,946.0 462,319.0 392,405.0 336,327.0 433,059.0 
  % of GDP 
General Expenditures  37.15% 26.35% 31.17% 22.89% 23.40% 28.56% 22.23% 21.82% 
General Public Services 0.55% 0.50% 0.51% 0.70% 0.87% 2.11% 2.48% 2.77% 
Defence and Internal  Affairs 0.05% 0.36% 1.64% 1.53% 2.59% 3.46% 2.99% 3.11% 
Education 7.56% 6.01% 5.04% 4.24% 6.08% 6.60% 5.23% 4.93% 
Health Care 3.71% 3.05% 2.87% 2.57% 3.48% 3.89% 3.13% 3.18% 
Social Security 4.80% 5.54% 3.44% 2.21% 3.08% 5.67% 3.78% 3.44% 
Housing and Public Utilities 1.91% 0.96% 1.37% 1.29% 1.09% 1.37% 1.27% 0.91% 
Recreation, Culture and Religion 0.83% 0.53% 0.39% 0.33% 0.59% 1.00% 0.53% 0.48% 
Fuel and Energy  0.00% 0.00% 0.36% 0.48% 0.24% 0.04% 0.00% 0.03% 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 6.56% 2.94% 3.30% 2.20% 0.72% 0.98% 0.77% 0.78% 
Mining and Construction 0.47% 0.38% 0.27% 0.13% 0.27% 0.41% 0.19% 0.22% 
Transport and Communications 0.81% 0.67% 0.61% 0.58% 0.55% 0.61% 0.42% 0.55% 
Other Expenditures 9.90% 5.42% 11.37% 6.63% 3.85% 2.43% 1.44% 1.41% 
Nominal GDP 42,800.0 92,500.0 741,300.0 5,354,700.0 12,019,200.0 16,145,100.0 23,399,300.0 30,685,700.0 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic
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Table 4.1.12. Kyrgyz Republic: General Government Expenditures, 1998-2005 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
  KGS thousand 
General Expenditures  7,298,339.0 9,311,963.0 11,308,223.0 12,255,730.8 15,188,614.2 16,890,586.6 18,841,523.2 20,143,246.7 
General Public Services 1,014,821.0 1,374,973.0 1,755,502.0 2,104,869.3 2,255,455.2 2,640,837.5 3,097,492.0 3,033,240.9 
Defence and Internal  Affairs 911,810.0 1,308,877.0 1,881,586.0 1,732,591.1 2,055,021.9 2,403,651.0 2,686,666.2 3,105,367.0 
Education 1,681,599.0 1,991,278.0 2,293,036.0 2,847,580.5 3,350,426.8 3,753,551.6 4,361,258.4 4,917,667.9 
Health Care 962,091.0 1,125,313.0 1,295,873.0 1,379,026.6 1,527,240.4 1,629,945.0 1,926,520.6 2,283,256.2 
Social Security 981,028.0 1,198,145.0 1,113,942.0 1,417,093.6 2,340,543.9 2,588,668.5 2,644,783.7 2,858,167.7 
Housing and Public Utilities 373,682.0 464,720.0 666,537.0 800,867.4 1,131,193.3 1,193,437.3 1,057,713.2 1,040,483.1 
Recreation, Culture and Religion 187,417.0 308,137.0 337,278.0 295,015.3 392,800.3 485,046.8 578,320.8 606,591.3 
Fuel and Energy  146,173.0 76,615.0 22,991.0 243,856.5 220,712.2 163,319.8 27,719.0 57,205.1 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 350,394.0 388,809.0 476,103.0 606,861.9 744,090.4 782,955.9 895,994.3 887,897.0 
Mining and Construction 68,325.0 81,119.0 330,298.0 103,205.3 220,709.4 282,455.5 270,109.0 290,571.4 
Transport and Communications 227,998.0 523,270.0 464,906.0 419,608.1 668,375.7 565,301.9 653,254.3 595,662.6 
Other Expenditures 393,001.0 470,707.0 670,171.0 305,155.2 282,044.7 401,415.8 641,691.7 467,136.5 
  % of GDP 
General Expenditures  21.35% 19.10% 17.30% 16.59% 20.15% 20.14% 19.97% 19.96% 
General Public Services 2.97% 2.82% 2.69% 2.85% 2.99% 3.15% 3.28% 3.01% 
Defence and Internal  Affairs 2.67% 2.69% 2.88% 2.35% 2.73% 2.87% 2.85% 3.08% 
Education 4.92% 4.09% 3.51% 3.85% 4.45% 4.48% 4.62% 4.87% 
Health Care 2.81% 2.31% 1.98% 1.87% 2.03% 1.94% 2.04% 2.26% 
Social Security 2.87% 2.46% 1.70% 1.92% 3.11% 3.09% 2.80% 2.83% 
Housing and Public Utilities 1.09% 0.95% 1.02% 1.08% 1.50% 1.42% 1.12% 1.03% 
Recreation, Culture and Religion 0.55% 0.63% 0.52% 0.40% 0.52% 0.58% 0.61% 0.60% 
Fuel and Energy  0.43% 0.16% 0.04% 0.33% 0.29% 0.19% 0.03% 0.06% 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 1.03% 0.80% 0.73% 0.82% 0.99% 0.93% 0.95% 0.88% 
Mining and Construction 0.20% 0.17% 0.51% 0.14% 0.29% 0.34% 0.29% 0.29% 
Transport and Communications 0.67% 1.07% 0.71% 0.57% 0.89% 0.67% 0.69% 0.59% 
Other Expenditures 1.15% 0.97% 1.03% 0.41% 0.37% 0.48% 0.68% 0.46% 
Nominal GDP 34,181,400.0 48,744,000.0 65,357,900.0 73,883,300.0 75,366,700.0 83,871,600.0 94,350,700.0 100,899,200.0 
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Table 4.1.13. Kyrgyz Republic: General Government Expenditures, 2006-2013 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
  KGS thousand 
General Expenditures  25,296,610.6 35,859,351.0 45,032,029.1 58,628,209.1 68,781,197.9 91,544,096.4 107,240,429.4 104,271,333.1 
General Public Services 3,355,675.5 4,221,707.3 6,740,240.1 8,572,562.6 8,191,395.6 10,130,625.3 10,947,587.7 10,774,415.9 
Defence and Internal  Affairs 3,605,919.0 4,338,523.3 5,464,222.6 6,382,260.2 8,475,787.5 9,720,300.3 9,957,618.8 11,356,070.5 
Education 6,315,746.4 8,012,760.8 9,618,838.3 11,502,249.6 11,993,832.4 18,239,033.8 21,685,705.5 21,701,979.9 
Health Care 3,059,233.3 3,664,862.5 4,391,924.7 5,816,473.9 6,413,264.0 9,084,196.1 11,368,838.2 11,828,516.8 
Social Security 3,610,567.8 3,780,592.5 4,659,855.6 5,587,094.6 11,075,226.2 14182532.2 17490057.6 20356471 
Housing and Public Utilities 1,415,777.6 1,710,629.4 2,303,673.8 2,441,790.1 2,504,236.0 2,893,312.9 3,441,931.1 3,547,396.8 
Recreation, Culture and Religion 812,961.5 995,574.9 1,130,893.1 1,381,527.7 1,560,123.3 2,234,489.7 2,432,217.4 2,685,937.5 
Fuel and Energy  6,695.7 0.0 134,928.8 10,490.0 145,000.0 0.0 0.0 54,307.9 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 1,106,342.8 876,485.9 693,022.7 859,998.2 856,481.1 879,703.3 864,135.7 1,012,637.1 
Mining and Construction 292,440.5 92,420.7 64,981.5 74,325.6 85,408.2 81,456.6 89,823.3 28,061.3 
Transport and Communications 853,815.0 603,035.4 611,480.9 820,775.5 963,221.8 864,372.5 847,191.6 789,711.4 
Environmental Protection 0.0 108,187.2 443,611.9 595,652.8 567,835.4 561,997.8 507,380.2 506,769.3 
Other Expenditures 861,435.5 7,454,571.1 8,774,354.9 14,583,008.3 15,949,386.4 22,672,075.9 27,607,942.3 19,629,056.9 
  % of GDP 
General Expenditures  22.23% 25.27% 23.95% 29.14% 31.21% 32.01% 34.54% 29.79% 
General Public Services 2.95% 2.98% 3.59% 4.26% 3.72% 3.54% 3.53% 3.08% 
Defence and Internal  Affairs 3.17% 3.06% 2.91% 3.17% 3.85% 3.40% 3.21% 3.24% 
Education 5.55% 5.65% 5.12% 5.72% 5.44% 6.38% 6.98% 6.20% 
Health Care 2.69% 2.58% 2.34% 2.89% 2.91% 3.18% 3.66% 3.38% 
Social Security 3.17% 2.66% 2.48% 2.78% 5.03% 4.96% 5.63% 5.82% 
Housing and Public Utilities 1.24% 1.21% 1.23% 1.21% 1.14% 1.01% 1.11% 1.01% 
Recreation, Culture and Religion 0.71% 0.70% 0.60% 0.69% 0.71% 0.78% 0.78% 0.77% 
Fuel and Energy  0.01% 0.00% 0.07% 0.01% 0.07% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 0.97% 0.62% 0.37% 0.43% 0.39% 0.31% 0.28% 0.29% 
Mining and Construction 0.26% 0.07% 0.03% 0.04% 0.04% 0.03% 0.03% 0.01% 
Transport and Communications 0.75% 0.42% 0.33% 0.41% 0.44% 0.30% 0.27% 0.23% 
Environmental Protection 0.00% 0.08% 0.24% 0.30% 0.26% 0.20% 0.16% 0.14% 
Other Expenditures 0.76% 5.25% 4.67% 7.25% 7.24% 7.93% 8.89% 5.61% 
Nominal GDP 113,800,100.0 141,897,700.0 187,991,900.0 201,222,900.0 220,369,300.0 285,989,100.0 310,471,300.0 350,028,000.0 
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Figure 4.1.3. Kyrgyz Republic: General Government Expenditures, 1990-2013 (% of Total) 
 
 
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic 
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Table 4.2.2. Kyrgyz Republic: External Debt, 2005-2012 (USD million) 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
External debt stocks 2,256.60 2,598.30 2,881.00 3,628.20 4,119.00 4,114.50 5,485.90 6,025.90 
Long-term external debt 1,825.30 2,101.20 2,278.00 2,942.30 3,395.20 3,612.40 4,986.00 5,491.50 
Use of IMF credit 299 290.5 283.7 295 300 307.1 311.9 320.8 
Short-term external debt 132.3 206.5 319.3 390.9 423.8 194.9 188.1 213.5 
External debt flows                 
Disbursements 149.9 243.4 281.6 920.1 661.1 701.9 776.2 882.5 
Principal repayments 104.1 65.5 151.4 284 226.1 483.5 338.6 287.1 
Net flows -149.6 250.1 241 709 471.8 -20 438.9 620.4 
Interest payments 38.5 35.9 42.7 52.1 43.1 73.8 71.9 60.2 
Net transfers on external debt -188 214.2 198.3 656.9 428.7 -93.8 367.1 560.2 
Total debt service paid 142.6 101.4 194.1 336 269.2 557.3 410.5 347.2 
Other non-debt resource inflows                 
Foreign direct investment 42.6 182 207.9 377 189.4 437.6 693.5 372.2 
Portfolio equity 0 0 1.5 6.2 0.7 -18.2 5.5 0 
Grants (excluding technical coop.) 121.3 105.4 183.7 241.6 239 303.2 418.5 381.8 
Memo: technical coop. Grants 91.2 99.6 58.4 68.6 60.9 57.9 46 56.2 
Ratios                 
External debt stock to exports (%) 234.4 195.9 139.5 129 159.8 162.2 159.4 189.5 
External debt stock to GNI (%) 95.1 93.3 76.8 73.2 91.5 92.5 96.8 99.1 
Debt service to exports (%) 14.8 7.6 9.4 11.9 10.4 22 11.9 10.9 
Interest payments to exports (%) 4 2.7 2.1 1.9 1.7 2.9 2.1 1.9 
Interest payments to GNI (%) 1.6 1.3 1.1 1 1 1.7 1.3 1 
Short-term to external debt stocks (%) 5.9 7.9 11.1 10.8 10.3 4.7 3.4 3.5 
Concessional to external debt stocks (%) 72.4 69.6 65.4 53.8 56.2 59.2 47.4 46.6 
Multilateral to external debt stocks (%) 48.7 45.8 44.4 35.6 31.8 31.5 24.5 23 
Reserves to external debt stocks (%) 25.2 29.4 38.4 31.8 36.3 39 31 31.6 
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  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Long-term external debt                 
Debt outstanding and disbursed 1,825.30 2,101.20 2,278.00 2,942.30 3,395.20 3,612.40 4,986.00 5,491.50 
Official creditors 1,664.80 1,830.80 1,897.90 1,962.80 2,319.50 2,441.70 2,618.30 2,839.80 
Multilateral 1,098.80 1,190.20 1,280.00 1,290.50 1,309.50 1,295.60 1,343.40 1,385.60 
Concessional 97.19% 98.19% 98.86% 99.32% 99.73% 99.59% 98.85% 97.68% 
Bilateral 566 640.5 617.9 672.4 1,010.00 1,146.20 1,274.90 1,454.30 
Concessional 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 99.57% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Commercial banks and other 160.5 270.4 380.1 979.5 1,075.60 1,170.60 2,367.60 2,651.70 
Currency composition of public and publicly guaranteed debt (%)                 
Euro 2.8 3.5 4.3 4 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.8 
Japanese yen 13.5 12.5 12.7 15.5 13 14 13.6 11.3 
U.S. dollars 69.5 67 68 65.3 69.2 68.9 68.9 71.5 
SDR 0.8 1.8 2.6 3.5 4 4.1 5.3 6 
All other currencies 4.3 6.9 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.4 
Average terms of new commitments (public and publicly 
guaranteed)                 
Interest (%) 1 1.4 0.5 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.7 1.7 
Maturity (years) 36.2 31.6 26.7 21.7 31.5 36.1 24.6 20.6 
Grace period (years) 9.3 8.1 7.3 5.9 6.5 9.4 6.1 8.9 
Grant element (%) 75.9 70 72.8 58.3 67.4 74.5 59.5 61.1 
 
Source: World Bank 
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Table 4.4.1. Interviews: Administrative Factors 
Interviewee Themes Comments 
Government Agencies 
Tax Officer 1 Administrative Factors 
Plan should be always met. The 
penalty includes scolding and 
firing of director and top 
management. There is no such 
practice in other countries. The 
responsibilities should be spread 
equally between all revenue 
collection agencies, including 
ministry of finance, ministry of 
economic development, treasury, 
national bank. 
 
Cultural Factors 
Soviet mentality – stamp on 
documents 
 
STS develops its own database. STS 
and Social Fund use the same 
identification numbers, as tax IDs and 
social security number in passport. 
Problematic is collection of payments 
by commercial banks. Each receipt 
should include payees ID and code of 
tax paid for, if missing the payment 
could not be allocated. It is planned 
that ADB will integrate the STS, 
treasury, national bank and 
commercial banks to one system. The 
payment system also needs 
modifications, in particular payment of 
taxes through terminals. 
The performance indicators should 
include the amount of information 
proceeded and non-tax functions, for 
instance antimonopoly commission 
and ministry of economy. The VAT 
invoices is hard to fill out by taxpayers. 
In this regard, the Latvia and Lithuania 
cancelled them and Turkey using the 
prefilled forms. 
Tax Officer 2 Administrative Factors 
Tax audit will be conducted 
according to risk factors by 10-11 
categories. 
Risk-based audit system will be tested 
and implemented within ADB project. 
Tax Officer 3 New tax code cancels cascade 
taxes, decreases number of local 
taxes, introduces property tax (4 
categories), VAT is 12%, and 
reduces custom duties. From 
2013 local taxes will be collected 
by local administrations – local 
self-governments should be 
motivated. The international 
treaties are signed for indirect 
taxes. Thus, tax burden was 
decreased due to low tax rates, 
better administration, minimal 
contact with taxpayers, quarterly 
reporting, one-stop-shop, STS 
web-site, hot-lines, e-government 
project. 
 
Administrative Factors 
Income legalization and tax 
amnesty 
Nonmaterial rewards and motivation of 
tax staff includes thanks letters and 
certificates. 
The main problem is the lack of single 
taxpayer database. Each agency has 
own datasets, for example the state 
vehicle inspection for movable 
property, state register for real-estate 
property, minister of agriculture for 
farm equipment and tractors, local 
councils for households. The ADB 
project on tax administration reform is 
aimed to develop the master database 
for all agencies and to launch the 
integrated information system. 
The universal declaration should be 
fill-out by all taxpayers, that is full 
coverage of individual taxpayers. 
However, the STS and other agencies 
lack of appropriate capacity for cross-
checking, so the starting date was 
postponed till 2016. 
Tax Officer 4 It is planned that the functions of 
the Social Fund and alcohol 
committee will be gradually 
transferred to STS. The first step 
in 2010 includes the collection of 
income by insurance slips 
(patents and sole entrepreneurs). 
As a result, the nontax base will shrink, 
so the quality of tax service will 
increase. However, different budgets 
use different accounts. The mid-term 
strategy is approved till 2015. Similar 
to other CIS countries the interests of 
all social groups are considered. 
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Administrative Factors 
Resistance to changes within tax 
agency. Goals and vision of 
reform should be distributed to 
low levels. 
Tax Officer 5 Leadership and management 
style do matter, including 
professionalism and competence 
of tax officers. 
The previous chief Keldibekov 
increased salary since 2008. 
 
Administrative Factors 
Weak institutional and technical 
capacity  
Lack of tax culture 
No database for local taxes 
Donations to local 
administrations in poor regions 
(Naryn, Talas, Batken) 
 
Cultural Factors 
Different lifestyle in urban and 
rural areas, north and south 
regions 
STS has to response to such new 
businesses and operations as network 
marketing, use of payment terminals, 
and installing of phone cables.  
From 2013, STS, Social Fund and 
SCS will be using the integrated 
information system and single 
database. It is necessary to include 
administrative sanctions to STS‘s 
classifier especially due to automation 
of their operations. 
The institutional and technical capacity 
should be adjusted accordingly. For 
example, these agencies should use 
the same identification numbers and 
unified database. 
Tax Officer 6 The tax system is perspective, 
with potential for 10 years. The 
directions for development 
include serviceability of system, 
and partnership between STS 
and taxpayers. 
 
Administrative Factors 
Enforced tax collections, tax 
appeals 
Civic engagement 
According to article 49 of the tax code, 
the main task of the STS is to control 
the correct implication of tax laws and 
enforcement of tax liabilities. These 
could be the goals of tax 
administration reform as well. The tax 
code in 2008 introduced the principles 
of honest taxpayer and criteria for risk 
assessment. That will change the 
attitude towards taxpayers in tax 
appeals and selection process for 
audit. 
Tax Officer 7 The balanced and liberal system. 
The total rate for VAT, CIT and 
PIT about 30%. 
 
Administrative Factors 
Enforcement collection 
Tax appeals and taxpayer 
representatives 
Administration of local taxes 
The articles 61 and 71 of tax code on 
sanctions and penalties start to work. 
So, the procedures of writing-off the 
liabilities should be clarified. Legally, 
tax liabilities are 3-4 in line after paying 
debt to owners, debtors and bank, but 
actually collected at first. The new 
code allows to use the taxpayer 
representatives to present their 
interest in disputes and court, usually 
tax consultants. As the court system 
does not rely on precedents, the 
decisions per each case could be 
different. Also the attitude toward 
taxpayers changed, according to bona 
fide principle they are assumed to be 
not guilty by default. Small businesses 
and individual entrepreneurs are not 
covered. In this regard, the social 
contributions should be administered 
by STS. The local keneshes are not 
ready to collect local taxes, this is 
extra burden for STS. 
Tax Officer 8 Administrative Factors 
Lack of professionals 
The trainings and seminars not 
conducted, the accountants become 
  358 
Low retention of high-skilled 
employees 
Low salary and compensation 
package 
smarter. Too much pressure on tax 
service. The work is stressful and job 
description list is extensive, but salary 
is low. The work at international 
organizations and projects is easier 
and more rewarded, hence high 
turnover in tax offices. The learning 
centre was open in STS, and regular 
IT trainings will be provided. 
Tax Officer 9 Administrative Factors 
Out-dated technology 
Old equipment and facilities 
No contact with taxpayers. The tax 
inspectors focus only on control 
function. Collection of local taxes will 
be transferred to local administration. 
Tax Officer 10 Administrative Factors 
Large taxpayers 
The state monopolies are not 
transparent (electricity, water, gas, 
telecommunications). Kumtor raises 
not only economical, but political 
concerns. 
International Organizations and Donors 
Tax Expert 1 Administrative Factors 
ADB project on tax administration 
reform and modernization 
It is expected that the STS will acquire 
functional organization, new 
equipment and modern information 
system in order to develop a central 
database, to set up a communication 
infrastructure, to update office 
facilities, to facilitate taxpayer service 
and to establish a learning centre. 
Tax Expert 2 Administrative Factors 
Widespread corruption  
Out-dated system 
Do not satisfy with tax service, 
especially the administration of taxes. 
Corruption is widespread in STS. The 
system was not for a long time.  
More tax consultations and promotion 
of e-filling of tax reports. 
Tax Expert 3 Administrative Factors 
Corruption risks 
Semi-government joint-stock 
company – corporate 
management or outsourcing of 
tax collection to independent 
agencies  
Tax court is needed for tax appeals, 
social insurance of part-time 
employees and individual 
entrepreneurs  
Stable system is mandatory. The 
government has to pay close attention 
to tax competition in the region. 
Amnesty of taxpayers and legalization 
of capital is a good initiative. 
Tax Expert 4 Administrative Factors 
Business development 
VAT administration  
Universal declaration campaign  
No stimuli to develop internal market 
and domestic business in the country. 
No exemption and preferences for 
start-up companies. The system is 
closed, and the concept of tax secrets 
prevails. Remove barriers, open 
access to fiscal information, and build 
transparent tax system. 
Tax Expert 5 Administrative Factors 
High tax burden on corporate 
taxpayers 
Heterogeneous tax system with a 
great emphasis on business taxation. 
For example, individuals pay patents, 
farmers and agribusiness only land 
tax. Hence, more tax burden on 
corporate taxpayers. The tax rates 
were reduced due to tax competition. 
Finally, social allocations should be 
replaced by payroll tax. 
Tax Expert 6 Tax policy does not meet the 
needs of corporate and individual 
taxpayers. It is vital to support 
Administrative procedures should be 
simplified as part of automated 
system. Kyrgyzstan has very high tax 
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domestic producers and to give 
them more ‗air‘ to be stable and 
enter the global market. 
 
Administrative Factors 
High tax burden and tax rates 
rates (69%) in comparison with its 
neighbours, Kazakhstan (29%). The 
tax system should be revised, in 
particular the tax rates and IFRS 
requirements. 
Tax Expert 7 Administrative Factors 
Old facilities and technologies 
Innovative technologies and the best 
practices could have positive impact 
on the tax system. 
Tax Expert 8 Since 2008, the tax system has 
been successfully reformed. Tax 
policy treats all taxpayers equally 
and the principle of one-stop-
shop is useful. But administration 
of taxes is only clear to tax 
authorities, not ordinal citizens. 
 
Administrative Factors 
Reduction in tax rates  
Taxpayer registration and tax 
payments  
Indirect administration  
Provide tax preferences for small and 
medium businesses in textile and other 
industries which have strategic 
potential. The procedures of 
government bodies are rather 
bureaucratic. Hope that the one-stop-
shops will ease such procedures as 
taxpayer registration and tax 
payments. 
Also, replacement of VAT by turnover 
tax, like the national retail tax. 
Tax Expert 9 Administrative Factors 
Administration of local taxes 
It is planned that the administration of 
local taxes will be given to local 
councils. Till now, they do not have 
capacity to do that. There is big 
difference in income level between 
regions and rayons, and poor localities 
are looking for new revenue sources 
and budget dotation. 
Civil Society Organizations 
Tax 
Consultant 1 
Administrative Factors 
Weak cadre, and personnel 
training. 
The taxpayers become 
competent, and finance 
accountants gain more experience 
after the introduction of the IFRS. 
Now the taxpayers and tax 
officials are ready for a dialogue. 
 
In comparison with other services, the 
administrative system is adequate and 
the best practice. 
For the last two years the tax collection 
actually increased. 
The public advisory council has 
participated in the development of the 
STS strategy for 2012-14. 
Tax 
Consultant 2 
Tax system in Kyrgyzstan 
definitely needs improvements on 
the example of the successful 
‗best practices‘ from other 
developing countries. 
 
Administrative Factors 
Administrative procedures of 
taxpayer registration, filing, 
payment 
If the sale tax is eliminated, the tax 
system will be ideal. New types of 
business and operations highlight the 
technical problems in the tax code. To 
improve the tax system, the 
procedures of taxpayer registration 
and tax accounting should be 
reconsidered, including preparation, 
submission and payment of tax 
liabilities. 
Tax 
Consultant 3 
Administrative Factors 
Weak local self-government. 
High tax burden  
Resistance to organizational 
changes  
Special tax regimes 
VAT refund 
No database 
Corruption in STS 
STS should work according to tax 
laws.  
As tax burden is more than 30%, all 
taxpayers should be in equal 
conditions in competitive environment. 
Not all taxpayers are covered for tax 
audit. The system should be flexible 
(exemptions, deductions, preferences), 
simple and transparent. 
Divide the responsibilities between 
STS and local administration  
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Decrease the number of tax 
inspections 
Simplify reporting system, and due 
dates for tax reports submission. 
Tax 
Consultant 4 
Administrative Factors 
High tax burden and tax rates 
Administrative procedures of 
taxpayer registration and filing 
 
In the republic too many taxes and too 
high tax rates. In reality, about 70% of 
income is paid to budget. This is too 
much even for developed countries 
where taxes comprise only 30-40%. 
Cut tax rates and simplify the 
administrative procedures for taxpayer 
registration and filing of tax returns. 
Although in last years a shift to positive 
side was observed. 
Tax 
Consultant 5 
Administrative Factors 
Lack of strong tax experts 
Contradictions in tax code 
The tax system is complex. The main 
tax act is the tax code, but its articles 
need explanations. Having a problem, 
the companies cannot understand the 
exact meaning of related articles. 
Probably, this is because of a lack of 
strong experts on taxation in the 
country. But at first, this is because of 
contradictions in code‘s articles 
themselves. 
Tax 
Consultant 6 
A number of indirect taxes should 
be decreased. For example, 
replace sale tax by VAT, or even 
completely remove VAT from the 
tax system. 
 
Administrative Factors 
Indirect taxation 
Administration of VAT, excises, 
and sales tax 
Close attention should be given to 
indirect taxation. Today, the global 
community already recognized these 
taxes as unfair and regressive. They 
violate the equity principle. As indirect 
taxes are in fact paid by consumers, 
government tries to mitigate its 
regressivity by applying different 
procedures and agreements. 
Taxpayers and Finance Accountants 
Taxpayer 1 The average score is 3 out of 5. 
One of the main reasons for such 
score is the frequent change of 
the STS‘s directors and top 
management witch substantially 
interrupts the continuity in tax 
reform. Need to develop the 
performance measurement 
system adapted to specifics of tax 
system in Kyrgyzstan using mixed 
approach and quantitative and 
qualitative indicators.  
 
Administrative Factors 
Corrupt government authorities 
Weak professionals in tax affairs 
Frequent changes of the STS‘s 
directors and top management 
Paying taxes is a painful process, and 
the emphasis exclusively on 
repressive apparatus in the form of 
STS and finance police. Such practice 
nowhere in the world reaches required 
results. Previously, there were 
commentaries to the tax code. It will be 
nice if this practice will be continued 
because taxpayers not always are able 
to find full explanations in the code. 
Some improvements began with the 
new tax code. From 2009, the number 
of control bodies reduced and the 
rights of taxpayers were strengthened 
to some degree. Also it will be nice if 
the government in order to cover 
budget deficit stops to send tax 
inspectors to catch any violations. 
Even small infringement leads to big 
sanctions. 
Taxpayer 2 Electronic filing of reports and 
documents, issuance of 
references and notification letters 
should be comfortable for 
taxpayers. 
Web-site and its daily updates will 
also help in interactions between 
It is recommended to modernize and 
automatize the tax administration, 
including the quality and speed of tax 
services, comfort for taxpayers, and 
distance communication. The hiring of 
candidates to the STS should follow 
the objective evaluation criteria. All 
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STS and taxpayers.  
 
Administrative Factors 
Administrative procedures  
Lack of proper management 
No clear criteria for personnel 
hiring 
depends on the government, tax policy 
and legislature. 
 
Taxpayer 3 STS keeps a blind eye on some 
violations due to bureaucracy. Not 
all tax payments are received by 
budget. From over 423 000 
registered firms only 200 pay 
taxes. This shows a poor work of 
STS. Calculate the total number of 
registered taxpayers and make 
estimation of total tax revenue. If 
there is a discrepancy, the certain 
problems exist. The frequency of 
tax audit should be no more than 
one in half-year. 
 
Administrative Factors 
High tax burden 
Lack of tax exemptions and 
subsidies 
Bureaucracy in tax service 
Discriminatory relations of tax 
officers to taxpayers  
 
Cultural Factors 
Absence of tax culture  
Taxpayers do not used to pay 
taxes but bribes 
It is necessary to improve the culture 
of taxpayers and tax inspectors 
through educational programs. In 
addition, remove the mechanism of 
bureaucratic operations in registration 
process, reduce the number of 
inspections and increase the quality of 
tax control. 
The relations between STS and 
taxpayers could be improved through 
information services and consultations 
about their rights and responsibilities. 
The hot-line could help to reduce 
corruption and fraud in taxation, also 
objective assessment by tax service. 
Taxpayer 4 Frequent inspections provoke 
bribes and corruption. So, the 
corporate management prefers to 
pay by ‗tariff.‘  On the other hand, 
the approach of tax authorities is 
to collect more and meet the plan. 
Often, the STS‘s director is 
politician, not specialist, with own 
vision. Up to day, the tax reforms 
were partial.  
 
Administrative Factors 
Corruption and bribery 
Plan as a target, STS‘s director 
It is essential to cancel the ‗plan‘ 
target, introduce declaration by income 
and expenses and make this process 
transparent, launch united IT system 
and contact the customs about its 
possible integration, sort out the issues 
with taxpayer registration especially 
the use of TIN in the regions. The 
bazars could be a good potential to 
increase tax collection. The tax code 
introduces the criteria of risk 
assessment for external audit. 
Taxpayer 5 Administrative Factors 
Distribution of authorities in new 
organizational structure 
Special tax regime 
Administrative procedures 
Not all of goals were achieved. Prefer 
to pay taxes in the form of patent only. 
The primary goals are simple tax 
procedures and transparent tax 
collection process. 
Taxpayer 6 Administrative Factors 
Poor cadre policy and motivation 
in tax offices ,STS‘s director 
Corruption in tax administration, 
tax inspectors receive low salary 
but still want to work there. 
 
Cultural Factors 
Low level of self-awareness in tax 
offices 
Following the example of financial 
police, disband and create new tax 
service, regularly oversee them, and 
appoint strong chief executive with 
western education. More analytics 
should be presented on the official 
STS‘s web-site, create and support the 
public advisory board.  
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Taxpayer 7 Administrative Factors 
Taxpayer service  
Poor use of administrative 
resources 
Intimidation of businessmen by 
inspections 
STS should improve the taxpayer 
service.  
It already provides tax consultations, 
information announcements, and 
online submission of e-documents but 
hot lines need further improvements. 
Perhaps, STS‘s service to clients could 
be improved.  
Taxpayer 8 Administrative Factors 
STS is focused on increase in tax 
collections. The culture of tax 
inspectors could be better as well. 
The performance is fine. 
Tax statistics should be regularly 
collected. 
It is easier to open the business than 
to liquidate it.  
Taxpayer 9 Never have experience with STS, 
but based on response from 
others the overall opinion is 
negative. 
The goals are not achieved as most of 
economy is in shadow. The tax reform 
is possible but it is a long-term 
process.  
The only thing to do is to hope for 
better. 
Taxpayer 10 On the whole satisfy with the work 
of STS. For the last years, the 
STS tries to improve its service, 
but not without problems. Some 
tax employees continue to 
participate in corrupt schemes, 
which push compliant taxpayers to 
bribe. Personally face such 
activities. 
The recommendations include more 
emphasis on tax consulting and 
‗human‘ relations with tax inspectors. 
The information on taxation could be 
periodically provided in the form of 
leaflets, books and other print 
materials in Russian and Kyrgyz. Also 
the rights and responsibilities of both 
taxpayers and tax employees should 
be explained, they have to be more 
competent in their work. 
Taxpayer 11 Do not know what to answer. It is difficult to answer. Certain goals 
were achieved, because a number of 
complains decreased. No personal 
experience, but rely on experience of 
older generation some improvements 
have been made. 
Educational Institutions 
Academic 3 Administrative Factors 
High tax rates 
The main objective is reduction in tax 
rates. The high rates force the small 
and medium business to reside in 
informal economy. As a result, the 
businessmen prefer to open their 
companies abroad, that is the outflow 
of investments and uncollected 
revenues. 
Academic 4 The system should be in place to 
cut overloads in STS and 
separate its functions from other 
agencies like state vehicle 
inspection, sanitary service.  
 
Administrative Factors 
High tax and customs burden 
Indirect taxes easier in 
administration – VAT, sale tax, 
and excises 
Administration of social 
contributions 
Corruption in tax administration 
Tackle corruption in tax administration 
(tax and customs service in top 10). 
Replace taxes by social contributions. 
Decrease tax and customs burden, for 
example, for individual entrepreneurs, 
and import of production equipment 
The learning centre was established in 
STS to train the employees. To 
address corruption, the direct contact 
with taxpayers was reduced and a 
coaching scheme eliminated. 
 
 
Academic 5 Administrative Factors 
Introduction of a single property 
tax, which combines real-estate 
Property tax and land tax are the main 
revenue sources of local budgets. 
While land cadastre for seasonal 
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tax and vehicle tax 
Registration of property by 
Register needs an integrated ICT 
system 
collections should be justified by the 
government, property taxation requires 
the institute of independent assessors 
and established assessment process. 
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Table 4.5.2. Kyrgyz Republic: PEFA PFM Performance Indicators, 2005 and 2009 
 
 Performance Indicator Score 
 A. PFM-OUT-TURNS: Credibility of the budget 2009 2005 
PI-1  Aggregate expenditure out-turn compared to original approved 
budget  
C D 
PI-2  Composition of expenditure out-turn compared to original approved 
budget  
C A  
PI-3  Aggregate revenue out-turn compared to original approved budget A A 
PI-4  Stock and monitoring of expenditure payment arrears D  D 
 B. KEY CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES: Comprehensiveness and 
Transparency 
  
PI-5  Classification of the budget  B C  
PI-6  Comprehensiveness of information included in budget 
documentation 
A B  
PI-7  Extent of unreported government operations  D NS  
PI-8  Transparency of inter-governmental fiscal relations  B C+  
PI-9  Oversight of aggregate fiscal risk from other public sector entities C+ D+  
PI-10 Public access to key fiscal information C C  
 C. BUDGET CYCLE   
 C(i) Policy-Based Budgeting   
PI-11 Orderliness and participation in the annual budget process B B  
PI-12  Multi-year perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and 
budgeting 
C+ D+  
 C(ii) Predictability and Control in Budget Execution   
PI-13  Transparency of taxpayer obligations and liabilities C C  
PI-14  Effectiveness of measures for taxpayer registration and tax 
assessment  
C+ NS  
PI-15  Effectiveness in collection of tax payments  D+ B+  
PI-16 Predictability in the availability of funds for commitment of 
expenditures  
D D  
PI-17 Recording and management of cash balances, debt and guarantees  B B+  
PI-18  Effectiveness of payroll controls  D+ NS  
PI-19 Competition, value for money and controls in procurement  D+ C+  
PI-20  Effectiveness of internal controls for non-salary expenditure  D+ D+  
PI-21 Effectiveness of internal audit  D D  
 C(iii) Accounting, Recording and Reporting   
PI-22 Timeliness and regularity of accounts reconciliation  A NS  
PI-23 Availability of information on resources received by service delivery 
units  
D D  
PI-24 Quality and timeliness of in-year budget reports  C+ C+  
PI-25 Quality and timeliness of annual financial statements  D+ D  
 C(iv) External Scrutiny and Audit   
PI-26 Scope, nature and follow-up of external audit  D+ D  
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PI-27 Legislative scrutiny of the annual budget law  C+ D+  
PI-28  Legislative scrutiny of external audit reports  D+ D  
 D. DONOR PRACTICES   
D-1 Predictability of Direct Budget Support  NS C+  
D-2  Financial information provided by donors for budgeting and reporting 
on project and program aid 
D+ NS  
D-3 Proportion of aid that is managed by use of national procedures  D NS  
 
 
Source: PEFA (2009) Kyrgyz Republic: Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability 
Assessment. Public Financial Management Performance Report, December 
2009, pp. 74-78. 
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Map 5.2.1. Central Asia: General Map 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Cartographic Section, Department of Field Support (2011) Central Asia.  
United Nations. 
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Map 5.2.2. Kyrgyz Republic: Physiographic Map  
 
 
 
 
Source:  Cartographic Section, Department of Field Support (2011) Kyrgyzstan.  
United Nations. 
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Table 5.2.1. Central Asia: Corruption Perceptions Index, 1999-2013 
 
Country 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score 
Central Asian States                                 
Kazakhstan 84 2.3 65 3.0 71 2.7 88 2.3 100 2.1 122 2.2 107 2.6 111 2.6 
Kyrgyz Republic 87 2.2             118 2.1 122 2.2 130 2.3 142 2.2 
Tajikistan                 124 1.8 133 1.9 144 2.1 142 2.2 
Turkmenistan                     133 1.9 155 1.8 142 2.2 
Uzbekistan 94 1.8 79 2.4 71 2.7 68 2.9 100 2.1 114 2.3 137 2.2 151 2.1 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
        
      
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Russia 82 2.4 82 2.1 79 2.3 71 2.3 86 2.1 90 2.8 126 2.4 121 2.5 
Armenia 80 2.5 76 2.5         78 2.1 82 3.1 88 2.9 93 2.9 
Azerbaijan 96 1.7 87 1.5 84 2.0 95 2.0 124 1.8 140 1.9 137 2.2 130 2.4 
Belarus 58 3.4 43 3.4     36 4.8 53 3.8 74 3.3 107 2.6 151 2.1 
Georgia  84 2.3         85 2.3 124 1.8 133 1.9 130 2.3 99 2.8 
Moldova 75 2.6 74 2.5 63 3.1 93 2.0 100 2.1 114 2.3 88 2.9 79 3.2 
Ukraine 75 2.6 87 1.5 83 2.1 85 2.3 106 2.1 122 2.2 107 2.6 99 2.8 
Baltic States                                 
Estonia 27 5.7 27 3.4 28 5.6 29 5.6 33 4.7 31 6.0 27 6.4 24 6.7 
Latvia 58 3.4 57 3.4 59 3.4 52 3.7 57 3.8 57 4.0 51 4.2 49 4.7 
Lithuania  50 3.8 43 3.4 38 4.8 36 4.8 41 4.7 44 4.6 44 4.8 46 4.8 
Sample Size 99   90   91   102   133   146   159   163   
 
Note: The CPI ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. It is a composite index, a combination of polls, drawing on 
corruption-related data collected by a variety of reputable institutions. For a country/territory to be included in the ranking it must be included in a minimum of 
three of the CPI‘s data sources.   A country/territory‘s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption there on a scale of 0 - 10, where 0 means 
that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 10 means that a country is perceived as very clean. A country‘s rank indicates its position relative to the other 
countries/territories included in the index. The CPI is not designed to allow for country scores to be compared over time. This is because the index draws on a 
country‘s rank in the original data sources, rather than its score. A rank will always deliver only relative information – and therefore a ranking is a one off 
assessment. A country‘s rank in a data source can change a) if perceptions of corruption in other countries included in that source change or b) if countries are 
added or removed from that data source. 
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Country 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average  
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score 
Central Asian States                               
Kazakhstan 150 2.1 145 2.2 120 2.7 105 2.9 120 2.7 133.0 2.8  140  2.6 3.3 
Kyrgyz Republic 150 2.1 166 1.8 162 1.9 164 2.0 164 2.1 154.0 2.4  150  2.4 2.9 
Tajikistan 150 2.1 151 2.0 158 2.0 154 2.1 152 2.3 157.0 2.2  154  2.2 2.8 
Turkmenistan 162 2.0 166 1.8 168 1.8 172 1.6 177 1.6 170.0 1.7  168  1.7 2.5 
Uzbekistan 175 1.7 166 1.8 174 1.7 172 1.6 177 1.6 170.0 1.7 168 1.7 2.8 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
      
      
Russia 143 2.3 147 2.1 146 2.2 154 2.1 143 2.4 133.0 2.8  127  2.8 3.1 
Armenia 99 3.0 109 2.9 120 2.7 123 2.6 129 2.6 105.0 3.4  94  3.6 3.7 
Azerbaijan 150 2.1 158 1.9 143 2.3 134 2.4 143 2.4 139.0 2.7  127 2.8  2.9 
Belarus 150 2.1 151 2.0 139 2.4 127 2.5     123.0 3.1  123  2.9 3.7 
Georgia  79 3.0 67 3.9 66 4.1 68 3.8 64 4.1 51.0 5.2  55  4.9 3.8 
Moldova 111 2.8 109 2.9 89 3.3 105 2.9 112 2.9 94.0 3.6  102  3.5 3.5 
Ukraine 118 2.7 134 2.5 146 2.2 134 2.4 152 2.3 144.0 2.6  144 2.5  3.1 
Baltic States                               
Estonia 28 6.5 27 6.6 27 6.6 26 6.5 29 6.4 32.0 6.4  28  6.8 6.5 
Latvia 51 4.8 52 5.0 56 4.5 59 4.3 61 4.2 54.0 4.9  49  5.3 4.8 
Lithuania  51 4.8 58 4.6 52 4.9 46 5.0 50 4.8 48.0 5.4  43  5.7 5.3 
Sample Size 180   180   180   178   183   176    177     
 
 
Source: Transparency International (2013) Corruption Perceptions Index. Berlin, Germany.    
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Table 5.2.2. Europe and Central Asia: Shadow Economy Ranking, 1999-2007 (% 
of GDP) 
 
Rank Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Country 
Average 
1 
Slovak  
Republic  18.9 18.9 18.8 18.6 18.3 18.1 17.6 17.2 16.8 18.1 
2 
Czech  
Republic  19.3 19.1 18.9 18.8 18.7 18.4 17.8 17.3 17.0 18.4 
3 Hungary  25.4 25.1 24.8 24.5 24.4 24.1 24.0 23.7 23.7 24.4 
4 Slovenia  27.3 27.1 26.7 26.6 26.4 26.2 25.8 25.3 24.7 26.2 
5 Poland 27.7 27.6 27.7 27.7 27.5 27.3 26.9 26.4 26.0 27.2 
6 Latvia  30.8 30.5 30.1 29.8 29.4 29.0 28.4 27.7 27.2 29.2 
7 Estonia   - 32.7 32.4 32.0 31.4 31.1 30.5 29.8 29.5 31.2 
8 Turkey  32.7 32.1 32.8 32.4 31.8 31.0 30.0 29.5 29.1 31.3 
9 Lithuania  33.8 33.7 33.3 32.8 32.0 31.7 31.0 30.4 29.7 32.0 
10 Croatia  33.8 33.4 33.2 32.6 32.1 31.7 31.3 30.8 30.4 32.1 
11 Romania  34.3 34.4 33.7 33.5 32.8 32.0 31.7 30.7 30.2 32.6 
12 Albania  35.7 35.3 34.9 34.7 34.4 33.9 33.7 33.3 32.9 34.3 
13 Bulgaria  37.3 36.9 36.6 36.1 35.6 34.9 34.1 33.5 32.7 35.3 
14 Macedonia  39.0 38.2 39.1 38.9 38.4 37.4 36.9 36.0 34.9 37.6 
15 
Kyrgyz  
Republic 41.4 41.2 40.8 41.4 40.5 39.8 40.1 39.8 38.8 40.4 
16 Kazakhstan  43.8 43.2 42.5 42.0 41.1 40.6 39.8 38.9 38.4 41.1 
17 Tajikistan  43.5 43.2 42.9 42.7 42.1 41.7 41.5 41.2 41.0 42.2 
18 
Russian  
Federation 47.0 46.1 45.3 44.5 43.6 43.0 42.4 41.7 40.6 43.8 
19 Moldova  45.6 45.1 44.1 44.5 44.6 44.0 43.4 44.3  - 44.5 
20 Ukraine  52.7 52.2 51.4 50.8 49.7 48.8 47.8 47.3 46.8 49.7 
21 Georgia  68.3 67.3 67.2 67.2 65.9 65.5 65.1 63.6 62.1 65.8 
  
Time  
Average  36.9 36.3 36.1 35.8 35.3 34.8 34.3 33.7 32.6   
 
 
Source: Schneider, F., Buehn, A. & Montenegro, C. E. (2010) Shadow Economies All 
over the World: New Estimates for 162 Countries from 1999 to 2007. Policy 
Research Working Paper World Bank, p. 23. 
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Table 5.2.4. SWOT Analysis: Macroeconomic Policy, 2013  
 
Strengths 
 Resumed operations by Kumtor gold 
mine exploring companies after 
repairs and recovery operations 
 Full start of sheet glass production 
 Steadily developing trade relations 
with trade partner countries 
 Preferential crediting for agricultural 
development leading to the 
development of the overall agricultural 
sector and processing industry 
 Forecasted agriculture sector 
development 
 Joining the Customs Union 
 Service sector stable development 
Weaknesses  
 Potential socio-political situation 
complication 
 Unstable budget and tax spheres 
 Persistently high deficit level for a 
prolonged period 
 Risk of inflation increase due to food 
price growth 
 Unfavourable economic development 
trends based on 2012 outcomes 
 Risks of Kumtor gold extraction 
decrease  
 Forecasted risks of low water level 
which may influence power generation 
output significantly 
 Increase of gas purchase price in 
Uzbekistan  
 Persistently high level of losses in the 
energy sector  
Opportunities 
 Political stability in the region and 
major trade partner countries 
 Gradual world economy recovery 
(forecasted economy growth up to 4 
% in Kyrgyzstan, 3% in Russia, 
Kazakhstan (6.0 %), and China (7-8 
%);  
 Low inflation below 7.0 % in trade 
partners such as Russia and 
Kazakhstan 
 Foreign trade cooperation within the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), Eurasian Economic Union, 
and CIS 
 Active employment of WTO 
membership by Kyrgyzstan 
 Political resolution on joining the 
Customs Union 
 Extended cooperation with 
international economic and financial 
organizations 
 Forecasted stabilization of world oil 
price at $100-110 per barrel for the 
reduced demand due to economic 
growth slow down in China and 
Europe  
 Investment in innovation growth 
Treats 
 High level of dependence on external 
loans to cover the national budget 
deficit 
 High risk of the country default under 
social commitments due to failure to 
secure external loans to cover the 
budget deficit 
 Financial instability of some European 
countries and the US 
 Economic growth slow down in the US 
and China 
 Worsening conditions of trade with 
major trade partners and Customs 
Union member countries 
 Forecasted world food price growth  
 Gold price decrease 
 
Source: IMF 2014. Kyrgyz Republic: Sustainable Development Program (2013-2017) 
— Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper IMF Country Report No. 14/247. 
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
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Table 5.2.5. Kyrgyz Republic: External Migration, 2002-2013 (Persons) 
 
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Immigrants  4,893 4,483 3,284 3,761 3,420 3,960 3,497 3,829 3,903 6,337 5,532 4,349 
CIS countries 4,825 4,431 3,195 3,664 3,321 3,844 3,378 3,716 3,792 6,244 5,437 4,137 
Azerbaijan 14 13 6 15 9 3 1 9 7 - 1 4 
Armenia 7 1 6 1 1 4 - 1 1 - 1 1 
Belarus 21 16 13 10 15 11 7 7 9 8 3 3 
Georgia 3 - - 2 1 - - … … … … … 
Kazakhstan 769 740 509 445 456 530 515 556 699 813 637 553 
Moldova  3 - 4 - - - 1 - - - - - 
Russian Federation 2840 2787 1891 2471 2241 2673 2304 2671 2689 5082 4376 3030 
Tajikistan 701 504 490 515 443 475 411 233 216 178 286 356 
Turkmenistan 2 3 2 11 5 5 9 2 3 1 3 2 
Uzbekistan 412 327 240 184 133 120 118 223 151 151 117 183 
Ukraine 53 40 34 10 17 23 12 14 17 11 13 4 
Baltic States 7 4 0 1 4 3 0 1 3 0 0 0 
Non-CIS countries 67 48 85 97 96 114 119 113 111 93 94 213 
Germany 32 21 41 34 45 34 28 14 14 5 12 11 
Israel 2 5 4 4 3 3 11 2 - 1 1 1 
United States 5 1 7 9 14 10 10 8 11 8 9 4 
                          
Unemployment rate 12.5 9.9 8.5 8.1 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.4 8.6 7.921 7.738 7.647 
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic
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Table 5.2.6. Kyrgyz Republic: External Emigration, 2002-2013 (Persons) 
 
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Emigrants 32,717 21,209 22,607 30,741 34,423 54,608 41,287 33,380 54,531 45,740 13,019 11,552 
CIS countries 30,069 18,794 20,604 29,569 33,813 54,078 40,877 33,031 54,222 45,505 12,799 11,371 
Azerbaijan 37 25 50 29 22 20 11 29 25 23 10 22 
Armenia 8 4 2 2 2 2 1 - - 1 1 - 
Belarus 191 122 182 105 140 93 57 55 76 37 25 23 
Georgia 5 6 5 10 2 - 2 … … … … … 
Kazakhstan 3,491 3,675 3,578 4,284 5,192 4,243 3,068 3,209 5,636 3,629 3,055 2,838 
Moldova  2 9 7 1 - - - - - - 2 - 
Russian Federation 25,242 14,214 16,161 24,677 28,070 49,333 37,472 29,429 48,103 41,558 9,475 8,307 
Tajikistan 77 89 72 95 67 77 52 57 52 46 45 46 
Turkmenistan 3 2 9 - 1 1 1 4 1 1 - 2 
Uzbekistan 717 412 354 229 185 190 154 192 239 130 138 89 
Ukraine 296 232 178 134 131 117 59 53 90 78 48 40 
Baltic States -6 0 4 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 -3 0 1 0 
Non-CIS countries 2,641 2,411 2,003 1,171 606 527 410 348 306 235 220 185 
Germany 2,237 2,000 1,548 790 317 282 153 139 111 67 86 69 
Israel 170 75 36 54 16 38 24 13 20 10 - 6 
United States 126 193 210 173 153 128 93 91 88 98 77 47 
                          
Net Migration  -27,824 -16,726 -19,323 -26,980 -31,003 -50,648 -37,790 -29,551 -50,628 -39,403 -7,487 -7,203 
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic
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Figure 5.2.1. Kyrgyz Republic: External Migration Flow, 2002-2013 (Persons) 
 
 
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic
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Table 5.2.7. Kyrgyz Republic: Salaries and Wages by Economic Activity, 1998-2013 (KGS) 
 
Economic Activity 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Average 841 1,050 1,227 1,455 1,684 1,916 2,240 2,613 3,270 3,970 5,378 6,161 7,189 9,304 10,726 11,341 
Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry  402 450 591 704 776 878 904 1,041 1,259 1,788 2,416 3,347 4,360 4,784 5,309 5,814 
Fishery 510 599 645 605 834 871 1,085 1,172 1,852 1,471 2,915 3,957 3,655 3,595 4,919 4,607 
Mining  1,415 1,699 2,240 1,893 2,051 2,164 2,415 2,928 3,964 4,609 5,749 5,856 7,857 10,208 15,309 15,825 
Manufacturing 1,406 1,962 2,020 2,391 2,834 3,183 3,759 4,230 6,211 6,254 7,812 9,546 10,986 14,465 15,291 16,748 
Energy, Gas and Water Supply 1,440 1,868 2,069 2,645 3,392 3,752 4,116 4,410 5,340 6,315 7,935 8,734 10,675 12,747 15,317 16,921 
Construction 1,130 1,538 1,816 1,819 1,984 2,111 2,213 2,388 2,887 3,613 5,245 6,620 8,012 7,439 8,132 9,177 
Trade 785 830 1,089 1,200 1,399 1,616 1,901 2,082 2,288 3,142 4,487 6,477 7,200 7,935 9,935 10,842 
Hotels and Restraints 714 1,278 1,712 1,719 2,581 2,781 2,915 3,416 3,244 4,191 4,769 5,793 6,631 7,716 8,283 8,540 
Transport and Communication 1,074 1,302 1,723 2,055 2,417 2,834 3,480 4,108 5,141 6,497 9,897 9,717 11,981 14,226 15,844 17,601 
Finance 2,532 3,056 4,240 4,717 5,146 5,489 7,507 9,555 10,669 10,791 14,864 16,750 18,768 20,098 21,558 23,325 
Real Estate and Service 863 1,151 1,429 1,716 1,880 2,199 2,521 2,981 3,492 4,576 6,326 7,853 8,424 10,187 11,778 12,366 
Public Administration 1,110 1,264 1,672 2,273 2,404 2,792 3,132 3,525 3,753 4,469 6,958 8,106 9,422 10,032 11,187 12,586 
Education 536 608 715 866 976 1,128 1,346 1,622 1,955 2,676 3,424 3,638 3,991 6,682 7,999 7,799 
Health Care 455 516 579 693 800 943 1,126 1,386 1,751 2,541 3,486 3,909 4,218 7,315 9,402 9,255 
Public Utilities and Social 
Service 625 760 995 1,081 1,239 1,393 1,684 1,934 2,243 2,536 3,414 3,566 5,825 7,248 8,587 8,482 
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic
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Table 5.2.8. Kyrgyz Republic: Interregional Migration Net Flow, 2002-2013 
(Persons) 
 
Region, City 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total -1433 1481 182 -489 -391 -1984 -1737 -2405 -857 
Batken  -145 -959 -1527 -770 -718 -719 -905 -1075 -509 
Jalal-Abad  -311 -1290 -2030 -1415 -1355 -1731 -1721 -1806 -1002 
Yssyk-Kul  -294 -1225 -1536 -1735 -1526 -1763 -1785 -1767 -849 
Naryn  -650 -2103 -2351 -2366 -2098 -2034 -1933 -1968 -928 
Osh  -311 -763 -1962 -1037 -1092 -1899 -2600 -2200 -1002 
Talas  -393 -818 -1135 -1193 -893 -1054 -1214 -1144 -626 
Chui  91 5551 6006 4677 3593 2809 3220 3298 1438 
Bishkek City 584 5092 4561 4834 4860 5424 5785 4648 2700 
Osh City -4 -2004 156 -1484 -1162 -1017 -584 -391 -79 
 
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic 
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Table 5.3.1. Kyrgyz Republic: Public Associations and Organizations, 2014 
 
  Units % of Total 
Total 17,095 100.00% 
Political Organizations 211 1.23% 
Business Associations 1,036 6.06% 
Professional Unions 651 3.81% 
Professional Organizations 769 4.50% 
Religion Organizations 499 2.92% 
Other Organizations 13,929 81.48% 
 
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic
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Table 5.4.1. Central Asia: Political Trajectories 
 
Short Term: 1991-1994 
 
Country Formal Regime Type1 Regime Durability2 
Kyrgyzstan Electoral democracy Durable 
Uzbekistan Autocracy Durable 
Tajikistan Collapsed regime Not durable 
Kazakhstan Autocracy Durable 
Turkmenistan Autocracy Durable 
 
Medium-Longer Term: 1995-2004 
 
Country Formal Regime  Informal Regime Regime Durability 
Kyrgyzstan Autocracy Clan politics Weakly durable 
Uzbekistan Autocracy Clan politics Moderately durable 
but declining 
Tajikistan Autocracy Clan politics Weakly durable 
Kazakhstan Autocracy Clan politics3 Durable 
Turkmenistan Autocracy Clan politics Weakly durable 
 
 
1 
Regime type is measured according to Freedom House scores. 
2 
Regime durability scores reflect indicators of collapse in Robert Rotberg, ‗Failed States, 
Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,‘ in Robert Rotberg, ed., State 
Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington, DC: Brookings Press, 2003), 
pp. 2-9. 
3 
Clan politics is much more limited and controlled in this case, as a result of economic 
prosperity. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Collins, K. (2006) Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 6. 
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Table 5.4.2. Kyrgyz Republic: First Secretaries and Presidents, 1924-2013 
 
First Secretary, 
President 
Years Nationality Clan Origin 
M. D. Kamensky 1924-1925 Russian - 
N.A. Uziukov 1925-1927 Russian - 
V. P. Shubrikov 1927-1929 Russian - 
M. M. Kulkov 1929-1930 Russian - 
A. O. Shakhrai 1930-1934 Russian - 
M. L. Belotsky 1934-1937 Jewish - 
M. K. Ammosov 1937-1938 Russian - 
A. V. Vagov 1938-1945 Russian Osh 
N. S. Bogolyubov 1945-1950 Russian Frunze (Chui) 
I. R. Razzakov 1950-1961 Kyrgyz Batken (Ichkilik) 
Turdakun Usubaliev 1961-1985 Kyrgyz Naryn (Sarybagysh, 
Kochkor) 
Absamat Masaliev 1985-1990 Kyrgyz Osh (Ichkilik) 
Askar Akaev1 1990-2005 Kyrgyz Chui (Kemin, Sarybagysh) 
Kurmanbek Bakiev 2005-2010 Kyrgyz Jalal-Abad 
Roza Otunbaeva2 2010-2011 Kyrgyz Osh 
Almaz Atambaev 2011-Present Kyrgyz Chui 
 
1
 Akaev was the first president elected, under the new law on the presidency, in indirect 
elections by the Supreme Soviet. At the same time, D. Amanbaev was the first secretary of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party until August 1991. 
 
2 
Otunbaeva served as the interim president until official elections in December 2011.  
 
 
 
 
Adapted from Collins, K. (2006) Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 109. 
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Figure 5.4.1. Central Asia: Variation in Clan Networks 
 
 
Note: The chart does not represent the actual degree of kinship in these networks. Spatial 
location signifies those networks that more explicitly emphasize their genealogical basis, and 
those that more explicitly incorporate fictive kin and patronage ties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Collins, K. (2006) Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 76. 
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Table 5.5.3. Kyrgyz Republic: Chief Executives of the State Tax Service, 1990-
2013 
 
# First and  
Last Name 
Position, Organization Period 
1 Salmoorbek 
Asipov 
Head, State Tax Inspectorate under 
the Ministry of Finance  
1990-1992 
2 Kerimjan 
Kunakunov 
Director, State Tax Inspectorate under 
the Government of KR 
1992-1994 
3 Sergey 
Barabanov 
First Deputy Minister, Director, State 
Tax Inspectorate under the Ministry of 
Finance 
1994-1995 
4 Arstanbek 
Nogoev 
First Deputy Minister, Director, State 
Tax Inspectorate under the Ministry of 
Finance 
1995-1996 
5 Karim  
Urazbaev 
First Deputy Minister, Director, State 
Tax Inspectorate under the Ministry of 
Finance 
1996-1997 
6 Medet 
Sadyrkulov 
Director, State Tax Inspectorate under 
the Ministry of Finance 
1997-1999 
7 Esentur 
Samykbaev 
First Deputy Minister, Director, State 
Tax Inspectorate under the Ministry of 
Finance 
1999-2000 
8 Avasbek 
Momunkulov 
 
Deputy Minister, Director, State Tax 
Inspectorate under the Ministry of 
Finance 
2000-2002 
9 Temir  
Atashev 
Director, State Tax Inspectorate under 
the Ministry of Finance 
April, 2002- 
November, 2002 
10 Askarbek 
Shadiev 
Deputy Minister, Chairman, Revenue 
Committee of the Ministry of Finance 
2002-2003 
12 Zamirbek 
Malabekov 
Deputy Minister, Chairman, Revenue 
Committee of the Ministry of Finance 
2003-2005 
13 Ishak  
Masaliev 
Chairman, Revenue Committee of the 
Ministry of Finance 
2005 
14 Toktobek 
Akmatov 
Director, State Tax Service under the 
Government of KR 
2005-2007 
15 Temirbek 
Kurmanbekov 
Chairman, State Committee of Taxes 
and Fees 
2007-2008 
16 Ahmatbek 
Keldibekov 
Chairman, State Committee of Taxes 
and Fees 
2008-2010 
17 Adylbek 
Kasymaliev 
Chairman, State Tax Service under 
the Government of KR 
2010-2011 
18 Baktybek 
Ashirov 
Chairman, State Tax Service under 
the Government of KR 
2011-2012 
19 Kabyl  
Abdaliev 
Chairman, State Tax Service under 
the Government of KR 
2012 
20 Ishak  
Masaliev 
Chairman, State Tax Service under 
the Government of KR 
September, 2012-
Present 
 
Source: Museum of the State Tax Service of the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek. 
 
 
  382 
Figure 5.5.5. Kyrgyz Republic: Organizational Structure of the Bishkek Tax Office, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Organizational structure of the Bishkek Tax Office approved by STS Order #73 on April 6, 2012. 
 
Source: State Tax Service of the Kyrgyz Republic  
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Figure 5.5.6. Kyrgyz Republic: Organizational Structure of the Rayon Tax Office in Bishkek City, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Control Cash Machines (CCM) with tax memory. 
 
Note: Organizational structure of the Bishkek Rayon Tax Offices approved by STS Order #144 on June 26, 2012.  
 
Source: State Tax Service of the Kyrgyz Republic  
Office Head 
Deputy Head Deputy Head 
Tax Liabilities Collection and 
Enforcement Department 
Tax Audit Department 
Financial Affairs Sector 
Legal Affairs Sector 
Personnel Affairs  
Chief Specialist 
Taxpayer Service 
Department 
Income Recording and 
Declarations Processing 
Department 
Audit Analyzing and 
Planning Sector 
Field Audit Sector 
Desk Audit Sector 
Clarifications and 
Training Sector 
Taxpayer Registration 
Sector 
Tax Reports and 
Declarations Sector 
CCM* and Protected 
Forms Registration, 
Patents Issuing Sector 
VAT Invoices Issuing 
and Recording Sector 
Income Recording 
Sector  
Declarations Processing 
Sector  
Analysis and 
Forecasting Sector  
Errors Correction Sector  
Non-Submitted and Stop-
Submitting Tax Declarations 
Department 
Chronometric Inspections and 
Raid Tax Control Department 
Gasoline-Related and Excisable 
Products Controlling Department 
Tax Notifications Sector 
Enforced Collection Sector 
  384 
Figure 5.5.7. Kyrgyz Republic: Organizational Structure of the Northern Interregional Tax Office, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Organizational structure of the Northern Interregional Tax Office approved by STS Order #187 on December 7, 2011. 
 
Source: State Tax Service of the Kyrgyz Republic  
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Figure 5.5.8. Kyrgyz Republic: Organizational Structure of the Eastern 
Interregional Tax Office, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Organizational structure of the Eastern Interregional Tax Office approved by STS 
Orders#6 on January 15, 2010.  
 
Source: State Tax Service of the Kyrgyz Republic  
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Figure 5.5.9. Kyrgyz Republic: Organizational Structure of the Southern 
Interregional Tax Office, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Organizational structure of the Southern Interregional Tax Office approved by 
STS Orders#6 on January 15, 2010.  
 
Source: State Tax Service of the Kyrgyz Republic  
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Figure 5.5.10. Kyrgyz Republic: Typical Organizational Structure of the Regional 
Rayon Tax Office, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Organizational structure of the Regional Rayon Tax Offices approved by STS 
Order #144 on June 26, 2012.  
 
Source: State Tax Service of the Kyrgyz Republic  
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Figure 5.5.11. Kyrgyz Republic: Typical Organizational Structure of the Regional 
City Tax Office, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Organizational structure of the Regional City Tax Offices approved by STS 
Orders # 143-144 on June 26, 2012 and STS Order # 182а on August 10, 2012. 
 
Source: State Tax Service of the Kyrgyz Republic  
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Figure 5.5.12. Kyrgyz Republic: Organizational Structure of the Large Taxpayer 
Unit, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Organizational structure of the Large Taxpayer Unit approved by STS Order#144 
on June 26, 2012.  
 
Source: State Tax Service of the Kyrgyz Republic  
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Figure 5.5.13. Kyrgyz Republic: Organizational Structure of the Southern 
Regional LTU, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Organizational structure of the Southern Regional Large Taxpayer Unit approved 
by STS Order #144 on June 26, 2012.  
 
Source: State Tax Service of the Kyrgyz Republic  
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Figure 5.5.14. Kyrgyz Republic: Organizational Structure of the Free Economic 
Zone Unit, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Organizational structure of the Free Economic Zones Unit approved by STS 
Order # 65 on April 1, 2011.  
 
Source: State Tax Service of the Kyrgyz Republic 
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Figure 5.5.15. Kyrgyz Republic: Organizational Structure of the Ethyl and Alcoholic Products Unit, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Organizational structure of the Ethyl and Alcoholic Products Unit approved by STS Order # 69 on April 4, 2012.  
 
Source: State Tax Service of the Kyrgyz Republic
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Figure 5.5.16. Kyrgyz Republic: Organizational Structure of the Learning Centre, 
2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Organizational structure of the Learning Centre approved by STS Order # 6 on 
January 15, 2010.  
 
Source: State Tax Service of the Kyrgyz Republic 
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Table 5.5.4. Common Forms of Tax Evasion in Revenue Administration 
 
Types Mechanisms of Integrity Violations 
‘Unadulterated’ tax evasion (without the involvement of tax officers) 
Smuggling  Smuggling of goods (beer, spirits, soap, sugar, 
cooking oil, etc.). Border police is involved in some 
cases. 
Taxable income/transactions 
are not reported or are 
underreported in accounts 
Several ledgers are often used, including one for 
taxation purposes that may show a deficit. Common 
within many businesses. 
Underreporting of turnover  Common within retail and wholesale sectors. 
Over-reporting of expenditures An accounting trick to reduce tax burden. 
Underreporting of the value of 
imports 
A general problem in imports of goods. 
Misclassification of goods  
 
Import goods with high tax and duty rates are 
classified as goods with lower rates. One example is 
the classification of alcoholic beverages as mineral 
water. May involve customs officers (see below). 
Goods in transit are sold on 
the domestic market 
 
Could involve many types of commodities. In some 
African countries it is a particularly big problem with 
respect to oil and petroleum products. In some cases 
customs officers and other civil servants are directly 
involved. 
Collusion between revenue officers and taxpayers 
Tax exemptions  
 
Involves the tax administration, the Ministry of 
Finance, and other public agencies, such as 
investment centres, which are in position to issue 
exemptions. In some cases, the taxpayer is not 
registered in the tax registers, but pays a lower tax 
‘privately‘ to tax collectors. 
VAT fraud  
 
Falsified claims for VAT refunds. Can occur with the 
help of collaborators within the tax administration. 
Goods in transit  
 
One way of evading tax is to report import goods as 
transit goods. Customs officers and importers work 
together occasionally. 
False classification of goods  Customs officers may be involved (see above). 
Underreporting value of goods 
 
To avoid pre-shipment inspection of goods before 
shipment from the export country, a common method 
is to split the goods into units which individually are 
worth less than the minimum required to trigger 
inspection. The goods are therefore exempted from 
pre-shipment inspection. 
Corruption without the direct involvement of taxpayers 
Extortion  
 
 
By taking advantage of taxpayers‘ incomplete 
knowledge of tax legislation, revenue officers 
threaten taxpayers to pay above rates. 
Embezzlement of collected 
revenue 
 
Revenue officers steal money collected. May take 
place with the collusion of bank employees and/or 
auditors within the tax administration. 
Fraud  Falsifying tax receipts is common. 
Corrupt inspectors/auditors  Internal auditing may be inefficient and corrupt. 
Exacerbates the problems of corruption since it 
undermines the credibility of the monitoring policy. 
 
Source: Fjeldstad, O.-H. (2005) Revenue Administration and Corruption. U4 Issue 
Paper. Bergen, Norway, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen 
Institute  
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Figure 5.5.18. Compliance Risk Management Process  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD (2004) Compliance Risk Management: Managing and Improving Tax 
Compliance Guidance Note Forum on Tax Administration Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs Compliance Sub-group, OECD Publishing, p.9. 
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Figure 5.5.19. Compliance Risk Management: Tax Compliance Model  
 
Factors influencing taxpayer behaviour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Source: OECD (2004) Compliance Risk Management: Managing and Improving Tax 
Compliance Guidance Note Forum on Tax Administration Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs Compliance Sub-group, OECD Publishing, p.41. 
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